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Volume XV

Bhedābheda and Dvaitādvaita Systems

Edited by
M.M. AGRAWAL
KARL H. POTTER

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION
(M. M. Agrawal)

What is Relation? Everything is determined to be true or false on the basis of direct experiences alone. Philosophy primarily explains different kinds of experiences. Every experience involves some kind of relation. That relation determines a cognition of it, which is an experience. Determinate experiences are made possible by relations. An abstract entity has no relation to anything. Relations determine facts. Hence, relations play a very important role in knowledge.

Every relation involves two terms, viz., a *pratiyogin* (counter-positive or referend) and an *anuyogin* (referent). The *pratiyogin* is that which "rests" on a substratum (or locus) and the *anuyogin* is that substratum.

In Buddhist philosophy relations are contingent reality, that is to say, no ultimate reality at all. Ultimate reality is unrelated; it is non-relative, it is the absolute. Relations are constructions of our imagination, they are nothing actual. The Indian realists, however, kept to the principle that relations are as real as the things related and that relations are perceived through the senses. Udyotakara says that the perception of the connection of an object with its mark is the first act of sense-perception from which inference proceeds. According to him this connection is perceived by the senses as well as the connected facts.

Dharmakīrti in the first stanza of his work *Sambandhaparīkṣā* states that relation necessarily involves dependence. Therefore, relations do not really exist in the sense of ultimate or independent reality. Vinītadeva, in another passage, states that the expressions "related to another", "dependent on another", "supported by another", "subject to another's will" are convertible. Causality, contact, inherence and opposition are not realities by themselves. There are no "possessors" of these relations otherwise than in imagination. A reality is always one reality. It cannot be single and double at the same time. Vācaspatimiśra quotes a Buddhist who remarks that these relations considered as objective realities are, as it

were, unfair dealers who buy goods without ever paying any equivalent. They indeed pretend to acquire perceptiveness, but possess no shape of their own which they could deliver to consciousness as a price for the acquisition of that perceptiveness. If a thing is a separate unity it must have a separate shape which it imparts to consciousness in the way of producing a representation. But a relation has no shape apart from the things related. Therefore, says Vinītadeva, a relation in the sense of dependence cannot be something objectively real. Neither can a relation be partially real, because to be partially real means nothing but to be real and non-real at the same time, since reality has no parts. What has parts can be real empirically, but not ultimately.[1]

Keśavamiśra defines a relation as follows: "A relation must be different from its relata, dependent on both, and single." (*sambandho hi sambandhibhyāṃ bhinnaḥ, ubhayāśritaḥ, ekaśca*),[2] as, for example, in the contact between a kettle-drum and a stick. The contact relation (*saṃyogasambandha*) is different from the kettle-drum and the stick because the kettle-drum and the stick are substances (*dravya*) and contact is a quality (*guṇa*) dependent on both, and is a single entity.

According to the Naiyāyikas a relation can be perceived. Vātsyāyana says that a relation is seen, i.e., perceived.[3] Similarly, Viśvanātha says that contact is an object of the eye[4] and the perception of inherence is due to the relation of

[1]Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*. Volume I, pp. 246-248.

[2]*Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśāvāmiśra, ed. by Visvesvara Siddhanta Siromani, Kashi Sanskrit Series 125, 1963, p. 122.

[3]*Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.15.

[4] *Kārīkāvalī* of Viśvanātha, ed. by C. S. Sarma (Darbhanga 1939), verse 54, p. 97.

attributiveness.[1]

Like Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas maintain that a relation is perceived.[2] Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Ślokavārttika,* interpreting the words *jñātasambandhasya*, says that they mean that a permanent relation, whether it be a case of co-existence (as in the case of the contiguity of the constellation of Kṛttikā with Rohiṇī where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the latter may be inferred) or a case of identity (as in the relation between a genus and a species), or a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and a third thing, which had been apprehended in a large number of cases, is perceived.[3] Sucaritamiśra in his *Kāśikā* on *Ślokavārttika* says that to indicate that relation is perceived it is said in *Ślokavārttika yadavastu lokaḥ pratipadyatesmin dvidhāpi tat śakyat eva vaktumiti.*[4]

In Śaṃkarite Advaita philosophy, all relations are purely conceptual and superimposed, because Śaṃkara holds that real existence (*paramārthasattā*) is one, whereas the phenomenal world is illusory, *vyāvahārika.* In this sense, no relations possess reality from the ultimate standpoint. So, relations such as cause and effect, etc. are held to be illusory (*vivarta*).

According to the Śaivas, the entire manifestation, whether subjective or objective, is due to the will of the universal self.

[1]Ibid., verse 61, p. 108. See also Tara Sankara Bhattacarya, "Relation according to the new school of Indian Logic (Navya-nyāya)", Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 2, part. IV, p. 392.

[2]*Śābarabhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.15.

[3]*Ślokavārttika* on *anumāṇā. Cf.* S. N. Dasgpta, *A History of Indian Philosophy,* Volume I, p. 187.

[4]*Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika* of Kumārilabhaṭṭa with the commentary *Kāśikā* of Sucāritamiśra. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 90, 99, 150; 1943, part III, p. 100.

Relation is nothing but a special category based on the general category–unity in multiplicity–involving two external realities. Because both the material and the subject that works on it are the manifestations of the ultimate, the relation naturally does not depend on the individual self, but ultimately depends on the universal self.[1]

Some Vedāntic schools such as those of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, etc., to establish the truth of the proposition that relations are real, recognize that each existent has a twofold aspect: one its causal state and the other its effectual state. Take for example the pot, the dish, etc., and the clay. The pot is different from the dish in nature and shape, but there is also non-difference so far as both are clay. They are thus both different and non-different from each other. In this manner both non-difference and difference are equally real, and so all relations are real.

II. Types of Relation

There are an indefinite number of relations in Indian philosophy. According to Naiyāyikas, the principal relations are contact (*saṃyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*). *Saṃyoga* is defined as the contact of two things that were first separate[2]; and therefore there can be no contact between two all-

[1]*Na kevalaṃ ca sambandhamayaikatāṣpārīpārīṃīṭṭāmāyāpṛāṃāṭṛa-paryavasāyi vastuprakāśanavyāpāraḥ yavaḍāṇāṇṭācīṇṃāyāśivāṭāva-bhāsaviśrāntaiva pratikṣaṇaṃ vastusaṃvitkriyā. Na ca saṃvidaḥ kramosti ekaivaikatraiva kṣaṇerthaprakāśanāt. Śaiva sambandhaśī-vatāmayameva svarūpamāviṣkarotityucyate. Sambandhasiddhi* of Utpaladeva (Srinagar 1921), p. 9.

[2]"*Aprāptāyāstu yā prāptīḥ saiva sāṃyoga īritaḥ.*" Bhāṣāpariccheda of Viśvanāṭha Pañcānana, ed. tr. by E. Roer (Bibliotheca Indica 8, p. 114.

pervading things which are never apart from each other.[1] For example, the tree is perceived through contact with the eye's rays. Inherence is an intimate or inseparable relation. Its blue col or cannot be separated from the blue lotus. Annambhaṭṭa[2] defines *samavāya* as an intimate relation between two things which are technically called *ayutasiddha. Ayutasiddha* means those things which have never existed in a separate condition without themselves being destroyed. *Ayutasiddha* things are limited number to (1) the component parts of a composite whole, (2) a quality (*guṇa*) and what is qualifies (*guṇin*); (3) a motion (*kriyā*) and what moves (*kriyāvān*), (4) an individual (*vyakti*) and a universal (*jāti*), and (5) an eternal substance (*nityadravya*) and its individuator (*viśeṣa*).

All these cases concern different aspects of the problem of the one and the many. But the Mādhva philosopher thinks they are not all aspects of the same type. Some of them concern the relationship between a substance and attribute, of a property-possessor (*dharmin*) to its multiple properties (*dharma*), while others provide an account of the plurality of the relations between a substance and other things, separate from some and yet in relation with others. These two aspects are considered in a distinct way by the Mādhva: the first is classed under the notion of what is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*), while the other is comprehended in the notion of difference (*bheda*) of real entities and divides them one from the others.

[1]*Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, ed. and tr. by Y. V. Athalye and M. R. Bodas (Poona 1963), pp. 164-165.

[2]*Nityasambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ ayutasiddhavṛttiḥ dvyayormadhye ekamavinaśyadaparāśītam evāvatiṣṭhate. tāvayutaisddhau/avaya-vāvayaviṇau gūṇaguṇinau, kriyākriyāvantau, jātivyakti viśeṣanitya-dravye ceti. Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa (Kasi 1939), pp. 130-131.

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III. Relation of *Bhedābheda.*

In the place of inherence the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins recognize the relation of difference-cum-identity (*tādātmya*). The relation of *tādātmya*, according to Bhāṭṭas, is not absolute identity as the Naiyāyikas take it to be, but it is identity in a relative sense, i.e., identity (*abheda*) compatible with difference (*bheda-sahiṣṇu*). Though difference and identity are ordinarily opposed to each other, yet they are taken by the Bhāṭṭas to be compatible with each other, on the ground that it is experience, after all, that determines the compatibility or incompatibility of two things and that experience warrants the recognition of difference, associated with identity, as forming the relation between *jāti* and *vyakti*. In the proposition "this is a horse" (*ayaṃ aśvaḥ*), for instance, "this" refers to a particular (*vyakti*) and "horse", according to the Bhāṭṭas, primarily refers to horseness (*aśvatva*), which is a universal (*jāti*). According to this view, in the judgment embodied in this proposition a *jāti* is equated with a *vyakti*. But this equation cannot be absolute as, in that case, the two words "this" and "horse" would turn out to be synonyms. Therefore the Bhāṭṭas argue that, on the strength of what is presented in cognition, a particular relation consisting in difference-cum-identity (*bhedābhedau)* should be recognized in the case of *jāti* and *vyakti*.[1]

In the philosophy of Nimbārka, a relation always presupposes difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*). When we say that the universe is non-different from Brahman, we do not mean thereby by non-difference absolute identity but simply that the universe is absolutely dependent on Brahman, which can have no existence and activity independently of Him, just as the thousand-rayed sun, having independent existence and activity in contrast to its own rays, is their soul and the rays are non-different from it. Thus, non-difference here means

[1]S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Madras 1951), pp. 30-31.

essential dependence and not absolute identity. The relation of identity is possible between two things when they are non-different in some way or other. No identity is possible between a cow and a horse. Again, identity is not possible in the case of a single horse as well. But there is a relation of identity between an effect and its cause, an attribute and its locus, a power and its possessor, i.e., only between two things which are both different and non-different. Otherwise, in accordance with the text "All this, verily is Brahman", the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, must be non-different from Brahman in nature, which is impossible.[1]

Thus, the non-difference is of the kind which is not in conflict with difference.[2] And difference means difference of nature. Thus, difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) in this relation are equally real and compatible with each other. There is no contradiction between difference and non-difference.

An objection may be raised here that there is contradiction in the co-existence (*sāmānādhikaraṇyavyāghātaḥ*) of difference and non-difference. The Naiyāyikas maintain that non-difference amounts to a negation of difference, and difference

[1]*Brahmasūtranimbārkabhāṣya* (*Vedāntaparijātasaurabha*) with *Vedāntakaustubha* of Śrīnīvāsācārya, *Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā* of Keśava Kāśmīri Bhaṭṭa and *Bhāvadīpikā* of Amolakaram Shastri, ed. and annotated by M. M. Agrawal (in four volumes) (Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan 2000), 4.1.3, Volume I, pp. 783-785.

[2]*Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā* of Puruṣoṭṭamācārya (Benares 1907), p. 91. Also *Tattvaprakāśikā* of Keśava Kāśmīri Bhaṭṭa, Commentary on *Gītā*, Hindi translation by Kalika Singh (Burdhwan 1935), p. 192

invariably involves total exclusion of identity.[1] It is clear that there is contradiction in the co-existence between difference and non-difference as in the case of a jar (*ghaṭa*) and the absence of jar (*ghaṭābhāva*). And again, they say that non-difference (*abheda*) is merely identity and that identity is in a relative sense compatible with difference (*bhedasahiṣṇu abheda*). Thus, to explain difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*), non-difference (*abheda*) is tenable but difference (*bheda*) is futile.

To remove this objection the Nimbārka school holds that, in difference and non-difference, difference cannot be the total exclusion of identity, since all things have Brahman as their selves (*brahmātmakatvāt*).[2] So, difference (*bheda*) is that which does not contradict things having Brahman for their selves, and this difference is the completion of different knowledge of different things and different things caused to be done (*tattadavastugatasvailakṣaṇyapratītaḥ vilakṣaṇakāryakāritāyāśca nirvāhakaḥ),* and is merely presence (*bhāva*) or absence (*abhāva*). Again, they say about non-difference (*abheda*) that non-difference is untenable as defined and that non-difference is merely absolute absence of that difference which invariably involves the total exclusion of identity, because non-difference is the relation of identity with Brahman only, which is not contradictory of difference but is compatible with difference as has already been shown. Thus, non-difference is the relation of identity with Brahman, and is compatible with difference. For example, it is true that an ear-ring is non-different from a bracelet as gold, but there is also difference in nature and shape simply on account of *kauṇḍalatva* and *kaṭakatva*. It is true that there is non-

[1]"*Tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākonyonyābhāvāḥ.*" *Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa, op. cit., p. 133.

[2]*Daśalokī* of Nimbārka (Benares 1907), Verse 7.

difference between the sun and its rays so far as brightness is concerned, but there is also a difference between the sun and its rays. Thus, there is no contradiction of co-existence in between di fference and non-difference; both are equally real and compatible.

The concept of the *bhedābheda* relation may be illustrated by the well-known example of a serpent and its coil.[1] The serpent is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the coil. The serpent is independent while the coil is dependent. On the one hand, this shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other hand, the existence and activity of the coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. This proves the non-difference of the two.

Hence, we may say that the relation of difference and non-difference is essentially an internal relation in the philosophy of Nimbārka, for in this system difference is compatible with non-difference, causation is not new creation but transformation to some extent as in the Sāṃkhya view, and all relations may be said to involve difference and non-difference in some sense.

IV. Types of *Bhedābheda.*

The above-discussed relation of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) may however exist between several types of things, as indicated by some illustration such as the serpent and its coil[2], the sun and its lustre,[3] and "an ocean consists of water, waves, bubbles, etc.". Four types of relation of difference and non-difference are mentioned by

[1]*Vedāntapārijātasaurabha* and *Vedāntakaustubha* II1.2.27.

[2]*Brahmasūtra* II1.2.27.

[3]Ibid., II1.2.28.

Sureśvarācārya in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika.*[1] These are the following:

(i) *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa,* a universal and the particulars, as for example horse-ness and the several individual horses. On this view Brahman (*parabrahman*) would be the basic or the most principal revealing itself in all existent things, the particulars and the *apara*-Brahman those existent things themselves.[2]

(ii) *Avasthāvat* and *avasthā*, substance and its modes. For instance, the waveless ocean manifests itself as waves and bubbles and yet maintains its self-identity. In the same way, *parabrahman* involves itself in the *aparabrahman* and yet is identical with itself.

(iii) *Kārya* and *kāraṇa,* cause and effect. For instance, threads (*tantu*) are a cause of cloth (*paṭa*) and cloth is the effect. Similarly, Brahman is the material cause of the universe and the universe is the effect. The universe arises from Brahman and returns to Brahman, so that the two are neither altogether different nor absolutely non-different but are both different and non-different. Thus, it is established that there is the relation of difference and non-difference between a cause and its effect.

(iv) *Bhāga* and *bhāgin,* the whole and its part. For example, a chariot-wheel and the nave, the circumference, etc. of that wheel. The wheel is the whole (*bhāgin*) and the nave, etc. are its parts (*bhāga*). In the same way, Brahman is the whole (*bhāgin*) of the *jīva*, and the *jīva* is a part (*bhāga*) of Brahman.

Prakāśātman maintains five types of relation of difference

[1]*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* of Śureśvara, Bombay, Anandasrama Sanskrit Series 1892-94, pp. 623-624.

[2]M. Hiriyanna, "Bhartṛprapañca - an old Vadāntin", *Proceedings and Transactions of Oriental Conference III* (Madras: 1924), Indian Antiquary 53, 1924.

and non-difference in his *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* instead of the above four. His five are:

(i) *Jāti* and *vyakti.* the universal and the particular. For example, blue and yellow things are naturally different in color, but are non-different so far as substance is concerned.

(ii) *Guṇa* and *guṇin,* a quality and its locus, for example a table and the shape and color, etc., of that table. Similarly, Brahman is the locus of the universe and the sentient and non-sentient universe is a quality of the Lord. There is the relation of difference and non-difference between the Lord and His attributes.

(iii) *Kārya* and *kāraṇa,* cause and effect, for example, a pot and its clay. Similarly, a self (*jīva*) is an effect of Brahman and Brahman is the cause of that self. So a self is both different and non-different from Brahman.

(iv) *Viśiṣṭasvarūpa,* qualified nature. For example, a pot, dishes, etc., are qualified forms of clay; thus clay is different from the pot, the dishes, etc. On the other hand, the clay is non-different from the pot and dishes, etc. because these forms are after all nothing but the clay. The same holds between *jīva* and Brahman. Brahman takes a special form when He becomes many, as selves; in this sense Brahman is different from the selves. But, on the other hand, Brahman is non-different from the selves, because the selves are after all nothing but Brahman.

(v) *Aṃśa* and *aṃśin,* the whole and the part, as for example the tree and its branches, etc. The same Brahman is the whole and the self is Its part. There is the relation of difference and non-difference between self and Brahman as part to whole.

V. The Origin and Development of Bhedābhedavāda.

The doctrine of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda-vāda*) goes back to Vedic times. The pre-Bādarāyaṇa thinkers like Āśmarathya and Auḍulominoffered a dualistic-cum-monistic interpretation of the Upaniṣadic passages and are referred to accordingly in the *Brahmasūtras*. Kāśakṛtsna is

interpreted by Śaṃkara as an exponent of non-dualism. But Śrīnivāsa, an immediate disciple of Nimbārka, and Śrīpati Paṇḍitācārya think that Kāśakṛtsna was an exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. Even in later ages Lakulīśa, Bhartṛprapañca, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa were supporters of this doctrine. And after that the doctrine of difference and non-difference was elaborated in the philosophy of Nimbārka, Śrīpati and Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya. Though the doctrine of difference and non-difference of Āśmarathya, Auḍulomin and Kāśakṛtsna is known from references only, and the same doctrine in the philosophers from Lakulīśa to Yādavaprakāśa has been almost lost, yet the doctrine of difference and non-difference of Nimbārka, Śrīpati and Śrīkṛṣṇacaitanya is living to this day. Thus, the development of the doctrine of difference and non-difference may be discussed in three stages for convenience.

FIRST STAGE

1.The Doctrine of Āśmarathya.[1] Sparks, being the effect of fire, are not absolutely different from fire, because they participate in the nature of fire; on the other hand they are not absolutely non-different from fire either, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from fire nor from each other. Hence the selves (*jīva*) are both different and non-different from Brahman. And again, just as in the case of the pot and the clay, being respectively the effect and the cause, there is undoubtedly primarily difference between them, but on the other hand there is also non-difference between them because the word "pot" refers to the clay as well, so, according to Āśmarathya, the self is also the effect of Brahman, who is the cause of all as the *śruti* says: "from whom, all these elements arise" (*yato va imāni bhūtāni jāyante*). Thus, these two are related as cause and effect. One being the cause and the other the effect, there is

[1]*Brahmasutra* 1.4.20

undoubtedly a primary difference between them. Being born from Brahman and so on, there is non-difference between them. There is thus a natural relation of difference and non-difference between the *jīva* and Brahman according to Āśmarathya.

2.The Doctrine of Auḍulomin.[1] Auḍulomin looks upon the difference and non-difference of the self from Brahman as due to different conditions. The *jīva* bound by the limiting adjuncts of body, senses and mind is different from Brahman; through knowledge and meditation it passes out of the body and becomes one with the highest Self. Auḍulomin admits the absolute difference between self and Brahman but asserts their unity when the self attains liberation[2], in accordance with two texts from the Upaniṣads. The first of these says that the *jīva*, after going out of this body, realizes its own nature and attains the higher light that is Brahman.[3] The second is: "As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their names and forms thus, a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine person, higher than high."[4] This shows that as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the self also, losing the name and form abiding in it, becomes united with the highest Person. On this view, there is the relation of difference between self and Brahman during the state of bondage (*baddhāvasthā*) of the self, and non-difference

[1]*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1.

[2]*Śaṃkarabhāṣya* 1.4.20.

[3]*Eṣa samprasādosmāccharīrātasamuthāya paraṃ jyotirūpasampādya svenarūpenābhinisampadyate. Chāndogyopaniṣad* VI2.12.3.

[4]*Yathā nadyaḥ syandamāṇāḥ samudre astaṃ gacchanti nāmarūpabihaya tathā vidvān puṇyāpāpād vimuktaḥ parātparaṃ pūruṣam upaiti, divyam. - Muṇḍakopaniṣad* II1.2.8.

during its state of liberation (*muktāvasthā*). Thus, there is the relation of difference and non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman.[1] Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmatī* on Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* and Bhāskara in his *Sūtrabhāṣya* quote from the Pāñcarātrikas: "Up to the moment of liberation being reached the *jīva* and Brahman are different. But the liberated *jīva* is no longer different from Brahman since there is no further cause of difference."

The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Auḍulomi is "*Satyabhedavāda*".[2]

3. The Doctrine of Kāśakṛtsna.[3] There is controversy over the question whether Kāśakṛtsna was an exponent of difference-cum-non-difference or of non-dualism. He is interpreted by Śaṃkara as an exponent of non-dualism, and is interpreted by Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa as an upholder of the "identity in difference" (*bhedābheda*) view in this regard. In fact, he has been interpreted by almost all commentators as supporting their different views and thus regarded as monistic, dualistic, dualistic-cum-monistic or qualified monistic, as is clear from the commentaries of Śaṃkara, Madhva, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha, Rāmānuja etc. But it appears that Kāśakṛtsna was an exponent of the doctrine of difference and non-difference, as is clear from the commentary of Śrīnivāsa, namely the *Vedāntakaustubha*.[4] Kāśakṛtsna is of the opinion that the *paramātman* dwells in the

[1]*Vedāntakaustubha* 1.4.21.

[2]*Vedāntasūtra with Śaṃkarabhāṣya,* English translation by George Thibaut. Sacred Books of the East 38, Volume I, on 1.4.20:, p. 278.

[3]*Brahmasūtra* 1.4.22.

[4]*Tadevam munitrayamatadvārā prasaṅgāt bhedābhedaprakāro bhāgavatā darśitaḥ. Vedāntakaustubha* on 1.4.22.

jīvātman who is controlled by Him, is his *niyamya*.[1] Thus there is a relation of difference and non-difference between the self and Brahman, as the object controlled as well as the controller. As declared by *śruti*: "He who dwelling in the self is other than the self who the self does not know, whose body is the *ātman*, He who rules over the self, He is your self, the inner controller of men, the self of all", etc. The controller, viz., the Lord, is denoted by a knower of the object controlled by Him, viz., the *jiva*.[2] And again, Śrīpati[3] interprets Kāśakṛtsna as abiding by the doctrine of *bhedābheda* which is declared by scriptural texts which, without being contradictory to each other, enunciate "*dvāsuparṇā*", etc., and other texts of the *bheda* doctrine as well as the *abheda* doctrine in "*tattvamasi*", etc., in other texts. In order to point out clearly the existence of *bheda* and *abheda* between the self and Brahman, Kāśakṛtsna here declares that all *śruti* texts purport to propound the underlying doctrine of *bhedābheda*. Therefore, the third doctrine, of *bhedābheda*, is the highest essential truth declared by all the scriptural texts, and so it must be understood. Hundreds of *śruti* texts declare that during *saṃsāra jīva* and Brahman are quite distinct from each other and separate; and that during liberation *abheda* is declared to be the established truth.

SECOND STAGE

1.The Doctrine of Lakulīśa. The Lakulīśapāśupata, a well-known dualistic-cum-monistic system propounded by Lakulīśa in the first half of the second century A.D. according to the inscriptional evidence of a Mathura pillar and the stone slab of

[1]Umesh Mishra, *Nimbārka School of Vedānta* (Allahabad 1963), p. 63.

[2]*Vedāntakaustubha* 1.4.22.

[3]*Śrīkāṛābhāṣyā* (Bangalore 1936), Volume II, p. 174

Somanātha, is based upon the five Vedic *mantras sadyojātaṃ prapadyāmi, vāmadevāya namaḥ, agnorebhyoth ghorebhya, tatpuruṣāya nidmahe and iśīnaḥ sarvavidyānām.*[1] These five *anuvākas* of the *Taittirīyāraṇyaka* are the basis of the Lakulīśa-Pāśupata system. Sāyaṇa in his interpretation of this text agrees that they refer to Śaivism in general, both as a religion and as a philosophy.

According to the Lakulīśa-Pāśupata there are five primary categories, viz. (i) *kāraṇa* or *pati*, (ii) *kārya* or *paśu*, (iii) *yoga*, (iv) *vidhi*,) and (v) *duḥkhānta*. Here it may be useful to discuss briefly the concept of the *kāraṇa* or *pati* and the concept of the *kārya* or *paśu*, to understand the doctrine of difference and non-difference as propounded by Lakulīśa.

(a) The words "*pati*", "*kāraṇa*" and "*brahman*" are synonymous. *Pati* is the cause of all effects, viz., *vidyā, kāla* and *paśu*.[2] He is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe. The universe springs up (*bhavodbhavaḥ*) from Brahman, as a sprout does from a seed. He is the cause of both the creation and the dissolution of the world. He bestows grace. He transcends all. He is playful. He is higher than the liberated. He has perfect powers of knowledge and action. They constitute his essential nature exactly as heat does that of fire. He inspires fear of the immortal deed in the bound *jīvas* and unites them with the merit and demerit of their deeds.[3].

(b) The effects (*kārya* or *paśu*) are controlled by the Lord or *pati* (*pāśanāt paśūn*). An effect, that which is dependent on something ulterior, is of three kinds: sentience, the insentient,

[1]*Pāśūpatasutra* (Trivandrum 1940), p. 55

[2]Ibid., pp. 56-58.

[3]Ibid.

and the sentient.[1]

(c) Relation between the cause (*pati* or *kāraṇa*) and the effect (*kārya*): There has been a great controversy over the question of the doctrine of causality in Indian philosophy. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy an effect is non-eternal (*asat*). But an effect according to Lakulīśa-Pāśupata is eternal (*sat*). Nor is the effect mere illusion, as the Advaitin asserts, for the Lakulīśa-Pāśupata is not monism, but dualism-cum-non-dualism. It holds that reality is not pure unity but unity in multiplicity and, therefore, that multiplicity according to it exists in unity just as do the stars in heaven. Creation is nothing more than the arrangement of what exists in another form (*vṛttilābha*). The triad of effects abides in His power, which constitutes His very being, the most essential nature, the principal attribute, the chief characteristic, *dharma*. There is no confused existence of one in the other (*vṛttisaṅkara*) between any cause and its effect, any more than there is of water with milk.[2] On the other hand, a cause and its effect are different, like the light of the eyes and that of the sun or of a lamp which illumines the object at the time of perception. He is all-pervading. But the pervasiveness of the different dependent categories of the "effect" is a limited nature. Each higher category pervades the lower. So, in the Lakulīśa-Pāśupata system, different effects do not have their existence in isolation from each other, like cells in a honey-comb; the pervaded and the pervading are to be seen differently, as water is grasped differently from the color that colors it.

Thus the cause and the effect exist together, but maintain their respective entities because of having different natures, though both of them are pervasive. The effect is as eternal as

[1]*Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* of Māḍhavācārya, English tr. by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough. Reprint of Benares 1961), p. 106.

[2]*Pāśupatasūtra* 58-60.

the cause. For a cause cannot be logically represented to be a cause without its effect, nor can a lord (*pati*) be spoken of as "a lord" without something to lord over. The effect has its existence in the cause as does a seed in the earth. The cause is free (*svatantra*) and the effect is "not-free" (*asvatantra*). The former is the *pati* and the latter is *paśu*. The one stands for *cit* and the other for both *cit* and *acit*.

Thus, the Lakulīśa-Pāśupata system is dependent on *satkāryavāda*, the existence of the effect in its cause. In creation the Lord is free. It has already been observed that according to Lakulīśa there is essential difference between the individual self and the highest self, between the cause and the effect, and between the sentient and the non-sentient. Though the cause (*pati*) and the effect (*paśu*) are mutually different, the effect, viz., *vidyā, kāla* and *rūpa*, has neither free being outside of *pati* nor equal superiority with the *pati*, yet the effect is dependent and "not-free" (*asvatantra*) because of its being carried on, created and effected by the *pati*. So the Lakulīśa-Pāśupata is a follower of the doctrine of difference and non-difference, because it holds that there is essentially difference between the cause and the effect but there is non-difference also, as the effect only exists in the cause. And again, the cause and the effect are non-different because the unmanifest state of the effect is known as *kāraṇa* and the manifest state of the cause is known as *kārya*. Thus there is the relation of difference and non-difference between a cause and its effect.[1]

2. The Doctrine of Bhartṛprapañca. Bhartṛprapañca is known from references only . None of his work is, at present, available. He wrote a commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* as

[1]K. C. Pandey, *Sarvadarśanabindu* (Benares *saṃvāṭ* 2021), pp. 35-36, 39-41 and 58. Alṣo K. C. Pandey, "An outline of Śaiva philosophy", in *Bhāṣkarī* (Lucknow: 1954), Volume III, pp. cxiii-cxvi, cxx-xxxvi.

Śaṃkara did; Bhartṛprapañca's commentary was even more voluminous than Śaṃkara's, and he was an old Vedāntin, anterior even to Śaṃkara.

To understand his doctrine of *bhedābheda* it will be helpful to discuss his concepts of Brahman, the *jīva* and the world. Bhartṛprapañca recognized, like Śaṃkara, that Brahman is both higher (*para*) and lower (*apara*). Brahman is both one and many, just as a cow is one as a substance, but its features, the dewlap, etc., are many.[1] Thus Brahman is different and non-different.

He does not say, as Śaṃkara does, that *jīva* or lower Brahman is a manifestation (*vivarta*) of the higher Brahman. And he does not say, as Bhāskara does, that the diversity of Brahman is adventitious. But he says that higher (*para*) and lower (*apara*) or the unity and diversity of Brahman are both real. Just as an ocean has unity as the cause of waves, foam and bubbles, etc., and has diversity as those effects, viz., waves, foam and bubbles etc.

Bhartṛprapāñca admits that Brahman evolves (*pariṇāmati*) but does not accept Śaṃkara's account of the manifestation of Brahman. According to Bhartṛprapañca Brahman transforms itself by its own creative urge into eight forms of the world plus *jīvas*. The eight forms are: (1) *antaryāmin*, (2) *sākṣin*, (3) *avyākṛta*, (4) *sūtra*, (5) *virāj*, (6) *devatā*, (7) *jāti* and (8) *piṇḍa*. Professor Hiriyanna says that these eight forms together with *jīva* may, according to Bhartṛprapañca, be divided into three *rāśis*, in which we have the three-fold subject-matter of all religion and philosophy, viz., Brahman (*paramātman*), self (*jīva*) and matter (*mūrtāmūrta*).

1. Brahman is the inner-ruler (*antaryāmin*) of all. So this *rāśi* is absolute Brahman.

2. A self or witness (*sākṣin*) is a real transformation of

[1]*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* of Śaṃkāṛā on 4.3.30.

Brahman.

3. There are six material forms of the world: (1) *avyākṛta*, an elementary substance from which all things were created, (2) *sūtra*, the adjunct of the logos, (3) *virāj*, the visible universe. (4) *devatā*, an organ of sense, (5) *jāti*, a class, and (6) *piṇḍa*, the body.

Bhartṛprapañca explains Brahman, *jīva* and the world's relation thus: There is no absolute difference between the three and there is no absolute non-difference (as there is according to Śaṃkara). The relation of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) between these three is obvious. To make it clear, in his *Bhāṣya* on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 5.1.1 Śaṃkara tells us that the one Brahman has got a dualistic as well as a non-dualistic aspect (*dvaitādvaitātmaka*). For example, the ocean consists of water, waves, foam, bubbles, etc. As the water is real and waves appear and disappear, but are a part of the ocean itself and are absolutely real, in the same way the dualistic world is absolutely real, it corresponds to the waves, etc. on the water, while the supreme Brahman stands for the ocean water and is absolutely real.[1]

Professor Hiriyanna says that it is difficult to determine which of these views was on the mind of Bhartṛprapañca. Otto Strauss[2] says that the types of relations indicated by *bhāgabhāgin* and *avasthāvatavasthā* appear to be the most usual. The relation of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇa*) has to be taken in the sense of transformation (*pariṇāma*), and the relation between a universal and a particular (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) cannot be employed directly on account of Brahman not being

[1]*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* with the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṃkara and the *Ṭippaṇa* of Ānandagiri, tr. E. Roer, Bibliotheca Indica 2, 1908, pp. 951-952.

[2]Otto Strauss, "*Jīva* and *paramātman*", D. R. Bhandarkar Volume (Calcutta: 1940), pp. 148, 150.

a universal property in the logical sense of the word. On the other hand, Professor P. N. Srinivasachari[1] says that according to Bhartṛprapañca the *sūtras* bring out this truth by means of the classical analogy of the snake and its coil and the sun and its radiance. The cause is, logically speaking, immanent in the effect. The whole pervades the part, and the universal is realized in and through the particulars. But the most adequate category of reality is the relation of substance and modes (*avasthāvat* and *avasthā*) in which there is a pervading identity that transfigures the parts.

3.The Doctrine of Bhāskara. Bhāskara wrote a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* in regard to the doctrine of difference and non-difference. This commentary is available (cf. work #4.1 of this Volume), and he belonged to the close of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A. D.[2]

To make his doctrine of difference and non-difference clear, Bhāskara accepts the three ultimate realities, viz., Brahman or the Lord (*īśvara*), *jīva*, and the world.

(i) Bhāskara holds Brahman to be the cause of the world, its creator, supporter and destroyer. Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. He is known only from scriptural authority.

In fact, for Bhāskara the world is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman. He does not accept the tradition of Sāṃkhya-Yoga which holds that the world is a transformation of *prakṛti* just as curd is a transformation or evolution of milk. Brahman possesses infinite power or energy (*śakti*) and makes his power undergo evolution, so that he can remain what he is.

[1]P. N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda* (Adyar: 1950), p. 152.

[2]*Bhāskarabhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras* Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 20 (Benares 1915), First edition, p. 7.

Pariṇāma is for Bhāskara the throwing out of energy (*śaktivikṣepa*).[1] According to Bhāskara Brahman has power of two kinds, viz., subjective and objective.

Brahman is both one and many. As cause it is one and as effects it is many, just as gold is one as material cause and many as bracelets, ear-rings etc. Thus Brahman is different-cum-non-different. The non-difference state is natural; the difference state is adventitious.[2] Brahman is true being, sentient, endless, blissful, omnipotent and omniscient.

(ii) The finite self or *jīva* is not a change (*vikāra*) in Brahman, for a *vikāra* is an actual change, in the way that the world is a *vikāra* of *prakṛti* according to the Sāṃkhya. It is essentially identical with Brahman, as sparks are with fire.

A self is atomic in size, and selves are innumerable. A self is a part (*aṃśa*) of Brahman. The term "*aṃśa*" is employed by Bhāskara in three senses. It may connote (i) the relation of a cause to its effect, as when thread is explained as an *aṃśa* or component of cloth; (ii) as a share in property to be divided; or, in the present context, (iii) as the principle of self-differentiation through a limitation (*upādhi*). As a part it is adventitious. It is not absolutely different from Brahman, but is related to Brahman both as different and non-different, just as the sparks are to the fire, as the five-fold breaths (*prāṇa*) are to air, and as aesthetic feeling (*kāma*) is to the mind. It is the agent of all deeds, but only so long as it is conditioned. It is the enjoyer of all results of deeds, pleasure and pain.

(iii) The world is the effect of Brahman. It is admitted by Bhāskara. Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient

[1]Ibid., pp. 85, 97.

[2]P. T. Raju, "Identity in difference in some Vedāntic systems", New Indian Antiquary 2, p. 105. Also, "*sa ca bhinnābhinnasvarūpa-bhinnarūpaṃ svābhāvikam upādhikam tu bhinnarūpam*", *Bhāskara-bhāṣya* I1.3.43, p. 141.

cause of the world. Bhāskara does not view the world as an illusion. According to him, it is real and eternal. The world is different and non-different from Brahman during the effected state, and it is non-different from Brahman during the causal state.

Bhāskara adopts the doctrine of difference and non-difference as the central truth of Vedānta, and this is the fundamental core of his doctrine. It is not correct to say that difference and non-difference are mutually contradictory. Nor should it be said that the two cannot co-exist. To avoid these objections Bhāskara says that everything depends on direct experience, both what is true and what is wrong in the world, so everything must be decided on the basis of direct experience. Nothing is seen to be absolutely different or absolutely non-different in the world of experience. Everything is different and non-different. For example, a cow is different from another cow as an individual, but non-different from it as belonging to the same genus cow. Again, a cow is different from a horse as a cow, but non-different from it being an animal. Similarly a gold ear-ring is different from a gold bracelet but non-different from it as gold. So direct experience is the only source which guarantees that difference and non-difference are not mutually contradictory and do co-exist.

Bhāskara says that there is no contradiction between the unity and the diversity of Brahman as cold and hot, because the relation of cold and hot is not that of cause and effect. But the relation between unity (Brahman) and diversity (the world) is that of cause and effect, so Brahman is both different and non-different from the world.

It has already been observed that the *jīva* is a transformation of Brahman through Its power. It is natural that that which is the effect of Brahman will be non-different from Brahman, because one effect arises from a cause and abides in that cause. Thus a self is non-different from Brahman. But a self is different and non-different from Brahman during the effect state of

Brahman (*kāryāvasthā*).

Thus it is established that the self and its world (*jīvajagat*) is non-different from Brahman during destruction and liberation. It is natural, Brahman being the cause, and the self and its world must be Brahman in nature and essence. That means that the non-difference of Brahman from a self and its world is natural (*svābhāvika*). But *jīva-jagat* is different and non-different from Brahman during the state of creation and *saṃsāra* (*bandhāvasthā*). Here, difference is adventitious (*aupādhika*), because at the beginning of creation the self becomes associated with obstrructions (*upādhi*).

4.The Doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa. Yādavaprakāśa is known from references only. Nothing much is known about Yādavaprakāśa and his philosophy. According to tradition, Yādavaprakāśa was a supporter of the doctrine of difference and non-difference. To establish that this was his doctrine there is no clear evidence because, though he wrote a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* this commentary is not at present available. His doctrine has generally been established on the basis of some critical references in works of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika. Rāmānuja criticizes the doctrine of Yādavaprakāśa in his *Vedārthasaṃgraha*. Vedānta Deśika devoted a brief chapter in his *Paramatabhaṅga* to a critical examination of the tenets of Bhāskara and Yādava.

According to the *Śrutaprakāśikā*, the gloss on the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmāṇuja written by Sudarśanabhaṭṭa, there is a relation of difference and non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman as cause and effect, as explained by Āśmarathya, and such is the view of Yādavaprakāśa, which is called there *svābhāvika-bhedābheda* ("natural difference and non-difference").[1]

[1]*ayaṃ yādavaprakāśa-pakṣo'smin sūtra upanyastaḥ/ tatra hi kāryātmanā kāryātmanā ca jīva-brahmaṇo bhedābhedau/ svābhāvikau matau. Śṛūtāpṛākāśīkā* of Sudarśana on the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja (Madras: 1967), Volume II on 1.4.20, p. 148.

Yādava tries to overcome the discrepancy with the concept of *brahmapariṇāma* or the theory of transformation of Brahman, by which the absolute which is the *sat* without a second by its own immanent potential energy becomes God and the universe of conscious and unconscious things (*cit* and *acit*) like the waves and ripples of the ocean. It proves that Brahman is the cause of the *cit* and *acit*, which are thus the effects of Brahman. In the view of Yādavaprakāśa, thus, there is a relation of difference and non-difference between these three ultimate realities as cause and effect, a relation which is natural (*svābhāvika*).

THIRD STAGE

1.The Doctrine of Nimbārka. In Nimbārka's view there are three ultimate realities, viz. Brahman, self (*jīva*) and world (*jagat*), and the relation between these three realities is difference and non-difference.

To understand his doctrine of difference and non-difference it may, therefore, be useful to say a few words about the concept of *jīva* the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), Brahman (*niyantā*) and the world (*acit, bhogya*) as propounded by Śrīnimbārkācārya.

(1) *Jīva* is knowledge by nature, dependent on Hari, is in a condition to be combined with or subtracted from a body, is atomic, different in different bodies, and is a knower and infinite.[2]

Jīva is knowledge by nature, knowledge being a peculiar quality of *jīva* which delights the entire body, just as the odor of a flower. It proves that a self is different from non-sentient.[1]

[2]*Daśaślokī* of Nimbārka, op. cit., Verse 1.

[2]*Vedāntaparijātasaurabha* 2.3.126.

The *jīva*, being knowledge, is knower as well.[1] There is no contradiction[2] between knowledge and knower, and no identity with each other. In many cases, we see, the locus and the thing located there are very similar, but that does not mean that they are identical. Just as a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet there is no identity; they are different and they stand in the relation of property-possessor and property.

A self, being a knower, is an ego or "I" (*aham*). A knower always feels "I know", "I want", "I do", etc. A *jīva*, being an ego, is a doer, enjoyer, under the control of Brahman and a part of Brahman, atomic in size; all these things are true in bondage as well as in liberation.[3]

Jīvas are infinite in number. The *Brahmasūtra* states that *jīvas* are many, Brahman is one; this proves thedifference between self and Brahman.[4]

The *jīva* is of two kinds: (1) bound (*baddha*) and (2) free (*mukta*).

(2) Nimbārka has given the following characteristics of Brahman in his *Daśaślokī* (verse 4): "We meditate on the supreme Brahman, viz., Kṛṣṇa, Hari, who has eyes like the lotus, who naturally has destroyed all defects, is the store of all auspicious attributes, his body being represented by the *vyūha*, and who is attended by all."

Thus, according to Nimbārka, the absolute ultimate reality is Śrīkṛṣṇa himself. He is denoted by the term "Brahman" who is greatest of all because of his infinite, incomprehensible, inherent nature, attributes, powers and so on. He is the cause

[1]Ibid., 1.1.2, 1.3.5, 2.3.18.

[2]*Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā*, p. 4.

[3]*Vèdāntaparijātasaurabha* 2.3.19.32-40, 43.

[4]*Bhedavyapadeśāccānyaḥ* on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.22.

of the universe. Brahman alone is the cause of the creation and destruction of the universe. All names and forms arise from him and return to him. Brahman is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe. He is lord of all causes, he is controller of all, he is lord of all.[1]

(iii) The world (*acit* or *jagat*) is of three kinds, viz., (1) *aprākṛta*, not derived from *prakṛti*; (2) *prākṛta*, derived from *prakṛti*; (3) *kāla*, time.

Prākṛta things are ordinary material objects; they consist of the three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva, rajas* and *tamas.*

The process of creation and destruction is as follows:[2] In creation first space originates from the Lord, from space air, from air fire, from fire water, and from water earth. But in every case Brahman (the Lord) is the real creator. In destruction the process is just the reverse of the process of creation, viz., first the earth is merged into water, water in fire, fire in air, air in space and space into the Lord, just as salt is merged in water.

In that process the world (*acit* or *jagat*) is the effect of Brahman. It arises from Brahman and abides in Brahman.

To explain the relation between the above-discussed three ultimate realities, Nimbārka adopts his doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (*svābhāvikabhedābheda*).

The mutual difference in the nature and concepts of Brahman, self and the world is obvious. It has already been observed that Brahman is the cause and the Its effect and there is an obvious difference between a cause and its effect, for example between the ocean and its waves, the sun and its luster.

There is a difference between a self and Brahman as

[1]*Vedāntapārijātasaurabha* 1.1.1; 1.1.10-12; 1.3.42; 1.4.23; *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.4.22.

[2]*Vedāntaparijātasaurabha* 2.3.1-14.

between a part and the whole. A self is a part of Brahman; Brahman is the whole.

Brahman is the object to be obtained while the self is the obtainer. Brahman is the object to be known and the object to be worshiped, while the self is the knower and worshiper. The mutual difference between them is obvious.[1]

There is this difference between self and Brahman, that Brahman is ever-free from all sins, while a self is an enjoyer of the results of all the deeds done by himself.

Again, Brahman is the inner-controller, while a self is not. Both the Kānvas as well as the Mādhyandinas depict *jīva* as different from the inner-controller, viz., Brahman.[2]

Thus, the mutual difference between the self and Brahman is natural and eternal.

On the other hand, the mutual difference between the world and Brahman is also obvious. Brahman is the cause, the world is the effect. Both cannot be identical. Brahman is omniscient and unlimited by time, space, and unit, while the world is inanimate and gross. Thus, the differences among the three are distinctly established, being natural and eternal.

In reality, there is non-difference between these three, established by scriptural authority. And it has already been observed that Brahman is the cause and selves and the world are effects. On the one hand, there is difference between cause and effect; on the other, there is non-difference between the two. For the effect is dependent on the cause for its activities and existence: though an ear-ring is different from a bracelet in name and shape, but it is non-different so far as their being gold is concerned. The ear-ring and the bracelet are dependent on gold for their existence and activities: in the absence of gold those activities and existences are impossible. In the same way,

[1]*Vedāntapārijātasaurabha* 2.1.13; 1.1.18; 1.2.12.

[2]Ibid., 1.2.8; 1.2.21

self and world are non-different from Brahman as effect and cause.

There is difference and non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman when the *jīva* is bound; on the other hand there is difference and non-difference between *jīva* and Brahman in the *jīva*'s liberated state also. A liberated self (*muktajīva*) is non-different from Brahman, being existence, consciousness, bliss in essence, but it, too, is different from Brahman, because the *jīva* is atomic in size in bondage as well as in liberation and even a liberated *jīva* lacks the powers of Brahman.[1]

In the very same manner, the world is different and non-different from Brahman during creation as well as during destruction.

In fact there is neither absolute difference nor absolute non-difference between these three, viz., Brahman, self and the world, but the relation between these three is both difference and non-difference. For example, while it is true that there is difference between the sun and its luster[2], there is non-difference so far as the brightness is concerned.

To make the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference clear as propounded by Nimbārka, the following example provides conclusive evidence: "But on account of the designation of both, like the case of the snake and its coil."[3] In this example the serpent is the material cause of the coil. On the one hand, this shows the difference between the serpent and its coil. On the other, the existence and activity of the coil is impossible in the absence of the serpent. This shows the non-difference between the serpent and its coil. Likewise, *jīva* and *jagat* are the effects of Brahman. The relation of the *jīva* and the

[1]*Vedāntakaustubha* 1.4.21

[2]*Vedntapārijatasaurabha* 3.2.28.

[3]Ibid., 3.2.27.

jagat, the effects, with Brahman, the cause, is natural difference and non-difference (*svābhāvikabhedābheda*). Thus it is established that there is such a relation among these three as propounded by Nimbārka; there is no contradiction.

(Other *bhedabhedavāda* authors belonging to this Third Stage include Śrīpati (1350?) and other proponents of Vīraśaiva philosophy, the system of Acintyabhedābheda founded by Caitanya (1520), Priyadāsa (1710), and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1780). Rāmānuja's system of Viśiṣṭādvaita can well be added to the list of Bhedābhedavādins . Future Volumes of this Encyclopedia will cover these authors and their works.)

VI. A Comparative Study of the Svābhāvikabhedābhedavāda with three other Bhedābhedavādas

1.*Svābhāvikabhedābhedavāda* and *Aupādhikabhedābheda-vāda.*

(i) Bhāskara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* throughout refers to the highest Reality as Brahman, and sometimes as *īśvara,* but Nimbārka along with Keśavakāśmīrin and his other followers call Him Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇa. Bhāskara does not speak of the consort of Brahman, as Nimbārka does in the form of Rādhā, as ever accompanying Brahman, i.e., Kṛṣṇa.[1] Here Bhāskara differs from Nimbārka.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds Brahman to be the cause of the world, its creator, supporter and destroyer. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. He is known only from scriptural authority.

In fact, for Bhāskara the world is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman. But he does not accept the tradition of Sāmkhya-Yoga according to which the world is a transformation of *prakṛti* in the way that curd is a transformation of milk. Brahman possesses infinite power or energy and makes that power undergo transformation, so that He can remain what He

[1]BSBhaskara 1.1.2-3; 1.1.12; VPS 1.1.1; VK 1.1.1; *Daśaślokī* verse 5.

is. Transformation is, for Bhāskara, the throwing out of energy (*śaktivikṣepa*)[1]. Here Nimbārka agrees with Bhāskara. Nimbārka also admits the *brahmakāraṇavāda* or *brahmaśaktikāraṇavāda,* i.e., that Brahman is the cause of the world.

Brahman, according to Bhāskara, has two forms, as cause and as effect. The former is the real, original and natural form of Brahman, while the latter is due to limitations and is, as such, something adventitious, though real. But Nimbārka does not believe in any such sharp distinction between the two forms of Brahman. According to Nimbārka, Brahman has a causal form during the time of universal dissolution, but even in His causal form Brahman is not absolutely non-different or *nirviśeṣa,* a pure unity or identity, as Bhāskara holds. According to Bhāskara Brahman is an abstract unity in His causal form, with no internal differentiation, but becomes a concrete unity in his effect form, with the internal differences of the sentient and the non-sentient. But for Nimbārka Brahman is always *saviśeṣa* in the sense that He always has internal differences. The sentient and the non-sentient are never absolutely identical with Brahman, but always retain their own individuality and separateness even during liberation and dissolution. Nimbārka, in fact, does not think it necessary to note the causal form of Brahman separately from His form as effect, for the evident reason that he thinks that there is no fundamental distinction between them to require separate mention.

Like Nimbārka, according to Bhāskara although Brahman is a qualified being, yet the qualities of Brahman do not involve any difference in His own nature. Never does Bhāskara directly refer to Brahman as the reservoir of all auspicious qualities, as Nimbārka repeatedly does. He throughout emphasizes only one quality of Brahman, viz., omniscience. Everywhere he refers to

[2]BSBhaskara 1.1.2; 1.111; 1.4.22; 1.11, 2.1.14; 1.4.25; VPS 1.4.26.

Brahman as omniscient and omnipotent.[1] Bhāskara, in fact, does not regard Brahman as a personal and embodied being as Nimbārka does.

Thus, although Bhāskara generally agrees with Nimbārka in holding the nature and qualities of Brahman as including that of being the universal cause, etc., yet there is a vital point of divergence between the two, in that Nimbārka does not regard Brahman as purely formless and distinction-less as Bhāskara does.

(ii) Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the *jīva* is by nature a knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and infinite. It is different and non-different from Brahman.[2]

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara is that the latter holds that although the *jīva* is the enjoyer, doer, atomic, infinite and different and non-different from Brahman, he is not *svābhāvika* and permanent (*nitya*), but adventitious and impermanent.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the self is the power of Brahman. Brahman has two powers, the power of what is experienced (*bhogyaśakti*) and the power of experiencing (*bhoktṛśakti*). The power of experiencing is transformed into the sentient self. As regards the different destinies and paths of the *jīva*, Bhāskara completely agrees with Nimbārka.

On the different states of the self, viz., dream (*svapna*), waking (*jāgrat*), etc. Bhāskara generally agrees with Nimbārka, only unlike Nimbārka he holds that what is found in the dream state (*svapnasṛṣṭi*) is not real and that it is created by the self and not by the Lord.[1]

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[1]BSBhāskara 3.2.23; 1.1.2; 1.1.11; VPS 1.11; 3.2.11

[2]BSBhāskara 2.3.18; 2.3.33-39, 1.1.17; 1.2.8; 1.3.7; 2.1.22; 2.3.19-28; 1.4.21; 2.2.37; 1.1.17; 1.2.6; 1.2.20

[2]BSBhāskara 2.1.27.

(iii) Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the world is the effect of Brahman. Brahman's power of what is experienced is transformed into the non-sentient world. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. Like Śaṃkara, Bhāskara does not accept the world as illusory, but in agreement with Nimbārka he says that the world is real and everlasting.[2] According to Bhāskara, as cause and effect the world is different and non-different from Brahman during the causal state. But according to Nimbārka, the non-sentient world can never discard its own nature and becomes sentient Brahman, and therefore the world is always different and non-different from Brahman during creation as well as dissolution.

Bhāskara also does not speak of the three kinds of beings–sentient, non-sentient, and time–like Nimbārka, but of the world alone. Here he differs from Nimbārka.

(iv) Bhāskara explains the relation between Brahman, the self and the world on the basis of his theory of limitations (*upādhi*). His theory may rightly be called *aupādhika-bhedābhedavāda* as distinguished from the doctrine of natural difference and non-difference (*svābhāvikabhedābhedavāda*) of Nimbārka.

As has already been observed, according to Bhāskara Brahman is the cause and the self and the world are Its effects. Being the effects of Brahman, the self and the world must be Brahman in nature and essence. During liberation and dissolution the self and the world are completely identical with Brahman.

Hence the non-difference between them is natural, permanent and real. But the difference between them, though neither natural nor eternal, is also real. It is not natural because prior to creation, as shown above, Brahman, self and world are absolutely identical, as well as during liberation and dissolution. So this difference is neither natural nor permanent

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[1]BSBhāskara 1.14; 2.2.14; 2.4.4.

but adventitious (*aupādhika*). At the beginning of creation self and world come to be associated with their *upādhis*. So they are different from Brahman. Thus, the non-different is natural, permanent and real but difference is only real; it is neither natural nor eternal but only adventitious.

But for Nimbārka, the self and world are different and non-different from Brahman in bondage and creation as well as in liberation and dissolution. Again, the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Bhāskara, because both regard difference and non-difference as real. But, for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference are on the same level; they have the same importance; both are equally natural, while for Bhāskara difference is due to limitations and non-difference is natural. In this manner Bhāskara fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

2.*Svābhāvikabhedābhedavāda* and *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda.*

(i) According to Rāmānuja, the highest Reality is Viṣṇu, a personal God, endowed with all auspicious qualities and free from all defects. His concept of Brahman is exactly like that of Nimbārka, except that Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Kṛṣṇa.

(ii) Like Nimbārka, Rāmānuja holds that a *jīva* is knowledge by nature, knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and so on. Here also Rāmānuja perfectly agrees with Nimbārka. But while according to Nimbārka *jīva* is a part of Brahma in the sense of being His *śakti*,[1] according to Rāmānuja he is Brahman's qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). The same applies to the non-sentient substance too. Like Nimbārka, Rāmānuja speaks of three kinds of non-sentients, viz., *prakṛti, kāla* and *śuddhatattva.* The last of these corresponds to Nimbārka's *aprākṛta.*

(iii) Rāmānuja explains the relation between Brahman, the self and the world on the analogy of substance-attribute (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇatā*) or self-body (*śarīrīśarīrasambandha*). But Nimbārka explains his doctrine, as has already been observed

[1]VKP 2.3.42.

on the analogy of the cause-effect relation. And again, the doctrine of Nimbārka has much in common with that of Rāmānuja. Both regard the difference as well as the non-difference as real. But for Nimbārka, difference and non-difference are on the same level. They co-exist and have the same importance. But for Rāmānuja, non-difference is the principal one. It is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it.[1]

3. *Svābhāvikabhedābheda* and *Śaivaviśiṣṭādvaitavāda.*

(1) According to Śrīkaṇṭha, the highest Reality is Śiva himself. He is denoted by the term "Brahman". He is variously known as Bhāva, Sarva, Paśupati, Mahādeva, Śambhu, Rudra, Nīlakaṇṭha, Trilocana, Umāpati, etc.[2] But according to Nimbārka, the highest Reality is Śrīkṛṣṇa Himself. Here Śrīkaṇṭha fundament-ally differs from Nimbārka.

Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.[3] Brahman is conceived as a personal God endowed with all auspicious attributes and powers and free from all faults, and he is supposed to form the material and efficient cause of the universe.

(ii) Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that *jīva* is by nature knowledge, knower, doer, enjoyer, atomic and infinite in bondage as well as in liberation. Here the two are in perfect agreement. But, while according to Nimbārka a self is a part of the Lord in the sense of being His power (*śakti*), according to Śrīkaṇṭha he is "part" in the sense of being His qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). The same remarks apply to the non-sentient substance also. Again, according to Nimbārka a self even when

[1]V. S. Ghate, *The Vedānta* (Poona 1960), p. 30.

[2]SBS 1.1.1; 1.1.21; 1.1.22.

[3]SBS 1.1.2; 1.1.5.

free is under the control of the Lord. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha the freed self is not under the control of the Lord, it is under the control of the Lord only during the state of mundane existence.[1]

Śrīkaṇṭha agrees with Nimbārka in regard to the different states of dream, deep sleep and waking. He also thinks that dream-objects are created by the Lord, that the Lord is the place of deep sleep and not the vein, and that the state of swoon is a distinct and peculiar state. As regard the different destinies and paths of the self Śrīkaṇṭha is in agreement with Nimbārka.[2]

(iii) Like Nimbārka Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the world is real and everlasting, a power of the Lord. According to him the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and non-sentient, is an effect or real transformation of the Lord, just as curd is of milk.[3] But he differs from Nimbārka on two points. First, he takes the world as an attribute of the Lord, which Nimbārka does not. Secondly, he does not speak of the *aprākṛta* and *kāla* as species of the non-sentient, as Nimbārka does.

(iv) Śrīkaṇṭha explains the relation between Brahman, self and world on the analogy of the self to the body, substance-attribute and cause-effect relations.

Like Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha thinks that there is both difference and non-difference between Brahman, self and world. But Śrīkaṇṭha says that the doctrine of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) is not tenable. He observes that no such doctrine of difference and non-difference is to be understood here, as we only establish the doctrine of non-

[1]SBS 2.3.19; 3.2.27-29; 2.3.33-39; 1.3.6; 3.2.13; 4.4.19; 2.1.22; 2.3.52; 2.3.40; 2.4.14.

[2]SBS 3.2.7-8; 3.2.10.

[3]SBS 1.4.9-10; 1.2.9; 1.4.27.

difference as qualified by difference (*viśiṣṭādvaita*).[1] According to him, the non-difference between Brahman, self and world simply means that the self and the world, the effect and the cause, the attribute and the substance, the body and the self. None of these can exist in the absence of the other, as is the case with a pot and clay. The self and the world can never exist without Brahman, while Brahman is never known to exist without His powers, viz., the self and the world, in the same way as fire is never seen without heat. If one thing cannot be known without another, then the first is qualified by the second. Hence it is said that Brahman is non-separable from, necessarily connected with, the self and the world. On the other hand the difference between the three also is natural, since the cause is non-different from the effect in nature and superior to it. Hence Śrīkaṇṭha calls his doctrine *Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita*, viz., the doctrine that Śiva, possessing the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient as His body, is one without a second, and is both the cause and the effect.

Thus the doctrine of Nimbārka has very much in common with that of Śrīkaṇṭha. Both of them regard difference as well as non-difference as real. But for Nimbārka difference and non-difference are on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance. But for Śrīkaṇṭha (as for Rāmānuja) non-difference is the main principle. It is qualified by difference, which is thus subordinate to it.

[4]*bhedābhedakalpanaṃ viśiṣṭādvaitaṃ sādhayāmaḥ*. SBS 2.1.22.

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS
(Arranged Chronologically)

1.BHARTṚPRAPAÑCA (550), Fragments

For our understanding of the identity and thought of this ancient figure we shall consult two articles by Mysore Hiriyanna, both published in the collections of his published articles which we refer to as IPS 1 and 2 respectively. The article on pp. 79-94 of IPS 1 is titled "Bhartṛprapañca: an old Vedāntin"; that on pp. 6-17 of IPS 2 "Fragments of Bhartṛprapañca". While it is tempting to reproduce both articles in their entirety here, it would occupy a good deal of space and presuppose an ability to read Sanskrit quotations, so we shall summarize.

As for Bhartṛprapañca's date, it is clear that he precedes Śaṃkara, who quotes him generously; cf. Hiriyanna's extracts (in the article in IPS 2, pp. 7-16) from Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika* with Ānandajñāna's (or Ānandagiri's) gloss and remarks in footnotes in both Hiriyanna's articles. On the basis of evidence available now it is impossible to say how much earlier a date for him is correct. Hiriyanna is certain that Bhartṛprapāñca wrote a commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*; indeed, he concludes from the extracts that Bhartṛprapañca commented on a different recension of the Upaniṣad, the Mādhyaṃdina recension, then did Śaṃkara in his own commentary on that Upaniṣad (cf. IPS 1, p. 79). Hiriyanna adds that Bhartṛpraprapañca appears to have commented on the *Īśopaniṣad*, and possibly on the *Brahmasūtras* as well, but these works are now lost. Thus our dating him to the sixth century is mere conjecture.

Hiriyanna gives accounts of aspects of what can be gleaned from the extracts and references in these various places in both of the two articles. We start with a brief one in IPS 1, pp. 6-7.

(a) Theoretical Teaching

"The doctrine of Bhartṛprapañca is monism and it is of the *bhedābheda* type. The relation between Brahman and the *jīva*, as that between Brahman and the world, is one of identity

[*abheda*] in difference [*bheda*]. An implication of this view is that both the *jīva* and the physical world evolve out of Brahman, so that the doctrine may be described as *Brahmapariṇāmavāda.* On the spiritual side, Brahman is transformed into the inner controller (*antaryāmin*) and the *jīva*; on the physical side, into *avyākrta, sūtra, virāj* and *devatā* which are all cosmic; and *jāti* and *piṇḍa* which are not cosmic. These are the *avasthās* or "modes" of Brahman and represent the eight classes into which the variety of the universe may be divided. They are again classified into three *rāśis–paramātmarāśi, jīvarāśi* and *mūrtāmūrtarāśi*, which correspond to the triple subject-matter of religion and philosophy, viz.,. God, soul and matter. Bhartṛprapañca recognized what is known as *pramāṇasamuccaya* [the confluence of instruments of knowledge] by which it follows that the testimony of common experience [*bhoga*] is quite as valid are that of the Veda. The former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of unity (as taught in the Upaniṣads). Hence the ultimate Truth is dualism-cum-nondualism (*dvaitādvaita*).

(b) Practical Teaching

"*Mokṣa* or life's end is conceived as being achieved in two stages–the first leading to liberation (*apavarga*) where *saṃsāra* is overcome through the overcoming of *āsaṅga*; and the second, leading to Brahma-hood when identity with Brahman is realized through the dispelling of [ignorance] *avidyā*. The means of reaching either state is *jñānakarmasamuccaya* which is a corollary on the practical side to *pramāṇasamuccaya* on the theoretical side."

In the article in IPS 2 Hiriyanna is attempting to reconstruct Bhartṛprapañca's tenets from the references he has found in the works of Advaitins indicated above. We select from his remarks, in which "B" is, of course, Bhartṛprapañca.

"B. maintained like Śaṃkara that monism was the ultimate

teaching of the Upaniṣads. A conspicuous feature of the latter's doctrine is the distinction between a *para* or higher and an *apara* or lower Brahman. Bhartṛprapañca also appears to have recognized this distinction, but while Śaṃkara explains the lower Brahman as an appearance (*vivarta*) of the higher and therefore not of the same order of reality, Bhartṛprapañca regards them both as real (*sat, satya*) in the same sense. This is a difference of much philosophical significance and to it practically all the other important divergences between the two teachings are to be traced. According to Śaṃkara, the two Brahmans form, as it is put, a non-duality (*advaita*). The relation between them (*tādātmya*) is completely imaginary, it being a relation between things of different order of being. In Bhartṛprapañca's doctrine on the other hand the two things related being equally real, the relation also is real. But the things are not altogether disparate, so that the relation is not one of entire difference as between a pot and a piece of cloth. It is rather *bhedābheda* and the ultimate reality may therefore be described as an identity in difference."

Hiriyanna speculates on four illustrations that might be provided of things in Vedānta metaphysics that may display this relationship of *bhedābheda,* [viz.,] cause [*hetu]* and effect [*kārya*], substance [*dravya*] and its modes, whole [*avayavin*] and part [*avayava*], universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*), and says that "all four [of these] views were acceptable to Bhartṛprapañca. Whichever...may represent the actual fact, the view more commonly associated with B. is the second, viz.., substance and its modes, and he seems to have reduced the variety of the universe into eight "modes" of Brahman, viz., (1) inner controller , (2) *sākṣin,* (3) *avyākṛta*, (4) *sūtra*, (5) *virāj*, (6) *devatā*, (7) *jāti* and *(8) piṇḍa*, and goes on to explain each on pp. 82-84 of IPS 2.

"1. Inner controller:. This is the spiritual principle controlling everything from within as described in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* III.vii and is also sometimes termed

īśvara on that account. It is not Brahman in its pure state, but Brahman with its homogeneity somewhat disturbed preparatory to the creation (*sṛṣṭi*) that is to proceed from it.

"2. *Sākṣin*: This is the [witnessing, *sākṣin*] individual self [*jīva*] which is regarded as another and a much more heterogeneous modification of Brahman. It is otherwise termed *kṣetrajña* ('the conscious principle in the body') or *vijñānamaya* ('made of *vijñāna* or Brahman'). The *sākṣins* are either cosmic or individual according as they have a universal or a particular function to discharge. Hiraṇyagarbha and the deities like Āditya are cosmic; the rest, individual.

"3. *Avyākṛta*: This is the whole of the physical universe in its subtle or causal form. It may be viewed as the limitation (*upāḍhi*) of the inner controller. Together, they constitute the first transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman and the distinction between the two is sometimes overlooked.

"4-6. Of the next three 'modes', the first or *sūtra* springs from the *avyākṛta* and is the limitation of Hiraṇyagarbha, the highest (*parama*) cosmic soul. From this again the gross material, constituting the visible [*dṛśya*] universe, proceeds. That is *virāj*. It is well known that this cosmic soul is often described in the Upaniṣads as having for its sense-organs' '(*indriya*) various [deities] *devatās* through which its activity, which is the same as the life of the world, goes on. These *devatās*, because they correspond to our sense-organs, are sometimes so termed [corresponding to those organs]..

"7-8. Of the last two–*jāti* and *piṇḍa*–the meaning of the second is clear. It stands for the individual bodies, such as the human, from which as material cause no subsequent effects are produced. The meaning of the first term is not quite so certain. It cannot be however understood here in its Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense, as there can be no enduring universals in monistic Vedānta. It may stand for *ākṛti*, a familiar conception in ancient Indian philosophy, and denote types as distinguished from individuals. These numerous types and the still more numerous

individuals are all the creation of the *virāj*. In other words, we have here what is known as the *vyaṣṭisṛṣṭi* or 'secondary creation' in its double aspect of universal and particular.

"Thus on the whole Brahman may be said to evolve in two distinct lines–one (1-2) the spiritual and the other (3-8) the material (*mūrta*) which constitutes either the limitation or the environment of the spiritual.

"These eight forms together with Brahman according to Bhartṛprapañca may be divided into three *raśis*, for which we have the three-fold subject-matter of all religion and philosophy, viz., God, soul and matter.

"1.*Paramātmarāśi:* This is the highest, Brahman, and we have probably to include under this head the inner controller also, since it can be brought under neither of the remaining two *rāśis*.

"2. *Mūrtāmūrtarāśi*: This comprises the six material forms beginning with the *avyākṛta*...Its designation is derived from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II. iii where "material' (*mūrta*) and 'immaterial' (*amūrta*) are described as the two 'phases' of Brahman. Bhartṛprapañca understands these terms somewhat differently [from Śaṃkara]; '*amūrta*' means for him [Bhartṛprapañca] the *avyākṛta*, the source of the 'world and '*mūrta*', the last of the elements (*bhuta*) to evolve from it, viz., [earth] *pṛthivī*, the intermediate elements being describable secondarily as either *mūrta* or *amūrta*.

"3. *Jīvarāśi*: According to Śaṃkara this does not form an independent category, for the *jīva* according to him is only Brahman in disguise and is therefore already included in (1). But Bhartṛprapañca regards it as a real transformation of Brahman and therefore counts it as a third *rāśi*. The determining factor of the *jīva* is its beginningless (*anādi*) [series of] *vāsanās* [traces]. These *vāsanās* are the characteristics, as in the Sāṃkhya, of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is evolved out of the *avyākṛta* and should therefore belong to (2). Bhartṛprapañca recognizes this; but at

the same time he consider that they are transmitted to the *jīva* with which the *antaḥkaraṇa* is associated and thereby transform it into a 'knower' (*jñātṛ*) and 'experiencer' (*bhoktṛ*). The transference to the self [*ātman*] of what really belongs to matter is accounted for on the analogy of fragrance which, though actually belonging to a flower, may be distilled into oil, for example. The individual self thus is a real, though temporary, transformation of Brahman and is not the result purely of a misconception as [it is] in Śaṃkara's Advaita. Bhartṛprapañca also recognizes ignorance like Śaṃkara: but it accounts only for the lapse of Brahman into the *jīva*-condition of finitude and not also for its worldly life or *saṃsāra*. Though springing from Brahman, ignorance does not affect the whole of it but only a part (*aṃśa*) which thereby comes to be cut off, as it were, from Brahman and forgets its identity with it. Ignorance has accordingly its abode in the *jīva* and not in Brahman. The *jīva* is thus the result of two conditions–one, ignorance, which delimits it (*paricchetrī*) and the other, *vāsanā* which modifies it (*vihartrī*). The second condition is sometimes stated as *āsaṅga* or 'attachment' since the *vāsanās* are eventually traceable to it...

"In contrast to Śaṃkara's view, "To him [i.e., to Bhartṛprapañca] both empirical and revealed knowledge (*jñāna*) are equally valid and in exactly the same sense. Perception not only gives diversity but also validates it; for noting that is properly ascertained by a *pramāṇa* can ever be otherwise than true. Moreover, the scripture (*śruti*) itself confirms the truth of diversity in such of its portions as describe creation. And it very properly emphasizes in its purely metaphysical portions the unity underlying it which we commonly miss. Bhartṛprapañca accordingly concludes that Brahman, the ultimate reality, should exhibit both the features and be a unity-in-diversity (*dvaitādvaita*)...

"According to all Vedāntins, *virakti* or 'detachment' is necessary before one qualifies for *mokṣa*. But while Śaṃkara

looks to *doṣadarśana* [seeing the defects] in the objects of our desire (*icchā*) as its means, Bhartṛprapañca considers that result [viz., detachment] as possible only through experience [*cit, cetana*].. It is only by learning through actual experience the real worth of all things that in one way or another minister to our desires that we can grow indifferent to them. This view is based upon a very ancient Indian theory known as *kāmaprakriyāṃsavāda*. The gradual exhaustion of *all* worldly enjoyment is obviously impossible, but there is another course open to us according to the Upaniṣads and that is by attaining to *sūtra*-hood and in that state participating in universal life. Nobody, according to Bhartṛprapañca, can acquire genuine *virakti* without reaching this state [viz.] *apavarga* or 'escape from *saṃsāra*', which Bhartṛprapañca viewed as distinct from *mokṣa* though on the way to it....Though the baleful influences of attachment, one of its two limiting factors [of ordinary experience], have then been overcome, the *jīva* has not yet realized its true nature, for ignorance, the other factor, persists separating it from Brahman. For accomplishing this further end of overcoming ignorance *[jñānakarma]samuccaya* again is necessary...

"A distinguishing feature of Śaṃkara's doctrine is that self-realization is attained *directly* through revealed texts like *tattvamasi* ['that art thou']...According to Bhatṛprapañca, and also according to all other Indian logicians, verbal statements, whether revealed or not, can never lead to immediate knowledge...Thus from the formula *tattvamasi* only mediate knowledge is possible; but it is not adequate to destroy our *immediate* belief in the truth of mere diversity until it also has been transformed into immediate knowledge. The means of doing this is constant meditation (termed *prasaṃkhyāna, bhāvanā, dhyāna,* etc.) upon it....If *bhāvanā* is thus necessary for securing *mokṣa* and if the need for it, which is a *kriyā*, i.e., something to be done, is known only through the scripture, the two *kāṇḍas* of the Veda are drawn together more closely here

than in Śaṃkara's Advaita. As in the *karmakāṇḍa* we find injunctions about sacrificial acts, so in the Upaniṣads we find, according to Bhartṛprapañca, injunctions about meditative acts."

2 NIMBĀRKA (750?)

For a long time little was known or even said about the identity and date of this ancient commentator. Recently, however, Madan Mohan Agrawal has written a number of books on Nimbārka, his works and his way of thinking, and has reviewed the scholarship on Nimbārka's date up to this point (cf. our Bibliography, Volume One of this Encyclopedia, for specifics). Rather than try to rehearse the history of scholarly guesses up to the present, we rely on Agrawal's summary, in the Introduction to his edition of Nimbārka's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (Agrawal 2000), in which he sums up that history and gives information about the most recent findings on those questions. Agrawal's conclusions are in keeping with those reported in the Introduction by R. V. Joshi to a previous work, Agrawal 1992.

The date of 750 A. D. is based on a number of considerations, not all of which we shall summarize here. After critically reviewing earlier estimates of Nimbārka's date Agrawal 2000 provides these "new points" (p. x ff.). Several references associate the early life of Nimbārka with the regions of Melkote and Paithan on the Godavari, and that he is associated with the period of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa kings of the middle of the eighth century. There is an inscription in an *agrahāra*, a village donated by a Rāṣṭrakūṭa king, concerning the instruction of a Nimbāditya-Prasāda by his wife. We know that Nimbārka and Nimbāditya are names of the same person.

A point often cited, though perhaps not determinative by itself, is that Śaṃkarācārya nowhere refers to Nimbārka (or even to Nimbārka's pupil Śrīnivāsācārya), and that neither of the latter refer to Śaṃkara, though Śaṃkara has a considerable section in his commentary refuting Bhedābhedavāda as found

in others by name and quotations, e.g., as we have seen, in Bhartṛprapañca.

A somewhat more complicated argument–at least suggestive–made by Agrawal (1992, p. xvi) is the following. "Bhāskara has not written his *Bhāṣya* on all those *Brahmasūtras* on which Nimbārka has written. We take as example the *sūtra Sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānādeva ca* (1.2.15). On this line Bhāskara writes:

> *ata eva tad Brahma iti sūtramanye paṭhanti tatpunar gatārtham. iti anyair nābhidhīyate.*

This line is very significant. This *sūtra* has not been accepted by Śaṃkarācārya. Rāmānujācārya has accepted it but has made a little change in the reading. Even Madhvācārya does not accept this *sūtra*. We know that Rāmānuja and Madhva both are post-Bhāskara *ācāryas*. Only Nimbārkācārya and Śrīnivāsācārya have accepted this *sūtra* with the *ānupūrvī* '*ata eva tad brahma*'. Therefore, it goes beyond doubt that Bhāskarācārya was quoting this *sūtra*, only keeping in mind Nimbārkācārya's reading."

Of Nimbārka's works only five clearly concern philosophy, corresponding to numbers 3.1-5 in the Table of Contents of the present Volume. But other works than those are ascribed to Nimbārka; we have listed those that might be considered philosophical works as 3.6 ff.

Yajneswar S. Shastri has written a chapter on Nimbarka in TV, pp. 276-305. Although he cites one of Agrawal's publications his account of Nimbārka's life and works make no reference to Agrawal's account referred to above. Shastri's article is useful for reviewing the state of scholarship on Nimbārka up to the date of his article's publication, which indicates a general lack of firm conclusions about Nimbārka's life and times. Shastri does, after an extended discussion, come to a tentative conclusion about Nimbārka's date that concurs with the one we have drawn here. Shastri also discusses at length the ascription to Nimbārka of some seven works (viz.,

Vedāntapārijātasaurabha, Daśaślokī, Prapannakalpavallī, Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī, Saviśeṣanirviśeṣaśrīkṛṣṇastavarāja, Rādhāṣṭaka, Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka and *Prātaḥsmaraṇastotra*), arguing against Nimbārka's authorship of any of them except the first.. A major part of his reasoning is that "[Firstly,] these works contain those doctrines such as surrender to the teacher (*prapatti, gurūpasatti*), Rādhākṛṣṇa worship, *premalakṣaṇā* devotion (*bhakti*) etc. which are not found or referred to in the *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha.* Nimbārka does not worship Rādhākṛṣṇa but rather Rāmakānta Puruṣottam or Bhagavān Vāsudeva, and he nowhere mentioned Rādhākṛṣṇa in his *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha.* Secondly, none of the earliest *ācāryas* or commentators of the Nimbārka school has mentioned them or commented upon them. Thirdly, all the sects developed within the Nimbārka tradition do not unanimously accept them as the works of Nimbārka..." (TV, pp. 281-282).

2.1 NIMBĀRKA, *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha (VPS)* on Badarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras*

Roma Bose , in VPSVK Volumes 1-2, translates this entire work. This is "T" in what follows. On p. 11 of Volume 3 she summarizes as follows: "This commentary is very condensed and its peculiarity is that unlike most of the commentaries [on the *Brahmasūtras*, we take it she means], it contains no attempt at refuting rival schools of thought, or at expounding at length the theory of the author himself. In it there are very few discussions and arguments, and the author is content with stating his case in as few words as possible in [the] course of explaining the word-meaning of the *sūtras* without ever entering into details of any sort. His language, too, is very simple, and just to the point. He quotes from the Upaniṣads, etc., the *Bhagavad-gītā,* the *Mahābhārata, Manusmṛti,* the *Purāṇas*, etc. in support of his case."

We provide here excerpts from Roma Chaudhuri Bose's translation. Many of the portions not set forth here consist of

quotations from various sources.

"E" is Agrawal 2000. Volume numbers are followed by pages, thus "1.1-2" indicates Volume 1, pp. 1-2. The work is numbered consecutively throughout the four volumes.

Translated by Roma Chaudhuri Bose

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER ONE

1.1.1 (E1.1-9; T1-2) "An inquiry is to be instituted, at all times, into the highest person–Ramā's husband, denoted by the term "Brahman", the highest of all because of His infinite, inconceivable and innate nature, qualities, powers (*śakti*) and so on–by one who has studied the Veda with its six parts; who has been assailed with doubt, arising from texts which teach the results of works are both transitory and permanent (*nitya*); who has, for that very reason, enquired into the science which is concerned with the consideration of religious duties and has, thereby, gained the knowledge determined therein regarding works, their kinds and their results; in whom, as a consequence, there arises a disregard (for worldly objects), that is the result of a discrimination between the finitude and permanence of the results of the knowledge of works and Brahman respectively, the former being surpassable, the latter non-surpassable; who wishes for the grace of the Lord; who is covetous of having a [vision] *darśana* of Him; to whom the spiritual preceptor is the only God (*iśvara*); who has whole-hearted devotion for the holy spiritual teacher (*guru*); and who is desirous of final release (*mukti*)–this is the sense of the introductory text.

1.1.2 (E1.48; T22) "...That very Lord–the locus [*āśraya*] of infinite attributes like omniscience, etc. and the ruler of Brahmā, Śiva, time (*kāla*) and the rest–from whom arise the origination, subsistence and dissolution 'of this', i.e, of the universe–endowed with manifold combinations, the abode of innumerable peculiarities of names (*nāman*) and forms (*ākāra*) and the like, and the form of which is inconceivable–is

Brahman, the content of the above statement (viz., 1.11).

1.1.3 (E1.59; T27) "...Of Whom 'scripture' alone is 'the source', i.e. the cause of knowing–that very reality, characterized as having the stated marks, is denoted by the term 'Brahman'.

1.1.4 (E1.66-70; T31-33) (Objection:) "Inasmuch as the entire Veda is concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta-texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of the agent (*kartṛ*), who is a part of sacrifices–just as the *arthavāda* texts are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive texts, by way of establishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have scripture as His sole proof?

"'That', i.e. Brahman alone, the content of inquiry and the cause of the universe, has scripture as His proof, and not action and the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him alone. (The word) '*samanvayāt*' is to be explained thus: '*Samanvaya*' means concordance in respect of the primary (*mukhya*) impact–on account of that...Or else, because there is concordance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone...

"It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to actions, since actions fulfil their purpose (*artha*) by simply giving rise to a desire for knowledge. To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their instruments; and is the giver of results. On the contrary, works themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting indirectly the rise of knowledge–which is a means to attaining Him–by way of generating a desire for knowledge...

(Objection:) "It being established in scripture that Brahman is not the content of the proof, viz. word, just as He is not the content of the proofs, viz. perception and the rest–Brahman has not scripture as his sole proof, .."

(Answer:) "Brahman, the content of inquiry, has scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an indirect concordance among the text concerning" various passage from the Upaniṣads, quoted..." [T]here is a direct concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to difference procedures, since the topics of all these different texts being equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their primary and literal sense...

"Moreover, we ask your worship: Do you or do you not mean that Brahman is the content of the statement 'Brahman is not a content of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence the object of inquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the self of all. All scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone–this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upanisads (viz. the Vedāntins).

1.1.5 (E1.76; T41) "But *pradhāna*, admitted by the Sāmkhyas, is 'non-scriptural', i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is 'not' the cause of the world, as in scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient being, is predicated of the cause of the world.

1.1.6 (E1.80; T44-45) "(Objection): As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects...e.g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said 'the bank is about to fall', or when referring to the

tilling of dry soil it is said 'tilling is awaiting rain', and we read in scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light...there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of *pradhāna* in the very same manner...[So,] The attribute of perception, belonging to *pradhāna*, is 'secondary'.

(Answer:) No...[T]he identity between the terms 'existent' (*sat*) and the rest denoting the non-sentient and bearing one sense and the term "*ātman*"' denoting the Supreme Self (Brahman) and bearing a different sense will be a contradiction, it being impossible for the term "self" denotative of the Supreme Lord to refer to *pradhāna*. Hence, to say that the perception is even metaphorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity (into them, the perception) on the part of water and light is not metaphorical...

1.1.7 (E1.82; T45) "As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brahman's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the meaning of the term 'existent, 'perceiver', 'self' and the rest–so *pradhāna* cannot be denoted by the terms 'existent' and 'self'.

1.1.8 (E1.83; T47-48) "That the non-sentient substance, taught by the term 'existent' and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as well as the purpose of the teaching, ought to have been pointed out by scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the absence (*abhāva*) of these two kinds of texts, *pradhāna* is not denoted by the terms 'existent' and the like.

1.1.9 (E1.84; T49) "Moreover, [since]...through the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all–the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not right.

1.1.10 (E1.84; T50) *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7.8.1 confirms that Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

1.1.11 (E1.85; T51) "As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is untenable.

1.1.1.2 (E1.85; T53) "Hence, the causality of the Universal

Lord–a sentient being, denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, omniscient, and the controller of all–being definitely stated in scripture, *pradhāna* can by no means be accepted as such a cause.

1.1.13 (E1.87; T'55) "'That which consists of bliss (*ānanda*)' is the Supreme Self alone, but not the individual self. Why? On account of the repetition (*abhyāsa*) (in scripture) of the word 'bliss' with reference to the Highest self.

1.1.14 (E1.90; T56) "If it be said that on account of the mention of (the suffix) '*mayat*' in the sense of modification, the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss, (we reply) No. Why: On account of the mention in *smṛti* of (the suffix) *mayat* as having the sense of 'abundance' as well.

1.1.15 (E1.92; T58) "On account of being the cause of the bliss of the individual self, the Highest Self alone is that which consists of bliss.

1.1.17 (E1.93; T60) "The qualities peculiar to the Lord, which are mentioned in scripture as relating to that which is signified by the term 'consisting of bliss' being 'inappropriate' on the part of anything else, 'the other', i.e. the individual self, is not signified by the term 'consisting of bliss'.

1.1.18 (E1.94; T61) "'On account of the designation of a difference' between the obtainer and the object obtained in the text (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7) the individual self is not that which consists of bliss.

1.1.19 (E1.96; T62) "If the individual self be admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, viz. on *pradhāna* which is an (object of) 'inference', just as a potter has to depend on clay and the rest in creating pots and the like. But the Highest Person, non-material, consisting of bliss and omnipotent, has to depend on nothing. Why? 'On account of desire', i.e. on account of intention, as declared by the scriptural text 'He desired: 'May I be many' (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6). Hence that which consists of bliss is different from that (viz., the individual self).

1.1.20 (E1.97; T64) "Scripture 'teaches' the 'union with that', i.e. the union with bliss" in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7. "Hence it is established that He, on attaining whom the individual self comes to be united with bliss, is different from it.

1.1.21 (E1.108; T67) "He who abides 'within' the sun and the eye is to be worshiped by one desiring salvation, is truly the Highest Self alone and not a particular individual self. Why? 'On account of the teaching of the qualities belonging to Him' alone, viz. qualities like 'freed from sins', 'being the Self of all' and so on.

1.1.22 (E1.112; T70) "The Highest Self is 'other' than the group of individual selves of the sun and the rest. Why? 'On account of the designation of difference' in the text 'abiding in the sun' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7.9) and to the difference of Brahman from the individual self, within which He abides, is established.

1.1.28 (E1.1.23; T80) (Objection:) "...First heaven is referred to as a 'locus', and then again, as a 'limit' , and there being such 'a difference of teaching', Brahman is 'not' recognized.

(Answer:) "No. Because there is no contradiction in both the cases, with regard to the oneness of Brahman...

1.1.29 (E1.1.24; T81) "In the text *Kauśītakyupaniṣad* 3.2 and so on the object denoted by the term 'vital breath' (*prāṇa*) and the rest is the Highest Self, because the qualities of highest auspiciousness, endlessness (*nityatva*) and so on are intelligible only if the Highest Self be understood.

1.1.30 (E1.1.25-126; T83) (Objection:) "The object denoted by the word 'vital-breath' and the rest cannot be Brahman...Because in the *Kauśītakyupaniṣad* 3.1 the very self of the [individual] speaker is taught.

(Answer:) "In this 'chapter' there is a multitude of references to the Highest Self. Hence , the object denoted by the words 'vital-breath', Indra and the rest is the Highest Self alone.

1.1.32 (E1.1.29; T87) (Objection:) "On account of the

characteristic marks of the individual self mentioned in *Kauśītakyupaniṣad* 3.1.3.8 Brahman is not referred to here."

(Answer:) "No, 'because of the threefoldness of the meditation' on Brahman, in accordance with the different grades of meditating devotees, viz. (meditation on Brahman) as the inner controller of the group of individual selves, as the inner controller of the non-sentient objects, and as different from them both..."

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER TWO

1.2.1 (E1.130; T91) In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.14.1-2 "the object which is to be meditated on as consisting of mind (*manas*) is to be understood as the Highest Self, the cause of all, and not as the individual self. Why? Because the Highest Self alone, celebrated in all the Vedānta, is taught in the above passages, viz. 'All this, verily, is Brahman'.

1.2.7 (E1.141; T100) (Objection:) "...On account of its having a small abode and as being itself small "(the object of meditation" in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.14.3 etc. "is not Brahman.

(Answer:) "Not so, because Brahman is to be meditated on in that way. Minuteness on the part of a great thing, however, fits in, as in [the] case[s] of a window and space.

1.2.8 (E1.142-143; T102-103) (Objection:) "Owing to His connection with all hearts 'there will follow experience' of pleasure and pain on the part of Brahman as on the part of the individual self.

(Answer): "No such objection can be raised, because there is an absolute difference between the individual self and Brahman, as the self is an experiencer of the results of the works done by itself, while Brahman is ever-free from sins.

1.2.9 (E1.143-144; T105) In *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.25 "the eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, 'on account of the comprehension (or taking, i.e. devouring)' of the good which has death for its condiment, i.e. of the universe...

1.2.11 (E1.146-147; T107) "...the two selves" in

Kaṭhopaniṣad 3.1 "entered into the cave should be known to be two sentient beings, viz. the individual self and the Supreme Self. Why: 'Because that is seen', i.e. because it is found that this section" of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* "designates the entering of these two alone" as seen in *Kaṭha* 2.12 and 4.7.

1.2.16 (E153; T115) reads "Also for that very reason, that is Brahman". (This *sūtra* is not found in the commentaries of Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva, notes Ms. Bose.) "Brahman alone is characterized by pleasure...on account also of the text", *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.10.5, "establishing their mutual specification.

1.2.18 (E1.157; T120) "That which is within the eye cannot be anyone 'other' than the Highest Self. Why? Because any one other than Him does not regularly abide therein; and because immortality and the rest are not possible on its part.

1.2.21 (E1.161; T125) "..The individual self is not the inner controller, because 'both' the Kāṇvas 'as well as' the Mādhyandinas depict 'it' 'as different' from the inner controller" (in Upaniṣadic passages quoted).

1.2.25 (E1.167; T132) "'Vaiśvānara' is the Highest Self alone, because that the word 'Vaiśvānara', though a common term, denoting (both) fire (*tejas*) and Brahman, is to be understood as implying Brahman here, follows from the fact that we know its 'distinctive attributes' through the designation of its parts, such as heaven as its head and so on.

1.2.27 (E1.170-171; T135) (Objection:) "Since the word 'Vaiśvānara' conventionally denotes the gastric fire, since there is the designation of a triad of fires, since it is mentioned as the abode of the offering to the vital breath, and since it is declared by scripture to be abiding within, Vaiśvānara is not the Highest Self, but the gastric fire."

(Answer:) "No, 'as' the Supreme Lord is 'taught to be viewed thus', i.e. in the gastric fire.; 'for' if the Supreme Lord be not understood here, then having heaven as the head and the rest is not possible; and it is declared by scripture to be a person–so

Vaiśvānara is none but the Highest Self.

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER THREE

1.3.6 (E 1.182; T148) "The Supreme Self being the topic, the individual self is not to be understood as the support of heaven, earth and the rest.

1.3.8 (E1,183; T150) "The Plenty, taught by the highest teacher, the venerable Sanatkumāra, to our preceptor, the reverend Nārada, in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7.22.1) is not the vital breath, but the Highest Persons. Why? 'Because of the teaching' of the Plenty as 'above' the vital breath.

1.3.12 (E1.193-194; T158-159) "Here, by the term 'imperishable' (*akṣara*) neither *pradhāna* nor the individual self can be understood. The Supreme Being alone is the meaning of the term 'imperishable'. Why? On account of the exclusion of another nature' in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.8.11.

1.3.14 (E1.198-199; T163) "The 'small' space, mentioned in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.1.1, can be the Highest Self alone. Why? 'On account of the what follows', i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, which are designated subsequently in the passage (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.1.3 etc.

1.3.19 (E1.206; T169-170) (Objection:) "From what is subsequent", i.e. from Prajāpati's statement referring to the individual self, the eight-fold qualities of freedom from sins and the rest are known to belong to the individual self as well, hence lit it alone be the small space."

(Answer:) "The Highest Self, endowed with the above-mentioned qualities and having His real nature ever manifested, is the 'small one'; but not the individual self, having its real nature manifest not always but only during release.

1.3.20 (E1.207; T172) "The reference to the individual self is for showing that the Supreme Self is the cause of the manifestation of the real nature of the individual self.

1.3.22 (E1.208; T173) ""And because of the imitation 'of that', i.e. of that which has its real nature ever manifest...the

individual self, the imitator cannot be the 'small one', having its real nature ever-manifest.

1.3.24 (E1.210; T175) "'What is measured', i.e. what is of the size of a thumb, is none but the Highest Person 'on account of the text', viz., *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.13.

1.3.25 (E1.211; T177) "The Lord can very well be of the size of merely a thumb 'in reference to the heart' of the worshiper. To the objection, viz., 'The size of the heart in animals being not fixed, how can Brahman be of the size of a thumb in reference to the heart?' the author replies 'because men (alone) are entitled (to scripture)'.

1.3.27 (E1.214; T181) (Objection:) "Since the worship (*pūjā*) of Brahman is not possible without a body [*śarīra*], their corporeality must surely be admitted. But if that be so, it will give rise to a 'contradiction with regard to works'."

(Answer:) "No such objection can arise. Why? 'Because of the observation of the assumption' simultaneously of many bodies even by one and the same deity.

1.3.28 (E1.215-217;T183) (Objection:) "If the corporeal-ity of the gods be admitted, a contradiction will result with regard to the Vedic words denoting them, as these words will become meaningless prior to the origin of the objects (viz. the gods) denoted by them and subsequent to their destruction.

(Answer:) "No such contradiction results, 'on account of the origin' of the objects (viz. the gods and the rest) 'from it', i.e. from the words alone denoting eternal (*nitya*) prototypes of forms and serving as reminders to the thought of Prajāpati in accordance with' scriptural and non-scriptural texts" (which are quoted).

1.3.30 (E1.218-219; T187) "Thus there is 'no contradic-tion even with regard to the resurrection" or the creation and destruction of the material world. Why? Because the objects which are to be created in the beginning (*ādi*) of each age have the same names and forms as those in the past ages, 'on account of perception' of scriptural texts such as

Ṛgveda.V.10.100.3 and *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 1.5.64.

1.3.34 (E1.224-227; T194-195) "It is not to be supposed on the ground that in the *Chāndogya*[*Upaniṣad*] the term '*śūdra*' is specified by a preceptor to one desirous of salvation that a *śūdra* is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Because of 'his', i.e. of Jānaśruti's desire for salvation, on hearing the disrespect-ful word used by the swan; and because of his hastening towards, for that reason, the preceptor at that very moment–'it is indicated' that his grief (*śoka*) had arisen and that was what was meant by the address '*śūdra*'...Jānaśruti was not a *śūdra*

11.3.35 (E1.227-228; T200-201) "On account of the reference to the purificatory rites of investiture with the holy thread in the section concerned with knowledge" (passages supporting this quoted) "a *śūdra* is not entitled to knowledge."

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER FOUR

1.4.1 (E1.239-240; T212) (Objection:) "In *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 3.11 'what is derived from inference', i.e., *pradhāna*, 'too' is found mentioned.

(Answer:) "No, because in accordance with *Kaṭhopani-ṣad* 3.3 the body, which is put down in the simile of the chariot, is understood by the term 'unmanifest' ['*avyakta*]...

1.4.2 (E1.245; T217) (Objection:) "The word 'unmanifest' denotes something subtle.

(Answer:) "...the body too, the meaning (of the term 'unmanifest') is a grosser state of something subtle indeed.

1.4.3 (E1.245; T218) "'*Pradhāna*', taught in the Upaniṣads, 'has a meaning on account of its dependence' on the Supreme Cause; while that admitted by others is meaningless; such is the distinction (between our *pradhāna* and that of others, viz. of the Sāṃkhyas).

1.4.4 (E1.246; T220) "The word 'unmanifest' does not denote *pradhāna* of the Tāntrikas (i.e. the Sāṃkhyas) 'also because of the absence of any statement of its being an object to be known'.

1.4.6 (E1.247-248; T221) "That in this Upaniṣad", viz. the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* "'there are statement as well as question about three',viz. the means, the end, and the realizing agent–is known from a consideration of the meaning of the prior and later texts. Here, there is no room for determining a principle which is derived from inference (viz. *pradhāna*).

1.4.7 (E1.252-253; T225) "Just as, although the word 'great' ('*mahat*') has been applied by the Sāṃkhyas to its second category called '*buddhi*' ('intellect'), yet it is found applied elsewhere as well in Vedic texts", examples given, "so the word 'unmanifest' may refer to the body.

1.4.10 (E1.257; T230) "No contradiction is involved in taking one and the same locus of qualities as unborn and having, at the same time, Brahman for its material cause. On account of the teaching of the creation of the universe from Brahman, the cause of the world and possessing subtle powers, both fit in, 'as in the case of the honey-meditation'.

1.4.11 (E1.260-261; T232-233) "...It is not to be said that the twenty-five principles, beginning with *pradhāna*, are based on scripture, so what dispute can there be regarding the knowability of one *pradhāna* from scripture? Why? 'On account of diversity', i.e. because the objects which are based on Brahman, established in scripture and denoted by the term 'in whom', are different from the objects established in the *tantra* (i.e. the Sāṃkhya-*smṛti*), since the former are found to have Brahman for their Self; 'and on account of the excess' of Brahman, the support, and likewise of space.

1.4.14 (E1.264; T237) "Omniscient and omnipotent Brahman alone is to be understood everywhere in the texts about the creation of space and the rest, because the very same Brahman is 'designated' in the characterization (*Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2 etc.) "'as the cause' of space and the rest.

1.4.20 (E1.280; T253) "To the question: Why, then, is there the beginning with the individual self? we reply: the fact that the Supreme Self is designated by a word (*śabda*) denoting the individual self–the latter being non-different from the former as His effect–is a convincing proof 'of the establishment of the initial proposition', viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. So Aśmarathya thinks.

1.4.21 (E1.281; T254) "On account of the union of the individual self, about to depart from the body, with Brahman, Brahman is denoted by a word denoting the individual self–so Auḍulomi thinks.

1.4.22 (E1.282-283; T255-256) "'On account of the abiding' of the Supreme Lord–celebrated in the passage 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 3.11.1.2) and so on–in the individual self as the controller, in the beginning and in what follows, by a term denoting the object to be controlled the controller is understood–so thinks Kāśakṛtsna.

1.4.23 (E1.286-288; T257) "'The material cause', as well as the efficient cause–indicated by the particle [*ca*] 'and' (in the *sūtra*)–is none but the Supreme Self" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.3-4 cited)."

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER ONE

2.1.1 (E2.303-304; T267) (Objection:): "There does exist a need for *smṛtis* for confirming scripture. Among these, the Sāṃkhya-*smṛti* is to be accepted. It is not to be said that it, designating as it does a non-sentient cause, is not to be accepted for that reason, –for, then, 'there will result the fault [*doṣa*] of leaving no room for *smṛti*."

(Answer:) "No, for then there will result the contradiction of other *smṛtis* which deal with a sentient cause mentioned in the Veda.

2.1.2 (E2.309; T272) "'And on account of the non-perception on the part of others', i.e. on the part of Manu and the rest, that the Veda is concerned with *pradhāna*, *smṛti* which is opposed to the Veda is unauthentic.

2.1.4 (E2.311; T274) (Objection:) The world has not Brahman as its material cause 'on account of difference'. And

the difference is to be known also 'from the text', etc. 'He became knowledge and non-knowledge'.

2.1.6 (E2.314; T278) (Answer:) "The word 'but' [in the *sūtra*] is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause on account of being different from Him is not tenable, since it 'is seen' that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles from the cow-dung, from which they are different...

2.1.7 (E2.315; T278-279) (Objection:) "If the effect be different from its material cause, it must be 'non-existent' prior to its origination.

(Answer): "No such objection can be raised, on account of there being a negation merely, in the previous *sūtra*, of the rule that there is a similarity between the material cause and its effect in every respect.

2.1.8 (E2.316; T280) (Objection:) "As at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) the cause, like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe is 'inconsistent'.

2.1.9 (E2.317; T281) (Answer:) "There is indeed no 'consequence of (becoming) like that'. Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman, also does not.

2.1.10 (E2.318; T282) "The Sāṃkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda, cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his own view as well.

2.1.11 (E2.318-319; T283) "On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion, since, if *pradhāna* and the rest be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning, then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally strong reasoning. As there will be the 'consequence of non-release thus also', owing to disagreement among the logicians,

so that alone which is mentioned in the Veda is acceptable...

2.1.13 (E2.323; T285) (Objection:) "If Brahman be the material cause, then Brahman Himself will become an experience of pleasures and pains in the form of the individual self, so that there will be no distinction between the experiencer (viz. the individual self) and the controller (viz. Brahman) as well-known from the Veda.

(Answer:) "In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the waves, and between the sun and its ray.

2.1.14 (E2.325; T288) "There is 'non-difference' between the effect and the cause, and not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts" (of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad,* e.g. '*tat tvam asi*').

2.1.15 (E2.354; T291) "There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because the effect is perceived only when the cause is existent.

2.1.17 (E2.360-361; T293) (Objection:) "'On account of the designation of what is non-existent' in" *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.19.1 "the effect does not exist prior to creation.

(Answer:) "'No, there is such a designation because of the subtleness (of the world prior to creation). (More *Chāndogya* passages cited.)

2.1.18 (E2.368; T296) "Just as a piece of cloth is at first rolled up and afterwards spread out, so is the universe.

2.1.19 (E2.369; T296-297) "Just as the vital breath, having the *prāṇa, apāna* and the rest controlled by breath exercises, etc. remains in its real form, and when the control removed is instantly known in those respective forms–so here too.

2.1.20 (E2.375; T297) (Objection:) "Since on the doctrine of the causality of Brahman the individual self is established to be Brahman" in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.5.9 "there result 'faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest' by reason of Brahman's creating the world, which is an abode of all miseries.

2.1.21 (E2.376; T299) (Answer:) "We hold that the creator

of the world is Brahman, who is 'something more' than, i.e. superior to, the embodied self, the experiencer of pleasure and pain. 'On account of the designation of difference' in" *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 14.6.7, 30) "there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Hence there cannot result the fault of not doing what is beneficial.

2.1.22 (E2.377; T300) "Like the diamond, the *lapis lazuli*, the ruby and the rest which are the modifications of the earth, the individual self, though non-different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it does, some peculiar qualities of its own.

2.1.23 (E2.377-378; T302) (Objection:) "'On account of the observation of collection" of many implements by potters and others, Brahman, who is without any external implement, is not the cause of the world."

(Answer:) "No, since Brahman transforms Himself 'like milk', possessing as He does powers peculiar to Him alone.

2.1.25 (E2.379-380; T305) (Objection:) "If Brahman be the material cause of the world, then if He be admitted to be without parts, there will be the 'consequence of the entire' (Brahman being transformed into the world); if possessed of parts, then the scriptural texts about His having no parts will be contradicted.

2.1.26 (E2.380-381; T 307) (Answer:) The answer to this "is based on scripture" passages such as 'He wished, 'May I be many' (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.6, etc. "itself–anything else has no basis to stand upon.

2.1.27 (E2.382; T310) "When various modifications are appropriate on the part of individual selves like gods and the rest, how can they possibly be inappropriate on the part of the omnipotent Lord of all, the cause of the universe?

2.1.28 (E2.383; T313) "Let our view stand. Since the faults mentioned by you rebound to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent.

2.1.30 (E2.385;T316) (Objection:) "On account of the

denial of His sense-organs in the text" *(Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.8) 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' "it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the creator of the world.

(Answer:) "The answer to this has already been given.

2.1.31 (E2.386; T317) (Objection:) "The Supreme Being who has all His desires permanently fulfilled is not an agent. Why? 'On account of the activity of an agent having a need'.

2.1.32 (E2.386; T318) (Answer:) "Such creation and the rest of the Supreme Being are like the mere sport (*līlā*) of kings and so on, well-known in ordinary life.

2.1.34 (E2.388; T320) (Objection) "Since the text" *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1: 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' "declares the 'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's dependence on the works does not fit in.

(Answer:) "No, as works exist even then, the works done by the individual selves in previous births being eternal. And prior creation 'fits in', as a sudden subsequent creation is unreasonable..."

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER TWO

2.2.1 (E2.391; T325) "*Pradhāna*, knowable through inference, is not the cause of the world. Why? 'On account also of the impossibility' of a varied 'arrangement' from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the objects to be created.

2.2.3 (E2.394-395; T329) (Objection:) "Like milk, etc., *pradhāna* acts for the origin and the rest of the world by itself.

(Answer:) "That 'there too' the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text 'Who abiding with water' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7.4).

2.2.4 (E2.395; T330) "*Pradhāna*, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not the cause of the world. Why? 'On account of the non-existence' of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not depend on anything else.

2.2.5 (E2.396; T331-332) "Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass and the rest, eaten by cows etc., become milk by themselves, so the unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of the intellect (*mahat*) and the rest.

2.2.7 (E2.398; T333) (Objection:) "Just as a blind man makes a lame man move, or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does *puruṣa* move *pradhāna*.

(Answer:) "In that case the assumption of the non-activity (of *puruṣa*) will be contradicted, and *pradhāna* being something to be instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world.

2.2.8 (E2.399; T335) "As it is impossible for the *guṇas*, which are in a state of equilibrium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i.e. the inferable *pradhāna*) is not the cause of the world.

2.2.10 (E2.400; T337) "The view of Kapila is 'inconsistent' because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements).

2.2.11 (E2.402; T338-339) "Since if they be possessed of parts, then there will result an infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them to be the producer of other evolutes–there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms (*aṇu, paramāṇu*); and there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these (binary compounds). Like this, everything admitted by the maintenance of the atomic view is inconsistent.

2.2.12 (E2.405; T341-342) "Because it is impossible for the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*) principle to inhere in the atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it, connected with the self, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms–thus 'even in both ways' the first motion of the atoms is not possible. 'Hence there is the absence' of the creation of the world through the successive

order of binary compounds and the rest, due to contact, which again is due to the motion of the atoms.

2.2.13 (E2.407; T343-344) "'On account of the admission of the relation of inherence' the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being absolutely different therefrom so the relation of inherence itself, too, is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects) being the same; that, too, by another relation, and so on–thus there will be an infinite regress.

2.2.14 (E2.409; T345) "If the atoms be active by nature, there being the existence of (permanent) activity there will result permanent creation; otherwise there will result permanent dissolution, and hence there is the absence of that (viz. creation).

2.2.16 (E2.411;T346) "If the atoms be possessed of more numerous qualities (*guṇa*), then the earth, water, fire and [air] *vāyu* will become similar. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities, then too all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each–this 'on account of fault in both ways', there is indeed the absence of that (viz. creation).

2.2.18 (E2.413; T348-349) "The author is refuting the view of Sugata [i.e., Buddhists].

"Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non-sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non-admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not possible.

2.2.21 (E2.423; T354) "On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non-existent, there must result the 'contradiction of the initial proposition', viz. that there is the origin of cognitions (*jñāna*) from four causes, viz. sense-organs,

light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present; and thus there must be 'simultaneousness' according to your view, who maintain the doctrine of momentariness!

2.2.22 (E2.424;T355) "There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction, because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series.

2.2.23 (E2.426; T357-358) "Because the series has no existence beyond the single members of the series. and because single members themselves are momentary, their view, viz. that liberation (*mokṣa*) is the cessation (*nivṛtti*) of ignorance, too, is inconsistent.

2.2.24 (E2.427; T359) "And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there is non-existence 'of space', and this is not reasonable 'on account of (its) non-distinction' from earth and the rest.

2.2.26 (E2.429;T360) "An entity (*bhāva*) does not arise from a non-entity, 'on account of non-observation'.

2.2.27 (E2.430; T361) "Otherwise, there may be the 'accomplishment' of ends like knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to any means.

2.2.30 (E2.434 ; T365) "Moreover, the 'existence' of past impressions [traces, *saṃskāra*] is admitted by you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not possible, since according to your view external objects are not perceived.

2.2.31 (E2.435; T366) "There is no existence of past impressions, 'on account of the momentariness' of their locus on your view.

2.2.32 (E2.435; T367) "The doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent 'in every way', being opposed by the evidence of direct perception and the rest.

2.2.33 (E2.437;T369) "The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason, because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and light.

2.2.34 (E2.442; T373) "'Thus' there must be incompleteness on the part of the self, assumed to be of the size of the body, when it attains a large body.

2.2.35 (E2.442; T374) "It cannot be said also that the self is possessed of parts which are subject to increase and decrease and hence there is no contradiction–for then there will result the faults of change and the rest (on the part of the self).

2.2.36 (E2.443;T374-375) (Objection:) "We admit that the 'final' size of the self is constant, and hence the initial and the intervening sizes too must be so.

(Answer:) "Then there must be 'non-distinction' everywhere, and hence the doctrine (that the self is of the) size of the body is set aside.

2.2.37 (E2.444;T376) "The Pāśupata doctrine is to be rejected, because it is opposed to the Vedic, which establishes a non-distinct efficient and material cause; and because it initiates a false faith.

2.2.38 (E2.446; T378) "'And on account of the impossibility of relation' between Paśupati, the instigator who is without a body, and *pradhāna* and the rest, to be instigated, Paśupati is not the cause of the world.

2.2.39 (E2.446; T379) "'On account of the impossibility' of a permanent body–since it is opposed to what is observed–as well as of a non-permanent one–since it arises later–Paśupati is not the cause of the world.

2.2.42 (E2.447; T382) "Since the origin of the world from *śakti* without *puruṣa* is impossible, the doctrine, too, which maintains it as the cause is not valid.

2.2.43 (E2.448; T383) (Objection:) "There is a connection (between *śakti* and *puruṣa*).

(Answer:) "No 'sense-organ' is possible on the part of *puruṣa* at that time.

2.2.44 (E2.448-449; T384) "If there be the existence of natural intelligence [*vijñāna*] and so on (on the part of *śakti*), what contradiction can there be in its being the cause of the world? The doctrine of *śakti* is set aside by itself through the admission of Brahman."

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER THREE

2.3.1 (E2.461; T389) (Objection:) "'Space' does 'not' originate. Why? Because in the *Chāndogya [Upaniṣad]* its origin is not mentioned.

2.3.2 (E2.462; T390) (Answer:) "In the *Taittirīyaka [Upaniṣad]* there is 'a text designating the origin of space', viz. 'From the Self space originated' (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1)

2.3.3 (E2.462; T390) (Objection:) "Because the origin of space, which is without parts, is impossible, and also because of the scriptural text 'the air and the atmosphere–this is mortal' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.3.3)–the text 'space originated' is metaphorical.

2.3.4 (E2.463; T391) (Objection continued) "But the same term 'originated' may be used in a metaphorical sense with reference to space, and in a literal sense with reference to the subsequent (elements), as in the case of 'Desire to inquire after Brahman by austerity, austerity is Brahman; (*Taittirīyopniṣad* 3.2).

2.3.5 (E2.463-464; T392) (Answer:) "'On account of the non-separation' of the mass of objects, beginning with space, from Brahman, there is no contradiction of the 'initial proposition', viz. that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one. But if space be something non-originated, then it must be outside the sphere of knowable objects, and thereby the initial proposition will be set aside. The non-separation of everything from Brahman is known 'from the scriptural text' such as *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.7.

2.3.6 (E2.465; T393-394) "It being established by the texts 'All this has that for its Self' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.7 etc.) and the rest that the entire expanse of the universe beginning with space has Brahman for its Self, it is definitely ascertained that space is an effect. Likewise, it is known that 'as far as there is effect' there is origin indeed. The non-mention of space and the mention of light and the rest as objects to be created in the text 'He created that light' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.3) fits in 'as in ordinary life'. In ordinary life, when referring to the group of Devadatta's sons the origin of some of them is mentioned, thereby the origin of all the rest is mentioned.

2.3.45 (E2.541; T439) "Though the individual self is a part of the Supreme Person, yet the whole (i.e. the Lord) does not experience pleasure and pain, but as 'light and the rest' are devoid of the virtue or vice inhering in their parts.

2.3.49 (E2.547; T444-445) "And the doctrines of an all-pervasive self and the rest of the opponents like Kapila and others are 'fallacies merely', since on those views there results a confusion (among *karmans* and so on of the selves)."

BOOK THREE, CHAPTER ONE

3.1.1 (E2.577-578; T475) "The object to be established (viz. Brahman) being definitely ascertained by means of concordance and non-contradiction, now the means (*sādhanas*) are being determined. Here with a view to generating dispassion, the author is, first, exhibiting the self's going [*gati*] to and returning from heaven and the rest. The individual self, having the stated marks and possessed of the vital-breath, discarding the present body, goes to another body as 'closely embraced' indeed by the subtle elements..."

BOOK THREE, CHAPTER TWO

3.2.1 (E2.601-602; T506) "Thus, the course of transmigratory existence has been enunciated for the purpose of generating a dispassion for worldly objects on the part of the

individual self in the waking state. Now, the states of dream and the rest are being determined.

"Referring to the dream-state, scripture declares 'Now there are no chariots, no teams, no roads there. Then he creates chariots, teams and roads' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.3.10) and so on, the doubt being whether the creation of the chariots and the rest is due to the individual self or to Brahman.

(Objection:) "In the sphere of dreams the 'creation' of chariots and the rest is due to the individual self, 'because' scripture 'depicts: 'He creates, for he is the creator' (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.3.9).

3.2.3 (E2.603; T509) (Answer:) "...In the state of dreams, the group of effects like chariots and the rest is made by the supreme Lord alone, possessed of true resolves (*saṃkalpa*) and omniscient–since such wonderful objects are not indeed made by the individual self, its attributes of having true resolves and the rest being not 'fully manifest' during worldly life.

3.2.5 (E2.605; T513) "If the self be the maker of the dream-objects, then the attributes of having true resolves and the rest must surely be admitted on its part. But through the wish of the Supreme Lord in accordance with the deeds of the self, they remain 'hidden' during worldly life. From Him alone the self's bondage (*bandha*) and release (*mokṣa*) arise (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.16 cited).

3.2.12 (E2.613; T524-525) (Objection:) "Because of its connection with the body, the imperfections arising from the difference of states do indeed pertain to the individual self, though endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. Likewise, they may belong to the Highest as well.

(Answer:) "No, because nowhere is there any text designating imperfections on the part of the Inner Controller; on the contrary, there are texts about His immortality" (e.g., *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7.3. etc.)

3.2.22 (E2.621-622; T541) "On the doubt, viz. whether the text '*neti neti*' denies the corporeal and the incorporeal forms

mentioned previously in the passage [2.3.1 of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad]* or denies simply Brahman's so-much-ness resulting from His connection with the previously mentioned forms.

(Objection:) It denies the forms of Brahman.

(Answer:) "It 'denies' only 'the so-much-ness resulting from what has been previously mentioned'. 'After that", 'once more' the concluding portion of the text says: 'For there is nothing higher than this–hence (it is called) 'not so' [viz. '*neti*'] (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.3.6).

3.2.25 (E2.627; T547) "Just as there is manifestation of the sun, fire and the like through the repetition of the means resorted to by those who long for them, so there is 'non-difference' in the case of Brahman too, i.e. there is 'manifestation' of Brahman. The sense is that the direct vision [*dṛṣṭi*] of Brahman results from the incessant repetition of the *sādhanas* or the means consisting in perfect meditation.

3.2.26 (E2.627-628; T550) "When the individual self directly intuits Brahman, it becomes similar to Him, in accordance with' [*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.3].

3.2.27 (E2.629; T551) "The view that the corporeal self and the incorporeal are never negated by scripture is being confirmed here. The universe, consisting of the corporeal and incorporeal, abides in its own cause, viz. Brahman, in a relation of unity-in-diversity, on account of the designation of both difference and non-difference 'like the case of the serpent and the coil'.

3.2.28 (E2.631; T554) "There is such a relation (of unity-in-diversity) between the individual self and the Highest Person as well–on account of the designation of both–as between light and its locus. Hence, it is not to be supposed that there is an absolute non-difference (between the two) on the ground of the *sūtra* 'Hence with the infinite' (*Brahmasūtra* 3.2.26)."

BOOK THREE, CHAPTER THREE

3.3.1 (E2.653; T575) "Although mentioned in many places, meditation is one only, 'On account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest'.

3.3.2 (E2.656; T577-578) (Objection:) "The content of meditation is not [always] the same; otherwise the same meditative science (*vidyā*) would not have been repeated in different scriptures. Hence the meditative sciences are different.

(Answer:) "No, because the repetition of one and the same meditative science is appropriate sometimes, because the readers are different, and sometimes for making the topic clear.

3.3.29 (E2.689; T632) "'There is meaning of the going' through the cessation, without distinction, of good and evil deeds. If the good deeds follow (the self), then immediately after the enjoyment of their results there must follow recurrence of births.

3.3.30 (E2.690; T635) "In spite of the decay of all the *karmans* of a worshiper of Brahman at the time of his separation from the body, the path (i.e. his going through the path of the gods) is 'appropriate'. Why? 'On account of finding things which are marks' of connection with the body and the rest, in the passages" [such as *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.3.4 and 7.25.1] "and so on, just as a royal servant attains mundane ends. The sense is that in spite of the decay (*kṣaya*) of all works and of the gross body he continues to retain the subtle body through the power of meditative science in order that he may go to a distinguished place. Immediately after his separation from that, the knower, having attained the form mentioned in scripture, comes to attain the nature of Brahman.

3.3.52 (E2.721; T693) "At the time of meditation the individual self is to be conceived of in its freed state, different from its worldly life,–since during release it is to become of that very form, just as one attains the Highest Self in accordance with meditation."

BOOK FOUR, CHAPTER TWO

4.2.7 (E2.806-807; T815) "The scriptural text" *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.6.6 "declares that a knower, too, departs from the body through a particular vein. This being so, the mode of a knower's departure (*gati*) up to the beginning of the path, i.e. till entering into the vein, is just 'the same' (as that of a non-knower). The scriptural declaration of 'the immortality' of the knower here and now" in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.7 "really means that a knower's prior sins are destroyed and subsequent sins do not attach to him any more, and not that his connection with sense-organs and the like is destroyed all at once."

BOOK FOUR, CHAPTER THREE

4.3.1 (E2.823-824; T835) "It should be known that there is only one path, viz. that beginning with light. Hence through it alone the knowers go." *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.15.5-6 and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 6.2.15 quoted.

2.2 .NIMBĀRKA, *Daśaślokī or Siddhāntaratna*

For a brief analysis see K. Dakshina Murthy, "Nimbārka and the Bhagavad-Gītā", in Gita-Samiksa pp. 75-86.

As noted above, Yajneswar S. Shastri doubts the ascription of this work to Nimbārka. "The *Daśaślokī*, also known as *Vedāntakāmadhenu* or *Siddhāntaratna* attributed to Nimbārka, occupies a prominent place in the Nimbārka tradition. It propagates Rādhākṛṣṇa worship, considers Śrīkṛṣṇa attended by Rādhā as the highest Brahman, advocates a special kind of love for Lord Kṛṣṇa as the chief means of liberation. Again, it refutes [the] Advaita of Śaṃkarācārya. Nimbārka nowhere mentioned Rādhākṛṣṇa by name in the entire *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*. His favorite God is Śrī Rāmakānta Puruṣottama, who is also called Bhagavān Vāsudeva, not Lord Kṛṣṇa. For Nimbārka, *brahmopāsanā* (meditation on Brahman) is the chief means of liberation to get the grace of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Nimbārka nowhere

refutes Advaita of Śaṃkara in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. If Nimbārka is [were] well aware of the Advaita of Śaṃkara, he would have refuted it in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* [i.e., the *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*] itself as he refuted the Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, Jaina, Pāśupata and Śākta systems. Even some of the scholars of the Nimbārka sect believe that Harivyāsadeva is the real author of the *Daśaślokī*. Thus, this work which advocates the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult is the work of the later period." (TV, p. 282).

Despite these arguments, since the work is regularly ascribed to (the) "Nimbārka" who authored the *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*, and since commentaries on it are likewise regularly included within the literature of his school, we have included it here, notwithstanding serious misgivings.

The translation below is found in Khurana, pp. 27-112. "T" references are to this work. "E" refers to the edition, with Giridhara Prapanna's commentary, by Dhundhiraja Sastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 358, 1927. Another translation is to be found in Agrawal 2000-, Volume 4, pp. 2ff.

Translated by Geeta Khurana

1 (E2; T29) "(The texts of revelation and the great sages) declare the soul to be in essence knowledge, as well as dependent on God, unitable with and separable from the body, infinitesimal indeed, distinct in each body, actively knowing and which they call 'eternal'.

2 (E8; T41) Through God's grace, however, [the followers of the Vedic tradition] know its [the self's] being to be indeed invested the less *māyā*. They must understand it to be in truth freed, devoted and bound, and to be particularized by numerous subdivisions.

3 (E9; T44) "The inconscient [*acetana*] is conceived to be immaterial [*aprākṛta*], material [*prākṛta*] and temporal in essence. [The material inconscient is] described by the terms

"*māyā*" and "*pradhāna*". And the distinctions of white [red and black, signifying matter's triple attributes] are also equally found in it.

4 (E12; T53) "By nature exclusive of all imperfection, on Kṛṣṇa let us meditate! On Kṛṣṇa, the Brahman, the Ultimate, the One mass of all noble qualities, the embodier of the Theophanies, the Supremely Desirable Being, Viṣṇu [The Remover of Sin], the Lotus-eyed!

5 (E14; T57) "At Kṛṣṇa's left, however, is Vṛṣabha's younger sister, all radiant with joy, endowed with a loveliness that reflects his nature, always surrounded by thousands of attendant maids, the Goddess gratifying every desire: let us always call her to mind!

6 (E19; T62) "Worshiped by men (seeking salvation] must Kṛṣṇa be, constantly and at all times, so that the influx of the darkness of ignorance may cease. This was declared by sages like Sanandana to the noble Nārada, witness to all the truth.

7 (E21-22; T67) "The knowledge of all things derived from the texts of revelation (*śruti*) and tradition (*smṛti*) is therefore wholly true, because it is in essence the Brahman itself. This is the belief of the knowers of the Vedas. But the triple nature of [the categories of the absolute or Brahman, the conscient or Soul, and the inconscient or matter] is also established by revelation and by Bādarāyaṇa's aphorisms.

8 (E26-27; T78) "No way can one perceive besides Kṛṣṇa's lotus feet, praised by gods like Brahmā and Śiva; besides Kṛṣṇa's forms, so agreeable to the fancy, and so quick to reveal themselves at the devotees' desires; and besides God's incomprehensible power and incomprehensible meaning..

9 (E31; T87) "His grace is born in one united with Himself through helplessness, whence grows a particular love for that great soul who has no one for His master. This is devotion of the highest kind; and there is another kind [of devotion], in essence a means to liberation.

10 (E35; T92) "These [then] are the five themes that the

good must meditate on: (1) the nature of the adored being [Kṛṣṇa]; (2) the nature of the adorer [the soul]; (3) the effect of God's grace; so (4) the supreme savor of devotion; and (5) the nature of the [two] factors hindering the realization (*siddhi*) of God."

Jaya Chemburkar, "Daśaślokī of Nimbārka", Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay 81, 2008, 34-36, offers this analysis of the author of the *Daśaślokī*'s ideas on devotion. Note the plethora of terms redolent of the so-called "*bhakti*-period", suggesting either that Nimbārka was not the author of this text or that the Nimbārka who wrote it is not the Nimbārka who wrote the *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha* or, if he is, he must be dated to a time-period rather later than we have dated him.

"2, 9, 10 Nimbārka depends on the grace of Kṛṣṇa which he believes generates devotion. But the grace of Kṛṣṇa appears to be conditional, it is not shown to any person. Kṛṣṇa's grace depends upon complete surrender on the part of the votary.

"5 The only striking feature of the devotion described by him is the introduction of the worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa.

"6, 8 As a Vaiṣṇava, Nimbārka laid down devotion as a means of liberation.

"9. His concept of devotion...lays down *smaraṇa, pūjā, śaraṇagati* and complete surrender as the modes of worship. He understands '*bhakti*' [as] connoting special love for *īśvara.*

"Nimbārka has described two categories (states) of devotion; the highest (*uttama*) devotion which is of the nature of special love (*prema-viśeṣalakṣaṇa*) and the other, secondary devotion or one which is instrumental (*sādhanarūpaka).*

"10 Nimbārka describes five categories as constituting his entire concept of devotion. He enjoins upon a votary the knowledge of the five things: (1) a devotee is required to know [the] following particular regarding the Supreme Being he wants to worship: He should know Kṛṣṇa as possessing a *body*

consisting of being (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss . ..dwelling in a cow-settlement, *vraja*, known as the celestial (*vyomapura*). He is a cause of all, merciful and gracious to his devotees. (2) a votary should also realize his own true nature. He should know that in comparison to the Lord he is minute like the size of an atom, but possessing knowledge and joy. He is different from the two bodies, viz., the gross and the subtle body. He has to understand that he is a servant of Kṛṣṇa.....(3) A votary should know that God's grace arises from self-surrender and giving up all actions except those in the service of God. (4) Feelings of *śānti* (serenity), *dāsya* (servitude), *sakhya* (friendliness), *vātsalya* (affection) and *aujjvalya* (love) are the means to devotion. (5) A votary should understand the things that create limitation to the attainment of God. These are as follows: (1) mistaking the body to be the soul, (2) depending on a person other than God and one's preceptor, (3) indifferent to the commands laid down in the sacred books, (4) worshiping Gods other than Kṛṣṇa, (5) not doing one's duties, ingratitude, wasting one's life in worthless pursuits, vilification of good men, etc.".

2.3 NIMBĀRKA, *Bhagavadgītā-Vākyārtha*

Lost, as far as we know.

2.4 NIMBĀRKA, *Prapatticintāmaṇi*

Again, this work seems to be lost

2.5 NIMBĀRKA, *Sadācāraprakāśa*

Also lost.

2.6 NIMBĀRKA, *Saviśeṣanirviśeṣaśrīkṛṣṇastavarāja*

VPSVK III, pp. 10-11, ascribes this to Nimbārka. But Y. S. Sastri in TV, p. 282, disputes the ascription: "[This work] cannot be the work of Nimbārka, because it contains refutation of Advaitic *nirguṇabrahmavāda*, *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda,* doctrine of

ignorance, and so on, which Nimbārka does not deal with in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Secondly, it contains polemics and sectarian controversies. Nimbārka *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha* is completely free from polemics and sectarianism. Thirdly, several follows of Nimbārka consider it a spurious work."

Khurana, pp. 120-125, provides a summary of this work. She calls attention to an edition of the work, with Puruṣottama Prasāda's commentary, in Benares Sanskrit Series No. 135, 136, 141, published in the Journal of Queen's College, Benares 1907-1908.

2.7 NIMBĀRKA, *Vedāntasiddhāntapradīpa*

Manuscript citation at L. 282611

2.8 NIMBARKA *Vedāntatattvabodha*

Mentioned by VPSVK III, p. 12 fn. 8, where we are referred to Oxf p. 297, Part 1; Oudh, mss. 1898, p. 42." However, Bhattacharya 1966, p. 290 is sure that this is a work of Anantarāma "as is evident from the title-page of the book". Yajneswar S. Shastri, in TV, does not even mention it as a work of Nimbārka's.

2.9 NIMBĀRKA (1250), *Ātmaparamātmatattvādarśa*

Edited. Neither Bose, VPSVK, nor Y. S. Shastri know of this work, and we have not been able to locate a copy of an edition from Vrndavan in 1934 by Amolaka Rama Shastri.

2.10 NIMBĀRKA, *Aitihyatattvarādhānta* (NCC 3, 89)

Bose in VPSVK III, p. 12, fn. 6 refers us to "Catalogus Catalogorum, pp. 14, 64, part 2; Report Bhandarkar 1894, p. 56.

3 ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA (780?)

Roma Bose at VPSVK III, pp. 66-67, says: "Śrīnivāsa was the immediate disciple of Nimbārka. Traditionally, he is supposed to be an incarnation of the Pāñcajanya, the Conch-shell of Viṣṇu (Śaṅkhāvatāra), and to have flourished when Vajranāma, the great-grandson of Kṛṣṇa was reigning in Mathurā. The fact is, however, that he can by no means be assigned to a very ancient date. At least, it is absolutely certain from internal evidence that he could not have flourished before Śaṃkara. If we assume that tradition is correct in making him Nimbārka's pupil he can be placed in the 9th-10th centuries.

"Śrīnivāsa is said to have [been] born in the hermitage of Nimbārka in the month of Māgha on the fifth day of the bright half of the moon. His father's name was Ācāryapāda and his mother's Lokamatī. Both of them were highly learned and pious. Tradition is that once Ācāryapada, out on a mission to conquer the whole world with his scholarship, accepted the hospitality of Nimbārka, but refused to take any refreshment as it was nearly sunset. Thereupon, Nimbārka made the setting sun linger over a Nimba tree in order to enable his guests to finish their meal. Ācāryapāda was so much struck with this extraordinary feat that he at once became a disciple of Nimbārka and continued to stay in the hermitage.

"It is said that Śrīnivāsa was taught all the scriptures by Nimbārka himself. Nimbārka dedicated his *Vedāntapārijāta-saurabha* to him, and also composed his *Daśaślokī* for him. Nimbārka, further, taught him eight verses in praise of Rādhā (*Rādhāṣṭaka*) and eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa (*Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka*) by reciting which, in accordance with his command, Śrīnivāsa, so the tradition goes, was able to have a distinct vision of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa.

"Śrīnivāsa traveled a good deal accompanied by his disciple Viśvācārya, preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion, and is said to have converted many people."

Bose credits Śrīnivāsa with several other works in addition

to the commentary on Nimbārka's *VPS*. None of them are of philosophical content and only one is known to exist now in manuscript.

However, Madan Mohan Agrawal, writing in Agrawal 2000, pp. xvii-xix, rejects Ms. Bose's dating. "Śrinivasa was the direct disciple of Nimbārka...Dr. Roma Bose and Joseph Satyanand placed him to post-Śaṃkara period. But it is absolutely certain from internal evidences that Śrīnivāsācārya was a pre-Śaṃkara *Bhāṣyakāra*. There are three main points on this:

"(i) Śrīnivāsācārya has not made allusion to the name of any *ācārya* and has not criticized the views of any *ācārya* like Nimbārka.

"(ii) Bhāskara has vehemently criticized the *Vedānta-kaustubha* of Śrīnivāsācārya. For example, [commenting on] *Brahmasūtra* I1.3.32: *Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo'nya-taraniyamo vānyathā,* [the] *Vedāntakaustubha* of Śrīnivāsācārya says *"Cetanabhūta-ātma-vibhutvavādimate doṣa-darśanārthaṃ sūtram idam"*, where Bhāskara's *Bhāṣya* remarks: *"Yat punar ātma-vibhutvavādīnāṃ doṣadarśanārthaṃ sūtram iti vyākhyātam, tad ayuktam. sarva-gatatve'pi śarīra-deśe bhogotpatteḥ karmanimittatvāt tasya.* Let us recall that Bhāskara also maintained like Śaṃkara that *ātman* is all-pervading (*vibhu*). He did not accept the doctrine of *jīvātma-aṇuparimāṇavāda* as propounded by Nimbārka. Although other Vaiṣṇava *ācāryas* maintained the *jīva-ātma-aṇuparimāṇavāda.[*, viz., the doctrine that the individual self is the size of an atom] all these were post-Śaṃkara *ācāryas*. Therefore, the above quoted lines of Bhāskara seem to refer to the *Vedāntakaustubha* because these lines are *in verbatum* the same.

"(iii) Finally, if we throw a glance on the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, we know that by whatever argument Bhāskara has refuted Śrīnivāsācārya, Rāmānuja has first refuted the same argument and then proceeded to refute the doctrine of all-pervading size (*vibhuparimāṇa*) as accepted by Śaṃkara and Bhāskara. This proves that Śrīnivāsācārya was a pre-Śaṃkara,

pre-Bhāskara and pre-Rāmānuja. A. P. Bhattacarya, Swami Vrajavallabha-Śaraṇa and Prof. R. V. Joshi also assign Śrīnivāsācārya to pre-Śaṃkara period. Their findings give additional support to the conclusion that Śrīnivāsācārya was a pre-Śaṃkara *Bhāṣya-kāra.*"

3.1 ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA (1290), *Vedāntakaustubha* on Nimbārka's *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*

Summarized by Karl H. Potter

"E" references are to the edition contained in Agrawal 2000. The work is translated by Roma Chaudhuri Bose in VPSVK I-II, which is our "T". It is a lengthy commentary, which we have attempted to summarize in what follows.

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER ONE

(E1.1-47; T2-18) 1.1.1 (Objection:) Since an inquiry into *dharma* is sufficient to satisfy our purpose, why inquire into Brahman?

(Answer:) The inquiry into *dharma* yields only results that are not everlasting: one needs to inquire into Brahman to get infinite bliss.

"Then" (in *sūtra* 1.1.1) implies only succession (*ānantarya*), not auspiciousness. "Brahman" here denotes the *śabdabrahman*, as indicated in *Maitryupaniṣad* V1.22, e.g. So "then the inquiry into Brahman" indicates that after one has understood properly the nature of actions (*karman*) one should then take up the present study. And "therefore" indicates that he who takes that study up has come to realize that the results of actions have a beginning and end (on the basis of many scriptural passages, quoted).

(Question:) Who takes up this inquiry?

(Answer:) One who is tired of karmic results and seeks the

vision [*darśana*] that he has heard promises liberation, who desires God's grace and approaches a proper teacher desiring such liberation.

This "Brahman" is none other than Lord Kṛṣṇa, the omniscient, omnipotent cause and ruler of all, made known in many scriptural passages. And the "desire to know" Him is not what is enjoined; rather it is meditation, knowledge that is enjoined, being the means to the direct vision of God that constitutes liberation.

"Liberation" means coming to have God's nature when one's awareness of matter ceases.

(Question:) Who is one desiring liberation, and how is he bound?

(Answer:) There are three kinds of reality–Brahman, self (*jīva*) and *māyā*. The latter consists of the three *guṇas* and is the origin of the self's ignorance. The self is by nature a knower and an agent, self-aware, atomic in size, and there is a different self in each body. There are three kinds of selves: ever liberated, bound, and those once bond and now liberated.

Māyā is of three kinds: material, non-material and time. The locus of the three *guṇas* is matter. It is permanent but changeable. The *guṇas* are *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*; they transform matter into bodies, organs, mind, etc. The non-material is an insentient substance, occupying an abode quite other than matter's; it is what is referred to in texts as the region of Viṣṇu, the abode of Brahmā, heaven, beyond time, where the holiest ones go and do not return. Time is all-pervasive and eternal; all material things are dependent on time. But though that is so, it is itself regulated by the Supreme Lord Kṛṣṇa, the creator, etc. who is what is means by the word "Brahman".

There are texts that teach the differences among these three, and other texts that teach their non-difference. Thus the correct view is that Brahman is both different and non-different from the material and non-material.

(E1.47-59; T23-26) 1.1.2 The origination, subsistence, dissolution and liberation of the world comes from Brahman, Lord Kṛṣṇa, the highest person. Thus He is the material and efficient cause of the universe. He is the material cause in that He manifests by His own natural powers the effects of those powers that are inherent in them. He is the efficient cause in that He provides the occasions for sentient beings together to experience their respective karmic maturations. A number of scriptural passages are quoted in support.

(E1.59-66; T27-31) 1.1.3 (Question:) Why can't we come to know Brahman by inference, as follows: Everything having parts has a cause, because everything having parts is an effect, like pots, etc. So we needn't continue this inquiry.

(Answer:) No. people do not know that things like space have a beginning and a cause, since one cannot come to know this without consulting the Vedas. The reason (*hetu*) in your inference is unestablished. And though people know that some things are effects and thus must have a cause, without consulting the Vedas they do not know that the entire universe is an effect.

Furthermore, Brahman cannot be known through perception, since the sense-organs cannot grasp Him, and so He cannot be known through inference either.

(E1.66-76; T34-41) 1.1.4 (Objection:) The entire Veda is concerned with action, on the authority of Jaimini. So how can Brahman have the Vedas as His proof?

(Answer:) Because the Vedas agree that their subject is Brahman.

(Objection:) There are only five kinds of texts in the Vedas: injunctions, prohibitions, supplementary texts, *mantras* and designatory texts (*nāmadheya*). So the first *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* says that *dharma* is to be inquired into, and the second *sūtra* says that the mark (*liṅga*) of that is scriptural injunctions–thus analyzing the Vedas into injunctions and prohibitions. Supplementary texts celebrate the subject-matter of these

injunctions and prohibitions, and likewise *mantras* help in the same way. Now those texts in the Vedas which seem not to be injunctive or proscriptive should be counted as *mantras* or supplementary texts so that they will not be rendered purposeless. For example, "that art thou" glorifies the god, the agent and the result of the sacrifice.

(Answer:) No, you made all this up. Sacrificial deeds are enjoined as productive of knowledge which in turn yields liberation. And that action is an aspect of knowledge is made clear in II1.4.26 below.

(Objection:) But *Āpastambhaśrautasūtra* VII1.11.1 says that actions have the same results as knowledge.

(Answer:) However, *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VII1.16, which tells us that the worlds produced by *karman* come to an end, has greater force than your text and is supported by many others (examples given).

(Objection:) Perhaps the Upaniṣads deal with Brahman, but the previous portion deals with actions, and so cannot concern Brahman.

(Answer:) No. The entire Veda is concerned with Brahman alone, though portions refer to action. They tell us about the difference of Brahman and beings, the non-difference of everything from Brahman, that Brahman is the creator, etc., that Brahman is unqualified by qualities produced by *māyā*, but that Brahman is qualified by the properties of a Lord. The texts that speak of the regular and occasional duties tell a person how to become purified and so ready for knowledge of Brahman; texts that speak of optional sacrificial duties give rise to a pure body that is ready for liberation. Even more simply, since everything has Brahman as its essence, all texts speaking of things refer basically to Him.

(E1.76-80; T41-43) 1.1.5 The Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* cannot be the cause of the world, since there is no scriptural authority for that.

(Objection:) Yes there is. For example, *Chāndogyopa-niṣad* V1.2.1 tells us that what exists was there in the beginning.

(Answer:) That text continues "He thought, 'May I be many...'", referring to the creator of the world. And a non-sentient *prakṛti* cannot have the power of thinking.

(Objection:) But it can have such power when it reflects the light of *puruṣa*.

(Answer:) Our explanation of this is logically simple. Furthermore, you admit that during dissolution *puruṣa* is not in connection with *prakṛti*.

(E1.87-90; T54-56) 1.1.13 (Objection:) *Taittirīyopaniṣad* II.5 identifies the embodied self (the *jīva*) consisting of bliss as what is to be purified. Now the Highest Self does not need purification, so that which consists of bliss must be the individual *jīva*, not Brahman.

(Answer:) But many scriptural texts speak of the Highest Self as consisting of bliss. And your point is not well-taken, since the Highest Self is within all as their controller and so the distinction is out of order.

(E1.124-125; T81-85) 1.1.29-30 (Objection:) In *Kauśītaky-upaniṣad* 3.2 it is Indra who says that He is breath. So "breath" refers to Indra, not Brahman.

(Answer:) But since this "breath' is equated with bliss and immorality, it is appropriate that Indra should think that he is everything just like breath, i.e., Brahman. Since there are many references so what is above the individual self, it is appropriate to interpret it as referring to the Highest Self.

BOOK ONE; CHAPTER TWO

(E1.131-143; T91-104) 1.2.1-8 In the next two Chapters we are shown how a number of texts that seem to refer to the individual self actually refer to Brahman.

"...Qualities appropriate to Brahman but not to the *jīva*"–such qualities as being the origin of the world, or "consisting of mind and breath", meaning "capable of being apprehended by a purified mind".

(E1.143-144; T105-106) 1.2.9 (Objection:) The "eater" (in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1.2.25) is fire, since it can burn up things (thus "eating" them); or it is the individual self, since that is who enjoys.

(Answer:) No, it is the "movable and immovable" spoken of that are the food (*anna*), and only Brahman is properly termed the eater of them.

(Objection:) In fact there is no mention of the words "immovable" and "movable".

(Answer:) They are to be understood metaphorically, the food in question being that which has death as its condiment.

(E1.146-148; TI107-109) 1.2.11 (Objection:) The two in the cave (in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1.2.25) are the intellect and the self, since the all-pervasive Highest Self can't be inside a cave, and can't experience the results of deeds, but the intellect and the self can.

(Answer:) No, the cave is the heart, and in this and other *sūtras* we are asked to view the Highest Self and individual self metaphorically as being both very small and hidden in a cave, etc .

(E1.149-156; T111-120) 1.2.13-17 (Objection:) The person within the eye (in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* IV.15.1) may be understood as a self cognized by someone else, or the individual self, or the god who rules the visual organ.

(Answer:) No, since the text attributes fearlessness, etc. to this person, and only the Highest Brahman deserves such attribution.

(Objection:) How can an all-pervading being (Brahman) occupy a small place? Just as light, though all-pervasive, is seen; in clouds as lightning, so the Lord, though all-pervasive, is seen in the eye, etc. And only Brahman can be referred to, as in this passage, as "satisfaction", as witness (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* IV.10.4, etc.), which speaks of Brahman as characterized by satisfaction.

(Answer:) "...Appropriate locations and properties are

attributed to Him (in scripture)". For example, *Praśnopaniṣad* I.10 and *Bhagavadgītā* 8.24 speaks of the northern path leading to the sun, which then leads the self to Brahman. The self attains Brahman-nature through austerity (*tapas*) appropriate to a forest-dweller (*vānaprastha*) and renunciant (*saṃnyāsin*), and through "faith", i.e., meditation and through "chastity", i.e., the duties of one's stations, those who are without devotion to Brahman and merely perform those duties are reborn again and again.

(E1.161-162; T125-126) 1.2.21 "The inner ruler...is not the *jīva*", since the *jīva* cannot be the "self of everyone", "the ruler of all". The individual self is not different from the Lord, but is a part of Brahman who is one alone, without a second.

Although it is said here that the individual self is different from the Lord, still as a property is different from its locus and also non-different from it, the difference spoken of does not negate this relation of difference and non-difference between the individual self and the Highest Self.

e (E1.162-165; T127-129) 1.2.22 "...Because of properties attributed to Him" (in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.15, e.g., such qualities as invisibility, imperishability, etc.

(Objection:) But *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* I1.15 goes on to speak of the Highest Self as "higher than the high imperishable"; and how can that be identified with what is imperishable?

(Answer:) The word "imperishable" in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.2 does not refer to the Highest Self; *this* "imperishable" is the individual self, or the person, or perhaps even *prakṛti*.

(E1.167-170; T132-134) 1.2.25-26 (Objection:) "Vaiśvānara" is found to refer in various passages to the digestive heat, to fire, to the god of fire, as well as to the Highest Self. So why are you so sure it refers here to the latter?

(Answer:) The passage also indicates that the reference of "Vaiśvānara" here is to that which shines brightly (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* V.18.1) and is the self of everything

(*Chāndogyopaniṣad* V.11.1), which can only be the Highest Self. And the *smṛti* passages referred to (in 1.2.25) are, e.g., *Mahābhārata* 12.1656b-1657a, or *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* II.14, etc.

BOOK ONE; CHAPTER THREE

(E1.181-182; T148) 1.3.5 The "very passage cited", said by Nimbārka to refer to the difference between the knower and the known, is said by Śrīnivāsa to refer to the difference between the individual self and the Lord,

(E1.183-187; T153-154) 1.3.8"...Because of the properties predicated of Him...", viz., serenity (in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.3.4) and of being a speaker of supreme truth (in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7.26.1; 7.15.4), the latter possible only by God's grace and just because one breathes.

(E1.195-197; T160-162) 1.3.13 (Objection:) "The person" referred to here is the four-faced Brahmā, since we are told that he who worships *oṃ* as one element achieves the world of men, or as two achieves the world of space, while if he worships it as three one gains the elements and gets the universe of Hiraṇyagarbha, higher than *ākāśa*. Now one who achieves this latter world appropriately can be viewed as perceiving Brahman, and is evidently superior to individual embodied selves.

(Answer:) The world of Brahmā is not higher than that of *ākāśa;* since the latter comprises everything. The world of Brahmā is the world of the results of action, whereas the world of Brahman is higher than all that. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.15-17, fleshed out by other passages, is cited as speaking of that higher world.

(E1.206-207; T171) 1.3.19 The meaning of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.3.4, one of the "relevant passages" cited, is explained as follows: Just as the eye, unable to see without external light, is able when the sun shines to perceive objects, so the individual self, unable to know without the aid of the Highest Lord, is able when attaining completion to achieve complete knowledge and to manifest is real nature.

(E1.210-212; T176-178) 1.3.24-25 (Objection:) *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 4.12 speaks of "a person the size of a thumb who resides within the self". Now since the reference is to someone "the size of a thumb", this cannot refer to either the individual self or Supreme Self, but rather to the subtle body.

(Answer:) No, for Brahman can be of any size, e.g., the size of a thumb (cf. *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 6.17) so that He can reside in the heart.

(Objection:) Since hearts are of different sizes in different beings the above cannot be the proper explanation.

(Answer:) It is only to men that this description is applied, not to elephants or lice, for only men can seek God and worship Him.

(E1.224-231; T195-203) 1.3.34-38) (Objection:) *Śudras* are mentioned in various passages (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.2.3; *Mahābhārata* 12.1360a) as entitled to Brahman-knowledge.

(Answer:) In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.2.3, thoroughly explained, the word "*śudra*" is used to refer to someone not a *śudra*. The Mahābhārata passage, which says "He should make the four castes hear", merely remarks that if e.g. a *śudra* hears the truth his sins will be destroyed and he will gain good retributions, not that he is entitled to meditate and thus gain knowledge. Some stories of *śudras* are rehearsed. One must be invested properly to be eligible for knowing Brahman.

BOOK ONE, CHAPTER FOUR

(E1.239-244; T214-217) 1.4.1 "...Through a simile". The simile is this: One desiring liberation is metaphorically likened to the driver of a chariot, with his body being the chariot, his organs, etc. being the charioteer. The metaphor shows that just as a potter can create a pot only when using the wheel or stick, etc., so the individual self can be agent or experiencer only when connected with a body. The reference in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 3.10 ff. is to this, and the term "unmanifest" that appears there

refers to the chariot, that is, the body, and a whole series of higher entities are referred to likewise metaphorically, culminating in the *puruṣa* or highest or Supreme Person. So the following passage (*Kaṭhipaniṣad* 3.12-13) clearly indicates the entity thus metaphorically represented is the Highest Self, not *prakṛti*.

(E1.268-271; T244-245) 1.4.16 "He...who is the maker of persons, of whom this is the work" (in *Kauśītakyupaniṣad* 4.19) is explained as follows. The "work" is the world, and only the Supreme Self could make it, not a sentient individual, nor *prakṛti* either, which is non-sentient; whatever is done by non-sentient things is due to sentient beings ultimately. "This is the work" does not mean karmic results here, but rather the universe's creation.

(E1.286-294; T257ff.) 1.4.23 Up to now we have been dealing with the atheistic Sāṃkhya; now we turn to the theistic Sāṃkhya, and refute it by pointing out that "the highest self is both the efficient and the material cause of the world".

(Objection:) This section should have been placed under 1.1.2, then.

(Answer:) No, since up to now no one has suggested that Brahman is *only* the material or the efficient cause, say. But now, the theistic Sāṃkhya suggests that God is only the efficient cause, whereas the material cause is *prakṛti*. This passage answers by confirming that Brahman is *both* the efficient and material cause, that indeed Brahman *is prakṛti*.

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER ONE

(E2.303-309; T267-268) 2.1.1 In this second Book, the first Chapter replies to objections to our view, the Second finds answers to opponents' views based on reasoning, the Third explains how certain passages about creation and destruction and the individual self are uncontradictory, and the Fourth shows that tests about that self's organs are faultless.

(E2.380-382;: T308-309) 2.1.26 (Sāṃkhya objection:)

Since both of us (we Samkhyaṣ and you Vedāntins) agree that matter (*prakṛi*) other than Brahman is transformed into the world, how are our views different?

(Answer:) Sāṃkhya teaches that the material cause of the world is something different from the self; but we [Vedāntins] hold that there is only one Brahman, and it is He who transforms Himself into the twin powers of experiencing (*cit*) and inert (*acit*)–e.g., the gods, etc., whom He enters as inner controller, and thus controls the karmic mechanism of deeds and results.

(Sāṃkhya:) We hold that this transformation arises from *prakṛti*.

(Answer:) Then scripture is contradicted–e.g., *Chandogyopaniṣad* 86.8.7 or 3.14.1, which speak of Brahman (not *prakṛti*) as "all this".

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER TWO

(E2.413-430;T348-362) 2.2.18-27 Thus Sāṃkhya has been refuted. Now the Buddhist theory, which is even worse, is to be considered.

There are four kinds of Buddhists: Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas. The first two say external objects are real, and the Vaibhāṣika says that objects are perceptible, whereas the Sautrāntika says that they are only known through inference. Yogācārins believe that only consciousness is real, that external objects are like dreams. Mādhyamikas say that everything is empty (*śūnya*), that it is momentary traces of past experiences that maintain the stream of awarenesses, but that when these traces are destroyed the stream is completely extinguished, and this is liberation. The others say there is no interruption in the stream of awareness. In the present section we deal with the views of Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas.

The Abhidharma ontology is presented, starting with the five aggregates. But that view is open to convincing refutation.

Since the components of the aggregates are not conscious and are independent of each other, being momentary, they cannot aggregate.

(Objection:) Ignorance is the cause of aggregation.

(Answer:) No. How can ignorance, say, mistaking a post for a man, be the cause of ignorance if there is no self to be ignorant? And since you hold everything to be momentary, nothing can last long enough to produce.

(Objection:) That's just the point: causes and effects being momentary, the cause has gone when the effect arises.

(Answer:) Then anything can arise at any time anywhere, or else, contrary to your tenets, there must be simultaneity of cause and effect.

You say that there are two sorts of causation, calculated and uncalculated. Calculated cessation is, e.g., when a thing get smashed by a hammer; uncalculated cessation occurs for each thing when it ceases at the next moment after its occurrence. But this defeats your theory, since everything is admitted to cease at each moment, and yet there is no reason why anything should not arise at anytime. So there can be no liberation, i.e., no cessation of ignorance, etc. Is liberation the cessation of the whole series (*saṃtāna*), or of a particular element in the series? But the series is nothing other than its members, and since each member (according to you) ceases immediately, the cessation of neither constitutes liberation..

(E2.430-435; T362-366) 2.2.28-31 As for the Yogācāra theory, it maintains that external objects don't exists, but that is wrong, for we perceive objects.

(Objection:) Precisely. Since every awareness has a content (*viṣaya*) with a form, the supposition of external objects causing those forms is superfluous.

(Answer:) But without its content the awareness would not have *that* form; we need the contents to distinguish the various forms.

(Objection:) In dreams there are no objects, yet we have

experiences with forms.

(Answer:) But there is a difference: in perceiving we use our sense-organs, while in dreaming we do not.

(Objection:) The various perceptions are different because of the traces of past experiences.

(Answer:) But how, on our view, could these traces be produced, since you do not believe in external objects? Traces are not viable on your assumptions, since there is no place–like your "storehouse-consciousness" (*ālayavijñāna*)–that can be invoked to support such traces, since everything (you hold) is momentary.

(E2.437-443; T369-375) 2.2.33-36 The Jain view of things is outlined at some length. It is wrong, because opposites cannot occur together either in whole or part.

(Objection:) But you yourself admit such a situation in Brahman, which is both one (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.14.1) and many (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 6.16).

(Answer:) No. Our view is that things are non-different from Brahman by their very nature, that they emanate from Him but do not differ from Him. But there is difference between things other than Brahman–and that produces no contradiction, unlike your theory.

Besides, the theory that the ultimate cause of things is a bunch of atoms is more complex than ours that the ultimate cause is single, viz. Brahman.

Furthermore, your view about liberation of perfected selves arising from their grace is not plausible. Does this grace depend on meditating on a perfected self or not? If so, then since in meditating on one perfected self the others are disregarded that will not provide liberation for the others; or if one meditates on all of them the theory will be unnecessarily heavy. And if you say that the meditation should be on the Highest Self you accept our view. On the second alternative–that grace does not depend on meditation on a perfected self, everyone is already liberated! In any case, there is no evidence for the existence of

a multitude of perfected selves.

Besides, the self cannot be the size of the body, since different bodies are of different sizes, and the self, if the size of an ant's body, won't be able to fill up an elephant's body. And if a self cannot change its size what will its size be when it is released?!

(E2.443-447; T376-382) 2.2.37-41 There are varieties of Māheśvaras: Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas. They all believe that *prakṛti* is the material cause, God the efficient cause. But they differ in the following ways: The Pāśūpatas and Kāpālas believe that in life the self becomes insentient, while the Śaivas hold that the liberated self is consciousness. But all of them, deluded by *māyā*, believe and practice things opposed to the Vedas, specifically that one thing is the efficient cause, another the material cause of the world. And meditating on *oṃ* while smearing oneself with a corpse's ashes is inconsistent and objectionable.

Again, how can the efficient cause and the material cause on your view cause anything, since on your view they cannot be related to each other, since Paśupati has no body?

(Objection:) So let God have a body!

(Answer:) But God cannot have an eternal body, or else everyone can; nor can He have a non-eternal (*anitya*) body, since everything non-eternal is an effect of something previous, whereas Prajāpati is supposed to be prior to everything.

(E2.447-455; T382-387) 2.2.42-45 "...For the world cannot arise that way", i.e. there would be plethora of *śaktis*, or else (an alternative reading) the world, being eternal, doesn't arise at all.

(Objection:) The Vedas are the proof!

(Answer:) Then, since the Vedas say Brahman is the cause, it is Brahman, not *śakti*, that causes the world.

(Objection:) The world arises from the connection between *śakti* and *puruṣa*.

(Answer: How can *puruṣa* help? It has no sense-organs

before creation. Or if you mean that *śakti* has the attributes that Brahman has, o.k., you admit *our* theory.

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER THREE

(E2.466-467; T396) 2.3.8 "...since that is impossible", i.e., if "Brahman" has a cause, then something else would have to be its causeless cause, namely (the real) Brahman.

(E2.512-513; T426-427) 2.3.32 (Objection:) We know from the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* and from the *Bhagavadgītā* that no one is killed nor a killer, that all actions are done by the *guṇas*; the self only thinks it acts out of delusion (*pramāda*). So the self is no agent.

(Answer:) As given above in the summary of the *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*..

BOOK TWO, CHAPTER FOUR

(E2.558-559; T458-459) 2.4.8 (Objection:) The chief breath has no beginning, as indicated in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 5.1.1 and *ṚgVeda* 10.129.2.

(Answer:) No, the chief breath also has a beginning, like the other elements, as indicated in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.1.3, since before creation, we are told, there was unity, viz., Brahman alone, not diversity.

BOOK THREE, CHAPTER ONE

(E2.577-578; T475-477) 3.1.1 In this the first section of the third Book, the first Section tries to instigate disgust with worldly existence by showing the world's imperfections; the second attempts to get one to desire the attainment of Brahman; the third concerns meditations on Brahman, how they do or do not differ; and the fourth shows that it is knowledge alone which provides liberation, that action is only a subsidiary means thereto.

BOOK THREE, CHAPTER TWO

(E2.608-610; T519-521) 3.2.9-10 (Objection:) One who has attained the Highest Self in deep sleep, since he has become free from frustrations, will never be born again. It must be someone else who is born "upon awakening".

(Answer:) No, the same self sleeps and then wakes up, as is evidenced by the continuity of is actions, by memory (*smṛti*), because of relevant texts to support this as well as injunctions to one to continue acting.

The halfway state of swoon is a different state from the other four states of waking, dream, deep sleep and death.

BOOK FOUR, CHAPTER ONE

(E2.783-785; T784-786) 4.1.3 (Objection:) One should meditate on the self as different from Brahman, since one's self is easily known (unlike Brahman) but meditation on the self needs to be repeated and since scriptural texts regularly distinguish the individual self from Brahman.

(Answer:) But the individual self is a part of the Highest Self, it is non-different from that Brahman; that Brahman is the self of the meditator, so both different and non-different from him, and there is no contradiction of scripture.

3.2 ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA, *Laghustavarājastotra*

Published with Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II's *Gurubhaktimandākinī*, ed. Devi Prasad Sharma. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 254, Banaras 1916.

3.3 ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA, *Khyātinirṇaya*

This work has not been found by us. It is referred to in Sundarabhaṭṭa's *Siddhāntasetukāṭīkā*, published in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 94, 99, Banaras 1905-1906, p. 161.

3.4 ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA, *Bhāṣya* on the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*

Attributed to Śrīnivāsācārya in Mānadāsa's

Upaniṣadprakīrṇaka, says Agrawal 2000,, p. xix.

3.5 ŚRĪNIVĀSĀCĀRYA, *Rahasyaprabandha*

Agrawal 2000, p. xix, says it has not yet been found, but is referred to in a work called *Pañcakādānuṣṭhānamīmāṃsā*.

4 BHĀSKARA (1000?)

We refer frequently here to A. B. Khanna's *Bhāskarācārya (A Study with special reference to his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya)* (Delhi: Amar Granth Publications, 1998). This work is indicated below by "Khanna". On pp. 10-22 of Khanna the evidence concerning the date of Bhāskara is reviewed, and the conclusion drawn there is that Bhāskara is later than Śaṃkara and must have flourished sometime during the ninth century. That Bhāskara is later than Śaṃkara is no longer in question: see V. Raghavan's article in WZKSOA XI, 1987, pp. 137-140. On the other hand, Roma Bose reports that "Bhāskara is said to have flourished during the reign of King Bhoja about 918-973 Śakābda, i.e., 996-1061 A.D.", citing "Bh.B, p. 7" (though it is unclear what "Bh.B. refers to). On the other hand, Bhāskara must have preceded Vācaspati Miśra, who knows him, and Vācaspati's date cannot be later than the tenth century. Thus we conclude that Bhāskara must have lived sometime during the ninth-tenth centuries, but after Śaṃkara..

Khanna also provides an extensive review of Bhāskara's philosophy (pp. 51-142) and a summary of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* which we have made extensive use of in our summary of that work below.

As well, Khanna provides a review of what little can be said about Bhāskara's identity based on references in a few later works. Udayana refers to him in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, which suggests to Khanna that Bhāskara lived in Mithilā. On the basis of another reference he speculates that Bhāskara may have belonged to the Tridaṇḍi school of Brahmins, an opinion shared

by Surendranath Dasgupta (see Khanna, p. 2), though Khanna views the evidence as not conclusive. Whether he was a Kashmiri or perhaps from Karnāṭaka has been argued for.

4.1 BHĀSKARA, *Bhaṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*

This work is available only in part (the first nine chapters); cf. BGBh in our Bibliography. T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyengar has written an article, "Bhāskara on the Gītā", published in Gitasamiksa pp. 51-64, from which we have selected the following paragraphs. Page references are to that article.

Summary by T. K. Gopalaswamy Aiyengar

"It is unfortunate that this *Bhāṣya* text covers only nine chapters at present and it is hoped that research scholars in India and abroad, will bring to light the other nine chapters soon...[That] Bhāskara wrote *Bhāṣya* on all the eighteen chapters of the *Bhagavadgītā*...is evident from the quotations in...Dvaita works. (p. 52)

"Bhāskara discusses at the very outset of his *Gītā-bhāṣya* the factors related to *anubandha-catuṣṭaya* and ultimately brings out the importance of the *Mahābhārata*. He places Vyāsa on a par with the Vedic seers and justifies his grammatical inaccuracies on the basis of the argument that Pāṇini's grammar alone should not be taken as the standard. He places *Mahābhārata* on a par with the Vedas and applies all the Vedic definitions to it to confirm its Vedic character (in his comment on BG 1.20, quoted).

"Bhāskara avails of the earliest opportunity to expound his doctrine of *bhedābheda* in the commentary on the stanza *naṭvevāhaṃ jātu nāsam*. He propounds that all the *jīvas* are [parts] *aṃśas* or fragments of Brahman and cites *Bhagavadgītā* XV.7: *mamaivāṃśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ* as an authority to confirm his doctrine." (p. 55) He explains that the relationship between Brahman and a self (*jīva*) is one of

difference cum non-difference analogous to fire and sparks. He also gives the analogy of the all pervasive space, conditioned by the size of the jars to illustrate the relationship. As a corollary, it can be drawn that the selves are neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical with God. Bhāskara defines his conception of [part] *aṃśa* based on the principle of self-differentiation through [limitation] *upādhi*.

"Bhāskara meets the argument of an opponent who repudiates the theory of *aṃśatva* of the *jīva* [i.e., of the self's being a part of a whole] on the strength of the concept of the absorption of the Lord into several bodies. He counters that such an assumption will involve *sarvamukti* or *sarvabandha* (release to all or bondage to all) when one among the selves is either released or bound. (On BG 2.13). He advances further that it is a very serious mistake to admit God to be enmeshed in the ills of *saṃsāra*, when several scriptural passagess declare that He is "*vijñānam ānandam, brahma*". He concludes that the selves related to God as his parts are differently conditioned in different bodies with varying experiences of pleasure and pain. On the basis of the example of space, he further states that just as space in the jar though smoky or dusty will not contaminate the space in other jars, the experiences of the selves in several bodies will not affect in any way the individual experiences of selves in other bodies.

"Bhāskara supplements his discussion to establish the atomic and monadic nature of selves by citing the Upaniṣadic authority which testifies to the ingress and egress of the subtle body or *liṅga śarīra* of the *jīvas* from and into several bodies. He holds that the atomicity of the *jīva* is the outcome of the conditionality of the absolute and that the *liṅga śarīra* is subjected to expansion and contraction (*samkūcana*). (p. 56)

"Bhāskaṛa's criticisms are remarkable. He advances several arguments refuting the interpretation of several stanzas by other in support of their doctrine. He is ever cautious to interpret the passages involving knowledge and action to justify

his patent doctrine of *jñānakarmasamuccaya*. He is not weary of refuting the theory of total renunciation of all action (*sarvakarmapariṭyāga*) of Śaṃkara. We shall cite some concrete instances to show how Bhāskara interprets certain verses interpreted by other schools to suit their own doctrines.

"(a) *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ* (2.16ab) (translated by Franklin Edgerton as "Of what is not, no coming to be occurs; No coming not to be occurs of what is;") is generally claimed by several schools of thought. Bhāskara criticizes in this connection the Vaiśeṣika first and then the Advaitins whom he names as *māyāvādins*...Bhāskara makes a remark, perhaps, about Buddhists whom he sarcastically mentions as very great experts in the science of *pramāṇa*. Ultimately, he concludes that the interpretation of others is wrong and endorses the view that the things correlated as universal and particular are both different and non-different.

"(b) Bhāskara levels charges against those who maintain that meditation on Brahman is the purport of the stanza

avināśī tu tad vidhi yena sarvamidam tatam (BG 2.17ab)

(translated by Edgerton as "But know that that is indestructible, by which this all is pervaded") Bhāskara justifies that the context refers only to the *jīva* of the form of [the highest self] *paramātman* in the original form and that the interpretation with reference to meditation which will be discussed only in the sixth chapter and not earlier is out of context here. (p. 57)

"(c) Bhāskara assumes the role of an expert Mīmāṃsaka and applying the principles of [the] *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* refutes the interpretation of some opponents while commenting upon

na jāyate mriyate vā, etc. (2 .21)

(Edgerton tr.: "He is not born, nor does he ever die"). He refutes the reading *nāyaṃ bhūto bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ* and instead has the reading *nāyaṃ bhūtvā* etc. Bhāskara holds that the change in reading is not consistent with the context. The commentators who change the reading mean to incorporate the sense of meditation on the highest Brahman into the context. The

opponents argue that the terms '*bhūta*' (past) and '*bhavitā*' (future becoming) of Brahman are negated in the stanza, whereby Brahman is neither a cause nor an effect like clay or pot. The opponents ultimately contend that the cause-effect relationship of Brahman is apparent and not real. Bhāskara is vehement in his criticism to fling the charge of wrongly directing their faith and interest towards meditation instead [of] towards the contextual considerations and topical sequences based on the principles of Mīmāṃsā such as *śruti, liṅga, prakaraṇa* etc. Bhāskara justifies his reading as correct and holds the view that the dispelling of Arjuna's ignorance is imminent and that a sudden jump to meditation without contextual sanction is unwarranted and illogical. To thrust meditation into the context by changing the reading is called by Bhāskara *āhopuruṣikā* which means the bragging of a person arbitrarily promoted by extreme vanity, arrogance (*abhimāna*) and high-handedness. The views of such persons are liable to cause confusion in the minds of those who are real seekers after truth.

"(d) Bhāskara raises an objection to the reading

avināśīnoprameyasya (BG 2.18ab)

This reading is metrically wrong. (p. 58) It should read] "*avināśino'prameyasya*. Bhāskara refutes the comments of some Bhāṣyakāras who hold that the *Gītā*'s teaching is meant only to remove grief and delusion and not to instigate Arjuna to do his own duty (*svadharma*). Bhāskara reminds the opponent that it is futile to advise the removal of grief and delusion after the commencement of the war. Lord Kṛṣṇa might have as well stayed at Dvārakā and composed the *Gītā* to teach knowledge conducing to liberation. The very intention of teaching in the battle field is to teach knowledge and action in full concordance for the attainment of salvation.

"(e) Bhāskara while commenting upon the stanza

vedāvināśinam (2.21a)

directs his attack on Śaṃkara who strains and twists the words

in the context to convey the sense of total renunciation of all actions and attributes the same as the central teaching of Lord Kṛṣṇa. He disproves the theory of Śaṃkara that action is the path to be resorted to by the unwise or ignorant alone who are incompetent to take up the path of knowledge. Bhāskara criticizes this view that the categorical and assertive imperatives *yuddhyasva, karman kuru,* etc. become futile, had the Lord meant the total renunciation of all actions.

"(f) Bhāskara brings to light a careless interpretation of a commentator who interprets BG 2.30 as though the stanza is a replica of the Vedic statement *śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. Bhāskara sarcastically remarks that such an irrelevant and unwarranted interpretation unsuitable to the context and spirit of the text can behoove a theologian (*śrotrīya,* who only hears). He points out that no marks of the scripture are traceable in the stanza owing to the clear absence of potential participles. By mere concatenation (p. 59) of some catchwords or syllables it does not behoove a commentator to create a novel idea regardless of the contextual sequences. Bhāskara suggests a parallel *mantra* which alone could befit the context.

"(g) Bhāskara upholds the theory of perfect co-ordination of knowledgre and action while discussing the implications of the terms '*sāṃkhya*' and '*yoga*' in the stanza

jñānayogena sāṃkhyānāṃ karmayogena yoginām (II1.3cd).

"Bhāskara brings to light the shallowness of other commentators. He criticizes the view of Śaṃkara who interprets the context to mean total renunciation of all actions. He makes a humorous remarks that such commentators attempt to hide the fruits from the tree by thick foliage. Further he extends his attack that *karmayoga* will result in all those who advocate the efficacy of action entering voluntarily into the ocean. Even for those who attained knowledge of Brahman the necessity for performing their duty is repeatedly stressed in the Vedas.

"Bhāskara challenges Śaṃkara that total renunciation of all

actions is not at all endorsed in the Vedas. He cites the Vedic authority quoted by Śaṃkara in support of the renunciation of all actions and holds that it is wrongly interpreted by him. The Upaniṣadic passage

na karmaṇā prajayā dhanena tyāgenaikenābhṛtatvamānaśūḥ[1]

is interpreted by Bhāskara as negation of *karman* etc., signifying only the denial of *karman* of [the] *kārya* and *niṣedha* categories and not the total *karmakarman.* He confirms his interpretation by citing a (p. 60) parallel Vedic authority where the word '*nyāsa*' is substituted in the place of '*tyāga*' or renunciation. Therefore it is specifically understood that '*nyāsa*' or '*tyāga*' does not convey the import of abandoning all action (*sarvakarmaparityāga.* He interprets the term '*nyāsa*' to mean Brahman.

"Bhāskara criticizes the interpreters who take '*nyāsa*' as a synonym for '*saṃnyāsa*'. He states that similarity of sounds with some modification will always mislead one towards a wrong interpretation. He cites an example from Mīmāṃsā *śāstra* where the Vedic passage *ājyaiḥstuvate* does not convey the meaning ghee by similarity of syllables but a collection of *sāmans* known as *ājya sāmans*. In this connection he quotes a *kārikā* warning one to guard oneself from being carried away by the mere similarity of syllables while interpreting the word and its meaning in a particular context...

"Bhāskara interprets the word '*naiṣkarmya*'*1* to signify *mokṣa* where there is the total absence of deeds in the form of good and bad. This interpretation is indeed quite befitting the context whatever the Bhāṣyakāras may hold. The word '*aśnute*' ('attains') becomes significant in association with '*naiṣkarmya*' used in the sense of *mokṣa.* He directs his criticism against those who interpret '*naiṣkarmya*' as total absence of all *karman.*

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[1]This reading of Bḥāskara sounds peculiar.

In the drift of his arguments, he stresses the necessity of the combination of *karman* and *jñāna* as a *sine qua non* to the attainment of *mokṣa*.

"Bhāskara's theory of *jñānakarmasamuccaya* is stressed in unequivocal terms in BG 3.14. The stanza expresses beyond doubt that one cannot attain actionless-ness which is liberation without beginning to perform action. He will not attain *siddhi* or (p. 61) *mokṣa* by mere *jñāna* followed by the renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*) of *karman*. Bhāskara then makes it quite clear that even for one who has realized Brahman, it is inevitable that he should perform his *nityakarmans* like *sandhyā-vandana* inasmuch as he does other deeds, as eating and moving around. Bhāskara cites the *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śaṃkara where Udaṅka's story is illustrated. Udaṅka rejected the nectar when it was offered to him from the back part of the body of Indra in disguise of a Caṇḍāla, suspecting it to have become polluted by the mixture of urine. Though Udaṅka desired to drink nectar, he rejected it on account of the fear that he would become polluted, whereby performance of *svadharma* would be affected. So Bhāskara states that *karman* or *svadharma* is a necessary factor like self-knowledge and that both go hand in hand and conduce to *mokṣa*.

"Bhaṣkara accepts *saguṇa Brahman* with auspicious qualities as against *nirguṇa Brahman*. He equates Brahman with Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva. He adds that Viṣṇu's abode is the highest goal to be attained by all the released souls. He offers two-fold etymology of the word '*vāsudeva*' and thereby brings to light the cardinal metaphysical truths regarding Brahman as world-cause and as inner controller. (On BG VIII.7) These two aspects of Brahman are the fundamental basic principles on which the edifice of true Vedānta philosophy is laid. In relation to the same etymological explanation, he says specifically that Brahman assumes both the states as cause and effect.

"Bhāskara again specifically states that Brahman is both cause and effect like *suvarṇa* and *rūcaka*. (BG 4.35) Such of

these views of Bhāskara as stated above appear to be opposed to his view of (p. 62) *bhedābheda* based on limitation. But it may probably be that his study of the *Gītā* made him later change his philosophical dogmas as found in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. The remark of Udayana "*brah apariṇāmaḥ bhāskaragotre yucyate*" is quite meet if Bhāskara's interpretation of the later part of the *Bhagavadgītā* is taken into consideration, where [the] evolving part of Brahman is expounded. It is obvious that *bhūtākāśa* or *ghaṭākāśa* explanations based on *upādhi* examples do not hold water if the *pariṇāma* theory is to be given preference on the basis of the *Gītābhāṣya*.

"Bhāskara holds that the performance of *kāmyakarmans* are optional and that *nitya* and *naimittika karmans* are to be performed as a compulsory measure along with *jñānayoga*. *Niṣedhakarmans* are to be absolutely given up forever. He maintains that sacrifices symbolically represent Viṣṇu for whose propitiation or [worship] *ārādhana* they are specified. (*Bhagavadgītā* 2.51) He warns that one should direct one's pointed devotion only to Lord Viṣṇu and completely ignore the worship of minor gods. He is emphatic in asserting that Viṣṇu alone (BG V2.19) can save and that others could not at all help in achieving the highest goal. He holds that such of those desirous of obtaining sons, cattle, etc., being prompted by their strong traces of their previous births, propitiate Rudra, Indra, Āditya, Durga, Gaṇapati, etc.(BG VI1.20). He cautions them that there cannot be any final redemption by their devotion to other deities...

"While specifying the height of ecstacy of [the] *sthitaprajña*, Bhāskara is eloquent in stating that the realization of Brahman will be of the nature of delightfully tasting nectar possessed of potent medicinal effect and finally promoting deep love toward Him. (On BG II.56). This shows how Bhāskara evaluated the spiritual love toward Brahman as devotion in the form of uninterrupted nectarious flow (p. 63)."

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4.2 BHĀSKARA, *Bhāṣya* on Badarāyaṇā's *Brahmasūtras*

Partially translated by J. A. B. Van Buitenen (unpublished; see Takahiro Kato at Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunda Sudasiens 22, 2010, 295).. The following summary of the initial portion of Bhāṣkara's commentary was made by Prof. Van Buitenen for this Encyclopedia many years ago. We provide the pages that remain with us. "E" references are to the edition by V. P. Dvivedin in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 20, the second edition of 1991.. Since Prof. Van Buitenen is no longer with us to edit his summary we have merely copied what he had provided–any changes in his text are explained in footnotes.

The numbering and reading of the *sūtras* of the *Brahmasūtras* is different in Bhāskara from that found in, e.g., Śaṃkara's *bhāṣya*. For a review of the differences one may consult Khanna pp. 23-50.

Several writers have written works assessing the differences between Bhāskara's and Śaṃkarācārya's readings of the *Brahmasūtra*. One such work is Khanna. Slightly more recent is Kumudini.

Summarized by J. A. B. Van Buitenen

FIRST CHAPTER, FIRST SECTION

(E1-8)) After a brief invocation to Bādarāyaṇa, Bhāskara says his commentary is intended to silence those who have explained the text so that it illuminated their own views.

1.1.1 Then, therefore, the desire to know.

"Then", here, means that after the study of actions the desire to know Brahman is arises.

(Objection:) Here, some say that our interpretation is not possible, since someone who has studied Brahman may then decide to study *dharma*. In the case of studying *dharma*, which is rewarded by prosperity, one must study it to gain that end, while in the case of studying Brahman, which is the highest

end, there is no means to the end which is absence and needs to be brought about. Thus the two are quite different and no temporal order relates them. In the case of *dharma* an injunction to act leads to action, while in the case of Brahman the injunction to know does not lead to any action–it leads directly to knowledge of the object, just as sentences such as *tat tvam asi* lead to knowledge of their objects without first prompting any action. So after what does the desire to know arise? After the discrimination of the eternal from the non-eternal, after obtaining such means as tranquility and restraint, after losing any to the pleasures of, and after the desire for liberation. The word "therefore" indicates that one should inquire into Brahman for the reason that the Veda indicates that the result of that inquiry constitutes the highest aim of man.

(Answer:) This objection is wrong, since liberation is achieved by a combination of knowledge and action, so that no division of the sort cited by the objector is possible. Only when knowledge of them precedes actions can the difference between kinds of actions be understood. Besides, the meditation that is expected to increase the effectiveness of an action cannot be effected unless the meditator has knowledge prior to action.

One studies *dharma* first, since it requires no special qualifications to do it; one only needs to understand the sense of the text from his teacher. Knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, only comes to one who aspires to liberation, not to just any student, for it requires other things such as sacrificing, giving, tranquility, self-control [*dama*]. The order of things is well indicated in the injunction to hear, apprehend, and inquire in that order.

(Objection:) Your argument involves a vicious circle. The student desires only when he has heard the injunction to learn, but he only hears that injunction when he has already started to learn.

(Answer:) No. The injunction to hear the Veda results from the injunction to learn, but that latter injunction results

from the teacher's injunction to teach the pupil. The relation between teacher and pupil is beginningless and does not involve any infinite regress.

It is not right to say that the word "then" indicates that actions are transitory and that knowledge is the means to achieving liberation. "Then" rather indicates that something follows something else (examples given). So here the word "then" in the *sūtra* indicates that knowledge of ritual actions is the cause of studying Brahman; thus that study can only be done after one studies ritual action.

Others explain the relation between the study of *karman* and knowledge differently. They say that the "then" indicates that the desire to know Brahman arises only when one has paid the debts one owes to the gods, etc. and has gained insight. Why so? Only by changing one's habits and acquiring new, good *karman* does one become ready for the injunction to hear, consider and meditate on Brahman.

But this interpretation is mistaken. We are told in the *karmakāṇḍa* that every injunction results in an appropriate achievement and not anything else. Where the goal is the production of good *karman* and avoidance of bad it cannot then be that the result would be the agent's becoming ready for liberation. The Vedic injunction that brings this about is the one enjoining us to see, hear, consider and meditate on Brahman.

(Objection:) But that's just what the whole of the Mīmāṃsā teaches!

(Answer:) True; still, one is supposed to study the self, which implies realization, just as the complete study of rituals implies mastery of the rite of the full and new moon.

(Response to the entire line of objection above:) No logician could accept the relation between the study of *dharma* and of Brahman that has just been described, for there is no reason to suppose that even the entire study of *dharma* can conduce to the highest goal. Each kind of action has its appropriate goal, and cannot produce something of a different

nature. Producing good and restricting bad *karman* are personal goals; there is an injunction that suggests they serve to lead to liberation. It is not the individual self that is spoken of as what is to be seen, heard and meditated on, but rather the highest Self. Beside, since injunctions only convey knowledge of what was not previously known, and we have already learned that perception shows us our individual self, this injunction (to see, hear and meditate) must have to do with efforts to realize the supreme Self.

Besides, the study of Brahman, like the study of *dharma*, is taken up to refute wrong arguments, in the former case there are more wrong views to scout since there are so many doctrines promulgated about liberation.

A self is a non-omniscient agent with a body and subject to emotions, so not produced by God (who is omniscient, bodiless and pure). If an object is beyond perception any and all features may as well be predicated of it.

(Objection:) Then no inferences can be acceptable–e.g., in "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot" sound should have all the properties of a pot, which is absurd.

(Answer:) No. When the *pakṣa* is cognizable by an instrument of knowledge its properties can be confirmed–e.g., we can tell that a pot can be baked and that sound cannot. But here, since the property of being eternal cannot be determined by perception, neither eternality nor non-eternality is precluded in sound by any other instrument of knowledge.

In any case this *sūtra* does not offer an inference but explains a Vedic sentence, viz., the one that refers to that from which beings are born, through which they live, and in which they dissolve.

How do we know that Brahman is the cause of the origin etc. of the world?

1.1.3 (E9-11) Because scripture is the source of knowledge of Brahman.

Some say that the self is the content of the injunction to

perform the action of destroying the world of experience (*prapañca*), and scripture is an instrument of the knowledge of that even though it depends on other conditions to effect its intent.

(Answer:) This is wrong. Since the self is eternal it cannot be an effect. Moreover, it makes no sense to speak of the self as being the content of an injunction. And to destroy the source of experience is not practicable, since when one meditates or is deeply asleep and objects disappear, still they reappear when one come out of those states.

Further, there is no means to destroy experience, since experience itself cannot destroy experience or else there is infinite regress. Of course, if you merely mean by the destruction of experience the destruction of the causes of bondage such as *karman*, etc., that is all right. But if all experiences are destroyed then everyone will be released at once, which is absurd.

Also, an injunction requires someone on whom something is enjoined; but in this case who could it be that is enjoined to destroy experience? An injunction, which is experienced, cannot cause anything experienced to cease; it requires something capable of cancelling experience.

Is this destruction of experience an operation (*vyāpāra*) or an absence? If it is an operation, it is experienced; if it is an absence it cannot be enjoined, being nothing like a hare's horn. Likewise, there cannot really be such an injunction as "one should not eat [poison] *kalañja*".

(Objection:) The injunction is to know the self.

(Answer:) Knowledge cannot be enjoined.

(Objection) But we are enjoined to know the daily lesson.

(Answer:) No. One is enjoined to study it. Knowledge may be the result of this study, but isn't produced by the injunction. Besides, if knowledge could be the content of an injunction it would have to already have arisen, and the

injunction would be pointless!

(Objection:) Scripture cannot be the source of knowledge of Brahman, because the Vedas only speak of things to be accomplished such as *dharma*, but Brahman is already existent and thus cannot be something yet to be accomplished.

Here one kind of Mīmāṃsaka says that an apparent statement in the Vedas must be understood as being really an injunction, as a sentence such as "that isn't a snake but rather a rope" can be understood as "Don't be afraid: it is not a snake but a rope"! Thus all non-injunctive Vedic passages, including the Upaniṣads, either describe the nature of the agent required for performing an act, or as prayers (*japa*).

Another kind of Mīmāṃsaka argues thus: Scripture is the source of knowledge of Brahman, not because it speaks to Brahman's nature but because it enjoins us to know Brahman, basically in the injunction to hear, study and meditate. This applies as well to all the sentences of the Upaniṣads; i.e., those which answer the question "what is the self?" and respond saying the self is beginningless, e.g., still serve the same purpose, viz., providing something to hear, study and meditate on.

So what is the relationship between the *karmakāṇḍa* and the *jñānakāṇḍa* (sections of the Vedas), since both are equally authoritative and contradict each other, one dealing with duality and the other with non-duality? In order to understand this, since we cannot subordinate the Vedānta, which speaks of the ultimate end, to injunctions toward ritual activity, we must rather understand those injunctions to be themselves subordinate to the Vedānta. And this can be done by distinguishing between two kinds of effects–direct and indirect. In the injunctions that enjoin one who desires something to perform a sacrifice, say, "one who desires heaven must sacrifice", the thing desired is directly connected to the action enjoined. On the other hand, an indirect effect of such an injunction is that *karman* as well as attachment (*rāga*) and

aversion (*dveśa*) etc. are gradually eliminated. Now the injunctions of the Vedas deal with direct effects of ritual actions, but they also deal with the indirect effects of actions, e.g. liberation. There is no conflict between the two kinds of effects; the results of ritual action depend on the inclinations of those who perform them. Thus the Veda consists exhaustively of injunctions, of which the injunction to know the self is included. The Vedas consist entirely of injunctions, and do not convey knowledge.

1.1.4 (Answer:) But that is wrong, because of the agreement (among the sentences in the Vedas).

(E11-21) "But" refutes the objection. Scripture does cause us to understand the nature of Brahman, and not merely of actions to be done. Why? Because the sentences (of the Vedas) that relate to creation agree in teaching the nature of Brahman.

What justifies you in saying that Vedic sentences are authoritative only if they enjoin ritual actions? What makes Vedic sentences authoritative is that they are not dependent on persons.

(Objection:) No, what makes them authoritative is that they enjoin something to be done.

(Answer:) In that case a command to worship a Buddhist *stūpa* is authoritative.

(Objection:) What makes Vedic sentences authoritative is that their validity is not dependent on other *pramāṇas*.

(Answer:) But verbal testimony (*śabda*) independently supports non-Vedic as well as Vedic sentences, though the Vedic ones are valid independently of persons. And just as perception can tell us what the facts are, so likewise can verbal testimony.

You say that we cannot convey a bare fact. But when one hears "that's not a snake; it's a rope!" one's fear vanishes as soon as knowledge arises. The sentence needs nothing to supplement it.

In a debate (*vāda*), though one is disputing his

opponent, one may utter a sentence intending to inform him of a fact, and knowledge of the fact is conveyed on the strength of reason, not by any injunction.

(Objection:) But even when one is conveying knowledge about a thing, the question that commands the situation is "what should be done about it?".

(Answer:) True, but that applies to any imperative sentence. Saying "go" raises the question "what for?", with the answer (perhaps) "in order to eat". But the purpose thus invoked need not be an injunction. Just as in the *karmakāṇḍa* obtaining heaven is the reward, so in the Vedānta attaining liberation is the reward.

You said that the relation between a word and its meaning is only found in sentences that convey that something is to be done, so that the denotative power of words obtains only in injunctive sentences. But if that is true then even injunctions such as an *agnihotra* cannot be meaningful, since we can only observe this power when the matter talked about is available to perception or inference.

We learn the meaning of a word through positive and negative comparison, and so arrive at a collection of separate meanings word by word.

(Objection:) But one word's use is determined by another; so meaning applies only to whole sentences, not to a word.

(Answer:) Then, since the word "cow", e.g., will mean something different each time since the sentence in which it occurs is different, no one could understand the meaning of a word and no usage could ever occur.

Furthermore, on the utterance "fetch the horse" if one has learned the word "fetch" in the context of cows, it should follow that the word "horse" means a cow. If you demur, it should follow that words have meanings in themselves. Indeed, word-meanings work together to build up sentence-meaning just as building-blocks make a house.

A thing to be done is expressed by optative suffixes; but where facts are being stated that cannot be known through other *pramaṇas* we must assume that the words used actually refer to those things. If you insist that *all* sentences are about things to be done then the existence (now) of an all-powerful Lord cannot be proved. On your assumption nothing can be said about what exists, e.g., God. The whole of the Upaniṣads can be, on your account, nothing but an injunction. An injunction must deal with phenomenal things, but Brahman is not phenomenal–so an injunction cannot deal with it.

Likewise, the claim--that the Vedas and Upaniṣads either speak of the agent's performing injunctions or serve as a way of expressing prayer--falls by the same reasoning. Brahman, the cause of the world, can't be enjoined to act: only individual selves can be so enjoined. We do not need proof of an individual self, since that has been known in the *ātmavāda* section of the Mīmāṃsā literature. And the Vedānta texts cannot be accessory to spiritual injunctions since there is no appropriate connection to show their relevance.,

Your distinction between direct and indirect things enjoined to be done in ritual injunctions is mere conjecture. Only the first kind exists, for that is what is referred to in scripture. An injunction requires three components–a result, an instrument, and something to be done. An injunction is delineated by reference to those three, so how can it serve an altogether different result? The existence of any such result is unproved.

Just as in a set of rituals the basic form does not depend on the derived form, but rather the reverse is the case, so one part of the Vedas does not depend on the other; rather the reverse. The Upaniṣads themselves say that the teachings concerning the *nityakarmans* are dependent on knowledge, nor merely on chanting the Vedas. So, since a person who is entitled to know the self cannot achieve liberation without acting, action is combined with knowledge. It is mad to suppose

that a person performing a ritual without knowing can make themselves fit for the supreme result.

(Objection:) But predicating difference and non-difference in the same thing involves contradiction.

(Answer:) We know that a single thing is unique. Now being unique presupposes difference. So a single thing must be different from other things. But every single thing is unique, and so is of the same kind as others, i.e., not different from others. So, since both difference and non-difference are found in each thing, how can it be said they are contradictory?

(Objection:) Difference and non-difference contradict one another as cold contradicts heat.

(Answer:) To be contradictory means either that two things cannot be in the same place at the same time, or that the two always have different loci: an example of the former pair would be light and shade, of the latter pair would be cold and heat. But neither type of contradictoriness applies in the case of Brahman and the world, for they are related as cause and effect. Thus to speak of cold and heat as exemplifying the relation of Brahman to the world is irrelevant.

So there is no basis for thinking that the phenomenal world is illusory. Nor should one say that it depends on which person we're talking about whether the world is illusory or not, the world being illusory for those seeking liberation and real for everyone else: one cannot correctly suppose that color is unreal for a blind man but real for those who see!

(Objection:) We discover, having been subject to the illusion that there are two moons, that there is only one moon.

(Answer:) If perception is said by scripture to be false then we must assume it is always false, as false as the awareness that there are two moons–you can't have it both ways! But we shall show later on that scripture doesn't teach the unreality of the world. And the cause of the two moons experience is not a faulty one; rather it is a cataract in the eye.

(Objection:) But all phenomenal experience has a faulty

cause, namely ignorance.

(Answer:) If this is true then the knowledge of Brahman is also false, and we must come to a nihilistic conclusion. Anyway, what is this ignorance of which you speak? Is it seeing a plurality of things in the world or the reverse? If the first, why is the view that there are many things not knowledge? After all, we perceive the things.

(Objection:) But there is a higher and a lower knowledge (*vidyā*).

(Answer:) But one cannot cancel the other. Knowledge of plurality (your "lower" knowledge) is also knowledge. "*Vidyā*" is another term for meditative awareness (*jñāna*).

On the other hand, if the second alternative (that ignorance is not seeing the plurality of things) holds, is ignorance eternal or not, is it Brahman's knowledge or that of the individual self? If ignorance, being Brahman's eternal knowledge, thus has no beginning, then liberation is unobtainable since ignorance could never be precluded. But if ignorance has a beginning, it must have come to exist at a time and thus have a cause, be an effect, and so must be an actual object. Ignorance can't be Brahman's since Brahman is pure consciousness and bliss. And it can't be the individual self's either for you, since you don't recognize a real self different from Brahman. Your ignorance is non-existent.

So what *is* ignorance? It is the mistaken belief that the body, etc. are really the self, plus wrong belief about Brahman's nature. So ignorance is both a grasping and a non-grasping, and it is removed by the correct understanding that comes from hearing sentences such as "you are that" (*tattvamasi*). Plurality of the world cannot be ignorance, since it is Brahman's effect.

(Question:) If the phenomenal world is real how can there be liberation?

(Answer:) How can there be liberation if the world is taken to be false? Just as those things seen in dream are cancelled (*bādhita*) when the dreamer wakes but recur when he

once again dreams, so things seen while awake will reappear to one who is liberated; likewise, ignorance, though it is temporarily suppressed during sleep and dissolution, will flame up again, not having been eradicated by knowledge?

(Answer:) How can it be eradicated? Since knowledge belongs to the world how can it destroy the world?

(Objection:) But knowledge is just the Self itself.

(Answer:) Then the world could never have come to be, just as darkness cannot appear as long as the lamp is there, and there can be no liberation, since no bondage. That is why we must appeal to scripture rather than reason to explain bondage and liberation (passage quoted).

(Objection:) Nevertheless, liberation results from knowledge alone, not from an act. There are just four kinds of effects of acts: origination, obtaining, modification, and purification. Brahman cannot originate, since it would then be non-eternal. It cannot be obtained through action, since Brahman is all-pervading and always there already. It cannot be modified, since again it would be non-eternal. And it cannot be purified since it is already pure. So action can effect nothing for Brahman.

(Answer:) You are correct about three of those kinds, but you can't deny that Brahman can be obtained. You yourself accept that Brahman can be attained by knowledge through removing ignorance, and you must admit that knowledge is taught to be gainable through ritual actions such as sacrificing, giving, etc.

(Objection:) Ignorance envelops Brahman, and liberation results from removing this ignorance by knowing, which is incompatible with ignorance.

(Answer:) Just the reverse follows from your assumptions. You say that ignorance is awareness of difference, but such awareness must persist as long as one's body remains alive since this awareness comes through the sense-organs. And ritual actions serve to bring on more such experiences, and

action and ignorance cause each other. There can be no cause to negate the plural world for good, as was just shown.

If awareness of difference were to disappear completely then the tradition would cease, since the ancient sages such as Manu, Vyāsa, etc. could only teach through language, etc. which involves differences.

On your account liberation involves no experience, no joy–some say it is better to be a jackal in a jungle! On our view the cessation of ignorance does not mean that awareness of difference ceases: what ceases is the false belief that what is not the self–the body, etc.–is the self. When this belief ceases and the body dies one becomes omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly happy, liberated.

Furthermore, how on your view can enlightenment destroy the *karman* that has been accumulated (*sañcita*) through many lives and whose results are just about to or have not yet come to maturation? Actions are not incompatible with knowledge. You say that acts are incompatible with the liberating knowledge since actions cause bondage, but how do you know they cause bondage?

(Objector:) From scripture.

(Answer:) Then you agree with me, since for you the ritual actions that scripture speaks of must be part of ignorance. We shall show below that according to scripture bondage, which involves both ignorance and *karman*, is terminated by knowledge of the self combined with ritual actions.

(Sāṃkhya:) The cause of the universe is unconscious *prakṛti* made up of three *guṇas*, When the Upaniṣads say :In the beginning there was Being..." the reference is to any Being and applies to *prakṛti (*as well as to *puruṣa)*. So the cause of the world is not consciousness.

In answer

1.1.6: (E22) (The cause of the world is) not non-scriptural, because of the use of the verb "to reflect". "Non-scriptural" means that for which there is no scriptural authority.

The cause of the world is conscious because it is said in a *sūtra* "it reflected I be many..."

(Objection:) This use of the word "to see" is metaphorical as in "that fire reflected...that water reflected".

(Answer:) No, it is not metaphorical, since the word "self" is used, as in "that are thou (i.e., your self)."

(Objection: But the word "self" may be used in a secondary sense to refer to *prakṛti*, since *prakṛti* subserves *puruṣa*.

(Answer:) No,

1.1.7 (E22-23) Because it is taught that there is liberation for one who takes his stand on that self, which cannot mean *prakṛti*, for it is the self that is released. And the word "self" is not used metaphorically,

1.1.8 (E23) Since there is no statement left out (of the supposed sort, viz.) saying that *prakṛti* is to be given up,

1.1.9 (E23) (And) Because it is said to "go to" (the self) in sleep, which is only possible if the "self" referred to as "gone to" is a conscious entity, not *prakṛti;*

1.1.10 (E23-24) Because (the Upaniṣads) agree about the path,

1.1.11 (E24) And because (the Lord) is revealed in scripture, viz., the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* where it says "no one is Lord to Him", etc., referring to Brahman as the cause of the world,

How can Brahman be both the cause and the effect?

1.1.12 (E24-25) (Brahman is called) "consisting of bliss" because of the repetition of the word "bliss".

(Objection:) "Consisting of bliss" refers to Hiraṇya-garbha, not to the Highest Self, since the one referred to must have a body.

(Answer:) But the passage repeats the word "bliss" several times ascribing it to Brahman.

(Objection:) But here, as in the passage which says "the self is food", the "self" referred to by this passage cannot be the

highest Self.

(Answer:) However, since the text states that this self is within all others, etc., it is Brahman that must be referred to.

1.1.13 (E25) (Objection:) (Brahman does not consist of bliss) for the words ("consisting of bliss") contain an expression ("consisting of") implying consciousness.

(Answer:) No, since the word *vikāra*, (construed as "consisting of") means "abundantly possessed of".

(Objection:(in the commentary on *sūtra* 19): Brahman cannot be the one made of bliss, since Brahman cannot be made of anything. So the one consisting of bliss is some self (*jīva*) subject to *saṃsāra*, not Brahman.

(Answer:) No. The word "made of", though it can mean "modified", cannot mean it here–just as though '*annamaya*' means "made of food", '*prānamaya*' cannot mean "made of breath", as breath is a fundamental substance. So "consisting of bliss" in the text here must mean either simply bliss itself or else one who has abundant bliss.

1.1.20 (E29-30) (Brahman is) the one within (the sun and the eye), since (Its) properties are taught (in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I.6. 6 ff.). Specifically, the property of being freed from all evil is ascribed to this "one", and no self subject to *saṃsāra* is free from all evil.

1.1.22 (E30-31) Space (is Brahman) since His marks (are mentioned in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I.9).

(Objection:) "*Ākāśa*" here means the substance space, not the highest Brahman.

(Answer:)(No. Since *ākāśa* is itself a being (*bhūta*), and since we are told that all beings are subject to origination and to dissolution, the reference must be to something or someone that is not so subject, and that is Brahman.

1.1.24 (E31-32) (In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I2.13.7) "light" (means Brahman) because of the mention of feet.

(Objection:) The word "light" in that passage should be understood as meaning the light (e.g., of the sun) that dispels

darkness.

(Answer:) No, since feet are mentioned in that text–the three feet of Brahman which are immortal in heaven. And light is appropriately predicated of Brahman in other passages.

FIRST CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION

1.2.1-5 (E37-39) (The one who consists of mind, spoken of in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I2.14) is Brahman because what (that passage teaches) is appropriate for Brahman but not for the embodied self, because agent and act are separate, because of a supporting text.

(Objection:) Every one knows that it is an embodied being that consists of mind.

(Counter-objection:) But the text itself mentions Brahman! So the reference must be to Brahman.

(Objector:) True, but the injunction in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I2.14 enjoins us embodied beings to think of the *jīva* as consisting of mind. So the text concerns the self so enjoined.

(Answer:) No, the thing we are to meditate on is Brahman, since the context contains other sentences to that effect. Brahman is said to "consist of mind" because He can be attained by a purified mind.

1.2.6 (E39) And because of a *smṛti* passage, viz., "the Lord, O Arjuna, dwells in the heart of all beings".

(Objection:) God is a transmigrating self; the individual self does not actually exist; and all talk of difference is based on limitations constructed through ignorance.

(Answer:) That is not right. God does not transmigrate, since He is pure knowledge and bliss and not subject to ignorance. It is the *jīva*, who is part of God, that transmigrates, being ignorant and subject to *karman*. We shall explain this later.

1.2.7 (E39) (Objection:) Not so, since the self spoken of is said to have a tiny home.

(Answer: No, it is the highest Self that is spoken of this

way, just as we say (that) space is tiny when we are speaking of as confined in, e.g., the eye of a needle.

1.2.8 (E39-40): (Objector:) Then the highest Self must be able to have experiences!

(Answer: No, for the highest Self and the individual self are different.

Are the two in the cave (in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* I.9.1) the intellect and the self, or the self and the highest Self?

(Objector:) Surely the former, for it is wrong to say that the highest Self "enters a hidden place" (where according to that text the two in the cave enter).

(Answer:) No, for the *jīva* and the Self are both conscious entities. And scripture tells us that

1.2.11 (E40-410 Both the two selves enter the cave, for it is found endorsed by scripture in another passage, the one about the supreme self making the individual self drink.

1.2.12 (E41) And because the two are different, one is shown in scriptural passages, though '*ācāryas*' claim the difference to be illusory--there is no basis for that.

In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* the question is whether the self in the eye is a reflection, the individual self, the sun, or the Ruler.

1.2.13 (E41-42) He (the Ruler) is in (the eye), since that is appropriate.

(Opponent:) It may be the individual self, since we are aware of that; or it might be the sun–but not the Ruler, since a specific locus is referred to.

(Answer:) No, it is the Lord, since it is He who is primarily the Self.

1.2.14 (E42) And because He has a locus; indeed several loci are mentioned,

1.2.15 (E42-43) and is said to be qualified by bliss, showing that it must be Brahman that is under discussion.

1.2.17 (E43) Because of impermanence (*anityatva*) and impossibility the individual self cannot be the agent (that is

referred to).

That agent, viz., the individual self, is impermanent and cannot be supposed to be immortal, since that self is subject to rebirth (*saṃsāra*).

1.2.18 (E43-44) The inner ruler of gods, worlds, etc. (in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II1.2.1) is (Brahman) because His properties are mentioned, viz., being the inner ruler.

1.2.19 (E44-45) It is not (*prakṛti*), since a contrasting property is ascribed to Him, viz.., being the inner Ruler.

1.2.20 (E45) Nor is it the individual self, whose distinctness (from the inner ruler) is shown in both recensions (of the Vedas), viz., in the *Kāṇva*, which explains the inner ruler as different from consciousness, and the *Mādhyanandina*, which explains it as different from the individual self.

(Objection:) How can two seers coexist in the same body? Indeed, the text says "there is no other seer than he"!

(Answer:) Since both recensions have equal authority both difference and non-difference have to be accepted.

1.2.21 (E45-46) The "invisible" (in the *Atharvopanisaḍ* (is Brahman), because of the proposition such as invisibility mentioned.

(Objection:) No, the reference is to *prakṛti*.

(Answer:) But this invisible being is said also to be omniscient, and *prakṛti* isn't omniscient.

(Objection:) The omniscient one is said (in the *Atharva* passage) to be "higher than the higher (*prakṛti*)". But alternatively this being referred to as "the source of beings' is the individual self, the cause of things produced by its *karman*. But since it is invisible it is better to construe the reference as being to *prakṛti*.

(Answer:) No, the reference is to the Highest Being, since a property is mentioned which is specific to Him alone.

1.2.22 (E46) And the reference is not to the other two, because of the properties and form attributed to Him (in the passage). The passage says of the one referred to that it is

different from *prakṛti*, there called "*akṣara*", to which the "invisible" of our present passage is contrasted.

1.2.24 (E47-48) Vaiśvānara (in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* V.11.18) (is Brahman), because of a peculiarity in the terms used. In this passage, where it is said "explain the Vaiśvānara self...whose parts are identified as fire", the question is what fire is spoken of–the heat in the body, the element fire, the fire deity, the body, or the highest Self? There are reasons to think it might be each of these.

(Objection:) In any case it can't be the highest Self, since it is inappropriate even metaphorically to equate the bodily fire with the highest Self.

(Answer:) The Vaiśvānara self *is* the highest Self, since among the elements of the passage one speaks of "the brilliant (sky) is the head" (of Vaiśvānara), which could only be properly said of the supreme Lord, since the sun is His product. Other parts of the same passage provide similar clues.

Different views are ascribed to Jaimini (1.2.28), who says the "Vaiśvānara" speaks of the Lord as having parts for the purpose of meditation; Āśmarathya (1.2.29), who thinks that the reference is to a part of space picked out by the Lord for meditation; and Bādarī (1.2.30), according to whom the Lord is recalled by the heart.

FIRST CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION

1.3.1 (E51-52)) A text says "the one cause, support of heaven, earth, etc." is the self. Is this the Highest Brahman or not?

(Objection:) This support is *prakṛti*, since the text goes on to speak of it as providing a causeway, and a causeway must have banks, but Brahman can't have any banks.

(Answer:) No, for the text specifies the cause as "one". And likening it to a causeway is a simile; it is not meant that everything about a causeway must be shared by the self.

1.3.7 (E52-53)) In the passage about the two birds, one

of which eats and the other doesn't, the meaning is that there is a difference between the Highest Self and the individual self. Others wrongly construe this passage to suggest that the difference between those two is only an illusion.

1.3.8 (E53-54) In the passage (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* VI1.23-24) saying one should seek that *bhūman* in which one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, the reference is to the Highest Self.

(Objection:) No, the reference is to breath, since it is breath that remains even in deep sleep.

(Answer:) Rather, the reference is to the Highest Self, since the passage refers to one who is *beyond* tranquility, i.e., beyond even deep sleep.

1.3.10 (E54-55) (Objection:) In *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* III.8.7-8 the word "*akṣara*" means *prakṛti*, since it is said to constitute the warp and woof of all. Others say that the reference is to the word "*om*", since that is what "*akṣara*" regularly means. But that is not pertinent here because the passage goes on to deny that what is spoken of has blood, love and shadow, and this is an appropriate thing to say about *prakṛti* but not about a word.

(Counter-objection:) The word "*akṣara*" here refers to Brahman, since its referent is said to support everything up to *ākāśa*.

1.3.11-13 (E55-56) (Answer:) Neither view is correct, since the text says that this *akṣara* commands the support of the sun and the moon, and only a conscious being can issue commands. Even is we lay that aside, still that support is said to be a seer.

In *Praśnopaniṣad* V.2 which is the content of meditation, the lower or the higher Brahman?

(Opponent:) From the reference in this passage about being conducted to the *brahmaloka* it is clear that the lower Brahman is under discussion here.

(Answer:) No, it is the highest Self, for the same passage

also makes reference to "the person residing in the fortress who is supreme to this" and upon meditating on Him one sees Him, concluding with the ascription of tranquility, immortality, fearlessness and supremacy, which are hardly applicable to the lower self.

1.3.14 (E56) (Objection:) The "small space" in *Chāndoyopaniṣad* VII1.11 may refer either to space (*ākāśa*) or the individual self.

(Answer:) No, it refers to the highest Self, since the passage goes on to say that heaven and earth are contained within it, and describes it as "free from all evil", which cannot be true of any self except the highest Self.

1.3.19 (E57-58) (Objection:) In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VIII.7-11 the self said to be "free from sin" is also identified with the self seen in the eye, and later with the one who sleeps and has no dreams. Thus it must be the individual self spoken of.

(Answer:) No, for the self spoken of is referred to as the self whose essential nature is manifested (*āvirbhūtasvarūpa*). Now when the individual self is in *saṃsāra* it is visited by ignorance, desirer and *karman*; it has to attain its essential nature through knowledge. So the self whose essential nature if manifested cannot be the individual self; it must be the highest Self.

1.3.26-30 (E60-65) The gods seek release and practice meditation, for they have bodies too.

(Objection:) Then there is a contradiction about their earning *karman* and performing rituals.

(Answer:) No, for those gods can take on many bodies and thus can act and sacrifice at once.

(Objection:) If gods have bodies they cannot be permanent. This contradicts the Vedas, for like the gods the Vedas would have to have a beginning.

(Answer:) No, for the world originates from language (*śabda*). During dissolution the Vedas persist in a subtle form

in Brahma, and re-arise at the beginning of the next age.

What does "language" mean here? Not the Grammarians *sphoṭa*.

(Objection:) The *sphoṭa* theory can explain how we come to understand meanings. That theory says that meanings cannot be produced by phonemes, since when they are spoken singly they do not produce meaning. Also, since each phoneme is gone by the time the next one arises, and since perceptions are momentary, they cannot produce anything jointly. And there is no proof of any traces produced by the earlier phonemes in one hearing a word. But a trace does arise from a whole word being spoken, and that is what provides meaning.

(Answer:) Upavarṣa has declared that a word is constituted by phonemes. It is the phonemes, not any *sphoṭas*, that are perceived when a word is spoken, and which has to be learned by children in order to master a language, etc. When they have mastered the meanings of several phonemes and ascertained their connections they arrive at a simple awareness of a whole word. Since our awareness of words can be explained in this way what is the point of assuming *sphoṭa*?

(Objection:) The *sphoṭa* is manifested by the final phoneme assisted by memory traces left by the preceding sounds.

(Answer:) That is unnecessarily complex. It involves three assumptions: that sounds lay down traces, that there is this *sphoṭa*, and that there is a relation between the two. Our view involves only one assumption, that of traces. The three sounds in the word "*gauḥ*" combine to produce a trace, and when the three are heard as connected when pronounced in the same order a memory of the meaning is produced.

Since the source of everything in the world is language, and since we don't recall anyone who could have established a relation between words, things meant and the relation between them, that relation must be permanent. It is universals, and not impermanent particulars, which are denoted by words, are the

things meant.

(Objection:) That is fine if language is beginningless, but you hold that the whole universe is destroyed and arises again after dissolution: How can you hold that the Vedas are permanent or that the world arises from language?

(Answer:) There is no difficulty. The creator Prajāpati at the beginning of each age recalls the words and things meant by them from the previous age. Dissolution is not total destruction: as in dreamless sleep things at dissolution merely dissolve into a subtle state. When creation recurs the words connecting universals with the universals connoted arise again; we know this from Vedic authority .

(Mīmāṃsaka:) How could anyone understand the Vedas at the beginning of an age without instruction? And if the existence of such a person is impossible, it follows that the Vedas are constructed, not permanent.

(Answer:) The supreme Self, being omniscient, knows when it is time for beings to experience the results of their *karman*; He then creates the world to these karmic requirements. He has no purpose in doing so, since he is omniscient and fully satisfied, but he creates and dissolves the universe periodically by his nature. From the permanence of the supreme Self and from the beginninglessness (*anāditva*) of *saṃsāra* the permanence of the Vedas follows.

Other reasons why gods have bodies are reviewed.

1.3.34-35 (E67-68) (Objection:) *Śūdras* are qualified to know Brahman, since knowledge only requires thinking.

(Answer:) No, because a *śudra* is unable to study the Vedas, not being allowed to have a teacher or to be initiated into study. It is expressly said in *śruti* that a *śudra* has no right to initiation, indeed is prohibited from hearing or studying the Vedas.

FIRST CHAPTER, FOURTH SECTION

1.4.1-13 (E71-76) Bhāskara shows how various

Upaniṣadic passages that Sāṃkhyas and others construe as referring to *prakṛti* or the individual self do not so refer.

1.4.14-17 (E76-79) (Objection:) Various textual passages credit different sources with the creation of the world. So there must have been many creators; Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.

(Answer:) No, these passages, though they fasten on different stages in the making of the world, all agree that Brahman is the source. For example, the passages in various Upaniṣads which say that being came from nonbeing mean that the very world which is now manifestly perceived was before, as it were, unmanifest.

Kauśītakyupaniṣad IV.19 does not refer to breath nor to the individual self, but to Brahman. The authority of Jaimini is cited.

1.4.18-22 (E80-84) Does *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.8.8, in which Yajñavālkya councils his wife Maitreyī, refer to the individual self or to the supreme Self? It must refer to the supreme Self, since only knowledge of that provides immortality. Also, knowledge of everything will not arise from self-knowledge unless it is the supreme Self that is meant.

Āśmarathya's view was that the individual self and the supreme Self are only partly different. Auḍulomi held that the individual self is entirely different from the supreme Self, but that, as in Pāñcarātra, at liberation the difference will disappear since the individual self ceases. Kāśakṛsna believed correctly that the self and the Self are not entirely different even after liberation. He is correct; the individual self is a part of the supreme Self, as sparks are a part of fire. During *saṃsāra* the individual self is visited by *vāsanās*, and needs to be taught to become liberated.

(Naiyāyika:) Desiring liberation is passion (*rāga*), and passion causes bondage. How can liberation occur thus?

(Answer) Passion towards the highest Self causes liberation; passion towards objects causes bondage.

(Objection:) If knowledge together with actions leads to liberation, then liberation will gradually arise for selves, eventually for all selves.

(Answer:) How can you be so confused? There is no end to individual selves. But from scripture we know that liberation is possible. The world will remain, but he who creates, maintains and destroys the world will know the remedy. Stop worrying and try for liberation yourself!

Here some believers in *māyā* say: It is God himself who enters the body and undergoes *saṃsāra* because of the limitations born of ignorance. But we respond: Whose is this ignorance? Not the individual self's, since there is none on this view. Not God's, since He cannot be ignorant. A God involved in rebirth is no God, for God is free from satisfaction, frustration and delusion, and cannot be involved in *saṃsāra*. Thus we must conclude that God is one and the transmigrating self is a part of Him, thus another. This God is independent, omniscient, omnipotent, untainted.

Others, who follow no authority, counsel that the self-principle should rid itself of evil by following the injunctions to hear, consider, meditate, upon which the world will disappear. But this is a foolish claim: no mere *puruṣa* can bring about destruction of the universe. And anyway, one doesn't bring about a change in one thing–the world–by changing something else–one's self, anymore than one destroys a cloth by breaking a pot. What is an injunction, after all? If it is a linguistic entity, then it can only indicate that some action should be performed. If it is itself a knowable thing it can't very well be an instrument of knowledge, since there is no instrument to support that.

Furthermore, it is wrong to say that the falsity of the world is known from scripture but that perception and the other *pramāṇas* are self-authenticating. The falsity of something is known through something else, not the something itself. If objects were not there to be seen they would not be seen. In fact, the *māyāvādins* are refuted in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* itself.

1.4.22-27 (E84-86) (Objection:) A king, or the sun, are the efficient causes of their creations but not the material cause. Material causes are non-conscious things like clay. No creation would be possible without some stuff to be formed.

(Answer:) Nevertheless scripture supports that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause (passages cited).

(Question:) How can a self be both the maker and the thing made?

(Answer:) Through *pariṇāma*, that is, the Self, having infinite power, causes itself to be modified, as the sun projects its rays. Those who put forth the doctrine of *māyā*, which smells of Mahāyāna Buddhism, confound the world.

SECOND CHAPTER, FIRST SECTION

2.1.1-4 (E87-89) (Sāṃkhya:) On your view that Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the universe, Kapila's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is contradicted. But it is a *smṛti*, and other *smṛtis*, such as Manu's, are authoritative. So we should accept Kapila's teaching, which is that the cause of the universe is *prakṛti*. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, a *śruti*, supports Kapila as well.

(Answer:) Not so. Other *smṛtis* teach our doctrine (examples quoted). And when *smṛtis* conflict the ones that accord with *śruti* should carry the day. And *śruti* supports our interpretation. Besides, in the Śvetāśvatara passage it is not Kapila the author of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* that is referred to, but Hiraṇyagarbha, called "Kapila" in a Purāṇa. Anyway, we need not respect Sāṃkhya since it refer to things not found in anyone's experience–things such as intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and the subtle elements (*tanmātra*).

By extension, Yoga is likewise refuted.

(Objection:) By extension one argument can refute equivalent theses. But why should one think that Sāṃkhya and Yoga arerequivalent theses?

(Answer:) Because Patañjali's Yoga teachings also teach

such principles as *prakṛti*, etc. and they are mentioned in the Vedas, specifically in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*. So let that part that agrees with the Upaniṣads be true, and the other part be false.

2.1.4-7 (E89-90) The rest of this chapter deals with arguments supporting criticism of Sāṃkhya.

(Mīmāṃsā objection:) But if injunctions are self-validating (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) what is the need for reasoning (*tarka*) at this point?

(Answer:) Because the Upaniṣads ("Vedāntas") deal with established actual entities (*siddhavastu*), and the Upaniṣads provide reasoning (examples given).

(Objection:) Brahman is not the cause of the world, because the effect, i.e., the world, is a different kind of entity, the world being material, the cause spiritual.

(Answer:) This reason is unproved: we infer that being the products of Brahman, Brahman's properties exist in rocks, etc.

(First objector:) But if bodies, senses and objects are conscious they are independent like Devadatta, not products of Brahman. It is not evident that these entities are spiritual.

(Second objector:) In some spirituality is evident, in others not.

(First objector:) No *pramāṇa* can prove clods of clay, etc., to be spiritual entities, for they are non-active.

(Second objector:) But scripture says that things like clay, etc. actually are spiritual, e.g.,. "clay spoke..., the waters said...fire thought", etc.

(First objector:) What such texts are referring to are the deities representing those material things (passage explained).

(Answer to these objections:) Even when cause and effect differ categorically the relation still holds–e.g., out of cow-dung a scorpion is born, out of food comes hair, nails, etc. There will always be some similarity and some dissimilarity between cause and effect–if they are completely similar there

can be no relationship.

(Objection:) Then the effect does not pre-exist in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*).

(Answer:) No, you have not proved that, nor the view that the cause does pre-exist (*satkāryavāda*) either. We shall speak of this shortly .

2.1.8-13 (E91-92) (Objection:) But if something non-spiritual can arise from a spiritual thing, then at the time of dissolution into its cause the cause must become non-spiritual. Furthermore, if what is non-spiritual infects selves, then after dissolution this impurity will infect even (supposedly) liberated selves.

(Answer:) No. Just as clay made into a bowl returns to mere clay when the bowl is destroyed, so when the world dissipates Brahman returns to its immaterial state. And the liberated selves will not be reborn, for there is no reason why they should. And anyway, Sāṃkhya is subject to the came criticism as directed against us.

Moreover, *tarka* is not definitive. What is *tarka*? The *Nyāyasūtras* (1.140) say that *tarka* is a conjecture about something the truth about which is (otherwise) unknown.

2.1.114 (E92-99) So far it is has been taken for granted that the experiencer is not different from the experienced, but it is time to prove this.

(Vaiśeṣika:) Cause and effect, e.g., the lump of clay and the bowl from which it is made, are entirely different.

(Answer:) This is not right. *Sūtra* 14 states that knowledge of one thing brings about knowledge of everything, as knowledge of a lump of clay provides knowledge of everything made of clay, since everything made of clay is non-different from clay. This is not an injunction, but an explanation.

Here some (Advaitins) say that the passage "only the clay is real" indicates that the cause alone, and not the effect, is real, and through ignorance the effects are seen to be real

but are actually not.

(Objection to the Advaitin:) If that is right, how can there be knowledge of things, and how can the scriptures containing injunctions and prohibitions be meaningful? Indeed, how can knowledge of Brahman arise from a scripture concerning liberation that is itself false?

(Advaitin:) The activities of life go ahead as long as there is no awareness cancelling them, and the instruments of knowledge relating to such matter hold good for those who are ignorant of the ultimate truth, only disappearing when that truth is realized. Likewise, the scriptural injunctions hold good for those under such ignorance. Knowledge of Brahman will arise eventually for the ignorant, just as one may eventually recognize that his dream is false.

(Objection to the Advaitin:) How do we know the world is false? Not by perception or inference.

(Advaitin:) Ignorance arises as in someone with an eye disease seeing two moons.

(Answer to the Advaitin:) Then it must be ignorance as well that discovers the illusion, since all awareness involves ignorance, according to you. Here is the argument: the awareness of Brahman is false, because it is an awareness, as worldly judgments (are according to you)..

One never gets knowledge from what is untrue, like a hare's horn. One discovers the double moon error [*bhrānti*] by recalling one's veridical experience that there is only one moon.

Your supposed counter-example of someone dying because he supposes himself poisoned doesn't apply. The poison doesn't kill him; his memory of it does. There is no instance where true awareness arises from false causes.

Nor does scripture prove the world to be false. E.g., the sentence "that art thou" consisting of sounds is therefore non-existent according to you. "This is not this, not this" distinguishes the self from all that it is not, such as the body, etc. And when the text speaks of "duality *iva*", which you

interpret as "duality as it were", the "*iva*" isn't comparative, as you assume, but is either expletive or emphatic. What is being denied in the pertinent text is that at the stage when only the cause exists there is no knowledge of any object outside this cause.

(Objection:) Ignorance cannot be correctly said to be either real or unreal.

(Answer:) It is mere jabbering to say that ignorance, which is held to provide the basis for practical doings, cannot be described. If ignorance is indescribable, how can a teacher explain it to his pupils? And how could it provide the basis for practical affairs?

Furthermore, *māyā* must have a beginning, since if it were beginningless it would be endless, indestructible, no liberation from it would be possible, and there would be a second beyond Brahman (contrary to Advaita tenets).

(Objection:) Then ignorance is Brahman's very nature.

(Answer:) Then certainly no liberation is possible! On the other hand, if instead you say that ignorance has a beginning, where does it come from? If it has no cause, it may at any time visit liberated selves once more. Or if Brahman is said to be its cause, then the foregoing problems arise once more.

(Objection:) The cause is the very nature of a self.

(Answer:) Then the product will never cease, since the very nature of a self (you hold) is everlasting.

(Objection:) Ignorance contains truth.

(Answer:) Impossible; one thing cannot have contradictory properties.

Ignorance isn't mere non-apprehension, for an absence of awareness cannot cause bondage, any more than a lotus in the sky: if it does bind, it must be an actual, positive entity. Indeed, that is why ignorance is called indescribable (*anirvacanīya*)–if name and form (*rūpa*) were meant by the word "ignorance" then it would not be indescribable (since it

has just been described!). So awareness of difference is not ignorance, nor false. The world is a particular aspect of the supreme Self. So the phenomenal world really exists, like space, in which properties such as incompleteness (*apūrṇatva*) exist.

(Objection:) But how can something without parts, such as space, undergo modification?

(Answer:) Because modification is its very nature, as it is in milk–and (unlike milk) since the supreme Self is omniscient and omnipotent it can, by its own will, modify itself.

(Objection:) The analogy is mistaken: milk can be modified, since it is divisible.

(Answer:) No, it is not its divisibility that makes milk modifiable–if that were true, we could get curds from water too! Rather, modification is inherent in milk.

Here a question arises: Does the power to modify inhere in the whole or the parts? Now the *māyāvādin* does not accept that liquid constitutes a whole, so its modifying power must reside in the parts. But either these parts have no parts, or in order to avoid infinite regress there must eventually be parts without part. Then, are these parts modified or not? If not, then we will find milk in curds–so the parts themselves must be subject to modification, and thus a part-less entity must be subject to modification. Thus, in particular, Brahman must be subject to modification, as indeed scripture declares in the analogy of the *nyagrodha* tree which, like a spider, projects its power without losing its own nature. Likewise a cloth does not lose its nature merely because it is constituted of threads, nor does space lose its nature because air arises in it–thus our reasoning is supported by an instrument of knowledge.

(Objection:) There is no such proof, for it must follow that Brahman as a whole is involved in modification just as milk is, and thus Brahman will be non-eternal, in contradiction to scripture.

(Answer:) We agree that an example never completely parallels that which it exemplifies. E.g., milk has only one

modification–curds, whereas Brahman has many modifications. And each source is unlike the next in that it only has certain things as its modifications, not everything.

But does the Brahman taught in scripture, the universal cause, undergo modifications? Yes, as scripture teaches: Brahman modifies itself by its own will on the strength of its own power. A number of Upaniṣadic passages are cited in support of the account of Brahman being defended.

(Objection:) Scripture is not pertinent, since these passages related to something not established.

(Question:) To what do those scriptural passages relate then?

(Advaitin:) They relate to non-difference, since creation and duality cannot be proved by any instrument of knowledge.

(Answer:) But you yourself propound the non-duality of the Self on the basis that cause and effect are non-different, and that is unproved! And if you deny that creation occurs, it will follow for you as for the Mīmāṃsakas that the universe is eternal.

(Advaitin:) The fact that the *karmakāṇḍa* requires duality to be acted on doesn't make duality scriptural.

(Answer:) Nor does it prove non-duality. Everything is non-dual inasmuch as it has more general–such as being–and more specific–such as bovinity--features, and from this it would follow by analogy that non-duality is likewise non-scriptural.

That injunctions pertain merely to *māyā* and that the "great sayings" of the Upaniṣads pertain to non-duality is contradictory. There is as much evidence for duality as for non-duality.

So the wise (*āpta*) say that perception is affirmative, not negative, for perceiving, say, color does not deny anything. Each thing's nature is distinguished by its properties, and what we are aware of in everyday experience is the difference among things.

Besides, if each sense-organ could apprehend pure being

there would be complete confusion–a blind man could see colors, the deaf could hear sounds. Of it is be said that each sense has its distinct kinds of appropriately cognizable features, then they don't all apprehend mere being. Is the awareness of being the same as being or different from it? If different there will be plurality; if the same, then since there is no apprehender different form being it cannot be apprehended. So the monist (Advaitin) view is like *māyā*, since without duality there is no one capable of knowing its truth.

In scripture the only use of the word "*māyā*" is to indicate the awareness one has in dreams.

2.1.16-18 (E100-101) On the other hand, there *is* non-difference, since the effect is found to be in the cause–the cloth in the threads, the pot in the clay--whereas for two completely different things they are found to occur at different places at different times.

(Objection:) Smoke only occurs with fire, but they are not non-different.

(Answer:) Fire is the instrumental cause of smoke, not the material cause. We are speaking of the non-difference between a thing and its material cause.

(Objection:) But we are told in scripture that "this was non-existent in the beginning".

(Answer:) The meaning of that text is that name-and-form have not yet been manifested, being too subtle, not that things don't exist in any way at all at the beginning. If things don't exist beginninglessly, anything could arise from anything–but we know that pots and not curds or hares' horns are produced from clay.

(Objection:) Well, the causal capacity of a thing is invariable.

(Answer:) As we've said before, what is responsible for this invariability?

(Objection:) But on y our own position the nature of the effect is determined before its production. And if you counter

that the "cause" merely occasions the manifestation of the effect that is already there, is this manifestation present before the effect or not? If it is, a pot cannot be produced by the potter's activity, but if it isn't, the effect is not pre-existent in the cause.

(Answer:) The effect *is* there before, since it is nothing but the cause itself. There is no property without a substance, and no substance without a property . So the cause is both the same as and different from its effect. Indeed, difference is a property of non-difference. So everything is at once both one and many; this is proved by perception, inference and scripture.

2.1.19-33 (E102-103) Just as a cloth does not become different when wrapped up from what is was when spread out, so the cause does not become different when it exists as product.

(Objection:) Then the individual self is as much of a creator as Brahman.

(Answer:) No, since the creator doesn't transmigrate, and is omniscient; further, scriptural texts differentiate the Supreme Lord from the individual self.

(Objection:) How can difference and non-difference occur together, since they are contradictories?

(Answer:) But both are attested by instruments of knowledge. What is known provides the ground for contradiction as well as non-contradiction.

2.1.24-25 (E103-104) (Objection:) Since an injunction is self-validating, it is proved that Brahman is the cause of the world. So what is the problem?

(Answer:) True. However, if it contradicts inference it isn't clear what the content of the injunction is, and so the discussion concerns what meaning can be assigned to the injunction to make it consistent.

(Objection:) A creator like a potter creates by utilizing various instruments. But since Brahman causes things before the manifestation of any instruments, how can it cause anything?

(Answer:) Brahman transforms itself through its own essential nature, just as milk transforms itself into curds.

(Objection:) Nevertheless, even there the milk requires something else–heat or a souring substance of some sort–to become curds.

(Answer:) Some things–e.g., spiders–proceed by themselves to produce without assistance. Still, all worldly agents, not being self-competent, require instruments. Brahman, however, is omniscient and omnipotent (i.e., self-competent).

2.1.26-29 (E104-105) (Objection:) If an indivisible Brahman transforms into the form of an effect, then Brahman is involved in its entirety, as in the case of milk (which is entirely involved when it transforms into curds). So the scriptures are pointless when they tell us that Brahman is this very world, since we know this already from perception. But if Brahman is divisible, one part transforming, another not, then various scriptural texts proclaiming unity would be contradicted. So there must be a *prakṛti* other than Brahman which transforms.

(Answer:) No. Brahman transforms itself without losing its essential nature, as scripture shows. Brahman has two powers, the power of being experienced and the power of being the experiencer. The former consists of non-conscious things like space, etc.; the latter is conscious, the individual self. So just as the sun alternately shines and then withdraws its rays, so Brahman first spreads out its power and then withdraws it. Even the *māyāvādin* doesn't contend that a part-less, bodiless being is the agent of *māyā*.

The difficulty of which the objector just spoke also vitiates the Sāṃkhya position–either the entire *prakṛti* modifies into the evolutes or it is not essentially part-less. And the Vaiśeṣika too commits the same error when he assumes that atoms are indivisible..

2.1.32-37 (E106-108) (Objection:) God does not create

anything, since He is perfectly satisfied and has no purpose for doing so. This is what Mīmāṃsakas say.

(Answer:) Even though He has no purpose, still He acts as those do who engage in play.

(Objection:) Then God must be cruel, since some creates have good qualities, others bad.

(Answer:) No, for God creates men's natures to match their karmic circumstances. Here some offer an irrelevant, unwarranted interpretation that the creation of God, an inner ruler, is based on ignorance whereas the creation of individuals is based on *karman*. But there is nothing unreal about God's being the inner ruler–it is not imagined, and not based on ignorance.

(Objection:) But at dissolution everything is separated, no *karman* is in operation. So creation cannot be a product of *karman*.

(Answer:) No, for creation is beginningless. During dissolution, as in deep sleep, the selves remain along with their store of *karman*. It is like the seed and the sprout, a beginningless series.

(Objection:) That involves infinite regress-we cannot tell cause from effect, since very thing is both cause and effect.

(Answer:) There is no cause-effect relation between seed and sprout as classes; it is an individual seed that causes a sprout, and an individual sprout that causes another seed.

This is our position: all properties are correctly predicable only if Brahman is the cause of the universe.

SECOND CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION

2.2.1-10 (E109-112) Now we refute opposing views.

(Objection:) Why bother to do so, since one only needs to establish one's on view as correct to achieve liberation?

(Answer:) True. However, to establish one's own view with absolute certainty one need to set aside other views. Also, since logical works (*tarkaśāstra*) also address the question of

liberation, people who fail to have proper respect for scripture rely on such works, and thus we expose their insubstantiality.

Definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) of debate and cavil (*vitaṇḍa*) following the Nyāya system.

The Sāṃkhya gives five arguments to show that *prakṛti*, composed of three *guṇas*, is the cause of the world, which we proceed to refute. Five reasons are offered by Sāṃkhyas for this conclusion: (1) because of natural quantitative and qualitative differences among things and people, (2) because of the differences in quantity among things, (3) because of differences in power among things, (4) because of the distinction between cause and effect, (5) because of the non-distinctness of the nature of all things. We reject these inferences. *Prakṛti* is unable to create anything since it is non-intelligent (*acetana*), whereas created things are found to be created by intelligent artisans. Furthermore, feelings such as satisfaction and frustration are mental, not physical, objects and result from external objects as conditioned by an individual person's way of thinking. As for the other reasons you give, about difference in power, causality and nature, these apply equally to Brahman.

Furthermore, a non-intelligent thing cannot cause anything by itself; the operation of chariots, etc. depend on their drivers, etc.

(Objection:) But even an intelligent thing does not operate causally by himself; so how can Brahman do so?

(Answer:) Because of His omnipotence.

(Objection:) However, in fact non-intelligent things can act: e.g., milk is produced for the calf, or water flows for the sake of mankind.

(Answer:) But in these cases there is another cause at work: the mother cow starts the milk out of love for her calf, and water flows to low places because it is liquid–as well as because it is supervised by an appropriate deity. If *prakṛti* operates by itself with nothing activating it, its operation should be eternal, and so always creating.

Even if *prakṛti* were supposed to be self-operating, since it is non-intelligent it can have no purpose, and could not itself enjoy the world, or gain release from it.

(Objection:) It is like the cripple who climbed on the blind man's back and directed him home.

(Answer:) Nevertheless, it is contradictory to say that a cripple is incapable and yet capable of directing. Likewise, it is contradictory to say that the self is inactive (*nivṛtti*) and nevertheless activates. Anyway, in Sāṃkhya there can be no activity, since being in equilibrium during dissolution there is nothing that can disturb that equilibrium.

(Objection:) The great Lord by his supreme *yoga* disturbs the equilibrium.

(Answer:) Yes, if you assume God, but then the Vedānta argument holds. And since Sāṃkhya conflicts with Vedānta it should be rejected.

2.2.11-12 (E113-114) We now turn to Vaiśeṣika. They say that a substance causes substances to come into being, that a quality (*guṇa*) produces qualities as effects. Thus a dyad, which is small, arises from two atoms; this duality combines with two other dualities and another two pairs to make a *minimum perceptibilium* (*truṭi*), which is relatively large, and so on. This shows that on their view the effect *can* have different kinds of features from its cause(s), so that this is perfectly consistent with Brahman, which is conscious, producing a non-conscious world of objects.

Vaiśeṣika: The way creation works is this: the atoms are the inherence cause of a dyad, etc.; the contact between the atoms is the non-inherence cause, and *karman* and God's will constitute elements of the instrumental cause. Now at the beginning of a new age God wills the atoms of air to combine into pairs, producing dyads, etc., leading eventually to the production of the whole of the air. Likewise fire from fire atoms, water from water atoms, and earth from earth atoms.

(Answer:) No initial combination of atoms is possible.

(Vaiśeṣika:) Yes it is: it is the result.of the influence of *karman*.

(Answer:) What can *karman* influence? *Karman* must belong either to a self or to atoms (on your view). *Karman* not being itself conscious it cannot by itself cause anything to move or change, since at the beginning of an age the selves are not yet embodied and so non-conscious. Nor can *karman* inhere in an atom, since it inherence cause is the agent of an action. And if the agent and *karman* are always in contact there will be eternal creation (, which is objectionable).

2.2.12-13 (E114-115)[1] (Vaiśeṣika:) But inherence, which explains the relation between inseparably connected things one of which subsists in the other, relates cause and effect, individual and universal, substance and quality.

(Answer:) To explain the relation between, say, the two atoms and the dyad they constitute, likewise the relations between inherence and each of the two relata it relates must be two more inherences, and so on *ad infinitum*.

(Vaiśeṣika:) No, inherence relates itself to other things; it needs no further relation to do this.

(Answer:) Then we say that contact needs no relation to relate itself to the two things in contact.

(Vaiśeṣika:) But contact (a quality) needs a relation to connect itself to a substance.

(Answer:) So you say, because of your definition, but inherence can also be defined as a quality. In any case, cause and effect are not inseparably connected, since the cause precedes the effect.

2.2.14-17 (E115-116) Are atoms naturally active (*pravṛttisvabhāva*), inactive (*nivṛttisvabhāva*), both or neither?

[1]The commentary on 12 is given and translated by Johannes Bronkhorst in *Gedenkschrift J. W. de Jong* (ed. H. W. Bodewitz and Minoru Hara). Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series XVII (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2004), p. 33.

If active, there could be no dissolution; if inactive no creation; and both together is self-contradictory. And atoms, since they have color, etc., must be non-eternal–or if they don't have color their products, such as pots, can't have color either. And as Dignāga pointed out, an atom that is connected with six other things must have six parts.

Do atoms gain qualities? If so, then atoms of water would smell, of fire would taste, etc. Or do they lose qualities? Then fire could not have touch as well as color, water no color in addition to taste. Or, if some atoms have more properties than others, they cannot be atoms! Our view precludes all this: omniscient Brahman has for practical purposes created space with one property, water with two, fire with three, water with four, and earth with five.

So the Vaiśeṣika position must be disregarded, since Manu and other sages do not adopt any part of it.

2.2.18-27 (E116-123) We now turn to the Buddhists. There are three kinds of Buddhists. One kind believes in external objects. A second says only consciousness exists. And a third says that nothing exists. It is said that there is a stream of consciousness, free from grasper and grasping, which exists moment by moment like a flame in a windless spot until karmic traces cease. When they cease the stream of consciousness is extinguished like a flame.

The Buddhists who believe in external objects are called Sautrāntikas. They believe in five categories called matter, consciousness, feeling, identification and conditioning factors. The atoms of sight, taste, smell and touch combine to form earth, the first three combine to form water, the first two combine to form fire, and the touch atoms combine to form air. So all external, material things together with their traces are momentary and non-substantial. Consciousness and mental concomitants are, however, internal, and together with the external things bring about practical experience. There is no necessity to assume an eternal self.

But when such a combination of internal and external factors is assumed to be all there is, there is no way it can come to be. Since it is unconscious and no experiencer or controller of it is allowed, there is nothing to bring about any combination of the atoms, and thus no objects suitable for being the objects of worldly activity is possible.

(Sautrāntika::) The consciousness aggregate, because of ignorance, streams out beginninglessly; it is its own cause. From ignorance also arise conditioning factors involving passion, hatred, delusion, etc., and from this arises action (*karman*) which breeds the birth of bodies, senses, mind and its objects.

(Answer:) That is not right, for there is no instrumental cause of any combination, since their supposed components are momentary. In fact, there can be no causality at all on that assumption, since it is empty.

(Sautrāntika:) But that is how causes are–the effect-moment occurs just as the cause-moment dies, like the moving down of one plank if a teeter-totter when the other gores up.

(Answer:) Unless one of the planks is heavier than the other no movement will occur, and even then, unless they occur at the same time nothing will happen, since there is nothing to cause an effect to occur. So talk of causation only applies if the two are eternal. But if they are eternal either production will occur all the time or never.

And production or destruction is nonsensical in any case. For when a hammer breaks a pot, is the destruction of the pot different or not different from the pot? If different, then no result will occur–what is destroyed is always something different. If not different, the pot's destruction is the pot itself, so nothing gets destroyed. Thus on your view of an entity's actually being a series of momentary occurrences, nothing can be produced or destroyed since it will require a factor of the sort that naturally produces potsherd moments to produce a destruction-of-potsherd moment. That is, you are going to have

to admit that destruction requires a persistent cause, not merely the passage of time.

Besides, are the beginning and end of a thing's existence different from the thing itself? Destruction is an absence. Is that absence–the destruction of a pot, say–before, during or after the existence of the pot? If before, the pot never gets made. If during, they will never diverge and the pot must be eternal. If after, we must conclude that destruction has causes, which is contrary to your theory.

Neither (your) calculated nor uncalculated cessation makes sense. What ceases? Either a series (*santāna*) of moments or a thing constituting a series. But the series of moments is assumed to be permanent, and a permanent thing does not cease. On your view, destruction is not brought about by any cause, since it is the very nature of momentary entities to cease. And your theory that the cessation of one who masters these truths is without cause renders the four noble truths inoperative, since destruction requires no such cause.

The (Buddhist) thesis that space is only an absence is contrary to scripture, which tells us that space was born from the self, as well as at odds with the Buddhist's own words when he tells us that "as long as space exists...so long shall I remain removing all frustrations". In fact, space has visible color, and this refutes those who say that space must be inferred from sounds, for we experience space even when there is no sound.

Furthermore, one who like the Buddhist believes everything to be momentary cannot believe in recollection, which implies recognition that the one who saw something yesterday is the same person as the one remembering it now, viz., a self. A series cannot persist–the Buddhist speaks of an intermediate state, but no such thing is possible on their view, involving as it does persistence which is denied by Buddhists. Something cannot arise from nothing, or anything could arise from anything.

2.2.28-32 (E123-125) We turn to the Yogācāra

Buddhists, the believers in consciousness (only). Their position is this: Yoga is a path which involves peace (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*). The insight is that there is only consciousness, momentary occurrences without essential nature. Viprabhikṣu explains: "Awareness of what is not perceived does not produce vision of an object. Consciousness, by nature undifferentiated, is taken by those with false views to have distinctions of grasped, grasper and awareness of them". The form of the grasped is the content of knowledge (*prameya*), the form of the grasper is the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), awareness of oneself (*svasaṃvit*) the result of all three being constructed into a single consciousness. So there is no external object, and no difference between something's being blue and someone's awareness that the thing is blue. So a waking awareness lacks an [external] object since it is an awareness, like a dream.

Our response to this is that external objects do not fail to exist, since they are experienced. The relation to an external world is experienced: fire, mountain, earth, water. Consciousness both has form and lacks form. Internally the self produces an awareness involving egoity (*ahaṃkāra*). How could one confuse knowing with what is known? They are experienced in completely different loci.

We too believe that consciousness is immediately presented: but it is only presented as having some content or other. An awareness is an awareness of pot, or an awareness of cloth. The "rule" of invariable co-apprehension (*sahopalambhaniyama*) needs to be examined. "Co-apprehension" must mean being at the same place or at the same time of two different things., but what is being claimed is that the things are not two, that they are the same thing! Thus there is a contradiction. Furthermore, you can provide no example for your thesis. Even the Mīimāṃsakas, in analyzing the illusory perception of two moons, assume the object known is different from the instrument of the knowledge.

As for your example "like a dream", we say that a waking experience cannot be like a dream. In dream sleep is the cause; when one wakes up it is cancelled. Your argument is: perception is false, because it is perception, like a dreaming perception.. But what proves the falseness of the dreaming perception? Since the waking perception is assumed to be false, it cannot cancel the dream. So, since perception is stronger than inference, it cannot be proved that waking perception is false.

(Objection:) The difference between objects in waking and dreaming might be based on traces (*vāsanā*).

(Answer:) There are no traces, for they are not experienced and so have no instrument of knowledge to prove them. The theory of a storehouse-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), that traces produced from awarenesses of pots, etc. reside there and that from these traces arise our awarenesses, thus producing a circle of traces and awarenesses–this theory is unavailable to the Vijñānavādin, since he holds that only consciousness–awarenesses--exist; as soon as he accepts something additional–traces–he abandons his own view!

(The commentary on *sūtras* 31 and 32 are lacking from E; the summary is based on T.)

Anyway, this storehouse-consciousness must be momentary. And in fact however one construes it the Vijñānavāda doctrine collapses like a dike built out of sand. So it should be disregarded.

This refutation of Vijñānavāda also refutesŚūnyavāda automatically.

2.2.33-36 (E125-127) Now the *Ārhatamata* (viz., the Jain view) is examined. They postulate seven categories: self, non-self, inflow (of *karman*) (*āsrava*), bondage (*bandha*), cessation of inflow (*saṃvara*), cleansing (of traces) (*nirjarā*) and liberation. Also they believe in five existent bodies (*pañcāstikāyas*), namely self, person (*pudgala*), merit (*dharma; puṇya*), demerit (*adharma; pāpa*), and space. Their position also involves the sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*). These are

each briefly explained.

Now how can an entity at the same time be and not have a given predicate? This is a contradiction.

(Jain:) Where is the contradiction? A pot does not exist in the form of a cloth, but does exist in its own form as a pot.

(Answer:) Because the sevenfold predication also says of the thing that perhaps it is itself and perhaps it is not itself. In fact, all seven may be either so or not so.

(Jain:) But everything is multiple (*anekānta*), everything is relative.

(Answer:) Then that very statement is itself relative, and there is no ascertainment possible; perhaps there is liberation, perhaps not–there will be no activity at all. The Tīrthaṅkara who proposes such a doctrine must be mad.

Besides, the (Jain) thesis is that the self has the size of the body will perhaps be so or perhaps not, and so the self will occupy one part of the body and not another. Anyway, will a self the size of a body if it is reborn as an ant?!

(Jain:) No. The self has countless parts, and these parts increase in an elephant and decrease in an ant.

(Answer:) If the self has parts it would be destructible like the body.

The Digambara Jains say the self has the size of its last body , and that when liberation occurs, since there is no body, the self is all-pervading and remains so eternally. But then, whatever the size of the body may be, that size is not contingent and cannot increase and decrease, as they hold it does.

2.2.36-39 (E127-128) Now we refute the (Śaiva) view that God is the instrumental cause of things. There are four kinds of Śaivites: Pāśupatas, Śaivas, Kāpālikas and Kālikasiddhāntins. Their views are described. But the God they postulate is unnatural, since He is partial and cruel to produce a world in which there are both good and bad people.

(Objection:) But that is because of their *karman*.

(Answer:) Then tell us whether He acts depending on *karman* or independently of it! A disembodied God cannot create, since we know a person who creates has a body.

(Objection:) Just as the self uses the sense-organs as its instruments, so God uses nature for Him.

(Answer:) But the self's use of sense-organs is for the purpose of experiencing objects that arise for the experiencer through *karman* provided he is subject to passions. All this is inapplicable in the case of God.

Alternatively consider this: are the sizes of *prakṛti* and the selves determined by God, or not? If so, they are of discrete (*parichinna*) size, like a pot, (and God is not omnipotent); if not, God is not omniscient. On our view, however, Brahman is both the material and the instrumental cause, and thus both omniscient and omnipotent.

(Here Van Buitenen's summary breaks off. The Editor (Potter) provides in what follows a summary of the remaining sections, based on Khanna. Where Khanna finds that Bhāskara's account accords with that of Śaṃkara we avoid summarizing the section. "E" references are to BSBh. Quoted paragraphs are taken from Khanna, with pages indicate

2.2.42-44 (E129; Khanna 282) The Bhāgavata or Pāñcarātra view is that God is both the efficient and material cause, that Vāsudeva is the highest reality and is just knowledge, and that he has four forms: Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.

Bhāskara agrees that God is both the efficient and material cause, but objects to certain aspects of the Pāñcarātra theory in general.

SECOND CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION

2.3.9 (E131-132; Khanna 285) (Objection:) Since scripture does not say that space, time, number and size, etc., have a temporal beginning, they are (also) eternal entities.

(Answer:) Things like qualities, etc. cannot be eternal.

Scripture need not specify them specifically. E.g., time, which is the motion (*gativiśeṣa*) of the sun, is implied when we are told (by Bhāskara) that the sun has an origin.

2.3.18 (E135; Khanna 291) The question is whether the self's awareness is adventitious or not. According to Bhāskara, since the self "is an *aṃśa* of Brahman like a spark is of fire, so just as Brahman is Intelligence itself, *jīva* also is intelligent", though the form of intelligence of *jīva* is natural while in Brahman it is due to limiting limitations.

2.3.43-53 (E140-143; Khanna 299-303) The topic of this section is the relation between the highest Self and the individual self. Bhāskara's view is that of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*), that is, that the self as an *aṃśa* or part of Brahman, the whole, is the same as Brahman while different due to limitations; thus Brahman is not affected by the faults of the individual self even though the self is a part of It, just as fire is not affected by the attributes of its part.

(Objection:) Then the actions of the various individual selves will be difficult to distinguish from each other, since they are all parts of the same Brahman.

(Answer:) No. The individual selves are atomic in size, not all-pervasive, so there is no confusion about which is which. And of course the liberated self has no limitations and performs no actions, not being in the world at all. Probably alluding to Śaṃkara's doctrine of "reflection" (*ābhāsa*), Bhāskara interprets "*ābhāsa*" not as "prototype in a reflection" (*pratibimba*) but as meaning a fallacy (as in "*hetvābhāsa*") and comments "as follows: If the *jīva* be a mere reflection and therefore *avastu* like the horn of a hare, there can be no question of bondage or release nor of action to secure *mukti*." (p. 302 of Khanna).

THIRD CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION

3.2.1-6 (E160-162; Khanna 320-323) Is the dream state real or not? Śaṃkara says it is only an appearance created by the individual self. "According to [Bhāskara] the world of

dream is to be understood on the basis of difference and non-difference of the individual soul from the Highest Self. "Thus the Sūtrakāra calls dreams *māyā* because they do not evince the characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking soul is obviously not *māyā*. Bhāskarācārya traces *māyā* to *jīvasṛṣṭi* [an emanation from the individual self] as distinct from *īśvarasṛṣṭi* [God's emanation]." (p. 323)

3.2.11-12 (E164-165 Khanna 325-330) Discussion of whether Brahman has qualities (*saviśeṣa*) or is without qualities (*nirviśeṣa*) or both. Bhāskara sides with the "both" alternative.

3.2.23-32 (E168-171; Khanna 330-334) Bhāskara interprets the "not this, not this" (*neti neti*) as saying "that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that which is implied in the negation of the material world expressed in *neti neti*. To him, the *sūtra* 3.1.122 continues the topic of meditation on Brahman in his formless (*nirākāra*) aspect who is non-different and pure being and consciousness." [Śaṃkara's use of *neti neti* is, of course, quite different; he uses it to establish the unreality of the world and its differences.]

THIRD CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION

3.3.29-30 (E186-187; Khanna 354) "According to both Bhāskarācārya and Śaṃkarācārya there is a complete decay of the *karmans* of the knowers at the time of their death. But going through the path of [the] gods is obligatory for all knowers according to Bhāskarācārya and is obligatory only for those who meditate on the qualified Brahman according to Śaṃkarācārya."

3.3.32 (E187-188; Khanna 355-356) "The question discussed here is whether persons who know Brahman attain new bodies or not." Khanna summarizes the position as follows: So long as they [selves] are subject to *prārabdha*karman, they pass, at their free will, from one body to another. Śaṃkarācārya says that their case is like those of those liberated while living (*jīvanmukta*) who even after attaining knowledge continue

their bodily existence due to their *prārabdha-karman*. Bhāskarācārya, however, interprets this as Śaṃkarācārya does, but he does not advocate *jīvanmukti*. He believes only in *videhamukti*."

THIRD CHAPTER, FOURTH SECTION

3.4.18-20 (E204-206; Khanna 376-377) Śamkaṛa takes the term "grounded in Brahman" as a reference to the fourth or *sannyāsa* stage of (the ideal) life, and infers that one in such a stage gains immortality and performs no further acts leading to acquisition of *karman*. "Bhāsakarācārya, however, says that *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I1.23.1 refers to the 'mendicant' because of his pre-eminence in the field of penance and not to the wandering mendicant [i.e., the fourth, *saṃnyāsa* stage]. Bhāskarācārya does not accept that the term '*tapas*' (austerity) is only connected with the mendicant because he aspires for immortality. The term "*brahmasaṃstha*" ("grounded in Brahman") denotes devotion to Brahman and that is indiscriminately prescribed for all the stages...He does not agree with Śaṃkarācārya when he says that the first three stages cannot belong to the state of *brahmasaṃstha* because of their *karman*. He emphasizes his theory of *jñāna* and *karman*. The purpose of man is either to attain heaven or salvation. Those who are desirous of salvation, all their actions are dedicated to Brahman for that purpose...All his actions...are related to body, the speech and mind, and that is to be abandoned. Thus anybody connected with a body is not entitled to immortality. Therefore, in the case of each one, according to his suitability, the sense of being rooted in Brahman is his devotion to Brahman and not in exclusion of all other activity. In the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* where it is said that renunciation is Brahman, Brahman is referred to and not the abandonment of *karman*. Thus those who perform action only attain to the world of blessed and they are grounded in Brahman and thus enjoy immortality."

3.4.26-27 (E207-210; Khanna 380) Is knowledge dependent on the actions enjoined on those in the four stages of life? Śaṃkara says that "works do not bring about liberation. Knowledge alone can bring about liberation." Bhāskara, on the other hand, prescribes works for all the stages, and this necessarily involves awareness of difference. "The body of even the knower continues to exist, due to the might of the *karman* being worked off in the present life, on account of its being for the purpose of enjoyment...The *karman* which has already started maturing cannot be destroyed. The state of being an experiencer persists as long as there is a body....*jīvanmukti* is not possible, therefore knowledge and action should be performed as means of attaining salvation."

3.4.50 (E217; Khanna 90) In Śaṃkara's discussion of the topic of this *sūtra*, which deals with whether one can gain knowledge in this life or only in a subsequent one, Śaṃkara introduces his distinction between knowledge of *saguṇa* vs. *nirguṇa Brahman*, that is, between the "lower" Brahman with qualities and the "higher" one without qualities. Bhāskara recognizes no such distinction.

FOURTH CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION

4.2.12-14 (E229-231; Khanna 407-409) The topic here is whether the life-principle of the Brahman-knower leaves his body at death, finding support in the *sūtras* for both affirmative and negative answers. Śaṃkara takes the position that the question actually doesn't arise–that there is no question of going out or not going out. Bhāskara, however, revises the text (by combining *sūtras* 12 and 13) so that what they imply is that both knowers and non-knowers leave their bodies at death, but that they travel through different paths,

FOURTH CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION

4.3.7-14 (E236-240; Khanna 415-420) The objector's

(*pūrvapakṣa*'s) view according to Śaṃkara is precisely Bhāskara's view here. The topic concerns *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* V1.2.15 which speaks of the "world of Brahman" where the selves "live forever". Two views are reviewed: one, Bādari's, is that the "world of Brahman" refers to a lower Brahman, not to the higher Brahman, whereas the view of Jaimini is that the liberated selves go to the highest Brahman. Śaṃkara favors Bādari's view, Bhāskara favors Jaimini's. Bhāskarācārya criticizes the view of Śaṃkarācārya and says if the soul's going is not possible with regard to those who know *nirguṇa* Brahman, it is equally impossible in the case of those who realize *saguṇa* Brahman. The attributes which belong to the all-pervading Brahman are themselves all-pervading...

If Brahman is *nirguṇa*, then it becomes non-Brahman because there is no object without qualities. Brahman is described as intelligence (*vijñāna*) and bliss....If Brahman ionly of the nature of intelligence then [Its] attributes of bliss etc. will be purposeless...And [there] is one bliss of Brahman i.e. there is no increase or decrease of bliss...Since...individual souls are of the nature of the Highest...[their] going is not possible even the case of reaching *saguṇa* Brahman. Moreover, the transmigratory self by nature does not go, the going is possible only due to the going of the subtle...body." These are only a selection among many such arguments adduced in this passage by Bhāskara for his view.

5 KEŚAVA KĀŚMĪRI BHAṬṬA (1200 or 1375?)

Amar Prasad Bhattacharya, "The date of Nimbārka", Calcutta Review 179, 1966, pp. 285-286, controverts the standard dating of this author, who has been supposed to be a contemporary of Caitanya in the 15th century. A. P. Bhattacharya says "this view is erroneous. Because a trust deed (*pattā*) dated *saṃvat* 1217 (1161 A. D.) in the name of the said Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa has been discovered in the Nimbārka

Pīṭha of Parasurāmpuri, Salemābad, Rajasthan. That deed was made by the inhabitants of Mathurā and given to him when he protected them and their religion by his spiritual power from the attack of the Muslims, a brief description of which has been given in the famous book *Bhaktimāla* of Nābhaji also. Now, the date of that deed (*pattā*) proves beyond doubt that Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa of the Nimbārka sect lived in the 12th century A.D.

"Secondly, the date of Śrībhaṭṭa, a direct disciple of that Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, has also been proved historically. Because Śrībhaṭṭas's name also appears in the deed mentioned above...Besides, Śrībhaṭṭa wrote a book named *Yugalaśataka* at the end of which he himself stated the date of its composition as *saṃvat* 1351 (1296 A. D)."

M. M. Agrawal, in Agrawal 2000, p. xxi-xxii, merely says that Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa "is traditionally placed in the 14th century". (In an unpublished article on "Concepts of Knowledge in Nimbārka-Vaiṣṇava-Vedānta" he specifies "the later part of the 14th century".) "He was a Telugu Brāhmaṇa, born in the province of Andhra, in the village named Vaidūrya-pattanam..Tradition is that he conquered thrice all learned men of his time. Hence the epithet 'Jagadvijayī' is often prefixed to his name. His first conquest consisted in vanquishing Vidyādharācārya, a scholar of the Śākta school of thought in Kaśmīra, and gave him the name Vrajeśācārya. Vrajeśācārya wrote in 1450 a commentary on Keśavakāśmīri's *Kramadīpikā*. Formerly Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa was acalled '*Keśavabhāratī*' [not the Keśavabhāratī who was the *saṃnyāsa guru* of Caitanya; see Agrawal 2000, p. xxi, note 46], but after his conquest he lived in Kāśmīra for some time" (and thus became known as Kāśmīrin). His second conquest consisted in driving away the Yavanas from Mathurā. After his second conquest Keśavakāśmīrin set out on his third conquest, vanquished the Śākta sect in Bengal, defeated all learned men of Navadvīpa and settled himself in Kaśmīra."

A multitude of works are ascribed to him, see VPSVK 3, pp.123-124. Among these those listed below appear to have philosophical content:

5.1 KEŚAVA KĀŚMĪRI BHAṬṬA, *Tattvaprakāśikā* on the *Bhagavadgītā*

Edited by J. Lallurama, Bombay 1912-13; Nityasvarupa 1909.

5.2 KEŚAVA KĀŚMIRI BHAṬṬA, *Bhāṣya* on the *Kenopaniṣad*

See NCat 5, 38, 62.

5.3 KEŚAVA KĀŚMIRI BHAṬṬA, *Prabhā* on Śrīnivāsa's *Vedāntakaustubha*

Roma Bose provides an analysis of this work in VPSVK pp. 124-132, which may be compared with the following summary prepared by Prof. Mukherjee specifically for our present Volume. "E" references are to the edition in Agrawal 2000, volumes 1-2.

Summary by R. N. Mukherjee

BOOK ONE, SECTION ONE

1.1.1 (E1.6-13) "Then" *(atha)* is taken in the sense of sequence. After having studied the Vedas and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and performing the ritual enjoined there, one acquires the necessary purity of character and realization that religious actions, without knowledge of God and devotion to Him, bring only transitory gains, and after approaching a proper preceptor of Vedānta with devotion, and wholly desirous of salvation, one should inquire into Brahman.

The subject of inquiry here is Brahman, who is Lord Kṛṣṇa, full of unthinkable (*acintya*) auspicious virtues and free from all blemishes, endowed with four manifestations (*vyūha*),

different-cum-non-different support of all sentient and non-sentient things, and the controller of gods, nature, atoms, time and activity.

(E1.12-14) For Advaita Vedānta this inquiry will be difficult, for the Advaitin must have doubt about the content of the inquiry, since in an Advaita context the question will arise whether that content is pure Brahman, or Brahman as veiled by *māyā*, or God as wrongly superimposed with attributes. It cannot be the first because pure Brahman, according to the Advaitin, can never become an object of knowledge without losing its nature of pure consciousness and becoming like any other inert object. It cannot be the second [viz., Brahman veiled by *māyā*] which would be obviously incapable of providing salvation. It cannot be the third [viz., something superimposed] either, because whatever is superimposed is liable to sublation [*bādha*].

In any inquiry four requirements are present: qualification, object, relation, and purpose. In the present inquiry a person desirous of liberation should have the required qualifications: the content is Brahman as Lord Kṛṣṇa with endless good qualities; the relation is between the text of the *Brahmasūtras* and what it established *viz., Brahman). The common purpose is liberation, when the devotee attains the proximity of the Lord or His likeness.

(E1.14-16) For an Advaitin, however, the content is difficult to ascertain, as their contention of identity of Brahman and *jīva* (the individual self) is assailed with alternative possibilities. Is this identity superimposed or not? If superimposed then it is false, and there is duality between Brahman and *jīva*. If not superimposed, then there also arises a duality of Brahman and 'identity' [*abhinnatva*]. If it is maintained that there is no duality between Brahman and 'identity', as they are in no way relative but one and the same, then establishment of Brahman's identity through the great sayings (*mahāvākya*) like "truth, knowledge, and infinity"

would be pointless. The indicative use of identity for setting aside illusions would also be not permissible .

Here it is claimed that this problem arises for an Advaitin because he puts relative and non-relative on the same level, but not for the Nimbārkist because he does not. For the latter non-duality for removal of ignorance is relative like difference or absence, and yet the identity of Brahman is preserved. This is because he accepts the relation of difference-non-difference between Brahman and selves.

(E1.16-20) For want of an object there can be no relation in Advaita Vedānta. A purpose [for the text] also is not ascertainable in Advaita Vedānta, because the question arises whether the consciousness in which a likeness of Brahman is to arise is one or many? Not the first, for then the experiences of different persons, like joy and sorrow, would get mixed up and would not be kept distinct even on the basis of different limitations, for even when hands and feet are different in the case of the same person their experiences get mixed up in the same consciousness. Nor is it reasonable to argue that the internal organ is superimposed on pure consciousness free from any distinction of knower and known.

Do the different ignorant awarenesses of misery etc. reside in different operations (*vṛtti*) of the internal organ or in one pure consciousness? If the former case there will no recipient (locus) of bondage or liberation. On the second alternative there will be mixture of feelings of different persons. And without a locus release from bondage will fail to coincide with release from ignorance.

Again, liberation can neither be possible in pure consciousness, which was never in bondage, nor in a distinct self that (according to Advaita) does not exist.

If bondage consists in limitation, is release due to removal of one limitation or of all of them? In the first case there is always release; in the second case, never. Nor can it be claimed that the diversity of selves being due to limitations, the

giving up of a particular limitation leads to the liberation of the particular self, because this position is beset with alternatives (claiming attention):

(E1.20-23) Is the diversity of selves real or accidental (*aupādhika*)? On the first the Advaitin surrenders his position. On the second alternative, even on release from one limitation pure consciousness, beset with other limitations, cannot get release. And if release requires removal of all limitations, no one has been released so far.

Do limitations that distinguish different selves pervade reality in part of wholly? On the first alternative, the part itself being a limitation, there will be infinite regress. On the second alternative there would be no difference between reality and limitation (so that the limitation will practically swallow the reality). But even Sāṃkhya and Buddhist admit the reality of at least the first presented data, and you also grant practical reality even of the false.

A realized self must be ultimately different from one in bondage. You cannot maintain that freedom and bondage are like dream states; otherwise one self going to sleep would plunge the whole world into sleep. Nor can you escape the difficulty by resort to one cosmic ego, for no one can sleep from creation to dissolution. There would, then, also arise confusion between 'I' and 'you'.

Nor can you say that the differences of experience arise out of diversity of internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*), for *yogins* can experience the state of another's internal organs also. You cannot postulate a single internal organ, for then dispelling of one man's shell-silver illusion would lead to dispelling of the illusion in all men. And, if differences in their internal organs stood in the way of yogic perception of another's mind, bodily differences would also do so. Nor can one self's cosmic imagery influence all, for a self cannot appropriate such a power of god.

(E1.23-30) On acceptance of diverse limitations there would result haphazard creation of the karmic results of actions

and their cessation, leading to erratic bondage and liberation. Nor can it be said that the internal organ being a limitation and selves being images of (cosmic) consciousness, and the internal organ being a product of imagination, when it comes to an end *jīva* and Brahman become one. In the case of the prototype (*pratibimba*), the image in the limitation, being with form and parts the cause is absent. Is the entity reflected with parts and subject to measure or is it part-less and immeasurable? It cannot be the first without violating your non-duality, nor can it be the second because a formless and part-less thing like space cannot be reflected.

A further question arises: Are limitations natural to selves or artificial? Not the first, as it goes against Advaita, nor the second, as that would lead to infinite regress and mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). In experience, a reflection is in material like the thing reflected. Therefore the reflection of pure reality in a limitation is not proved, as the latter is a product of ignorance. Otherwise the images of the sun and the moon in a mirage etc. would be disproved. Nor is it possible that an imagined preceptor can remove the ignorance of a disciple. And is the teacher pure Brahman or not? If he is, he cannot create the scripture; if he is not, he can only deceive (as when he says 'I am Brahman').

From the beginning of creation, has ignorance ever been dispelled or not? If the first, why is the world appearing now? If the second, there should be no incentive for study of scriptures.

Since pure consciousness is always free, and the bound is completely imaginary (*tuccha*), for whose liberation is the study of the scriptures? It will not do to say that nothing beyond liberation that is already realized is meant, like a man reminded of a gem in his neck that he has forgotten. The example is not appropriate because gem and body are different, land the gem is related to a part of the body. Such forgetfulness is not possible in the case of onself that is one's own nature, and

that pervades the whole of one. Where there is no purpose, where is there question of qualifications?

(E1.30-42) Moreover, you cannot claim blanket escape from all difficulties by resort to your theory of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), which cannot be as you hold it to be. In illusory superimposition there are two factors, one the activator (*sādhaka*) and the other the obstructor or sublater (*bādhaka*), the former being of the nature of a common quality, and the latter a special quality. In the shell-silver illusion, silver is the activator and shell is the sublater. Neither of these can be present in pure consciousness that you take to be the common locus of both, as it has neither common nor special qualities.

What is superimposed is thus something else of the same category, experienced elsewhere, and transferred here through memory. What is completely imaginary and never experienced, like a hare's horn, is never superimposed. As there is no occasion for experience of *prakṛti* elsewhere, there can be no question of its superimposition on Brahman. Previous experience is an essential feature in superimposition, for fear etc. in the rope-snake illusion cannot be due to a mere appearance of a snake, for children are not afraid of even real serpents before they learn of their danger .

Illusory superimposition is of the nature of imposition somewhere. It is a self-created appearance in a locus of its absolute absence (*atyantābhāva*). Superimposition is wrong attribution of a generalized remembered entity in a locus of its total absence, based on similarity with the special quality in the locus, resulting from habit and with a beginning in time.

Nor is union through superimposition possible. Is this union positive, negative (an absence), or without a cause? Not the first, as such an entity could not be in union with the self-luminous self. Not the second, because the ignorant person perceives himself as an agent. Nor the third, because falsity cannot be the cause of ignorance, despite such distinctive claims.

Nor can it be maintained that the scripture, being non-personal is free from defects of language and that utterances like 'that thou art' indicate inactive Brahman. In fact many passages in the Upaniṣads attribute active and volitional qualities to the supreme principle. You cannot argue that through secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) even these statements indicate attribute-less Brahman, because what will be indicated will be another word and, according to you, all words being false, the real (*sat*) will end up meaning the completely imaginary (such as a flower in the sky). Even if in implication the attribute is given up and the substance only is retained by *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*, the substantive, being also verbal, will fare no better.

The aforesaid question of the validity of perception cannot be linked with the superimposition of false awareness, as the definition, grounds (of proof), locus , subject, purpose, and dispeller of ignorance are not established.

(E1.42-47) Is the proper definition of ignorance (1) a beginningless entity yet dispelled by knowledge?, (2) what generates illusions?, (3) falsehood that is dispelled by direct knowledge? or (4) falsehood without beginning or locus? It cannot be (1) because (a) some illusions have a beginning and (b) some illusions are dispelled only on the removal of a condition, such as the case of redness in a crystal which is in the vicinity of a red object, as well as in the case of a *jīvanmukta* whose illusions vanish only after exhaustion of the results of past deeds. It cannot be (2), because ignorance so understood cannot reside in Brahman without destroying Its basic nature, and it cannot be entirely without a locus. Case (3) is refuted for the same reasons as the first, and (4) for the same reason as the second.

The definition of Brahman is at once the non-different material and efficient cause of origin, existence, dissolution and salvation of the world with different experiencers and experienced entities. and also reality, consciousness and

endlessness (*saccidananta*).

It cannot be claimed that nowhere do we encounter an efficient cause that is non-different from a material cause, because God as inner-dweller, in union with an individual's consciousness, is both material and efficient cause.

According to the Advaitin there are two types of definitions, intrinsic (*svarūpa*) and accidental (*taṭastha*). An example of the former is "real, knowing and eternal", while "being the cause of the world" is an accidental definition by negation, as it does not help in case of doubt.

An essential nature cannot be cited as a definition, because no definition can be based merely on a thing's intrinsic nature without differentia. Nor can it be maintained that differentia can be provided by imagining the one non-dual reality (Brahman) to bear a distinction, e.g. of qualities and the locus of qualities. for imaginary differentia cannot help in definition.

Again, are words like "real" ("*satya*") conventional or derivative? In either case (to convey sense?) they have to be determinate. Nor will it do to say that reality etc. may be determinate but by the indicative they cancel their determinations to lead to the notion of indeterminate Brahman, for secondary meaning, whether by giving up the direct meaning as incompatible or only a part of it, is as determinate as the meaning that is cancelled. Moreover, by cancelling what is true one can get only what is not true, false, and not indeterminate reality.

When Brahman is stated as real, knowing and eternal, this threefold-ness goes against Its indeterminateness and non-duality and, if only one of them fixes the meaning, the other two become prolix.

If the express definition as real, etc. is only to be cancelled, how can it help in release? Moreover, is that which is to be cancelled real or unreal? In the first alternative there would arise duality, in the second futility, for what is the point

of cancelling a completely imaginary entity like a hare's horn?

Again, since reality etc. are only the substance, and a distinction of subject and predicate is not admitted, the universal being already known and the particular not accepted, the idea of having a part-less notion based on "reality", etc. is itself fallacious.

Again, how is Brahman as cause of the world to be taken, as (1) pure consciousness or as (2) clouded with ignorance or as (3) a support of superimpositions? Given (1), is this pure consciousness (1a) endowed with all auspicious qualities or as (1b) totally bereft of qualities? In the former case (1a) you give up your doctrine and accept ours; on (1b) Brahman cannot "desire or wish to be many" (as stated in scriptures).

Assuming (2), is the cause (of the world) (2a) God or (2b) the *jīva*? If (2a) it will be like a face reflected in a mirror, and God would not be an inner dweller in individual selves; if (2b) there would arise all the limitations of what is itself a product of ignorance.

Alternative (3) is also ruled out because the superimposition of illusion on pure consciousness is like darkness in the sun.

When God is called *māyin*, it means controller of *māyā*, and only as supreme Person, endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities, as non-different material and efficient cause of the world. He can neither be pure consciousness lacking volition nor pure consciousness superimposed on by illusion. Again if Brahman and illusion were both inexpressible the equation of them would follow.

1.1.2 (E1.47-60) This sūtra is taken to refer to *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 3.1, "from whom all these things arise, are sustained, and to whom they go forth and enter". Thus, Brahman is the cause of the origin, maintenance, salvation and dissolution of the world and its beings. The last two eliminate parents, etc. the first two death, etc.

"Reality, knowledge and infinity" also state the nature of Brahman. Some think that these are stated to negate the unreality, ignorance, and finitude of the world, but this is not correct. As both sentient and non-sentient nature are real, they cannot be negated to arrive at reality.

Perception is not possible in the case of Brahman as It is unmanifest. Inference cannot establish Brahman, because inference has to be based on a middle term (or reason, *hetu*), with positive and negative instances. Here positive and negative instances are not available as Brahman is not something determinate or perceptible, nor is there anything outside it. A middle term (or reason) is also not available, because unlike cases such as pot etc., for which an agent is inferred, that entities such as space etc. which are produced and have a cause are themselves not known outside scripture. Moreover an agent for them would be inferred with limitations, finitude, etc. like a human potter, etc. Also all means of proof are lighted by the light of Brahman, so how can they establish Brahman?

Pure being, as such, is not a ground or middle term of inference, because inference rests on specific qualities related to particular senses. Otherwise what is inferred on the basis of vision could also be inferred on the basis of taste. Brahman is free from such specific qualities and hence is not a locus of perception or inference. Inference or reasoning in harmony with scriptural revelation is acceptable.

(E1.60-75) Other instruments of knowledge like comparison, (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*) or non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) cannot prove Brahman. There is nothing to compare with Brahman, there are no marks or features to presume Brahman on their basis, and non-perception can prove only an absence and not any positive entity.

(E1.75-76) Unlike Jaimini's view that the main import of Vedic texts is action, and other statements playing a role subsidiary to it, the concordance of Vedic texts leads to the

establishment of Brahman. Actions are subsidiary to it for attaining the required purity and discipline. When it is seen that the results of actions are transitory, it leads to inquiry into Brahman for liberation.

1.1.5 (E1.76-80) "*Īkṣaṇa*" stands for deliberation and decision that are not possible for *prakṛti*, an insentient first cause as in Sāṃkhya. As *īkṣaṇa* is mentioned in texts like *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.3 and *Aitareyopaniṣad* 11.1, and in the former the first cause is held to be such that by knowing it everything is known, it can only be omniscient, all-powerful Brahman.

1.1.6 (E1.80-81) The mention of perception above cannot be a secondary usage, because the first cause is identified with Śvetaketu's self in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*'s "All this is self, that is real, that is (your) self".

1.1.8 (E1.83) Had it been *prakṛti* Śvetaketu would also have to be told about its inferiority (to be discarded [*heya*] for liberation), but actually his self-identity with it is stated, therefore it is Brahman.

1.1.12 (E1.85-86) Hence the scriptures establish an omniscient abode of all good qualities, an all-powerful great person as the cause of the world, and dismiss both *prakṛti* and indeterminate pure consciousness as the cause.

1.1.13 (E1.87-90) In the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* after four other sheaths of food, vital breath, mind and understanding, bliss is mentioned. This has led some to conclude that it refers to the individual self. But in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* and elsewhere blissfulness has been repeatedly stated of the supreme Self Brahman, to whom it really applies.

1.1.14 (E1.90-92) The suffix "*mayaṭ*" does not mean defect, but abundance. "*Mayaṭ*" here does not represent 'defect' [*doṣa*] which cannot be applicable to Brahman, but means an abundance of bliss, as stated to be the superlative of different degrees of bliss.

1.1.16 (E1.93) Brahman that is referred to by the *mantra*

"truth, knowledge and infinity" is also referred to as supremely blissful.

1.1.18 (E1.94-96) As it is said in the scripture that the individual self gets joy on attaining Brahman, the two cannot be the same, nor can the individual self itself be blissful. The idea cherished by some that the individual self is only Brahman delimited (*parichinna*), like space delimited by a jar, is not tenable as it would lead to momentary bondage and liberation.

1.1.20 (E1.96-107) (In this section there is a long discussion of whether "*ānandamaya*" ("blissful") refers to Brahman or to Brahman delimited as individual self. Those who insist that Brahman is attribute-less and part-less are of the opinion that the attributive experience "blissful" and also the statement that "bliss is the tail of Brahman" in this section of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* cannot refer to Brahman. But the author thinks that the employment of the suffix *-mayaṭ* here signifies abundance and not defect, unlike in "*annamaya*", and "part" has been used for the bliss of Brahman also when the beings of the world are stated to be sustained by a mere speck of it. In case "*mayaṭ*" is taken in the sense of deterioration, does it apply to pure consciousness or to the insentient? The first is impossible as pure consciousness is immutable, the second because of insensitivity.

1.1.21 (E1.108-111) The golden person is the sun and the eye mentioned in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* stands for Lord Kṛṣṇa as Brahman, because of the qualities stated like free from sin, remover of sin, etc., and support of all. He is not an individual self. When about Brahman it is stated that It is free from qualities and formless, it is meant that he is free from natural qualities and forms. But he assumes unnatural forms at will for favoring devotees and destroying wicked people.

1.1.24 (E1.116-118) The "breath" (*prāṇa*) here does not stand for elemental air that is breathed, but the supreme cause from which all the elements originate and in which they merge. Indeed about the individual breath it is said that in sleep the

eye, mind and ear merge in it, and arise from it when he awakes. But here the question is of the origin and merger of cosmic elements, which is possible only from God. Etymologically also *prāṇa* is that from which all things properly arise and are sustained (*prakarṣeṇāniti*).

1.1.25 (E1.118-120) The contents, practically a repetition of *Vedāntakaustubha*, indicate that "light" here is not to be taken as the physical light of the sun, etc. but Brahman, whose one foot is said to cover all beings, and the other three feet to be immortal, and who as fire digests food (in bodies (as stated in the *Bhagavadgītā*).

1.1.26 (E1.120-122) Practically a summary of *Vedāntakaustubha*.. "Gāyatrī", mentioned in the scripture referred to above, does not stand for a meter merely, but Brahma as conveyed by the meter, an application of the mind to Gāyatrī, as the self of all, is mentioned for meditation.

1.1.27 (E1.122) Gāyatrī is Brahman also because the four feet of it, viz. beings, earth, body and heart, are appropriate to Brahman but not to a meter, which is a collection of letters.

1.1.28 (E1.123) Despite differences of application, of location, and the ablative case-endings for "heaven" in the two passages of scripture (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.12.6 and 3.13.7) the "light" mentioned refers to Brahman of unsurpassed splendor in both cases.

1.1.29 (E1.123-125) In the *Kauśītakī Brāhmaṇa* benediction granted to Pratardana by Indra, "*prāṇa*" stands for God (great self), because devotion to it has been said to most beneficial of all, it is *prajñātman*, blessed, free from sickness or old age, and leads to truth.

1.1.30 (E1.125-127) In spite of Indra's instruction to worship himself as destroyer of the son of Tvaṣṭṛ etc., the meaning of "*indra*" and "*prāṇa*" is to be taken as Brahman, because of frequent reference to the highest Self in the section from *Kauśītakī Brāhmaṇa*, and reference to it as of highest

benefit to mankind and free from age, blissful and immortal.

When Indra gives advice to "worship him", he is actually referring to one supreme Self who is inner-dweller of all, as realized by seers like Vāmadeva who uttered "I am the sun, I am Manu".

1.1.32 (E1.129-130) Largely the same as VK, but three ways of meditation on Brahman are given here as on the inner-dweller of selves, of vital breath, and their objects of devotion, instead of inner-dweller of sentient, insentient and all, as in VK.

The statement that one should look for the speaker rather than speech, the exploits of Indra, and the role of the vital breath in sustaining the body, are mentioned corresponding to the three ways of meditation on Brahman in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* as mentioned above.

BOOK ONE, SECTION TWO

1.2.1 (E1.131-136) In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* it is stated: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating, breathing and disappearing in Him. Let us meditate thus on Him. Man is determiner of his deeds; as he acts in this world, so he becomes on death. He should so determine (his activity) that his mind, vital breath, and body become of the form of light".

Here the question arises whether the individual self is to be meditated on or the supreme Self. Here association with mind, vital breath and body, *karmans*, and further on reference of his stay in the heart of the size of a grain of rice or barley may suggest that it is the individual self that is to be meditated upon. But the individual self cannot be the cause of the origin and dissolution of the world, and about Brahman also it has been said that He is endowed with mind (*manomaya*). Hence the content of meditation is Brahman as great Lord.

1.2.2 (E1.136-137) *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.14.1 "consisting of mind, with breath as body, of the nature of light, of true resolves, with space as self, having all desires, odors...tastes, all-pervasive, non-speaking, indifferent" are appropriate to

Brahman alone. Here '*manomaya*' means that Brahman can be grasped only by a mind made pure by abstinence, orderly life, and devotion to God; '*prāṇaśarīra*' means having the lives of all regulated as its body; '*bhārūpa*' means full of unnatural, blessed splendor, etc.

1.2.3 (E1.137)As the prior mental (*manomaya*) does not apply to a bodily *jīva*, Brahman is to be worshiped as endowed with the property.

1.2.4 (E1.137-138) Because "possessed of the mind" has been indicated as good for the *jīva*, to be attained by him on death by proper deeds (of meditation etc.).

1.2.5 (E1.138) Because of difference of word constitution in the statement "This self of mine within the heart" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.14.3-4) where the highest Self and the individual self are denoted differently by the nominative and genitive respectively, the reference to that which is possessed by mind etc. is to Brahman.

1.2.6 (E1.138-141) "I am the inner-dweller of all", "Have resort to God, who is the inner-dweller of all", such *smṛti* (*Bhagavadgītā*) statements show the difference between the worshiper and the worshiped. For some (i.e., the Advaitin) the self determined by the "body-mind-intellect' complex appears to belong to the body just as space, not actually limited, might appear to be limited by a jar. As omniscient Brahman is really incapable of contact with ignorance, the limitations are due to limitations.

Now, are limitations all-pervasive or atomic or of a medium size? In case the limitation is all-pervasive, there would result all-pervasive darkness or ignorance and no possibility of release. The limitation cannot be atomic because of incompatibility of an atomic limitation determining an atomic self and its invisibility. In case the limitation be of medium, finite size just as the space delimited by a jar does not move with the jar, the movements of the limitation would plunge different aspects of one pure consciousness into arbitrary

bondage and liberation, making a mockery of the scripturally approved means of liberation.

Again, is the limitation real or unreal? It cannot be real without destroying monism, with surrender to duality, and the impossibility of its removal by knowledge. If the limitation is unreal, and it can cause bondage, then dream bondage would also remain real in waking life.

As such, the bondage and liberation of *jīvas*, who are of the nature of the *śakti* of God, are due to their own *karmans*, and not ignorance or otherwise, nor any extraneous factor like a limitation.

1.2.7 (E1.141-142) Even if the content of meditation is mentioned as of small size like the top of a spoke or a grain of rice etc., it represents Brahman and not the individual self. Because it is also mentioned as "greater than the earth and sky", and even space can be considered to occupy the tip of a needle in its subtle aspect.

1.2.8 (E1.142-143) Even if Brahman reside in the heart of a *jīva* It is not subject to joy and sorrow because a selfs experiences arise due to his deeds that do not affect God. Otherwise fire at one spot would set all of space ablaze.

1.2.9 (E1.143-144) In *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.2.9 the eater of *brāhmaṇa* and *kṣatriya* is Brahman and not the individual self, because by its enjoyment is not meant, but destruction of anything movable and immovable, which is not possible for a *jīva*.

1.2.10 (E1.145) As the topic under discussion is mentioned as 'great all-pervasive", and it is also said that "He is attainable (only) by those he chooses", it is the supreme Self who is indicated thereby.

1.2.11 (E1.145-148) Mainly the same as VK, but unlike VK takes the reference to the Supreme Self and the individual self as respectively light and shade to mean omniscience and limited awareness. "*Aditi*" as applied to *jīva* is explained as derived from the fact that it determines karmic results

corresponding to actions and "mode of deities" as standing for the fact that due to enjoyment through the senses of the earth etc., the *jīva* attains a different status like a god etc.

1.2.12 (E1.148-149) A combination of VPS' ending and VK. The Supreme Self and the individual self are to be taken to have entered the cave, because in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* I.17 and 3.5 the two are indicated as the worshiped and the worshiper, the goal and the getter of the goal.

1.2.13 (E1.149-151) A question arises whether the person within the eye (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.15.1) is the reflected self (*jīva*), or some presiding deity of sense, or the supreme Self only.

1.2.14 (E1.151-152) By "staying in the eye" what is indicated in the scripture as the supreme Self is the basis of vision and since it is taught to be hidden from vision, it can be seen only by *yogins*.

1.2.15 (E1.152-154)The person within the eye is the supreme Self indicated by *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 4.10.5 "life-breath is Brahman, bliss if Brahman, space is Brahman". Here Brahman is indicated as blissful support of vision having the quality of receiving all enjoyable things from everywhere, the uncaused content of meditation to be worshiped.

1.2.16 (E1.154) In the above section of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, when it is said that "what is bliss (*kām*) is space (*kham*), and what is space is bliss", bliss unlimited like space is indicated, which is possible only in Brahman.

1.2.17 (E1.154-156) A Upaniṣad is that which removes the doubts about the relation between the devotee and his (proper) object of devotion, and the Lord of the world, and leads to the attainment of God through close determination (*upaniścaya*) (between teacher and disciple).

As stated in another Upaniṣad (*Praśnopaniṣad* 1.10), those who proceed through devotion to the person in the eye (as stated above in *sūtra* 1.2.6) do not return to human-fold; this person is the supreme Self.

1.2.18 (E1.187) If a reflected self (*jīva*), the deity presiding over the senses etc., were accepted as residing in the eye, then immortality or acquiring of all enjoyments etc. (as stated) would be impossible. Hence the person in the eye is the supreme Self.

1.2.19 (E1.158-160) The inner controller of earth, the sky, space and others, including individual selves, cannot be an individual self or presiding deity of earth etc., because he is said to be the inner-controller of the former and as not known to earth. As controller of all and immortal, He is the supreme Self.

1.2.22 (E1.162-165) The *mantra* from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.15-16 where mention is made of the immutable, invisible, subtle, beyond hearing, source of being, is also said to be beyond the immutable. This raises the question how could the same entity be beyond itself? Therefore the first mention should be taken as referring to *prakṛti* which is both immutable and invisible. But this is not possible for *prakṛti*, but it is for Brahman. The second mention of "immutable" can alone be taken to mean *prakṛti*.

1.2.25 (E1.166-167) "Vaiśvānara" has several meanings: digestive fire, natural fire, deity, and Supreme Self. Here in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* "Vaiśvānara" means the supreme Self, because here Vaiśvānara is mentioned in answer to a query "What is the self, and what is Brahman?". To a question "what is Brahman" the reply has been about Vaiśvānara. Also it has been said that it dispels all sins and that can be applicable to Brahman or the supreme Self only.

1.2.26 (E1.169-170) The reference to Vaiśvānara as supreme Self is corroborated by a similar statement in *smṛti* (vix., *Mahābhārata* 12.16.56) whereas in the Upaniṣad's passage the great being with fire as mouth and heavenly heads is referred to as the adorable self of all.

1.2.27 (E1.170-172) "Vaiśvānara" here cannot mean just the digestive fire, as the digestive fire cannot be te self of all, as mentioned; also because Vaiśvānara is mentioned as *puruṣa* or

person, the self.

1.2.29 (E1.172-173) "Vaiśvānara" stands for inner controller or great Self. "*Nara*" has been called great Self. Vaiśvānara represents the universal Self transcending difference, and as the common cause and regulator of all men. In this way, both Vaiśvānara and Agni can also directly (etymologically) mean the great Self.

1.2.33 (E1.175-176) The idea (in taking Vaiśvānara as a person dwelling within the devotee) is that the devotee takes his breast as an alter, etc., and identifying himself with Vaiśvānara with heaven as head, regards the oblations as that of his own vital breath.

BOOK ONE, SECTION THREE

1.3.1 (E1.177-179) The one Self, mentioned in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.5 as support of sky, earth, mind, vital breath etc., and the bridge to immortality is to be taken as te supreme Self and not as *prakṛti* or the individual self, because of the mention of "own", that is the great Self's own extraordinary attribute of being a bridge to immortality, being all-pervasive and regulator of all. If in the same text (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.6) it is referred to as "becoming manifold" that also does not make it the individual self, because God who is unborn can also take birth out of kindness towards his devotees.

1.3.7 (E1.182-183) The first part is the same as VK. The *Prabhā* adds that the purpose of this section is to remove the doubt that might arise from certain expressions in the *śruti* passage referred to in *sūtra* 1.2.22.

1.3.8 (E1.183-188) Practically the same as in VK. Because of its importance a short summary is as follows:

Bhūman is not quantitatively larger, but stands for what is unlimited as contrasted to *alpa* or limited. *Bhūman* is said to be the real bliss, where one does ot see another, hear another, know another.

Does it stand for the individual self's realization or for the supreme Self, Brahman? It cannot stand for the former because in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* I.16-17, after mentioning vital breath that stands for the individual self, it is said to be transcended in the realization of truth and *bhūman*. Hence the latter stands for the supreme Self or Brahman as ultimately blissful.

1.3.9 (E1.188-189) The first portion is the same as in VPS. The supreme Self is indicated because of the attributes like complete bliss, immortality, etc. and the expression "based on its own glory" that are appropriate only for the supreme Self. In the *Prabhā* it is added that in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* when Sanatkumāra speaks of attributing egoity to the all-pervasiveness of *bhūman*, to consider "I am everywhere", it is not because *bhūman* is of the nature of ego, but for the sake of worship;.

1.3.10 (E1.189-193) Śrīnivāsa, the author of VK, gives alternative explanations, of which the first agrees with Śaṃkara, while the second agrees with Nimbārka and Rāmānuja. Our commentator accepts the first explanation only. In it "*ākāśa*" is taken as *prakṛti*, and hence *akṣara* (imperishable) that is the support of space and all other produces is Brahman or the Supreme Self.

The commentator also mentions an additional view, held by some, according to which "*akṣara*" stands for *praṇava* [i.e., *oṃ*], but dismisses it as not fitting into the context.

1.3.11 (E1.193)The support of everything up to space is possible only for the supreme Self, because it is said in the same Upaniṣad (the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) that by its unrestricted command the sun and the moon stay supported, which is not applicable to an individual self.

1.3.13 (E1.195-197) The person seen in *brahmaloka*, according to *Praśnopaniṣad* 5.5, is Brahman and not the deity Brahmā, because of attributes "tranquil, ageless, immortal, and fearless, supreme" apply to Brahman only.

1.3.14 (E1.198-202) After a section that is a resumé of VK, the *Prabhā* provides the following exposition of the content of meditation: Brahman is indicated as residing in the body of the meditator, in close proximity with it as its organ, as an atomic lotus shaped in the heart, to be meditated on in a subtle form in the small space of the heart. It is indicated as free from sin to bring out its auspicious qualities. It is also compared to external space, and stated to be the support of all like earth and sky. when it is said that everything that is and is not are in it, its permanence is stated; that it is free from old age implies its freedom from the body. It is also indicated that by its grace a wise man attains all desires and becomes of true resolve.

1.3.15 (E1.202-203) As all beings are said to go to it day by day (during deep sleep), the small space is Brahman (*Chāndoyopaniṣad* 8.3.2), and not physical space.

1.3.16 (E1.204) The "small space" is regarded as the bridge that keeps apart different objects of creation (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.4.1). It is Brahman, by whose commands the sun and the moon are said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* to be held apart.

1.3.17 (E1.204-205) It is well known that the supreme Self is frequently mentioned as "space". Hence here also physical space is not meant.

1.3.21 (E1.208) If due to smallness "small space" was meant to indicate the individual self, then it would not be said to be as the outer space.

1.3.22 (E1.208) By imitating the ever-present qualities of the great self who is "small space", the individual self gets release from sins etc. Hence the imitator cannot be the same as the object imitated, and the individual self is not the "small space".

1.3.23 (E1.209) In *smṛti* also it is stated that on liberation the individual self becomes like the great Self ("attains my attributes", *Bhagavadgītā* 14.2). Here the commentator mentions that some others (Śaṃkara, Bhāskara)

interpret two *sūtras* here as a different section, taking the reference to be to *Bhagavadgītā* 15.12 etc., where the self is declared as the cause of illumination (revelation) of all. The present commentator is of the view that this not necessary, because in *sūtra* 1.1.24, supposed by *sūtras* 1.2.21 and 1.3.1, this has been already dealt with.

1.3.24 (E1.210-211) The person of the size of a thumb mentioned in *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.1.12 is the supreme Self. The rest is the same as VK.

1.3.25 (E1.211) When it is said that the Supreme Self is to be taken as of the size of a thumb, according to the heart of a human devotee, it wold not apply in the case of (say) an elephant. But actually the size of a thumb is meant to suggest the size of its own thumb, the individual self, in all cases, being atomic itself.

1.3.26 (E1.212-213) Gods also can meditate on Brahman and they also possessor assume bodies. But this presents no contradiction, because thumb-size applies in all cases with reference to a particular body (for meditation while in it).

1.3.27 (E1.214-215) To the objection that if gods have bodies how can the same deity receive offerings at different places simultaneously, the answer is that they can assume different bodies at the same time, as even a *yogin* can.

1.3.28 (E1.215-217) Practically the same as in VK. The commentator adds the clarification that the names of gods are not like personal names that refer only to individuals, but are like the word "*go*" for a cow that has a generic meaning also. Vedic names of gods, through this general meaning, enable the creator to create gods at the beginning of every cosmic period. Hence, in spite of the destructibility of gods, there is no break in the eternal nexus between Vedic words and the corresponding objects that they denote.

1.3.43 (E1.235-236) The objector's position is elaborated. Because "this self is Brahman", Brahman attains

Brahman. "That thou art" states the identity of the individual self and Brahman, and "there is no diversity whatever" denies all differences. On liberation there can be no difference between the individual self and Brahman, the difference, when stated, being due to limitations, like that of space enclosed by a jar. The reply is given in VK.

BOOK ONE, SECTION FOUR

1.4.1 (E1.239-244) The commentator gives a more explicit resumé of what has come earlier in the previous three Chapters (*pāda*). The rest, as in VPS, establishes that the "unmanifest", mentioned in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, stands for the body and not for Sāṃkhya's *prakṛti*..

1.4.2 (E1.244-245) The first alternative meaning of VK is adopted here. The effect body is taken to be the same as the cause, and hence mentioned as subtle cause, which is unmanifest.

1.4.3 (E1.245-246) The unmanifest is not the *prakṛti* accepted by the Sāṃkhya but *prakṛti* as controlled by the supreme Self and inseparable from Him. The supremacy of *puruṣa* means that everything else including *prakṛti* is under his control. The metaphor of the charioteer, as given in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, also denotes the same. Without working under sentient direction, *prakṛti* would be unable to yield any result.

1.4.4 (E1.246) In Sāṃkhya the distinction between *guṇas* and *puruṣa* should be known for liberation, hence *prakṛti* is to be known. This is not mentioned here, so the unmanifest here is not the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya.

1.4.6 (E1.248-252) There are only three questions asked in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*: (1) about the end to be attained, the supreme Self; (2) the attainer, the individual self, and (3) the means thereof. Thus, there is no place for the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya.

1.4.7 (E1.253) Just as "*mahat*" is used in Sāṃkhya to mean the category of the intellect) but as a self in Vedānta, so

the unmanifest also does not mean *prakṛti* in Vedānta.

1.4.14 (E1.263-266) Brahman is the (first) cause of the world. Just as a potter remains the same even when producing different kinds of earthen vessels, God sometimes creates space and sometimes fire and yet remains the same.

1.4.19 (E1.275-279) (Objection:) When it is said that "immortality is not attained by wealth, it is not meant as a statement of a means for attainment of immortality, but as a limitation of the individual self. Liberation lies in establishment of the self in its own nature, freed from *prakṛti*. For the liberation of all the selves from *prakṛti*, due to all-pervasive units in universal knowledge, there is the necessity of one supreme Self. Under His supervision, *prakṛti* creates the world, and the *Ṛgveda* is as his breath. All things defeat him who sees them as different from the self. Hence it is the individual self, according to Sāṃkhya, that is mentioned.

(Answer:) Realizing that wealth cannot win immortality, on Maitreyī's request Yājñavalkya tells her: the self that is the means of attaining immortality is the supreme Self. "By knowing Him one escapes death, when he wraps up space, like skin, to realize the supreme Self." Thus, by methods of agreement and difference, the supreme Self is established as the content of meditation. The individual self's freedom from *prakṛti* is not the means of liberation, but knowledge of God, by knowing whom everything is known. The limited *jīva* cannot be the cause of all. Hence by "self" here the supreme Self of all, the cause of all, denoted by all texts, is meant.

1.4.22 (E1.282-285) In the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.4.5 and 4.5.6, beginning with the statement that verily husband is not loved for himself but for the Self, and ending with the instruction that Self verily is to be seen, heard and meditated upon, the phrase "verily" would be pointless if the reference were to the individual self.

What is meant is that the supreme Self is the object of worship. All dear objects become such as part of an individual

self's yearning for the supreme Self, and reflectively endows other objects with Its desirability and loveliness. God who is worshiped (*ārādhita*) in all activities, endows joyfulness to all objects for His devotees, as is stated in "This (supreme Self) gives joy to that (individual self)" (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7.1) and "I provide the desirable ends and their protection to unswerving devotees" (*Bhagavadgītā* IX.22).

By "*ātman*" this section indicates Brahman. "Whatever is taken as different from Brahman" defeats desires. All views that admit such differences in sentient or non-sentient things are erroneous. The example of "salt fully pervading water" indicates the pervasion of God in His worshiper to encourage him. "That which knows all this, who will know him?" indicates the difficulty of knowing God. In this way the whole of the section deals with the Supreme Self, and not with Sāṃkhya's *puruṣa*.

1.4.23 (E1.285-295) The view that *prakṛti* is the material cause, and Brahman is only the efficient cause, cannot be maintained, because there is a promise that by knowledge of Brahman everything can be known (*Chāndogyopaniṣad*), and as an example is cited the case of clay by knowing which all clay vessels are known. This is possible provided Brahman is also the material cause.

Scriptural texts mention Brahman both as efficient cause as regulator and material cause. *Prakṛti,* which normally stands for material cause, is dependent on Brahman. And unless Brahman be taken as material cause, He cannot be all-pervasive.

Of the two kinds of cause the efficient cause is dependent on matter, i.e., objects having awareness, will and activity directed toward them; dependence on matter means narrow specific interest in that matter due to beginningless traces, leading to actions according to the karmic results of past activities.

In Advaita Vedānta efficient causation is difficult to

comprehend. Since a "cause" is imaginary, there can be no awareness, will or activity such as a potter's. The deluded man cannot be proved to be an agent in the case of the illusory perception of shell as silver. Mere non-perception (of facts) cannot be taken as activity. According to this view an omniscient person cannot be an active agent. Unless there is a mental mode determined (by a specific meaning and form) and a corresponding desire for the observed, there is no activity. Similarly in the shell-silver illusion there is no activity (to appropriate silver).

When in scripture the Supreme Principle is said to express in names and forms it is not comparable to shell appearing as silver. The mistaken person is not necessarily always guilty of superimposition. Deluding through magic is not like *māyā*; the magician [*māyāvin*] deludes others but not himself.

As for the definition of material cause, only one point about it needs to be stated here. It cannot be the locus of illusion, because the behavior of such a locus of illusion as the shell is not seen to be similar to a material cause like clay. On perception of clay a clay pot is not cancelled like the sublation of the illusory silver on perception of its locus, shell. The change, that is actual, is not apparent but a transformation.

It cannot be said that in every case of change of form, the locus is the material cause, and therefore, in Brahman's appearance as the world, due to ignorance Brahman acts as a material cause of the "false" diversity, with transformation taking place in ignorance, because only the false can transform into false. The real cannot transform into the unreal without surrendering its nature as "real".

Moreover, if "real" does get changed into "unreal" there must be qualities in it corresponding to such change, and that is not possible in part-less ultimate reality or else its indeterminateness has to be given up. Nor can it be said that the material cause is that which is seen as inseparable from its

effect, for in that case water and milk, and pests and corn, would stand in the relation of material cause and effect.

Nor can a material cause be regarded as inseparable from its effect, for where similar objects are involved, this applies to an efficient cause only.

If it is held that *māyā* is the material cause, God the efficient cause, and pure Brahman the locus (of the world), then the Advaita theory of Brahman as non-different material and efficient cause in the same sense and locus is given up. If *māyā* or ignorance is taken as the material cause of the world, there is the further dilemma: did the transformation of *māyā* precede or follow the Supreme Being's resolve "I am one without a difference"? It could not be the first without making the resolve impossible; it could not be the second without flouting the resolve. Acceptance of Brahman as qualified by sentience and non-sentience is also frought with difficulties for the Advaitin. In accepting it, he has to give up the doctrine of indeterminacy; in discarding it, he cannot explain how Brahman is the material cause of the world.

Actually Brahman, who is the soul of the whole world and import of all words, and who is non-different from all sentient and non-sentient things, is both the efficient and material cause of the world, through his conscious power (*citśakti*), and pervades all the diverse conditions that are commonly taken to constitute causes.

1.4.24 (E1.295-296) Brahman as creator of the world has expressed it as his own manifestation. The Vedic statement "He desired" expresses His creatorship; "Let me be many" expresses His material causality.

1.4.25 (E1.296) God's activity is of two types: unnatural (*aprākṛta*) and natural (*prākṛta*). The latter is one of transformation, where by God projects himself as the world through his power. It is not a case of self-transformation of *prakṛti* independently of Brahman, as held by Sāṃkhya.

Vivartavāda (the theory that the world is an appearance)

cannot be correct as it goes against the scriptural premise of knowing everything by knowing Brahman, for by knowing the shell silver is not known, unlike clay, by knowledge of which vessels of clay are known.

1.4.28 (E1.300-301) Had God, who is omniscient, all knowledge, not been the cause of the world, there would be no regularity in space, time, and the cause-effect sequence.

BOOK TWO, SECTION ONE

2.1.3 (E2.303-309) In *smṛti* Sāṃkhya and Yoga stand for knowledge and unattached activity, which is in agreement with the Vedas.

2.1.6 (E2.314-315) Is the effect to be entirely like the cause or only partially? The former is obviously not the case, as seen in effects like hair, nails etc. from food. If the effect has to be only partially like the cause, this obtains even regarding space as the product of Brahman according to scriptures, since both have "reality".

2.1.9 (E2.317-318) Just as the earth is not affected by its fourfold transformations (in the form of attributes of elements?), Brahman is also not touched by the express names and forms as sentient and non-sentient world. It stands apart as possessed of unthinkable unlimited power and having the nature of unexcelled constant bliss. Moreover, the limitations, ignorance, and bondage of deeds pertain to the powers of sentient and non-sentient things, and not to pure, unrelated Brahman.

2.1.10 (E2.318-319) "When the same fault lies on two sides of an argument, it cannot be leveled against one side only". According to this logic, Sāṃkhya also cannot explain how part-less and formless *prakṛti* produces the world of parts and forms. According to their logic, the effects should be partless and formless, too, when they wold not be perceptible at all.

2.1.11 (E2.319-322) As Buddhists, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas,

Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems have demolished one anothers' arguments, the Sāṃkhya system, based on arguments or logic merely, is also not reliable.

This is not said to mean that logical reasoning has no place in ordinary practical life, in averting pain and gaining happiness. What is meant is that in matters spiritual, that are not accessible to perception and reasoning, mere arguments have no basis: only arguments based on (revealed) scriptures are reliable, as for deciding whether the self is unborn and eternal.

2.1.13 (E2.323-325) The argument of the *Prabhā* is closer to VPS than to VK. In VK two objections to regarding Brahman as the material cause of the world are considered, viz., it would make God as controller one with the individual self as experiencer, and the individual self as experiencer would become one with what it experiences, viz., the body and objects. Of these the *Prabhā* considers only the first objection and answers it by maintaining that while Brahman is the material cause of the world, yet there is a distinction between Brahman and an individual self as in ordinary experience we see a distinction between clay and clay vessels in name, form, and attributes. The individual's actions, being based on such attributes, in no way affect Brahman.

2.1.14 (E2.325-354) The non-difference of the effect from the cause is based on the text "The effect has its beginning in speech, is (only) a name". A question presents itself here: Is the effect false, that is, inexpressible, or unreal, or real? In this doubt one (an Advaita Vedāntin) says: "The unreal never appears, the real is never cancelled, but the world -appearance (as effect) both appears and is cancelled, and hence it is different from both real and unreal, and (hence) inexpressible". What is inexpressible is false: had the appearances not been false, they would not be set aside by knowledge.

But the above position is not correct. The theory of falsity and inexpressibility has been demolished earlier. Here it

needs to be added that it is not the case that something must be false or unreal to be removed by knowledge. Many instances are available where the real is removed by knowledge, viz., knowledge dispels the grounds of ignorance in its locus, truth dispels its prior absence (*prāgabhāva*), knowledge of defects (in a person, etrc. removes attachment, and the sight of Setubandha (Rāmeśvara) dispels the sin of killing a Brahmin.

Nor are cases lacking where despite knowledge to the contrary the unreal keeps appearing. Thus to the jaundiced person the shell keeps appearing yellow even when he knows it is white, and, according to Advaitins themselves, the liberated-in-life continues to experience the world till the residual consequences of his past actions are exhausted.

Even if not instantiated in experience, why may it not be granted that, as stated in scriptures, the real bondage may also be removed. Else the world as experienced in a state of liberated-while-living, due to actions (of the past), would also be true.

Moreover, your beginningless ignorance is also opposed to both experience and scriptures. If non-sublatability by knowledge be the criterion of reality, then the world cannot be due to ignorance by equating ignorance with *prakṛti*. Nor will it help to grant practical reality to the world, for there are indisputable statements in scripture that the world is born of Brahman and not ignorance. In the scriptures "*māyātu*, etc." the conscious nature of God is meant by "*māyā*", and not ignorance without will. Even mere practical durability, that is conceded, is not maintainable.

Just as the meditation on and knowledge of Garuḍa, a black bee, etc., dispel a real poison or insect, etc., the world-order that is dispelled by knowledge based on real tradition is also real. In fact, that which is dispelled and what dispels are on the same level of reality, and so would be Brahman and ignorance in case the former were to dispel the latter.

If, according to you, by knowledge of that which is

reflected (*bimba*, Brahman), the difference of its reflection (*pratibimba*, anindividual self) is removed, just as by knowledge of the whiteness of a shell the awareness that it is yellow (due to jaundiced vision) is dispelled; actually, even on the knowledge of whiteness, the yellowness generated by ignorance of it is not dispelled (in vision). It won't do to say that due to the presence (*bhāva*) of a limitation, during its duration the effect of ignorance continued. For knowledge does not depend on anything else for dispelling its prior absence in ignorance., just as removal of the material cause leads to the removal of its effect. Why is it that in Vedānta revelation does not remove at one stroke all those traditional sources of ignorance that lead to bondage in the state of liberation-while-living? If (residual) actions can stand in the way of even knowledge for dispelling ignorance, your view is similar to ours. In fact the bondage is removed only by God's grace and by no other means. Knowledge also is obtainable by God's grace.

If the world-order be not real, then what is God maintaining or sustaining? If the shell is seen as shell, then who tries to find silver in it? Who except a madman would like to rear dream-children in a wakeful state, so God, who always sees through illusions, would have no occasion to sustain an illusory world, God would engage neither in imagining the unreal nor in sustaining it.

There are, on the contrary, clear references to God's resolving to be many and creating the world of diversity.

Also, a magician is not deluded by his own magic, and as such when he asserts that he sees magic it must be there. The example that a physician may prescribe a medicine for a particular disease as if he has seen it work, even without seeing it work, merely on the basis of what he has learnt, won't do. Hence the problem is not of one magician sustaining another's conjured stuff.

A commentator has stated that in practical reality God is omniscient and He assumes the limitations of names and

forms to appear as individual selves, just as space gets delimited as the space of a pot by a pot-limitation. But all this is not real ultimately.

All of this account if not based on scriptures but on a fertile imagination.

Neither are names and forms false, nor are God's omniscience, power and activity merely practical truths, based as they are on discriminative language born of perceptual differences, because then the Advaitins own statements become open to objections. The author of the *Vivaraṇa* [viz., Prakāśātman] has based the non-difference of Brahman and *jīva* on the fact that their difference is not amenable to perception and other *pramāṇas*. If perception can be relied upon to prove non-difference true, it can equally well be relied upon to prove difference.

When it is said that "God has become self-like" does it mean (1) total non-difference in nature, (2) appearance of reality like silver in shell, or (3) inseparability in nature? It cannot be the first because that is not supported by scriptures, nor the second because that is opposed to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* statement that "the named (i.e., Brahman) is truth of truth". When it said in scriptures that Brahman expressed itself in names and forms it is not stated that it is only projected as an appearance. Therefore, only the third alternative remains.

Nor can it be said that all knowledge except that of Brahman is false, as different from reality and consciousness, being objective, inert and limited like shell-silver, because of the untenability of the locus, the *sādhya*, the reason and example.

Here a question arises whether that which is different from (pure) consciousness is experienced or not? If it is experienced, then you cannot deny the perceived thing. If you claim that it is false as located in the real, because this characteristic extends to Brahman also, this too-general (*ativyāpti*) reason would reduce Brahman also to falsehood.

Nor can it be maintained that it is not experienced, for then what is being dismissed as false? In the latter case the whole argument is vitiated for want of a locus (i.e., it commits *āśrayāsiddhi*).

The *sādhya* (of your argument) is impossible, it being falsehood. Is this falsehood (of the world) itself true or false? On the first alternative these will be two truths and that will demolish Advaita; on the second alternative, by double negation, the reality of the world will be restored. Thus there is a dilemma both ways to challenge non-dualism.

What is falsity, anyway? It cannot be real without a locus in existence, or a real thing of the nature of non-existence or absence, because in the world only absences with specific counter-positives are experienced.

Nor can total absence of the real and total absence of the unreal be two non-related distinct things. The absence of one establishes the other, as in the case of attribute-less Brahman the absence of existence reduces it to falsity. Thus both entities of the nature of total absence of reality or unreality are discredited, being equally faulty.

Is the real that which does not appear in the existent due to an limitation or it is that which is never cancelled? And is the unreal that which is the counter-positive of an absence thereof? This is not possible, as the definition would then extend to Brahman. If the unreal is to have the above nature, then it would be futile to apply the characteristic of being different from the real to it (the unreal), for then the completely imaginary also may be assigned reality, as it would be an unreal such as is accepted by Śūnyavādins in the world-appearance. Therefore, it is simpler to accept real and unreal as negations of each other..

Nor can you say that if everything is to be accepted as real there would arise confusion in behavior, for the Advaitin himself admits three levels of reality. According to scripture, "Whatever exists depends on that (Supreme)". What has

dependent or derivative reality will be regarded as such and not as unreal.

It cannot be said that Brahman of like nature is the locus of diverse states, because then it would become like the manifest world. Nor can it be said that Brahman, being attribute-less, is not the locus of being or non-being, as its attribute-less-ness negates being and non-being, for then the *sādhya* (of the argument for it) becomes impossible.

The reason (in the argument) stated is also only apparent. According to some Advaita teachers the world is false because it is perceptible and inert. About this the author argues as to what is meant by "perceptible"? Does it mean the content of a mental operation. or that which is pervaded by faults of actions. Neither would be applicable, because the falsity would assail Brahman also. This is not because, according to Advaita theory, Brahman also becomes the content of a mental operation (produced by a *mahāvākya* or great saying). And moreover in many passages of scripture Brahman has also been enjoined to be perceived. The results of actions, as determined by merit, being unrelated to mental states like joy and sorrow, if non-pervasion by those results were the criterion of reality, such mental states would also qualify as realities.

Nor can inertness be a proof of falsity, because mental modes are not divisible as percipient of the inert as far as objects are concerned, and as receptive of the sentient as regards their basis in the self, with the consequence that inertness would pervade the self also.

Again, is awareness of the self with a content or without one? On the first alternative, is the self the content or something else? Not the first, as self-consciousness is not accepted in your system; nor the second, for in liberation, according to you, there is no second content. Nor can it be said of knowledge, which involves the capacity for lighting up perceived objects, that it persists in liberation, for the following reason: if knowledge were to remain in the liberated state

because of off and on relations with objects, sorrow would also remain in liberation for the same reason.

Just as an absence has the same locus as its counter-positive, similarly awareness and its content have the same locus in their cognizer. The relation between awareness and its content is not one of wrong attribution or superimposition. If such a relation be false, its prior state also is false, but such falsity cannot be admitted in liberation. Just as there can be no experience without one who experiences and something experienced, so there can be no knowledge without knower and known. It won't do to claim that if ignorance be beginningless, there need be no such dependence. Just as a prior absence, that is beginingless, requires its counter-positive, and a universal requires individual objects of its class, ignorance also requires its content. Awareness is of the nature of reference to the known, and such reference indicating worldliness, according to Advaitin, such worldliness then must penetrate knowledge in liberation also. Knowledge cannot be free from its content without losing itself, and without contradicting the *Vivaraṇa*'s definition of knowledge as revelative of the meaning of the known.

Is self-consciousness knowledge or false awareness? Not the first, because then the Advaita theory of the falsity of what is knowable (*vedya*) will be jeopardized. Not the second, lest the Self be infected with the fault of falsity. And awareness that is neither true or false is no cognition. Nor can it be beyond both like God's construction-free awareness in Nyāya, because in God's case it arises from excellence, while in the case of error it arises from a defect. Construction-free awareness is without the relation of being like the content, but in God's awareness there is validity in the form of non-cancelled-ness. In God's awareness, also, the characteristic of corresponding with mental operations endures, since the excellence of the means does not determine the generality of awareness but its specificity, as the author of the *(Tattva)Cintāmaṇi* has stated: "In generality of

awareness excellence is not to be inferred, because it is regulated by defects".

Nor can it be said that being inert is a kind of awareness different from the kind indicated through the term "*jñāna*", as there is no division possible in awareness due to mental operations (*vṛtti*), for there is no proof of any such kind of awareness in the body or the senses.

Nor can inertness be the non-Self. The Self being one (in Advaita) and not of any specific class, particular (objects etc.), despite differences, do not fall outside the (all-pervasive, one) Self.

Nor can it be claimed that want of joy is inertness, because joys associated with objects of the world blur such a distinction. Nor can it be claimed that such joys are also that of Brahman, because such joys have gradation characterized by admixture with pain, as is not possible in the bliss of Brahman.

Nor can inertness entail non-cognizing, as in your system; though it would not pervade the inner organ that is accepted as a cognizer, it would pervade Brahman on the basis of the inference that Brahman is false, being a non-cognizer like space etc. Escape from that inference is not possible by holding that in Brahman also imaginary cognizability can be accepted, for by such admixture of imagined features Its purity would be affected and pure and impure would get mixed up.

Nor is determinate distinctness a reason for falsity. A fact (*tattva*) is constituted by space, time and other objects, its total absence has as its counter-positive differentiability [*vyāvartakatva*] by space and time, the absence of it upon destruction has as its counter-positive being differentiated by time, and absence of matter has as its counter-positive differentiation by objects. The first differentiation fails, as there being no second space by which space could be determined by space and time, an all-pervasive entity like space would become eternal.

In scriptures it is said that the real was in the beginning,

and from it both mortals and immortals originated. In this statement activity is perceptible both in the substrate–reality- and in the percipient, the self.

Nor can discreteness be a reason for falsity. For if discreteness of entities led to superimposition of one on the other, there would be no bar to superimposition of completely imaginary entities like human horns and sky-flower on other objects of experience, or of the same entity on another of its kind, or of a whole cow on a part thereof, as all these share discreteness. Nor can it be maintained that except in case of attribution to Brahman such wrong attribution is not stated, for it is specific objects that separate one another and not Brahman, which is common to all. Yet any specific object, being itself false, cannot serve as a locus of false attribution. Nor can Brahman that is formless be the locus of illusion, and if Brahman be regarded as perceptible to the senses, then it also cannot escape your own charge of falsity due to perceptibility. So Brahman is unmanifest and false pots, etc. are without any locus.

If, on the other hand, Brahman be perceptible to all the senses, it also becomes false like other perceptible entities (according to you). Also, if Brahman be perceptible to the senses, there is no point in stating *mahāvākyas* (great sayings), since a perceptible entity needs not be established through verbal testimony, which would be unnecessary or prolix like an inference that fire is the cure for cold.

If it be said that for substances form, etc. is expected, and since Brahman is not a substance, absence of form is maintainable for Brahman, as in the scriptural text "neither bulky nor atomic". But this only denies natural size, otherwise how to explain a *mantra* like "subtler than the subtle and larger than the large"?

Nor can mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) be the reason for falsity, for then Brahman will be the reason for falsity, since Brahman, which stands in a relation of mutual absence with

falsity, would also be smitten with falsity.

If the world be imaginary, there should be its locus, and Brahman, that is neither universal nor particular, cannot be such a locus. If the world is imaginary, there is need of *prakṛti*, but it is not admitted. If the world is attributed wrongly, it requires prior results of experience, because the world cannot have produced its own basis in memory. If the world is wrongly attributed, it must have a similar world to provide a prior image that is remembered, just as a golden conch provides the prior experience of an illusory yellow conch perceived by a person suffering from bile. Also, if the world be wrongly attributed, it cannot be due to beginnngless results of actions, for in an illusion such as shell-silver no such beginningless results of action are involved. Therefore like the doctrine of falsity, the theory of indescribability (*anirvacanīyatva*) is also disproved. Again, if the world were falsely attributed, it would not be beginningless, for all known cases of such attribution have a beginning. have a beginning, and as in the scripture it is said that "In the beginning the real was there", the reality of the world is established. The author of the *Brahmasūtras* has said that the world is non-different from Brahman.

When *ārambha* or beginning is stated in a *Chāndogyopaniṣad mantra* it stands for making explicit what was formerly implicit. When in that Upaniṣad it is said that by knowledge of the material cause all effects are known, and that is illustrated by saying that "By knowledge of clay all objects of clay are known", the products are said to originate with words, because through words products are distinguished for use, as "Bring water in the (earthen) pot". By "change" (*vikāra*) two types of phenomena are indicated; one the neck, mouth etc. of the pot, the other its name.

The purport here is not to deny the reality of the effect, which is as real as the cause. Only it has no reality independent of the material cause, from which it is inseparable. Similarly, the world has no independent existence from Brahman from

whom it is inseparable. Thus the effect's independence of its material cause is denied, not its reality. If some try to establish that the world is only an illusion on the basis of unscriptural examples like the shell-silver or mirage, that is not correct, as it is not borne out by either the resolve or the example in the scriptural text.

When it is stated in scripture that by knowledge of the cause the effect is known, does it refer to the pure Brahman or a concealed one? It cannot be the first as that is not knowable for want of proof. It is stated in scripture that "By knowing it death is transcended and space is wrapped up like skin". Thus by agreement and difference knowledge of it is excluded, and without knowledge of it liberation is not possible. Nor can it be the second, for even if a concealed Brahman is cognized as the cause of the world that awareness, being false, cannot lead to liberation.

But examples like shell-silver and a mirage are contrary to the text. Unlike knowledge of clay which enables one to know vessels made of it, only a madman would maintain that awareness of a shell enables one to know of silver, or that a knowledge of a desert would enable one to now the water seen in a mirage, for in such cases the material cause is not present in the appearances.

According to the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama only those are acceptable as examples that have practical similarity. It cannot be maintained that in the example of clay and clay vessels the latter are falsely attributed, for even after knowledge of the clay underlying them clay vessels continue and are in no way cancelled, as is required in cases of false attribution.

Seeing the untenability of a position that pot etc. are falsely attributed to clay, the Advaitin might try to argue that the pot etc. are in consciousness as conditioned by clay-ness, which is fit to be cancelled. But that attempt also is in vain, the scriptures clearly mean clay and not consciousness as conditioned by clay-ness.

It cannot be claimed that a desert is non-different from eater etc. seen in a mirage in the same way as space in a pot is non-different from cosmic space. When Vācaspati Miśra in the *Bhāmatī* tells us that by knowledge of a shell silver is factually grasped in its reality, and similarly by knowledge of Brahman everything is known, the example is not convincing. By knowledge of a shell, silver cannot be known. But a fact is in its own normal form, with its own quality and not just a locus of illusion. If Brahman were just a locus of a illusorily superimposed world, by knowing the former everything would not be known as claimed in scripture. In the example given in the scripture, clay is not such a locus of illusion, else like a mirage the clay pot etc. would be cancelled. Otherwise everything would be destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, just a silver is destroyed by the knowledge of the shell, and there would be no question of all becoming known.

Again, you take "*vācārambha*" or "creation by words" as meaning falsity which is based neither on *yoga* nor on *rūḍhi,* and as poetry etc., based on words are not false, you take the meaning here as merely "dependent on words", and thereby, in place of the scriptural phrase "naming and indicating" you take it as merely naming of the nature of prolix repetition.

Scripture, therefore, indicates that the changed products (*vikāra*) are non-different and dependent on the material cause, and not that they are false.

If merely because something is open to mental deliberation it were to be false, Brahman would also be false, as It is said to be neither real nor unreal.

Had the sculpture meant unreality, examples like shell-silver would be used instead of clay and its vessels. If whatever had name and form was false, then Vedānta scriptures would also be such, and hence unable to ensure liberation.

(It appears that) even an unreal cause may produce a real effect, as in a reflection seeing lines etc. one can know the words and their differences, as between the written words

"*nāga*" and "*naga*", herbs, death due to suspicion of poison, or due to the sun in the wrong place in the horoscope, delight due to copulation in dream and good or bad results from corresponding omens in dreams.

About this the commentator rightly remarks that the examples cited do not prove the position. as supported by scripture also, true dreams truly indicate good and bad premonitions, and only true lines etc. indicate the corresponding letters and words. Only when the cause is really present does the effect arise: without clay no clay pots are possible. Only fire in association with wet fuel generates smoke, and scorpions that appear to originate in cow-dung are really transformed states of soil. From an image the letters and words are truly inferred in the corresponding written object.

Again, actual entities are attributed elsewhere, a completely imaginary thing like a sky-flower is not even wrongly attributed elsewhere. It is not correct to argue that the attribution of reality to what is attributed is not required, it being only an appearance, for even an appearance of the completely imaginary is not possible.

In case of death out of fear of imagined poison, it is the disturbed condition of the body that produces death, and not imagined poison. In the case of fear generated by a rope-snake, it is the past awareness of a snake that causes fear, not an unreal snake. In general, incases of illusion like the shell-silver or rope-snake, the mistake arises due to defects like imperfect light, etc., and not due to false silver or snake. Hence, in all cases, only real causes produce effects.

2.1.16 (E2.356-357) As the effect is there in the cause where it is absent it cannot originate, as seedling in fire or oil in sand. Just as Brahman never departs from reality, so does not its product, the world. Otherwise there would be no point in scriptural statements like "reality was merely in the beginning", "*ātman* is real", that indicate prior existence of the effect, for the unreal can have no relation with time.

Nor can you maintain that just as objects created in dream are false, so are objects seen in waking experience, and consequently also knowledge of them, for actually the dream objects are also real, being created by God. To this the opposite party might object that if dream objects are real, why don't they last beyond sleep, and why are they not observed by others nearby? The answer is that how long a thing endures rests on God's will, and many real entities, like one's mental states, are not revealed to people nearby. Nor should doubt arise on the score that mental states like joy and sorrow are products of individual minds, for God has said otherwise in the *Bhagavadgītā*. The dream states are also produced by God according to the karmic results of action and corresponding resolves of individual selves, and act by those selves themselves in bondage, otherwise they would always be present, and then what would prevent individuals from conjuring up visions at will during waking hours also?

2.1.17 (E2.360-368) Those who support the prior non-existence of the effect before its production adduce both scriptural testimony like "non-existent was in the beginning" and reasons for their positions. The reasons are as follows. the effect is different from the cause, and is designated differently. The actions performed by them are also different. Pot and cloth are useful for fetching water and dress, and clay and thread for creating earthen jugs and rope, and not vice-versa. There is difference of time between the two, the cause appearing earlier and the effect later. there is also a difference of parts: clay is one lump, but pot is constituted by different parts like th neck, belly, stand etc. Also, if the effect were already present in the cause the activity of the agent in producing it would be useless.

2.1.18 (E2.368-369) Just as Brahman never departs cause from reality, so does not its product, the world. Otherwise there would be no point in scriptural statements like "reality was merely in the beginning", "*ātman* is real", that indicate prior existence of the effect, for the unreal can have no relation with

time.

The reply is that the scriptural text indicates the absence of name and form in the non-existent, and the extremely subtle state of the world. That is why at the end of the *mantra* it is connected with the statement "existence was in the beginning", also reiterated in the statement that "self produced itself". The totally unreal like a sky-flower can neither be related with time past or present nor is it ever seen to be produced. What was stated about the difference of cause from effect is apparent rather than intrinsic.

An effect is never seen without a cause, and temporal sequence between them cannot be said to be total difference, as it cannot amount to an alteration in substance. The difference of appearance, parts, activities etc. doesn't warrant the assumption of such a change of substance. Otherwise differences in age have also to be taken as intrinsic to difference, and one cannot say "I who played in the lap of my father, now in old age am rearing children", since on the assumption in question the past is destroyed and the future is unborn.

Nor is the activity of the agent useless, as it functions to express what was unmanifest. On the contrary, if the non-existent could be produced, then from fire barley shoot, from water smoke, and from sand oil could be obtained. Moreover, if the non-existent is produced as effect, one set of causes may well generate any set of effects indiscriminately! Thus threads may generate pots.

That is why the scriptural text is to be taken as indicating by "non-existent" and "existent" the subtle and unmanifest in the cause, and gross and manifest state in the effect respectively.

The condition of curd and butter oil is not in excess of milk, nor that of pot in excess of clay, for admission of excess would go against the prior existence of the effect (*satkāryavāda*). Nor is the agency of the cause only

instrumental in producing the effect. On the contrary the (material) cause itself gets transformed as the effect.

Else if the effect be absent in the cause, there would arise the possibility of gaining any effect from any cause. If to escape this difficulty you maintain the equality of cause and effect and state that curd is not in excess of milk and pot not in excess of the clay, that would not help as it would destroy *asatkāryavāda* and establish *satkāryavāda*.

Nor is it the case that on acceptance of *satkāryavāda* the function of the efficient cause becomes futile, for it acts to transform the cause into effect. The cause itself changes into the form of the effect, comes to be called effect, as said in *śruti* "All this is *ātman*", and in *smṛti* "Vāsudeva made himself all objects".

In the Upaniṣad the use of *'asat'* ('non-being') in the statement attributed to someone that "non-being was in the beginning" is to emphasize the reality of being (*sat*) in the beginning by contrast, through the reasoning stated as "How can unreal be in the beginning?". Here the statement of non-being is subsidiary to that of being, for both real and unreal cannot be attributed together.

Nor will it do to claim that while the sections that state differences are concerned with practical truth, those maintaining non-difference apply to ultimate reality, for this claim is based on personal fancy. How is a claim that passages on non-difference are pre-eminent because they are continuous and accepted by authorities etc. tenable, because the same thing can be maintained for passages that admit differences. Nor can the passages admitting differences be regarded as inferior because they accept the perceptible, for even adherents of non-difference cannot altogether discard perceptible entities like a pot or a cloth. Are the objects in the context of unqualified Brahman according to scriptures maintaining non-difference or not? Not the first, because according to you their practical reality is different from unqualified Brahman in the same way as "*vyoman*" and "*div*", i.e., verbal, both being words

for space. Nor the second, because "this word stands for this object" is accepted for all practical purposes in the school of non-difference also.

To an objection that if we do not accept the world as an appearance we are forced to accept either the theory of aggregation (*saṅghāta*) of the Buddhists or of origination of the logicians (the Naiyāyikas) or of transformation of the Sāṃkhya, we reply that we accept the scriptural text that Brahman altered itself (*ātmakṛtaḥ pariṇāmāt*).

Nor can it be maintained that the all-pervasive, part-less Brahman cannot undergo change like space, for we can maintain that its nature provided for change like milk, and being all-powerful and omniscient, it changes itself. Nor will it do to maintain that an example of changefulness in an entity like milk with parts cannot be extended to what is part-less. Even in the case of milk, it is not being with parts that generates its changeableness, but its own power for it. Else, water with parts could also change into curd.

Even all-pervasive entities like space and air have been attributed changes as in the scriptural texts "From space originated air", etc.

Here an objection may be raised: If Brahman changes, does it change altogether or only in part? In the first case there would remain nothing changeless and free in it. On the second alternative it would lose its part-less-ness. The reply is that even all-pervasive entities like space change. Moreover, changes in Brahman are projections of its power, not alteration of its intrinsic nature.

2.1.19 (E2.369-374) Even when the names and forms that are expressed in creation are not manifest before in their cause, they are latent but real in it (as the specific qualifies of breath in a man who has restrained them in *prāṇāyāma*).

Here an Advaita Vedāntin might object: the names and forms of the effect cannot be real in Brahman for it is denied in scriptures by both the methods of agreement and difference

when it is stated that "the reality in the beginning was only one" and "there is no diversity whatever". Thereby the unity of cause and the denial of everything else as false is established, when it is said that clay alone is real and its products are only the verbal entities and where Śvetaketu is said to be Brahman, the physical distinction of Śvetaketu's body is thereby cancelled like the serpent when the rope-snake illusion is rectified, and with the body also go all practical affairs related to it.

This account of Advaita Vedānta is not correct. By 'one' the scriptures mean omniscient Brahman, and by denial of diversity, they deny another independent cause. The latter in no way denies the reality of objects. They only deny parallel entity to itself, just as to say that "the Cola King is one and without a second" does not deny other kings, but only means that he has no peer among kings.

Moreover, if all products of creation are false, then the unreality of the effect in the cause (*asatkāryavāda*) would follow, negating all Vedic teachings, establishing the demonic doctrine that "The world is false, unestablished, and Godless", and dismissing scriptural texts like "Real was there in the beginning". "*Sat*" (real) here stands for that which is the basis of independent existence and true. The term "one" in the text stands for pre-eminence among all changeful and changeless entities. Here "one" stands for the pre-eminent among others without dependence, like the number "first".

"One" indicates first in number, and "non-dual" (*advaita*) indicates denial of the sentient and the insentient, meaning that Brahman is equally independent of both. Despite infinite auspicious qualities like knowledge and compassion within the self, there is no contradiction in denying independent existence of another. Also sentient and insentient things are intrinsic qualities of God and are inseparable from Him in their identity with Him. The scriptural meaning is that this independent reality is the substance of that whereof it is the self (*tat tvam asi*). The import is that the self is real. Here the purpose is not

to deny difference of the type of difference from objects of the same class, etc.

If non-duality indicates denial of any other entity, it is for all time or not. The first contradicts the Advaitin's own position, the second accepts duality.

Nor can it be maintained that if the second (entity) is of the nature of an absence then there is no infringement of non-duality. Absence requires a locus that has to be positive to contradict non-duality. Moreover, the very postulation of absence would make for discriminative (*khaṇḍārtha*) meaning (not accepted in Advaita Vedānta).

Next, what is real? The pure, the covered, or the unexpressed? Not the first, as it is denied in the Upaniṣadic expression "It desired to be many". Not the second, because a problem would arise whether the limitation born of *māyā* is different from Brahman or not. The first alternative would lead to duality;, the second to Brahman becoming one with the limitation. Further, if the concealed entity could be the God of liberation, there would be no need of the pure one.

Nor is a third alternative, the unexpressed, acceptable by you without adopting our standpoint, for we accept God as the unexpressed state of the entire creation, as the inner dweller, wherein the subtle state of all things resides before becoming expressed. In this form, it is the basis or support for subtle states of various specific qualities, and thus would be contrary to Advaita Vedānta's standpoint.

If expressed things are not accepted in subtle form in Brahman, then their unreality as effects (*asatkārya*) follows, non-acceptance of individual selves would lead to destruction of the results of actions, and the consequent lack of those results that account for diversity in creation would lead to lack of creation, or would result either in uniformity in creation or the charge of partiality in God. If God is not accepted, as in the heterodox systems, for want of a creator there would be no creation. If only the negation of another was intended, then the

first term "one" (in the *śruti* passage) would be prolix. Moreover, what does "non-dual" stand for? "Non-dual", meaning not dual, could have six meanings. It cannot mean "similar", or else there would arise a second similar thing, though in an indeterminate entity similar qualities cannot reside. It cannot mean "absence, because "it becomes like unreal, and (be) realized unreal Brahman" would be a matter of reproach. It cannot mean "difference" as that would imply another. Nor can it mean "slightness" is it would mean slight second matter. Nor can it mean "non-abundance", as that would imply a non-abundant second. Therefore "non-dual" in short, standing for merely the absence of the second, all possibilities are accommodate in taking it as a denial of a second characterized by independence, in short, denial of an independent second. It won't do to claim that, without any other meaning, from the ultimate meaning of "indeterminate import" the second's absence is established, for even by absence of the second, non-duality is lost, if this statement be true. If it be false, then duality is established.

If Brahman is known merely as qualified by absence of a second, there is absence of doubt also, but such a conception of import is inadmissible in such a case, for indiscriminate meaning can be maintained by granting two meanings to every word.

"*Ātman* was in the beginning", when said in the Upaniṣad, has the same meaning as "Nārāyaṇa is one". Those who do not see that the cause of the world is one go from death to death. The same idea is expressed when it is said in the Upaniṣad "from second etc. fear arises".

Those passages that verbally appear to indicate more than one cause of creation are also only apparently so; even their real import is that the first cause is one.

2.1.20-22 (E2.375-377) Nothing new except that Keśava makes the relation of difference-cum-non-difference (*bhedābheda*) between God and the individual self more

explicit, and in 2.1.21 enumerates the points of difference between them. Thus when it is said "Self is to be seen, heard, and mediated upon" there is difference of doer and deed etc. The statement "the knower of Brahman attains the supreme state" states the difference between seeker and object sought. When it said that "It dwells in the self", there is difference of regulator and regulated.

2.1.31 (E2.386) The commentator adds that Brahman cannot act for another either, because of the miseries of the world.

2.1.32 (E2.386) The commentary adds the instance of one who is mad with delight, and as an expression of the delight breaks into dance (so Brahman expresses Himself in creation).

BOOK TWO, SECTION TWO

2.2.1 (E2.391-394) First a resumé of the Sāṃkhya theory of *prakṛti* as cause of the world is given, which is much the same as in VK. In refuting this theory of Sāṃkhya's the author adds: *Prakṛti* cannot be the cause of the design in the world because it is insentient, without awareness, and not established.

The Sāṃkhya theory of *prakṛti* as constituted of three *guṇa*s like pleasure, pain and indifference because all objects are their combination, is not correct. Pleasure, pain etc. are not constituents of objects, but mental states that arise through interaction with objects. For the same reason the argument based on power also fails.

2.2.4 (E2.395-396) If *prakṛti* can create or desist from it by itself, for want of another in the beginning there would be perpetual creation. If the proximity of *puruṣa* is accepted as a condition of creation, there would result absence of dissolution and release.

2.2.6 (E2.396) There can be no purpose for *prakṛti* in creating. Could it be enjoyment, liberation, or both? The first is

not possible for *puruṣa* before creation, who is totally unatttached and inactive. If mere proximity with *prakṛti* produced enjoyment it would always continue, barring liberation. Secondly, liberation could not be a purpose even before bondage. The third (both) would lead only to eternal experience due to perpetuality of what is experienced (*prakṛti*).

2.2.12 (E2.405-407) The argument is more systematically presented, thus: The activity (at the start of creation) is not established for want, then, of effort and collocation required for that.

Only on entry into a body and union between self and mind are the self's efforts born. Hence at the time of dissolution, for want of a body, activity is not possible. If instead it is attributed to God, it would lead to permanent creation due to the permanence of God's will. Nor can it be due to the unseen principle, as that is beset with alternatives (equally inapplicable). Is initial activity located in atoms due to *adṛṣṭa*'s action in atoms or in the selves? It can't be the first, for how can the unseen principle, which is quality of a particular self, reside in atoms, and also because, in case it were so to reside, it would lead to perpetual activity in the atoms, and also because *adṛṣṭa*, being itself unconscious, could not prompt the self to action.

Even if *adṛṣṭa* is taken to reside in selves, in their then unconscious state they would not start activity, so dissolution would never be possible.

2.2.13 (E2.407-409) A new point raised by the author is this: It will not do to add that inherence being a relation it does not require a further relation with the relata, for contact is also a relation but is taken to be related again to its terms by inherence. Nor is it tenable to maintain that inherence is an eternal relation, because what is born cannot be eternal, for then the effect could be too and causal collection futile.

2.2.20 (E2.419-423) Having stated that even if the prior moment be the cause or the succeeding moment the aggregate (*skandha*) is not established, now the impossibility of causality

(as maintained) is shown.

As the entity in the prior moment is destroyed by the time that of the next moment arises, the destroyed things cannot be the cause of the latter. Now, the cause of the next moment: is it generated or not? Whether generated and productive of the next moment or not generated, both alternatives are inadequate. Whether produced and destroyed or not produced, an absent cause cannot be the cause of the next moment, or else everything would be the cause of everything.

Nor can it be that the destruction of the antecedent and production of the consequent are simultaneous like the rise and fall of the two pans in a scale, for in the latter case the two pans are simultaneously present and regulated by the fulcrum, so that the heavier weight pulls one pan down and sends the other up. In the present case the cause is not present when the effect arises, or else momentariness is wrong.

However, after the attributes of the cause comes the effect, in which the presence of those attributes, like clay in pot and gold in ring etc., are seen in the effect, which would not be possible if the cause was momentary and was destroyed, and these facts, based on perception and memory would point to (some sort of) permanence.

(Objection:) This is not so. Permanence and causal sequence are not compatible, simply because simultaneity and sequence cannot go together. Is it in the nature of barley, kept in storage, to sprout or not? If the first, it should sprout all at once, since then accessory conditions would be negligible. If not, it could never sprout. As for permanence being based on memory, it is one-sided because even in case of a flame there is apparent permanence.

(Answer:) Had there been permanence destruction would not be seen. When there is destruction, is it different or non-different from the thing (destroyed)? If different, it would have nothing to do with the object; if non-different, how would

destruction differ from creation? Again, what is the relation here, identity or generation? In the first case, the same difficulty arises as in the second alternative above; in the second, there is no relation. Hence destruction is to be taken as natural. But then these alternatives go against your own (Buddhist) views, for according to you, as an entity is destroyed it leads to a similar series, but here the production of sherds constitutes a divergent series to that of a pot.

But then like your accepting a divergent series due to caused destruction, we also accept the pot's destruction by the mace About the first: it is seen as changing in size, therefore, the example does not disprove the endurance of things.

Since barley seeds cannot sprout all by themselves, we also accept the importance of accessory conditions.

Are destruction and creation within the existence of the thing or outside it? On the first alternative, things exist in three moments (at least), those of creation, endurance, and destruction. In the second case existence becomes permanent, since creation and destruction are unreal. If destruction is of the nature of absence, is it prior to presence, simultaneous with it or posterior to it? In the first case there will be no presence (existence); in the second case absence will co-exist with presence, making existence eternal; in the third case, the destruction will be caused.

2.2.21 (E2.423-424) The commentator adds the meaning of the four types of causes: (i) the main cause, the sense-organs like the eyes, (ii) the auxiliary cause, the light; (iii) the immediate cause, the direction of the mind, and (iv) the supporting cause, the sense-object. It also adds the example that a destroyed cause cannot produce an effect, just as a dead man cannot produce a son.

2.2.25 (E2.427-429) In usage everyone refers meaning to himself. No one thinks that "I am not" or "(memory is) not mine", and always underlying "I" is the sense of being the same "I" as in the past. When a man proves that there is no self, his

own self is engaged in this proof, hence the self cannot (properly) deny itself. Nor can similarity (that Buddhists try to substitute for identity) be noted except by someone who himself persists. Without a self to note a series, the dispute of substituting a series for the self could not arise. One cannot remember what another experienced, and without this (enduring) experience, there would be no ideas of cause and effect, being and non-being.

Nor can there be a transmigration of a series through an *antarābhāva* body, which is only imaginary.

These arguments also disprove the theory of "creation on sight" (*dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*) held by others.

2.2.26 (E2.429-430) The commentator adds: the material in the seed changes into another state in the sprout, as is perceived. The sprout originates from the seed just as curd originates from milk and not from clay.

2.2.28 (E2.430-433) External appearances like fire, a mountain etc. are seen as external appearances, while ideas (*vijñāna*) are formless and arise in the self associated with self-reference. Hence an awareness and its content are located differently, and how can they be regarded as one, as they don't mix together like milk and water. Nor are past ideas perceptible. When an appearance is perceived it appears in front of one, while the percipient is indirectly presented. Even where simultaneous presence of the perceptible and its perception as of two types, either in space or time, is stated the intention is to distinguish them rather than to confuse them, the instance of perception of two moons (by a squinting eye) being also in the same category.

2.2.33 (E2.437-442) That a cloth is not a pot is acceptable, but in the Jain's seven-fold predication, if in its own system also those predications are applied, then the seven kinds of objects admitted into the system are also subject to the same rules. Even the theory that seven-fold predication is applicable everywhere should be subject to the same rule, leading to the

second predication, that everything is not. Similarly, liberation is both, is and is not, leading to meaninglessness of the scriptures of Tīrthaṅkaras. Also their atomic theory, in place of the God-governed one (of Nyāya), is also in doubt. Similarly five kinds of existence are five-fold , and also alternatively, non-five-fold.

I1.2.42 (E2.447-448) Here Keśava differs from both Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa and appears to follow Rāmānuja. While Nimbaṛka and Śaṃkara hold this passage and *sūtra* 43 to refute Śāktas, Keśava takes them as presenting a *prima-facie* case against Pāñcarātra, to be given up later in I1.44, 49.

Pāñcarātra holds that *śaṃkarśaṇa* or the individual self is born of Vāsudeva, who is the non-different, efficient and material cause of the world. But the individual, who is eternal according to scripture, cannot be born.

2.2.43 (E2.448) Nor is it possible that the mind (*manas*), called Pradyumna, is born of the individual self called "*śaṃkarśaṇa*", as is held in Pāñcarātra, for it is not seen that the potter makes his stick.

2.2.44-45 (E2.448-459) These *sūtras* are taken as refuting some Tantras and not Pāñcarātra, in contrast to Śaṃkara and others who take these to refute Pāñcarātra. We are told that texts like the *Mahābhārata* have accepted the authority of Pāñcarātra. So far as the fourfold emanation from Vāsudeva is concerned, they are the assumed forms of Vāsudeva according His fee will.

Accordingly *sūtra* 43 is translated as "If "*śaṃkarśaṇa*" and others are taken as Brahman of the nature of intelligence and bliss there is no denial of the doctrine, because they then fall in line with the Vedas and other scriptures".

Similarly *sūtra* 44 is taken to mean that if "*śaṃkarśaṇa*" is taken in the sense of Brahman from it the origin of the mind is well-established.

What is meant is that the fourfold manifestation of Vāsudeva are self-revelations and are all collateral, with no idea

that the effect exceeds the cause, as in the case of pot exceeding clay.

BOOK TWO, SECTION THREE

2.3.1-6 (E2.461-466) Keśava adds that when space is mentioned as immortal together with the gods, only very long duration is meant.

2.3.15 (E2.473-474) Keśava gives a quotation which says "Mind is made of food, life of water, and language of fire".

2.3.18 (E2.476-495) Is the self (1) like the body as accepted by the Cārvākas? or (2) distinct from the body but of the same time?; is it (3) an aggregate of four elements (earth, water, fire, air) as held by Lokāyatas?; is it (4) a momentary external entity as held by Vaibhāṣikas?; is it (5) a momentary idea as held by Yogācāras?; is it (6) empty as held by Mādhyamikas?; is it (7) sense?, (8) mind?, or (9) life?; is it (10) all-pervasive?, (11) different in each body?, (12) different from sense etc., with consciousness as accidental attribute and the locus of awareness, desire and activity, as held by Naiyāyikas?; is it (13) pure consciousness as accepted by Sāṃkhya?; is it (14) different from the body etc.?; or is it (15) of the nature of knowledge endowed with the attributes of knower etc.?

It cannot be (1), because on death no sense-consciousness remains: the body is not the self as it is physical like a pot etc. Nor can it be (2), as then it would be made of parts and hence non-eternal like a pot etc. (3) is not right, as the self would be like a heap of barley. Nor is (4) correct, as that would make the self both material and momentary. Nor is (5) correct, for that would make the self momentary like words. Not the sixth, since that would make the self inert like space. Nor can it be (7) as the senses depend on the self. Not (8), as mind and intellect constitute the internal organ (for the self). Not (9), as during sleep if someone steals, the self can take no

notice for want of consciousness, since it is of the nature of air.

Nor can it be (10), for then, on account of the all-pervasiveness of selves, pain felt by one when a thorn enters his foot should be felt by all, since all are present everywhere. Nor will it do to argue that only the body generated by a particular *adṛṣṭa* (results of past actions) will be affected by its *adṛṣṭa*.

(Objection:) A self is of the nature of knowledge and knower. Now knowledge is very similar to self-consciousness and hence the two will merge without distinction like two masses of water that come together.

(Answer:) The example is not appropriate. Even when two masses of water cannot be distinguished because of close similarity they can be inferred. But a gem and its sparkle, and the sun and its brightness are clearly seen to be in the relation of a locus and its properties. Just as the sun and its light are inseparably related as substance and quality, so also consciousness and self-consciousness are inseparably related as know and self as in "I know", "I do", "I am through (God)", "Thou art I", etc.

Someone (Śaṃkara) has said that the combination of the concept for "You" with pure consciousness is superimposition, the first superimposition being egoity, whereby true and false are mixed up and usages like "I am so","This is mine" arise in practical worldly life (*saṃsāra*). Reference to I, i.e., egoity is not the self, that is why it is absent in deep sleep. The scriptures also state about egoism "This is about self" and "Egoism is among my different eight-fold *prakṛti*" (*Bhagavadgītā*), thus distinguishing it from the self. The above account of the distinction between 'I' and self is not correct, being impossible.

In every case of superimposition there are two factors, but here two factors are absent. The view that there are two parts as perceiver [*draṣṭṛ*] and perceived [*dṛṣṭa*] is only imaginary. In that case even in a meaningless sentence like "waters with fire" there would be the parts in superimposition.

A statement like "here it burns" would also be taken to indicate fire by *ajahallakṣaṇā*, an indicative sense, without discarding the first meaning, or would be taken as a case of superimposition. But in cases where it is not experienced, to imagine duality is without basis. By the same token one could imagine duality in the self, even without reference to I-consciousness, as in "Brahman experiences", "Self is", "Consciousness shines", etc. Hence, there being no appearance of duality in I-consciousness, it is proved to be the Self, as accepted by old teachers also.

If consciousness is the very nature of the self, a question arises why it is not felt in deep sleep. That is because I-consciousness is more explicit where there is conative activity, but dormant when it is absence except when there is consciousness of bliss. In deep sleep also there is I-consciousness associated with bliss, but not with any conative tendency. That is why there is continuity of consciousness that I who as asleep am awake now.

Without I-consciousness one's deeds would not be attributed to him and there would arise destruction of the karmic results of actions done and accretion of the karmic results of actions not done.

Where the scriptures have called for giving up egoism, it should not be confused with I-consciousness, for egoism is different both as word and meaning from I-consciousness. "*Ahaṃkāra*" ends with "*kāra*", whereas the word denoting I-consciousness ends with "*d*" (the stem is *asmad*, which ends with "*d*".

It is also not necessary for I-consciousness to be associated with objective awareness as its subject: there can be also consciousness that I don't know. Nor is it associated with awarenesses from the body.

Thus it is a permanent feature of the self. The Self is also doer, and no one would seek its disappearance in liberation. In God also the pre-eminent presence of I-consciousness is amply

shown in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

2.3.19 (E2.495-502) (Objection:) There is a fault in admitting several minds and selves as all-pervasive. But what harm is there in accepting one all-pervasive self with limitations, by which it appears as many like the same space being separated into different spaces by different pots, with attendant diversity of joys and sorrows as related to these different limitations? Or as one Brahman differentiated by different limitations of internal organs like different images of the sun in different pitchers filled with water. Thereby both mixing of joys and sorrows, *karman*, and salvations of different selves are prevented.

(Answer:) The above solution is not satisfactory. Are the limitations all-pervasive or partial in their limitation? In the first case the world would be plunged into the darkness of ignorance without escape. On the second alternative the above difficulty will not be eliminated, as already shown earlier.

Again, is an limitation real or unreal? If real it will generate duality, and if a real limitation cannot be removed by knowledge no salvation can occur. If the limitation is unreal, it can serve neither to produce images or portions, because both must have the same category of reality as the original to be mirrored or divided. Else thieves could be held with dream-ropes, and the sun could be reflected in imaginary water.

On knowledge of reality, on destruction of an limitation, is the individual self destroyed or not? On the first alternative, due to destruction of itself there would be no liberation; on the second also there will be no salvation, as the *jīva* will continue beside Brahman.

Nor can it be said that the reflection of reality is like a blemish seen in the mirror-image of a face, blemish (or dirtiness) standing for the fault in the limitation. In case the dirtiness standing for the limitation in the mirror is removed, does the image remain or not? In that case either the *jīva* will also endure, resulting in non-liberation, or else liberation would

be of the nature of the destruction of the *jīva*.

Does the purpose of man lie in eliminating those faults that stand in the way? Then does awareness of the fault in the limitation lie in Brahman who is mirrored, or the *jīva* who is the reflection, or in a third source? None of these alternatives is possible, because neither the face nor its image has the fault, and there is no third possible viewer. Nor are the face or its reflection capable of awareness, as they are inert.

In case *jīva* is taken as imagined due to ignorance, who imagines him? Not ignorance, which is inert. Not the *jīva* himself, for that would be mutual dependence, as *jīva* himself is being imagined like shell-silver. Nor can he be imagined by Brahman without ignorance assailing the latter.

In case ignorance be attributed to Brahman, does He perceive the *jīva* or not? If not, then it is not the case that Brahman projected the world with names and forms (as stated in scripture). If He perceives the *jīva* that is the product of ignorance, then He will also become subject to ignorance. Thereby the distinction between *māyā* and ignorance also goes. And it is impossible that the source of *māyā*, Brahman, should see the *jīva* through ignorance. The *māyāvin* (the owner of *māya*, the magician) is not deluded, nor is *māyā* his means of perception, for him it is only a means of deluding other percipients.

Nor will it do to regard ignorance and *jīva* as mutually determined like seed and sprout. It is only a self-imagined theory, but what purpose is served by taking ignorance as dependent on *jīva*? If it is claimed that thereby bondage and liberation are explained, that is not the case. If ignorance is dependent on *jīva*, then one man's liberation should ensnare everyone's. Else, so long as ignorance endures (in anyone), there should be no liberation.

In case a different ignorance is imagined for every *jīva*, then is this difference natural or imagined? Not the first, because the Advaitin does not accept difference, and if

differences are admitted, there would be no need to postulate ignorance to differentiate selves. On the second alternative there would arise mutual dependence, as *jīvas* would depend on ignorance for their existence, and ignorance would in turn depend on *jīvas* for its imagined existence. It won't do here to bring in the seed-sprout analogy either, because seed and sprout come serially, sprout coming from one seed not generating the same seed, but another. Do you accept such a series, or a position like the Vijñānavādins?

In the first case, there is the impossibility of a first *jīva* starting the series by his imagination. In the second case, there would result momentariness, leading to destruction and adventitious accretion of deserts. As such Brahman cannot be taken as a series of selves dependent on the imagination of prior selves.

These selves would have no permanence, and even in pure Brahman they would also have ignorance, which is not possible. Thus ignorance cannot reside in *jīvas* either who are not different from Brahman in their purity and non-distinctness.

Nor does the scriptural text "One being exists in all beings, one appears as many, like the moon in the water" support the image-theory. The meaning of this sentence is that the self of beings, God Vāsudeva, who is one in different beings conscious and inert (or if it is analyzed as *bhūta* and *abhūta*, in the causal elements and effect elements or bound sentient beings and ever-liberated beings), exists as their inner-controller, His uniform blissfulness untouched by their faults. It is this latter fact that is meant by the example of the moon in the water. Whether the water is the pure water of the Ganges, or dirty water of the gutter, the moon is not affected by it.

In the image-theory, are the images in Brahman or in the objects? The first is not possible, because beings in a different body of water do not perceive the image; nor is the second, for Brahman cannot be mirrored outside.

In partition-theory, in addition to the above defects,

additional factors arise around the question of the reality or falsity of the limitation.

Hence the self is atomic in size.

2.3.23 (E2.504-506) While the self is atomic, its attribute, knowledge (*dharmabhūtajñāna*) is all-pervasive. Hence it is capable of experiencing all over the body through contact internal organ. To the objection that, with an all-pervasive attribute of knowledge one should experience through other people's bodies also, the author replies that, due to the bond of *karman* one's all-pervasive knowledge is obstructed and remains limited to contacts through the senses, including the internal organ. But in the case of a liberated self there arises universal knowledge on removal of limitations due to *karmans*.

2.3.32 (E2.512-523) It is held that the self is not the agent, but activity is falsely attributed to it, due to its association with the internal organ whose activity is wrongly attributed to it by superimposition, just as the red color of a hibiscus flower appears to be that of a pierce of crystal where it is superimposed.

Is this superimposition limiting (*sopādhika*) of non-limiting (*nirupādhika)*? Not the last, as the idea that the self is an agent is not removed merely by an awareness that it is a superimposition of the internal organ's activity in the manner in which the serpent is removed on knowledge of the rope. Nor the former, because there is no compulsion to think that the self is an agent after knowledge, such as that of seeing red in crystal even after knowledge that it is due to the flower.

The case of the superimposition of the internal organ's activity on the self is exemplified by that of the superimposition of a snake on a rope rather than that of the redness of the flower on the crystal which lacks identification, and as such the illusion cannot be limiting either.

But it is not non-limiting because in such cases there exists an entity more real than the superimposed one:

elsewhere, for instance, there is a more real snake than the one superimposed on the rope. But outside the activity superimposed on the self there is no other more real activity of the internal organ. Yet it cannot be limiting either, because the internal organ cannot itself serve as the limit. Otherwise, if a deeper (more real) red existed elsewhere, redness in a crystal du to reflection of a flower might also be non-limiting.

Nor can it be claimed that where superimposition is by identification, and that which is superimposed has a more real counterpart elsewhere, there is a non-limiting case, and since differences between self and mind etc. are obvious in expressions like "my mind", "my intellect", "my internal organ" there is no identification, hence the case is an limiting one.

For, really, in limiting superimposition one thing apparently transforms to another its property (as the flower transforms its redness to the crystal). In case identification is admitted the activity of the mind appears as that of the conscious self.

But acceptance of the Sāṃkhya position by Vedānta would go against its own theory. Even on the Sāṃkhya doctrine the intellect, being primarily of *sattva guṇa*, is not an organ of activity. Being the discriminative power of the self it is cognitive rather than conative, an instrument for bondage or liberation. How can it superimpose activity on the self to thwart its own purpose of liberation?

If bondage of the nature of evil be due to activity and enjoyment induced by the intellect, then liberation also pertains to it. Since according to you evil arises from ignorance, the source of both bondage and liberation lies in the same intellect, the former resulting not due to intellect but to false awareness pertaining to it.

Since both bondage and liberation are dependent on actual experiences etc. (and not those in dreams, etc.), the gross experiences involve the body also, and not the self with the limitation of the intellect, which is the locus of evil

associated with experiences.

Nor can the self residing in the body be said to be the locus of evil, as it can never be attributed to it. On occasions of illusion the ego is associated with experience, on occasions of knowledge with the intellect, never the self.

The mind that is the source of liberation through language should also be the recipient of the fruit thereof, lest there result destruction of merit and accretion of what is unmerited.

Even disembodied and liberated selves have been given an active nature in scripture. A self that determines "I do" in attempting to attain liberation should also get its result. And the locus of ignorance must also be the locus of knowledge, bondage also befalls the self. In fact, if the self were not active, the teaching regarding bondage an liberation would not be possible. Indeed activity is attributed to God also in scriptures when it is said that He "perceives names and forms everywhere by his activity".

Attribute-less-ness cannot be made a ground for inactivity in the self, because the former itself becomes an attribute. When the self is said to be inactive what is meant is there is no activity in the self that is independent of Brahman. When the self is said to be unaffected it is like space that is unaffected by what occurs in it. Nor is it inactive in sleep, for then breathing etc. continue.

When it is said that "the learned tell that the self, together with the sense and the mind, is the experiencer", body and mind both are indicated as cooperating. When in the *Bhagavadgītā* it is said "misguided people take a lonely self as active", Keśava interprets it to mean the self's independence of the Supreme Spirit.

If instead *prakṛti* engaged in activity it would be subject to bondage and liberation.

When in the *Gītā daiva* is said to be the fifth factor in activity it refers to God, under whom the individual self, with

limited light and power, acts. God controls all activity in the world, and liberated selves share in such activity.

A question arises: Is that the activity of the intellect, or of pure consciousness, or of the I-consciousness? It cannot be the first as that [the intellect is inert. It cannot be the second, there being no consciousness free from I-consciousness. Hence it belongs to the third.

2.3.42 (E2.527-540) When at once the individual self is called a part (*aṃśa*) of Brahman and Brahman is said to be part-less (*niravayava*) a question arises, whether the *jīva* is an entirely discrete part, or a portion differentiated by a limitation, or a part imagined by ignorance, or different-cum-non-different like the powerful and his power?

Is the part entirely different as servant, son, brother or friend are, as in scriptures teaching diversity as "two birds" etc. in *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad,* the passages teaching non-difference being secondary? Alternatively it might be held that Brahman is part-less, the texts on non-difference have precedence, and cannot be secondary, and differences have been criticized and hence the part is mentioned as based on a limitation in Brahman that is non-different like "the sparks of fire", or as space is delimited by earthen vessels or air as it is differentiated as five-fold vital breath, or mind in terms of its different modes.

The relation between Brahman and *jīva* is variously said to be of the nature of difference-cum-non-difference, non-difference intrinsically and difference in terms of limitations. "That swoons to move imbued with itself: "that is known as many" etc. indicate multiplicity, while "that thou art","there is no other than the seer", indicate non-difference, thus presenting alternatives. If a self is taken as part of Brahman based on an limitation, that is not proper, for Brahman is part-less and a self has no beginning. Nor can a self be regarded as broken into atomicity with a limit in one part of Brahman, there being neither division of parts in Brahman nor any relation with limits.

If all the limitats alike cover Brahman, by contact all *jīvas* will be like Brahman without distinction of ego. In such a case is omniscience eclipsed or continuous? The first is impossible. Then are omniscience etc. intrinsic qualities or limits? Not the last, for if limiting, is the limitation true or false? If true, is it different or non-different from Brahman? If different is it self-determined, other-determined or determined by Brahman? Not the first, as self-based; not the second, leading to infinite regress; not the third, leading to mutual dependence. If the determinant (or limit) be eternal, there will be no release. In case of non-difference, the difference (due to the limitat) also cannot arise, and there arises the objection of Brahman and limit being in the same locus. If the limit is false, there would result a surrender to the opposite view. If natural, is it different from Brahman or non-different or both different-cum-non-different? If altogether different, then scriptures that deny such differences are opposed If non-different, how can it reside in the same locus with Brahman. The third alternative is our position. Else there would result concealment of true nature and the eclipse of omniscience.

Again, does a limit have a cause or is it without one? The former would lead to infinite regress. The latter would endanger even the liberated with fresh bondage.

Again, does the limit pervade Brahman's omniscience, or only one aspect? In the former case the world would be plunged into darkness, and there would be no liberation. In the second case, being partial, good qualities would be reduced to non-entities.

Again, in liberation does the self attain its real nature or not? In the first case, even after giving up the limits, on acceptance of the presence of the self's own form, the theory of limits goes and differences are accepted. On the second alternative, there would be destruction of a self's real nature in liberation. Nor are the examples given above of sparks of fire and modes of mind and breath appropriate. Fire and air are

materials with parts, and hence are not suitable for imagining limits in the real. Passions are real changes in the mind, and if such a change occurred in Brahman's transformation into *jīva* both would be perishable. Hence a self is not a part determined by a limit. That does not make the above scriptural texts meaningless. They account for the bodily birth of an unborn self..

In fact it is useless to admit difference-cum-non-difference if total difference is conceded. Nor can Brahman and a self's relation be that of whole and part, or of the nature of class and individual, substance and attribute, or cause and effect, for there is nothing to prove them. Nor is difference-cum-non-difference seen in these forms. Nor is the *Gītā*'s statement "In the world *jīva* is my part" indicative of part and whole, for that would contradict scriptural texts that establish part-lessness in words like "phraseless, inactive". Even a scriptural text like "The world is a part of (Brahman)" does not establish a whole and part relation, but rather the infinity of Brahman and the paucity of *jīva*. Nor can these be taken as the mind's way of attributing parts to what is really part-less, for that would not determine real difference anymore than a sword can really cut space.

Nor can it be the case that what is ultimately one appears as different in selves, like imaginary differences in the sun created in different images, because of the completely imaginary (*tuccha*) nature of the examples and their inability to exemplify the self as a part of Brahman. In your example both the sun and water are with parts and have an appearance, whereas neither Brahman nor ignorance have these. Nor can your claim be that the internal organ being created will be with parts, for you yourself have tried to establish the all-pervasiveness of selves and denied them atomicity. Thus you are caught in a dilemma: if the limitation is part-less there can be no image, while your own commentary denies it parts.

Hence a *jīva* is a part of God. For getting rid of all

opposition, the theory of difference-cum-non-difference is suitable, and not the theory of limitations. There are many diverse indications in scriptures like "the controller and the controlled, free and dependent, omniscient and limited in knowledge, locus and what is supported, the worshiped and the worshiper...one and many, all-pervasive and atomic" about God and *jīva* , and also statements of their identity as "that thou art", "this self is Brahman", "I am Brahman" etc. in scriptures.

Both types of statement have equal force. Existents are of two types, free and dependent. The first is self-dependent, and its stay and activities are self-regulated and regulator (of the world. As is said, "the self is supremely free". This applies to Śrī Kṛṣṇa. The second class is of those who are dependent and under regulation (*niyama*). These are of two classes, conscious and inert (*cidacit*). Dependent entities are of two types, changeless and changing. The former are free from birth and other changes, of the nature of *jīva*, and called *pratyak, akṣara, puruṣa kṣetrajña*, etc. The second are active, true, beginningless, endless, of the nature of *prakṛti*. The texts that deny difference deny the free being of conscious and inert substances and their modes.

They are not free as they are inseparable from Brahman and are regulated by it.

The difference between Brahman and selves lies in the fact that Brahman is free and independent, but *jīvas* are not free, but dependent on Brahman. As difference and non-difference are of equal force they don't cancel each other.

Here one might object: How are difference and non-difference of equal force? Because differences only report perceptual truths such as that "fire is the remedy for cold". But it is not so. The differences residing in selves are not subject to perception, and what scriptures criticize is the separate existence of selves from Brahman.

Next the opposite side raises further objections against the very concept of difference. (They say:) Is difference of the

nature of essential nature (*svarūpa*) or is it a property (*dharma*). Not the first, for then like objects such as hands or feet difference could also be used without reference to its counter-positive. Nor can it be a property , for then it sill be difference an essence, leading to infinite regress. In grasping a property difference has to be grasped, and in turn, in grasping difference a property has to be grasped, leading to mutual dependence. Hence difference is not established, and sentences about difference cannot have qual force with those on non-difference.

(Answer:) But actually, a parallel objection can be raised against the concept of non-difference. Is non-difference an essence or a property? If the first, then it will be tangible or graspable like a pot or a cloth, rendering later perceptions to be false. And everywhere there will be experience only of universal pure being, thereby putting an end to Vedāntic thought. Nor can it be a quality, as the objections stated in the case of difference will apply to non-difference also.

In fact difference is a quality or class such as cow-ness, enabling the distinction of objects to be made.

Thus the sentences on difference and non-difference having equal force, Brahman is different-cum-non-different from the world, according to scriptures. Thus to protect both interests, words conveying non-difference mean that Brahman and the world have the same locus. This being-the-same-locus can be of two types, real and unreal. Unreals are again of two types, superimposed and cancelled. Superimposition is the case where a different type of worship is prescribed for a different place, for instance, when Brahman's worship is prescribed as through a word, a symbol. The real cases are of various types as cause and effect, pervaded and pervader, locus and located, adjective and what it qualifies, self and what belongs to it, etc.

If then the relation between Brahman and *jīva* is of the nature of cause and effect, "that thou art" (*tat tvam asi*) is to be understood accordingly. The omniscient, all-powerful, free

great being is indicated by "*tat*". "*Tvam*" indicates a conscious being dependent on that. "*Asi*" indicates their identity. In this way it means the inseparable dependence of conscious beings represented by "*tvam*" on the world self Brahman, with omniscience, omnipresence, and freedom . Brahman, who is free cosmic Self and the basis of all being is (ultimately) meant by all words, and in "*tat tvam asi*" "*asi*") indicates identity with It.

If there is a doubt about whether "*tvam*" indicates the *jīva* or applies to the inner-dweller it should be remembered that Brahman, the universal Self, is indicated by all words as stated in scripture. "In that which all names enter, all Vedas indicate which, which is established by all and known through the Vedas".

2.3.43 (E2.540) Keśavakaśmīrībhaṭṭa adds: "*Bhūta*" indicates *jīva* and *prakṛti*, static and dynamic (world); "*pāda*" indicates part, meaning part of conscious forces.

2.3.46 (E2.542-545) Had selves not been real, and Brahman, through ignorance, [actually] attained the state of a *jīva*, then Brahman could never escape the faults of selves.

(Objection:) Just as whiteness or blackness in a part of the quality of a cow affects the whole cow, and a part of the body of a man the whole man, so if a self is a quality of Brahman its defects should affect the latter.

(Answer:) No, for the example is not applicable to Brahman, and individual selves are not related to Brahman as quality to substance. If conscious and insentient things were as qualities to Brahman, they would have to be distinct from the latter. It has been said that a quality is what colors a substance by its sense. Neither one nor both sentient and non-sentient things in this way affect Brahman, or else knowledge of insentient things or of a man's body etc. would be conducive to knowledge of Brahman

It cannot be said that the same faults would apply to doctrines of difference-cum-non-difference, for in this theory

God does not pervade the differences of gods, men, animals, in His own intrinsic nature, and is not Himself affected by their virtues or vices, just as the special qualities of earthen pots, like fetching water, do not belong to earth and do not affect it.

It cannot be that God is in one part full of auspicious qualities and in the other part of low dispositions, like the ludicrous cases when in one part of the body sandal-paste etc. is applied and in the rest alkali for diversion of children. On the doctrine of difference-cum-non-difference, supported by scriptures also, the above faults do not arise.

In criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita it is said that the doctrine regarding the ultimate reality as having the qualifications of sentience and non-sentience with all their sins, impurities etc.

Is Brahman qualified by sentient and non-sentient, omniscient or detached? Not the latter, for the its indeterminate nature will not last, or it will be reduced to *māyāvāda*. In case Brahman were qualified by both omniscience and also of sentient and non-sentient things, there would result two such qualified entities, negating qualified monism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*). Also these would lose Brahman's regulative role so that the omniscient region would be lacking in the region qualified by sentient and non-sentient qualifies.

Nor is the first alternative (sentient and non-sentient) applicable. How can God with all auspicious qualities again get qualified with the special features of partial beings with all their miseries etc.? Even *māyāvāda* is better than such a position as it recognizes the difference of Brahman endowed with omniscience etc. According to *mayāvādins*, by accepting the world as imaginary, there is the possibility of liberation, while according to Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine this should not be possible due to its acceptance of the world as a quality of the self.

2.3.49 (E2.547-548) If the *jīva* is determined by ignorance, then there will be no motion in *jīva* or nor any limit, and there will result a mixing up of experiences and the proper results of actions.

According to this theory due to the obscuring of the uniform pure self-luminous consciousness, changes of quality are accepted, "*ābhāsa*" (appearance) being taken as a plural word. When there are no differences of the same class, of another class, or intrinsic, the association of the limitation with Brahman is only an appearance. Even when limits are regarded as imagined, due to ignorance, when in all selves the reality is obscured experiences of anyone will affect all. According to others "*ābhāsa* " is taken as singular, and they regard a self as an appearance of God, like an image, reducing it to a non-entity to which neither bondage nor liberation nor the right of action can really belong.

BOOK TWO, SECTION FOUR

2.4.7 (E2.557) From the mind's atomicity it does not arise that it will be unable to record pleasure and pain all over the body, because it is capable of contraction and expansion.

2.4.14 (E2.564-565) All awareness, action, and usage arise from a cooperation of *adhyātman, adhibhūta* and *adhideva.* Of these *adhyātma* is the *karaṇa* (the sense-organ as the immediate causal factor for awareness), *adhibhūta* is the data of sense-perception, and *adhideva* is the presiding deities over the *karana.* Thus the eyes are *adhibhūta,* and the sun *adhideva.* Similarly for the other sense-organs (details are listed).

2.4.15 (E2.565-566) The Supreme Being has posted the special gods as superintending deities over sense-organs not for enjoying objects themselves but to serve as door-keepers for the enjoyment of the individual self.

2.4.18 (E2.568-570) Breath (*prāṇa*) is alive when speech etc. are asleep; senses die, but not breath; senses receive their objects, but breathing is concerned with maintenance or collapse of the body; hence scriptures regard them as separate entities. The senses have special sense-objects, but breath is the common source that sets all the senses vibrating.

What about contradictory series in creation mentioned, some with breathing as a step, others without? That is because some statements are shortened, and doubt is to be resolved by reference to the states of dissolution mentioned, where there is no contradiction.

2.4.19 (E2.570-573) Just as a herald entering a foreign army acts as a representative to the king, similarly individual selves, despite being products and forms, stand for God's activity as an individual self is incapable of it. Else even in case of dissolution individual selves would retain this capacity making dissolution impossible.

By the same token Brahmā also cannot create names and forms, for he also was born after tripartite creation. Could names and forms appear before tripartite creation? In a general way it might have been possible, but specific names, associated with the tripartite creation, could arise only after this creation.

Actually the example of the king and herald is completely imaginary as they are different, but the individual self is not separate from Brahman. It is impossible for a self who is within the universe to provide it with names and forms.

Those who hold the view of complete non-difference of self and Brahman have to be asked: Before creation, during dissolution, was the identity of a self there or not? Not the first, for that would go against non-duality. Nor the second, because that would go against the non-created eternity of selves and lead to destruction and adventitious accretion of deeds. And if selves did not exist, how could God enter them and produce names and forms? Those who regard the self as completely different from Brahman leave no locus for the world. They tend to join the Naiyāyikas.

BOOK THREE, SECTION ONE

3.1.1 (E2.577-580) The means of attaining the highest aim are: First, man should have the mercy of Śrī Kṛṣṇa as a common basis for creating desire for liberation. This leads to a

pure (*sāttvika*) birth of one desiring liberation, and from desire for liberation comes truth. Thence devotion to the truth according to one's right, from that according to rights unattached activity devoted to God, due to God's grace purity of mind, the quest together with detachment from the world, and desire for liberation, desire to listen to scriptures, direct awareness of reality, from that perpetual remembrance (*anusmṛti*) that is supreme devotion, and that leads to establishment of fixed concentration, finally leading to the vision of God and liberation.

3.1.8 (E2.585-588) He who is still to enjoy the results of actions exhausts the remnant of works pertaining to this world and descends with the results of actions that are to be worked out in this world, like prayers and oblations (*homa*). Here the author gives the example of a servant who goes to the king's residence with various articles of service, and having exhausted them and left only with his own meagre belongings, returns.

3.1.9 (E2.588) When "wrong activity" and "disgusting activity" are mentioned, "activity' (*caraṇa*) stands for conduct, virtue and vocation. "Virtue" (*śīla*) stands for "non-hatred for all, in terms of actions, words, and thought, kindness and wisdom (*prajñā*)". Thus by "*caraṇa*" meritorious or non-meritorious motions are not indicated. In the Vedas also a distinction is made between *caraṇa* and *karman*. Hence "descent is not by *karman* but by *caraṇa* and *śīla*" is not correct. Kārṣṇāṇi accepts *caraṇa* for injunctions in the scriptures. And happiness and sorrow arise from meritorious actions and not by *caraṇa*.

3.1.11 (E2.589) About worldly action, *caraṇa* is not applied. The word is "*śīla*".

3.1.12 (E2.590) Those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest have three types of journey after death: (1) through light, etc., (2) through smoke, and (3) under control of Yama (the god of death). Those who are learned and strive for liberation go by the first; the non-learned in conduct take the second route; while those lacking both go to hell.

BOOK THREE, SECTION TWO

3.2.12 (E2.613-614) All objects become pleasant or painful according to the resolve of God at different times. They are not so by nature, else they would always be pleasant or painful. But "the same thing pleases (on one occasion), and gives pain afterwards". Hence, due to *karman*, for selves alone there are faults in things because of divine resolve corresponding to those actions. But God being free is untouched by faults even though all-pervasive, but His contacts with those objects contribute the savor of world-sport (*līlārasa*).

3.2.22 (E2.620-625) Formerly Brahman has been stated to be the inner-self of the sentient and non-sentient world, yet is untouched by their faults or limitations in Its perfection. So here in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, realizing that Brahman is unattainable by perception and other instruments of knowledge, Its description as having gross forms is denied in order to establish Its nature as truth, knowledge, and infinite auspicious qualities.

When in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* the material and immaterial (*mūrta, amūrta*) five elements are denied, some held that thereby the world is denied as imaginary to establish a quality-less, non-dual Brahman. But that is not correct. What is being denied is not the world, which is real, but the defects or limitations in Brahman because It pervades the world of defects and limitations.

As stated (in the *Bhagavadgītā* 15.18) "It is beyond the transitory and better than the permanent". Here the permanent covers sentient and non-sentient, gross and subtle *prakṛti* by double negation (*neti neti*). Brahman is established as distinguishable from both gross and subtle matter and individual selves delimited by association with it. That is why it is called "truth of truth". Truth stands fo the individual self mentioned as *prāṇa*, but its activities (*karmans*) have created

defects leading to contraction and expansion of its awareness. God is not subject to these limitations, that is why He is its truth.

Therefore, what is denied is not the world of elements or sentient and non-sentient things, but limitations in Brahman arising due to Its pervasion of them.

Those who regard the world as imaginary are not right, because there can be no imagination without one who imagines, and neither Brahman in its perfection nor the individual self, who himself is regarded as a product of imagination, can do the imagining.

Some (Advaitins) think that just as a beam of light appears different and bent due to an limitation like fingers, similarly the luminous self also appears as different due to limitations of meditations, awarenesses and activities. As indicated by "that thou art", really a self is one. When the differences due to limitations are overcome, the self attains identity with Brahman (they say). This view is incorrect, because Brahman cannot come into relation with limitations without losing its purity, nor can God, who (for Advaita) Himself comes after ignorance, be its locus. Nor is "that thou art" meant to deny all differences. When it is said that "that self is the inner-dweller" difference is also indicated, and statements indicative of difference and non-difference are of equal force. If the intrinsic difference of an individual also ceased in liberation, it would mean destruction of its nature.

3.2.28 (E2.631-633) Like insentient objects, individual selves are also related to Brahman through difference-cum-non-difference The difference is stated as between the percipient and what is perceived, the one engaged in concentration and the other the content of concentration, the one who attains and the objects of attainment, the controlled and the controller. Statements like "that thou art" etc. indicate non-difference, thus establishing difference-cum-non-difference. To remove further doubt the examples of light and its source are given. The light

of the sun, the lamp and the gem are perceived to be different from those sources even if the sun, or the lamp, are immaterial: their differences from their light are perceptible even at a distance. But their non-difference is also clearly perceptible due to the dependence, union and inseparability of light from its source.

Similarly the (individual) self is different from Brahman as dependent, finite, atomic and with limited awareness, but also non-different as united with Brahman, based and dependent on it, pervaded by it and non-separable from it.

Just as the sun's light that is always present may not be perceptible due to destruction of vision during sunset, etc., due to ignorance the dependence of the individual self on Brahman maybe obstructed, but it gets revealed when by God's grace the ignorance is dispelled.

3.2.29 (E2.633-634) Brahman, that is with endless qualities and powers, having a transformative nature even when pervading gross things of independent nature, due to Its power remains unchanged in Its intrinsic nature. Hence examples of coils etc. are not faulty, because they express difference even in non-difference by inseparability. The scriptural passages that indicate difference also are of the nature of relation of cause and effect, and not indicative of complete difference, which would contradict passages stating non-difference.

3.2.30 (E2.634-643) Some (Advaitins) hold that *sūtras* 28-29 mention difference-cum-non-difference only as an opposing view. As ignorance produces bondage and knowledge lead to liberation, if again the self is regarded as actually affected as a snake by its coils, as light and its locus pertains to one place, then from such real bondage there would be no liberation, and scriptures maintaining release would be useless. As such difference and non-difference are not regarded (in scripture) as of equal force, but non-difference is stated and difference rejected (they say).

(Answer:) So far as ignorance is regarded as the cause of bondage this is accepted, but ignorance stands for the effects of beginningless activity (*karman*), of the nature of merit and demerit, that constitutes bondage and that is removable by scriptures.

The view that real bondage cannot be removed is only a dogma. Actually real relational consequences like the subtle body etc. resulting from activity can be dispelled according to scriptures. On the contrary, if bondage were false, there wold be no actual bondage or liberation, making scriptures prolix.

Just as the sun, if delimited as image in water or a jar, etc., is in no way affected in reality by any sort of reduction and in no way seeks release, similarly according to you Brahman, who is pure, conscious and ever free, even if delimited as image in imaginary ignorance, is in no way touched by faults and will in no way try for release, Its reality being all the while evident.

Nor can the image try for release, being inert and bereft of awareness or activity, and also because release would be suicidal. And where bondage is false, so is its removal and the means thereof.

Some (viz., Advaitins) do not accept that the conscious principle can assume form like a coil in a serpent nor is it appropriate to apply to it the example of light and its source, as it (the conscious principle) is not spatially located and therefore locus and location are not obvious as in the case of light.

Nor are difference and non-difference given equal weight (in Advaita): the position maintained is that of non-difference. Knowledge of difference is based on perception, and it is well known that neither the individual self nor God is perceptible. Even if the non-sentient world is perceptible, for perceiving a difference it is not enough to perceive only one of the different factors but both (they say). But the world as perceived, being limited etc., is different from Brahman, as is stated in scripture. In this sense its difference from the latter is known through scripture. And according to the Advaitin also the awareness of

non-difference is no more than a truism based on perception because, according to them, all perception is of pure being.

But the Upaniṣadic statement "not this, not this" does not deny the world of difference to establish non-duality, as the scriptural statement "there is none other than the percipient", which does not deny the existence of other percipients but only their independent existence.

Others (Rāmānuja) have explained the conscious self as a particular state of Brahman, but that would invite the same fault (of impurity) leading to non-liberation. They explain the co-location (*saṃsthāna*) of unconscious and conscious entities as due to their genus (*jāti*), which is opposed to scripture. If finite entities, sentient and non-sentient, are regarded as qualities, then also difference is emphasized. But if they are regarded as parts, unity is emphasized and other defects avoided.

Therefore all sentient and non-sentient entities are one with Brahman, based in it, pervaded by it, regulated by it and dependent on it, and non-different from it, In spite of that, Brahman is untouched by any of their faults, being intrinsically unchanging. It is like gold that remains unchanged in gold ornaments. According to scriptures both sentient and non-sentient things are one with Brahman in inseparable relation.

In the example of the serpent and its coils the relation of difference-cum-non-difference has been accepted between Brahman and the world, but transformations with attendant faults belong only to consciousness-power (individual selves) and Brahman remains unattached.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita also God has been accepted as the material cause of the world, He being one as cause and many as effects. Thus whatever fault goes to this theory attaches to their view also. According to them purpose belongs to the conscious effects (selves) and changes (*vikāra*) to insentient (inert) things. And these do not affect Brahman. In this there is no dispute with us, because we also accept all faults as

belonging to changes only in God's powers as sentient and insentient things.

Regarding the example of light and its source, so far as sentient and non-sentient things are taken to exist as universals in God, this is nowhere also supported, and such universals would go against non-duality. The doctrine that in the case of the locus non-difference is primary, while in the relation of locus and property difference is primary, is only dogma. Actually primacy belongs to difference-cum-non-difference

Insofar as it is stated that light, universal, quality, and body are to gem, particular, qualificand and self as parts of the nature of inseparable substances and attributes, similarly selves and sentient objects are as parts to Brahman, it has to be said that in the example of the gem etc., even while the substance-attribute relation should be accepted, the relation of whole and part is not accepted. Where there is the relation of body and self, there is no relation of property and locus, and as such, if the world stands as body to Brahman as self, it cannot also stand as property to locus. *Jīvas* are both powers and parts of Brahman as stated in the *(Bhagavad)Gītā,* but such is not the case with matter. Hence qualified monism is nowhere supported in scripture, and both the above examples of serpent and coil, and light and source, support the relation of difference-cum-non-difference.

3.2.38 (E2.648-649) Activity being momentary cannot produce results later. Nor can it be produced by *apūrva* [=*adṛṣṭa*) which is inert and cannot move without conscious direction. There is no presumption to accept *apūrva* when God is there to prescribe the proper results of activity.

BOOK THREE, SECTION THREE

3.3.1 (E2.653-656) The commentator makes a three-fold classification of *vidyās*, meditative sciences, viz., symbolic (*partīka*), subsidiary (*udgītha*) etc. as subsidiary of action, subsidiary to self (helpful for getting identity with Brahman).

3.3.23 (E2.676-678) In *daharavidyā* Brahman is said to be in the space of the heart, and in *upakośavidyā* in the space of the eye. Therefore, while worshiping in these forms one should not combine the versions found in the Taittirīyānayanīya recensions with it, where Brahman in its vigor is said to pervade all space, so that the former refers to the small size of Brahman while the latter to Its vastness.

Brahman is referred to as elder as it preceded all other things and beings, including the first born Brahman. As such, nothing that follows it can compete with it for pre-eminence. Hence it regulates and pervades all things, and it is the locus and substance of all things.

3.3.25 (E2.681-683) *Abhicāra* (rites to harm others) are not to be taken as part of meditation. The *mantras* used for study also do not constitute part of meditation. And *pravargya* is used in the *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice that leads to heaven.

3.3.33 (E2.694-696) Is the knowledge of the imperishable to be combined in all meditations, or only where specifically mentioned? It might be said that being of a special negative nature and being different from intrinsic nature as blissful etc., it is to be used only where stated. Against this the accepted position if that they are to be always used as common factor of all meditations. Non-grossness etc. are intrinsic to an inquiry into Brahman. Only bliss etc. do not establish the special nature of Brahman as they are present in individual selves also. When associated with non-grossness they distinguish this bliss from that of the individual self, because in spite of the fact that the individual self also, by nature, is unrelated to the gross nature of the insentient, it borrows grossness through connection with the insentient. Hence the non-grossness etc. of Brahman has to be associated in all meditation as a subsidiary to correct these acquired deficiencies.

3.3.35 (E2.697-701) Sometimes the word "Brahman" is applied to the individual self also, as excluding qualities like

perceptibility. Brahman as immaterial (truth), knowledge, infinity also pervade all things as their inner-dweller, and is the primary vital source, since the activity of life is not seen in deep sleep, swoon etc. Only one principle as the cause of life of all creatures, and also beyond it, is established.

3.3.52 (E2.720-722) There are scriptural statements like "All this is the self, thou art that", "That self is the inner-dweller immortal?. Accordingly the self worships God as self, so that the self enters the state of God, having attained identity with the Supreme. As he meditates so he becomes, accordingly the self is also to be sought as it would be in its intrinsic form when rid of all sins. Just as attainment f Brahman is according to the form in which Brahman is sought, so the attainment of the Self is according to the form in which it is sought. The self is to be meditated upon as bereft of sins, and as in union with Brahman.

3.3.63 (E2.731-732) The subsidiary of the associated activity connected with meditation is optionally prescribed. This is because the activity, by itself, has a different potency for result, hence its part is not to be (necessarily) included in meditation. When the Udgithā is part of subsidiary activity its result is also different (from the main purpose) like milking of a cow for getting animals (?).

BOOK THREE, SECTION FOUR

3.4.2 (E2.736-737) The knowledge of the self as different from the body etc. is not conducive to the next world like the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice etc. Hence it is part of the activity as help for inducing activity.

3.4.18 (E2.746-747) Those who engage in penance in the forest are of the way of the gods, for there are no duties pertaining to stages of life (*āśrama*) for those who are *ūrdhvaretas* (whose semen flows upwards).

3.4.20 (E2.748-750) Some knowledge of *ūrdhvaretas* is an aim of life (*artha*) by itself, and is not as subsidiary of

action. Knowledge is of two kinds, that of the self as distinct from the body, and that of oneness between the self and Brahman. While the former might become part of activity, the latter is never so. Everywhere the knowledge of the self and God are granted of liberation independently . If God could not grant results except as dependent on activities then God would be without purpose.

(It might be said) that just as agricultural activity independently yields fruit, Vedic activity also can be fruitful by itself. It should not be said that being of short duration it cannot yield results because it can generate unseen potency for future results. But it is not so, for both activity and unseen potency being insentient, they cannot also give future results. Such activity again is not always capable of yielding results., just as agricultural activity may fail to be fruitful for want of rain or hail. That is why even in sacrificial activity there is worship of gods also.

Nor can it be said that the individual self itself, when it becomes potent due to good deeds, yields results, for the individual self being dependent is incapable of it. Only God as inner-dweller can give the results.

3.4.46 (E2.772-774) Like the duties of one's stage of life (*āśramadharma*), tranquility and restraint, hearing and reflection (on scriptures) (*śravaṇa*), learning, childlikeness, and wisdom (*mauna*) etc. are coordinate rules of knowledge. In stating three factors (learning, childlikeness, and *mauna*) there is no fault of repetition, because learning by itself does not necesssarily provide wisdom also. From constant reflection (*manana*) comes mind, it stands for one who is properly reflective. Proper reflection means adopting of worship (devotion) based on the inner meaning of what is heard through scriptures, of the form of constant meditation on God's nature and qualities, and that is the unusual cause of God's grace and known as intense meditation (*nididhyāsana*).

Hence the meaning is as follows: As the Brahmin, having

known the self, for the sake of progeny went begging, so now also the learned Brahmin, having acquired learning of the Vedas with their parts on the basis of hearing, and having reflected on it as a child to get rid of doubts based on ideas of impossibilities, or with a pure mind free from vanity etc., like a child, and having got certainty of it and having become a *muni* through hearing and reflection, becomes permanently established in meditation on the Supreme Brahman. Thereby he becomes a Brahmin with mastery of learning. Thereby, by God's grace, her has a vision of Him.

It should not be said that by hearing etc. liberation is obtained and therefore mention of grace is prolix, for in (the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*) it is said "He is not obtainable by hearing or learning. He is obtained by one whom he chooses". Thus a combination of both meditation and grace is required.

The duties of the householder are stated because of their numerousness like sacrifices, duties pertaining to both his present stage of life and the other three state, besides control of the senses and non-violence. Hence the numerousness of these duties is mentioned to represent all *dharmas*. But begging is also mentioned for the state of mendicant.

3.4.49 (E2.776) Just as a child is without arrogance, as he has not discovered his high birth, so a learned man loses arrogance as he discovers his own lack of importance.

BOOK FOUR, SECTION ONE

4.1.1 (E2.781-783) Repetition is necessary for self-realization, as indicated by '*nididhyāsana*' which means constant meditation.

4.1.2 (E2.783) "Remembrance" stands for frequent reflection on scriptures.

4.1.5 (E2.786) Mind etc. that are insentient, of limited power, and dependent on the content of worship, Brahman, are to be seen as Brahman for worship and not vice-versa, because higher sight raises one while lower sight lowers.

4.1.8 (E2.788) In constant meditation it is necessary to have one-pointed concentration, in which all different ideas are discarded and persistent remembrance of the (chosen) content of attention is attained, leading to steadfast memory and superior devotion. For it one has to be in a sitting position, for movement would lead to distraction, and lying to sleep.

BOOK FOUR, SECTION TWO

4.2.3 (E2.804) The mind combines with vital breath but does not merge in it, because the mind is said to be of food, and is born of egoity, while breath is said to be of water and produced by space

4.2.7 (E2.806-807) About the scriptural testimony that the knower transcends the mundane state to attain immortality, immortality (ambrosia) sustains one. By nectar one becomes immortal "as immortality sustains, and as in the heart destruction of relation with the body and senses results, so it leads to non-clinging to prior sins, due to their destruction , and remains even after termination of the relation with the body and senses." As such, when worshiping according to scripture, experience of Brahman becomes the object, constant remembrance leads to greatness, else immortality would not sustain. Unless the subtle body is destroyed there is no liberation. Hence "merger", then, stands for reaching a particular place. To resolve the conflict of such movement with (other) scriptural utterances, the worship for immortality leads to a state where everyone gets liberated. When the desires of the heart leave, then as a termination of worship immortality is attained in the mortal world by removal of prior sins.

4.2.12 (E2.810) In the statement quoted from Yājñavalkya on the matter of the end of life of a dying man, the man's name, reputation, merits and demerits etc. are described, and there is no topic of the learned. About the non-learned, it is said that the vital breath does not leave like the gross body, but leaves with the subtle *jīva*, the individual self.

4.2.15 (E2.814-815) The meaning is this: Having discarded the gross body and not on the road of the gods, the learned has the subtle body with him so long as he reachers the border river Virajā that separates the region of Viṣṇu from the mundane regions. Then giving up the subtle body to the (presiding) deities (of elements), and decked with superb, supernatural decorations, the sage (*ṛṣi*) enters the region of Viṣṇu to reach Brahman.

4.2.16 (E2.816-817) The learned, having discarded the body, rising from the heart through the hundred and first vein, and finding the aperture of Brahman (*Brahmarandhra*), where the sun and (inner) light become one, exists through *suṣumnā*. In that heart where God lights up the door at the foot of *suṣumnā*, that type of learned man, knowing that path, makes his exit from the body by it.

4.2.19 (E2.819-820)The learned who die during the southern solstice and so go to the moon are not debarred from reaching Brahman. For them the proximity to the moon is only a resting place for proceeding to Brahman.

BOOK FOUR, SECTION THREE

4.3.1 (E2.823-825) For the learned the path of light is admitted in scriptures including the *pañcavidyā prakaraṇa*. There are two paths indicated, the path of light of the unattached and the path of smoke for the activists. And in *smṛti* the two paths of gods and forefathers are indicated for the liberated and the bound.

4.3.2 (E2.825-827) In the *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad* it is stated that after passing the region of fire the self reaches the region of air. Air stands higher than *abda* (year) and below the sun. Here air is mentioned as non-particular, to stand for any element. But when in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* the sun is stated to be above air, air is mentioned in a particular sense. Here above means "in sequence".

4.3.3 (E2.828) Lightning is in the clouds and as such, the

relation between lightning and Varuṇa (the water-god) is well known. Above Varuṇa are Indra and Prajāpati.

4.3.4 (E2.829-831) He who goes forth in the subtle body must move freely. As his supra-mundane pówer grows he is wafted toward the Supreme.

4.3.5 (E2.831-833) Having crossed the boundary of Viṣṇulokas and having met on the way devotees of equal virtue, he comes to see Hari in His bejewelled court on the throne of precious stones with consort Lakṣmī, of the splendor of the sun beyond darkness, with all auspicious qualities and untouched by any defects, of the nature of knowledge and bliss, and cause of the world. By the grace of God he attains the state of Brahman and never thinks of returning to the earth.

4.3.13)E2.837-841) Some (Advaitins) hold that there can be no movement toward unqualified Brahman as it is all-pervasive: what is already possessed is (re-)found. Only what is limited, like a village, can be reached. Therefore, only those whose knowledge is confined to qualified Brahman can journey towards it.

But, then, the same objection would apply to Brahman endowed with qualities, because He is also worshiped as Brahman, as one without a second, with the quality of omnipresence. He is all-pervading like the immensity of space. He is the Supreme Self (God) who is the cause of the world, and free from sins. It is not as if Brahman with qualities, who is the object of worship, ceases to be Brahman. An object has both substance and qualities. There is no quality-less object, just as the can be no fire without heat and light.

When it is said that Brahman is joy or Brahman is knowledge and bliss, joy is established beyond a hundred qualities which would be meaningless if Brahman were pure consciousness.

Are not omniscience, omnipotence, and creator-ship of the world also qualities? If qualities, activities, or diversity are perceived, they are not faults within our system in the context

of difference-cum-non-difference, they are as ornaments. Even in the case of Brahman with qualities, there being no movement, attainment of it does not become a re-finding of what is already possessed. The movement is like entering a well. Even for the self sought in the world there is no movement literally, as, in fact, because it is not the self but the subtle body that moves (in rebirth etc.)

If the self be the appearance of God, and as thus limited, taken to be in motion, then is this appearance real or unreal? If unreal, then its attainment of heaven or liberation are like hare's horn. If real, according to you it will have either atomic or middle dimension. If the limitation be atomic, the movement is in the subtle body, not in the self itself, as held in scripture. By nature the self's movement is not possible, as it is the body that gets the results of actions. Still, not only we but also those who hold the view of quality-less Brahman read of movement in scripture.

Going by light there is the merger of the subtle body in God, not before. At one place it is said "In the supreme undifferentiated, everything is one', and elsewhere "the person finding the *puruṣa* goes there".

These two types of conflicting views are there in scripture. In your theory also this type of difference is not acceptable, but differences that stand in the way of liberation are limiting, so that there also movement is in the limit and not in the self. But there liberation is also not proved. In our system, as differences are natural according to scripture, movement also presents no contradiction.

BOOK FOUR, SECTION FOUR

4.4.1 (E2.845-846) The question is whether the realized self shines in revelation in its natural form, or in an acquired, relational, or created form? Liberation is an ideal of man. In deep sleep this ideal is seen as of the nature of self. Is liberation such an ideal of man, or is it like the gods, something external

or acquired?

4.4.(E2.846-847) The liberated self is freed from bondage and sins, and also from contracted awareness and virtues resulting from ignorance associated with worldly activities, and it attains a state beyond waking etc. states, with unclouded knowledge and revealed self-nature.

4.4.5 (E2.850-851) Liberation of the self, according to Jaimini, is a state when sins are destroyed, and Brahman's qualities like omniscience, omnipotence arise in awakened consciousness.

4.4.6 (E2.851-852) Just as "horse" negates non-horses, so statements like "sins are destroyed" convey only that the released self negates sins and other limitations, indicating only pure consciousness.

4.4.7 (E2.852-869) According to Bādarāyaṇa, while the liberated self is of the nature of pure intelligence, there is no opposition to its being free from sins etc.

The state of pure consciousness does not exclude other attributes, just as having pure taste of salt does not prevent something from having color etc. Nor does it exclude distinction from other tasty things like mangoes. Here (in the case of the liberated self) insentient objects are distinguished in the idea of a completely self-luminous self: Liberation is a state where, being free from sin, pure consciousness is established in its own form and constantly experiences the nature and qualities of God. This is the view of another.

When it is stated in the Upaniṣads that one "attains the form of supreme light" it means constant awareness of God through one's own self. When it is said that the liberated self attains ultimate similarity with the Supreme, it means similarity in omniscience and freedom from sins, but not in the matter of regulator-ship or freedom. When it is said that He perceives all, it implies omniscience, "*svarāja*" means equally to be revered, "*sāyujya*" indicates constant union. It does not denote identity, exemplified by the river being merged in the ocean, for even

there difference is seen. Even water poured in water does not become identical with it, only it enters into permanent union with it. Nor, when it is said that "Having known, seen and entered reality", that which has entered cannot be seen as different, leading to non-difference, as both Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna state a perception of diverse things in God.

"Entry" here means attainment of world-wide and divine consciousness and remaining in cosmic Brahman as Its power. Even gods who create and destroy are emanations of divine power; they on dissolution merge in His power, as stated in the Viṣṇudharma. Attainment of God lies in a state of uninterrupted experience of God, that is the medicine for the disease of the world and is marked with great bliss. It has to be free from gaps in time and entirely devoted to the import of the word "God".

Some (Advaitins upholding image-theory) hold that *jīva* is an image of God who is reflected in the self. Pure consciousness pervades both, so that it being liberated, everyone should be liberated and have omniscience and other powers. But this is not accepted, and it is stated that even when one man's ignorance is removed, others remain under its spell. To the question whether God's omniscience etc. are due to His ignorance it is stated by Śaṃkara and his followers like Vācaspati Miśra that it is part of the activity of persons under the bondage of *māyā*.

Taking the above view there is a clear fault in the liberated's acquiring God's state according to image-theory. As the author of the *Kalpataru* states, that which is an image in *māyā* cannot be the form of the liberated, as that would be impossible due to its being completely imaginary.

Nor will it do to maintain that until all are liberated the individual who gets released lives as God with powers of omniscience etc.; that is untenable. Does he remain like God in form or in respect of powers like omniscience etc.? Not the first, for then, contrary to scripture, it would involve destruction of its own nature. Attaining God's nature, is it like water thrown

into water that cannot be separated, or sublation of the *jīva*'s form (nature)? The first would lead to failure of purpose and the giving up of Advaita. The second would lead to self-destruction.

Are God and *jīva* as the object and image real or false or inexpressible, or completely imaginary like a hare's horn? Not the first without entry into the opponent's camp. Nor the second, for then bondage and liberation theories would be futile: bondage being unreal, even if destroyed, it would not be possible to determine who is bound or liberated. Nor the third, as it would reduce all scriptures to silence, lest their utterances may sound like "my mother is barren".

Nor is the above second alternative of omniscience acceptable, as it is vitiated by alternative possibilities. Is the being here a basis of the imagined omniscience or of (real) omniscience. Not the first, as that is not accepted and likely to lead to the opponent's position. Nor the second as lacking in evidence and leading to the impossible position of the existence of many Gods.

There is no cessation of God's power, only *māyā* is transcended. As indicated in the *Gītā*, world *māyā*, that stands in the way of liberation in the form of attaining likeness to God, has to be overcome. There can be no transcending of God's normal omniscience, because that would lead to loss of knowledge for all. Hence the notion that God's omniscience and true resolve are only imagined by bound *jīva*s, is without proof and only imaginary.

If indeed pure consciousness be your conception of liberation, it is Auḍulomi's position and not Bādarāyaṇa's.

God cannot be indeterminate, else all means of knowledge of God would be futile, as these means deal with determinate objects.

According to the followers of Gautama (the author of the *Nyāyasūtras*) liberation lies in the destruction of twenty-one types of suffering. They are related to body, six-fold objects, six

types of intellect, joy and sorrow. Joy also is sorrow, as it is hemmed in by sorrow on both sides. Sorrow, birth, hankering, faults, false awareness are linked in a series. Getting rid of them in reverse order through knowledge is release. That view is not correct, because the aim of human life cannot be the negative escape from suffering. Release of the nature of lasting joy is not just escape from suffering. Such a (negative) aim cannot be the motive of action. Motives being basically positive, negative purposes are attached to corresponding positive ones. The purpose of removing a thorn is not an aim in itself but a part of the purpose of walking freely.

According to the Vaiśeṣika also liberation is the cessation of suffering; the words like "joy" only indicate absence of pain. If joy depends on attachment, then it can only be a source of bondage. The released self has escaped body and mind, and is free from the causes of the origin of ideas, and stays alone like a stone.

So far as it is said that attachments are causes of bondage in scriptures differences have been made between right and wrong attachments, like those for wife and another's woman. It is the latter that lead to bondage. Attachment to Brahman of supreme joy is a cause of liberation. Nor is joy the absence of pain, as the bliss of Brahman has been stated as the ultimate in a series where joys arise progressively hundred-fold In *Taittirīyopaniṣad* also Brahman has been described as bliss, having known which there is no other fear. In usual worldly awareness also grades of happiness and sorrow are distinguished.

According to Sāṃkhya the conscious percipient self attains liberation through image-less concentration, only staying in its pure consciousness. As in other thought, there is no place for joy of Brahman, there is want of such joy. In the Yoga of Patañjali also there is no state of Brahman, liberation comes through *yoga*. Their theory of the removal of five forms of suffering is acceptable to us also.

Therefore, liberation is the attainment of God's state, obtainable by direct vision of God due to His grace. It results from constant remembrance of the Lord, and exhausting the results of past deeds. As stated in scripture, "He whom the lord selects, he attains. Then the knot of the heart is broken, all doubts vanish, and all activities cease on perceiving the Supreme".

(In Advaita theory) Does direct knowledge destroy the basic ignorance (*mūlājñāna*) or not? Not the first, because on destruction of the cause the effect cannot stand, because a positive effect cannot be without its material cause. Is the effect (here) with material cause? Is this material Brahman or something else? Not the first, as Brahman being a non-cause it cannot be the material cause, else the effect would be permanent like the cause, leading to non-release. Nor the second, when ignorance is destroyed its effect, including the actions that have started yielding fruit (*prārabdhakarman*), cannot remain, like a piece of cloth on the destruction of its threads. Nor can it be argued that ignorance continues for a short while to work out these karmic results of action, for if ignorance is not (entirely) destroyed by knowledge, the latter loses its nature.

If, on direct awareness of Brahman ignorance is to be truly removed, it cannot wait for exhaustion of the *prārabdha* actions through having a dual nature. Nor will it do to maintain that while on direct awareness of Brahman the concealing power of ignorance is removed, its projecting power endures until these results are exhausted, for the same ignorance cannot together continue and also cease. Nor can it be said that only the power ceases, since power and its source are not different. If they were so, there would arise the indestructibility of basic ignorance for want of the destroyer. It cannot be the cessation of the results of action that leads to its destruction, because the destruction of an effect has the efficiency for destruction of its cause. Nor can prior awareness destroy it, as its power for

liberation is negligible. Nor an ignorance destroy itself by its own nature, as that would involve self-contradiction and moreover loss of the position maintained in the school. Further, if knowledge does not remove ignorance it would lead to futility of knowledge and to non-release.

Just as on sunrise no darkness remains, on the rise of knowledge no trace of ignorance can remain. Nor will the example of the burnt cloth do. For in that case it loses the capacity to cover the body, but in the case (of the one liberated while living) all activities (attributed to ignorance) continue. Nor can it be said that the activity of ignorance persists in another's eyes for that would concede dualism (of observers).

How is ignorance removed, by itself or by another? The former is ruled out as it would make knowledge futile. Is the ignorance to be removed real, unreal, both or inexpressible (viz., neither)?

Not the first as it would go against non-duality. The second would make it unfit for removal by knowledge. When the object to be removed is already absent, where is the function for a remover? It would be without a function like a candle in daylight. As the inexpressible is the material cause of ignorance, even in release ignorance would not cease, as it could not be removed by knowledge. Nor is there any fifth possibility as held by Ānandabodha. Hence by definition the concept of liberated-while-living becomes self-contradictory.

Nor would non-acceptance of liberation-while-living do away with Vedānta for want of a teacher, a difficulty that is claimed to beset all schools of Vedānta. This is denied on the basis that in our Nimbārka school incarnations of even released attendants of God are accepted, like incarnations of God who can act as teachers. In scripture it is said "It became one, became three fold".

According to you (Advaitins) what is the cessation of ignorance? Is it cessation of the beginningless relation with *māyā* or the bondage resulting therefrom, or the prior absence

of knowledge derived from Vedānta, or the absence of the destruction of what is denoted by the word "ignorance"?

The released is the blissful state of the self, with uninterrupted vision of Brahman. In it there is no scope for non-permanence etc. as it is not something produced by action. Actions are of four types: creation, acquisition, purification and transformation. Thus a chariot etc. might be produced; acquisition can be like perception of form etc.'purification lies in endowing a thing with a special competence, as in providing the sacred thread or cleaning a mirror; transformation is like changing of milk into curds.

So far as (the theory of) ignorance is concerned, has the self contact with beginningless ignorance or not? In the first case there will be a defect due to association with ignorance necessitating purification. In the second case there would be no bondage and thus no liberation. (On the contrary) in Nimbarka's theory this contingency does not arise, for despite freedom from all contacts with defects in nature the *dharmabhūta* knowledge contracts due to ignorance born of activity, like a lamp inside a pot. On direct vision of God, the affliction (*kleśa*) is destroyed, giving release. The object of such vision being Vāsudeva, there is no question of His being the result of action, He being eternal.

(It might be objected) that the experience of Brahman cannot be eternal, for its realization depends on competent experience and means of knowledge, else everyone would be released. Like heaven etc. attained through external activity, it also is attainable through mental activity like concentration.

The appearance of causation in concentration is completely imaginary, it acts only to remove obstacles to vision, not to create it.

If the mental function of concentration be taken as activity so too should be the mental operation (*vṛtti*) accepted in Advaita Vedānta (as conducive to release through the great sayings (*mahāvākya*).

It might be objected that in concentration God becomes an object of worship against which there is scriptural testimony. The reply is that the scriptural testimony is against worshiping God through symbols like name or mind.

When liberation is conceived as embodied one might object that it could not be free from pains. The objection would apply to natural bodies, not to unnatural ones.

4.4.9 (E2.871) Except Vāsudeva there is no other ruler over him. There is no blanket denial of all rulership, for then instead of "no other ruler", "no ruler" would be said.

4.4.22 (E2.881-883) God also, having such a wise man, never wants to lose him from His own sphere, as the truly wise are very dear to Him.

5.4 KEŚAVAKĀŚMĪRIBHAṬṬA, *Prakāśikā* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*

Cf. Oxf p. 127, Part 1.

5.5 KEŚAVAKĀŚMĪRIBHAṬṬA, *Ṭīkā* on a *Brahmopaniṣad*

Oxf p. 28, Part III.

5.6 KEŚAVAKĀŚMĪRIBHAṬṬA, *Kramadīpikā*

Edited by Deviprasada Sarma Sukla in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 49, 1917

6 PURUṢOTTAMĀCĀRYA (1250?)

Roma Bose (VPSVK p. 70) writes: "Puruṣoṭtama was the immediate disciple of Viśvācārya, and the third after Nimbārka. Nothing definite is known of his life and date." He must have lived after Śaṃkara, whom he criticizes. Writing more recently, Madan Mohan Agrawal, in Agrawal 2000, Volume 4 p. i, says "[Puruṣoṭtamācārya] is said to have been born in Tailaṅga district, his exact birth-village is not known", citing Kiśoradāsa in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 113, Banaras 1907-1908, p. 1.

6 1 PURUṢOTTAMĀCĀRYA, *Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā* on Nimbārka's *Daśaślokī*

Edited by Ratna Gopala Bhatta in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 117, 1907-08.

Roma Bose summarizes this work in VPSVK 3, pp. 71-107. We provide most of this summary below. "E" references are to the edition by Ratna Gopala Bhatta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 113, Banaras 1907. Ms. Bose has rearranged the order of topics; we provide her summaries sentence-by-sentence (page references indicated by "S") re-arranged in the order found in the text.

A topical analysis of the work is to be found in Agrawal 2000, Volume 4, pp. i-xxviii. This is followed by an edition of the work, as well as by "Notes" in English explaining some of the passages in the work further.

Summarized by Roma Bose

(E3-4; S79) "The self is essentially of the nature of knowledge (*jñānasvarūpa*), i.e. different from whatever is non-sentient, viz. the body, etc. The Cārvāka view that the self is nothing but the body, and the Naiyāyika view that the intelligence is not the very essence of the self, but only an adventitious quality of the self generated through the connection with the internal organ–are both wrong.

"The self is not only knowledge, but a locus of knowledge, i.e. a knower.

"An objection may be raised here: The self cannot be both knowledge and knower, i.e. possess knowledge as its attribute, for here the locus itself and what inheres in it, the possessor and the quality possessed–both being equally knowledge–are identical, just as one drop of water has no separate existence from water, but is identical with it. Hence the self is not a knower, but pure knowledge, and only appears to be a knower.

(E5; S79) "The answer to this objection is as follows: In many cases the property-possessor and the property are very similar, but that does not mean that they are identical; e.g. a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet they are different and stand in the relation of locus and property. Similarly, though the self and the quality of knowledge are equally knowledge, yet on account of this very fact that one is the locus and the other its property, they belong to different categories and are hence distinct from each other. The fact is that there does exist a difference between a drop of water and water, for that drop of water having a distinct form must be different from other drops of water. We can argue thus: a drop of water is distinct from water, because it has a form just like dust thrown into dust, or sesamum-grain in a heap of sesamum-grains.

(E5-6; S84-85) "The doctrine that the self is not really a knower but that it appears to be so through the reflection of consciousness in the intellect is an absurd one, for a mere reflection cannot behave as if it is really possessed of knowledge–a knower. The reflection of the sun, e.g. can never do what the real sun does, viz. remove darkness and cold. In the very same manner, if the knowing self were a mere reflection, it could not have acted–as it evidently does–like a real knower. Further, here both the object reflected (the *bimba*, viz. consciousness, *caitanya*) and the limitation (the *upādhi*, viz. intellect) are without form and color, hence no reflection is

possible, otherwise we have to admit that there may be reflection of taste in sound, or in time, of time in taste, etc.–which is evidently absurd.

(E6-7; S85) "Criticism of *avacchedavāda* or *upādhivāda*. According to this doctrine Brahman as limited by ignorance or the internal organ is called the self. Just as the space within a pot is distinct from the universal space, but when the pot is broken is no longer distinct from the universal space, so the self as limited by ignorance is distinct from Brahman, but when free from ignorance is no longer distinct from Him.

"But this view is absolutely untenable. Thus whether the limited limitation be ignorance or the internal organ the question is: How exactly does it limit Brahman? Does it actually cut Brahman into separate pieces, as an ax cuts a log of wood, or does it limit one portion of Brahman (without actually cutting off that portion from Brahman)?

"The first alternative is not possible, because what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be actually cut off into pieces, and also because in that case the Self would cease to be eternal and unborn, as scripture declares it to be.

"The second alternative, too, is equally untenable. Here the question arises whether the limiting limitation is all-pervading or limited. First, it cannot be all-pervading, for then no going out, coming back etc. of the self would be possible. Also, if the limiting limitation, too, be all-pervading like Brahman, everything will be veiled, even Brahman in His entirety. Secondly, it cannot be limited either, for in that case, although the going out, etc. of the self becomes possible, space being motionless. Some other difficulties arise, viz. just as in the motion of the pot no motion of the space within it is possible, space being motionless, so on the notion of the limiting limitation no motion is possible on the part of Brahman, the all-pervading, who is motionless like space. In that case, there will arise sudden and causeless release and bondage and violation of the law of *karman*. So the doctrine that the self is but

Brahman limited by limiting limitations does not stand to reason in any way.

(E7; S79) "To say that the self is a knower is to say that it is an ego–an "I", for a knower always feels 'I know', 'I see', etc.

"An objection may be raised here: If the 'I' were the very essence of the self, it would have always accompanied it. But that is not the case, for in the states of deep sleep, liberation etc. the 'I' no longer exists. Hence the 'I' is simply an effect of *prakṛti*, i.e. non-sentient.

(E8-10; S79-80) "To this we reply: Even in deep sleep the 'I' persists, as is proved from such memory as 'So long I slept happily and did not know anything', which shows that the 'I' was present during the state of deep sleep as the locus of knowledge (viz. 'I do not know') and the feeling of happiness (viz., 'I am sleeping happily'). Even the memory–'So long I did not know even myself–does not prove the absence of the 'I' during the same state. For here the first 'I' ('*aham*') means the self as it is during that state of *suṣupti*, i.e. the self, the knower, pure and devoid of all connection with matter, i.e.., the body, the sense-organs, etc., while the second 'I' ('*mām*') means the self as it is during the waking state, in union with matter, i.e. the body, etc. Hence 'So long I did not now even myself' means simply that the real, pure 'I' persists in deep sleep; what is absent is the 'I' as it is during the waking state. Otherwise, on rising from deep sleep, one would have felt in effect 'So long I did not exist, but now I have come into existence', etc.–but such is not the case...

(E10-12; S80-81) "Hence the 'I' must persist even during states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest. During those states, of course, there is no definite well-defined consciousness, as during the waking state for there are present no well-defined, special objects then. Nevertheless, such a vague and general consciousness during deep sleep etc., too, requires a locus, for consciousness implies one who is conscious, and this locus is the 'I'–the real I.

"Moreover, there may be some room for doubt whether the 'I' persists during the states of deep sleep, etc., but there can be no doubt that it persists in the state of release–for release is not the destruction of the self but its full development.

"The self is, further, an active agent or a *kartṛ*, and continues to be so during its states of deep sleep and release. Of course, during the state of deep sleep its agency is not manifest as during its state of waking. This is due to the fact that the self in bondage has to work through its sense-organs, i.e. during its state of bondage the *kartṛtva* of the self has to depend on the functions of its sense-organs, and hence, since in the state of deep sleep the sense-organs function no more, the self does not seem to be an agent at the time. During the state of waking, too, it is not always an agent, but only when its sense-organs function in relation to some or other particular object.

(E11-12; S86) "Further, the doctrine that the self, which is but Brahman, is not really an active agent, but that the limitation (viz. the internal organ) of the self is the real agent, is also absolutely untenable, for the limitation, being non-sentient, can never be an agent. If it is said that it is not the limitation by itself but the self in connection with the limitation which is the agent, we point out that the self (which, according to Advaitins, is not an agent) cannot become an agent simply through its union with a limitation which also is not an agent, otherwise we have to admit that a hermaphrodite can produce children through associating with a woman–which is evidently absurd. Hence the fact is that just as though the fire is the substrate of the natural power of burning, yet this power is manifested only in connection with fuel, etc., so though the self is the locus of the natural power of being an agent, yet this power is manifested through the functioning of the sense-organs only. That is, just as there is nothing contradictory in the fact that the fire does not burn always though the power of burning is natural to it, so exactly there is nothing contradictory in the fact that the self is not always active (e.g. in deep sleep,

etc) though the power of being an agent is natural to it.

"The self is an experiencer and continues to be so during deep sleep and release. During deep sleep, it enjoys happiness (as is evident from the memory: 'So long I slept happily') and during release it enjoys supreme bliss arising out of its direct vision of Brahman.

(E13-15; S81-82) "The self, though knowledge by nature, knower, doer and experiencer, equally like the Lord, is yet never equal to Him but is essentially under His control. Although the sentient is different from and superior to the non-sentient, yet it, in common with the latter , is dependent on the Lord for its very nature, existence and activity...

"An objection may be raised here: If the selves be not responsible for their own acts, but the Lord is, then seeing that He induces some to meritorious acts while others to evil ones, the Lord must be accused of partiality and cruelty. Puruṣottama refutes this objection just in the same way as Nimbārka does.

"It is not be argued that since the freed self has no *karmans* it is not under the control of the Lord, for the essential nature of the self is to be controlled, while the essential nature of Brahman is to control, and one can never change one's essential nature. Hence the freed selves, too, are dependent on the Lord for their nature, existence and activity.

"It is not to be supposed, further, that since it is the Lord alone who leads the selves to this or that course of action there is no use of the study of scripture recommending different courses of action, for the study of scripture is by no means useless, seeing that it arouses the self to the consciousness of its real nature. The self, engrossed in the world of matter, thinks itself to be an independent being, but scripture reveals to it the great truth that far from being an independent being its very nature and existence depend on the Lord.

"Because of having Brahman for its very nature, the self is dependent on Him. This may be proved from the following positive and negative arguments:

"(Positive:) Whatever has something else for its very essence depends on that for its nature, existence and activity, like pots which have clay for their essence.

"The *jīva* has Brahman for its essence.

"(So) the *jīva* depends on Brahman for its nature, etc.

"(Negative:) Whatever has not something else for its essence does not depend on that for its nature, etc., like the sky-flower.

"The self does not depend on what is non-Brahman for its nature.

"(So) the self depends on Brahman for its nature, etc.

(E15-16; S82) "Next, the size of the self. In size it is atomic, although it is able to pervade the whole body and experience its pleasure, pain etc. through its all-pervading attribute of knowledge.

(E16-17; S86-87) "The doctrine that the self is really all-pervading (being Brahman itself) but appears to be atomic through its connection with the limitation (viz. the internal organ) is equally absurd. If the self be all-pervasive, the question arises whether there is a plurality of selves or one self only. In the first place, there cannot be a plurality of selves, for in that case, whether the mind be all-pervasive or atomic, in either case selves, being all-pervasive, must be in eternal connection with all objects, therefore with all minds, and hence everyone must be aware of the thought of everyone else. Hence there will be no special perceptions to the effect 'I', 'you', 'he' etc., all perceptions being universal and identical. And, if every self were to know everything and every mind, a self would become equal to Brahman who is omniscient.

In the second place, to say that there is not a plurality of selves but one self only does not obviate the above difficulty; for the one all-pervasive self, being connected with all minds, must be omniscient. If not, i.e. if it be said that the self, though in connection with all minds, feels the pleasures, pains, etc. of only one of them (viz. its own), we are inevitably led to the

conclusion that the self is non-sentient. And if the self be non-sentient, it cannot, evidently, be the knower and hence we have to say that the limitation of the self (viz. the internal organ) must be the knower. Now if the limitation be atomic there can be no simultaneous experience of pain, etc. in different parts of the body (which, however, is an undeniable fact), for a limitation which is atomic cannot be simultaneously connected with different parts of the body. If, again, the limitation be of the size of the body, the self, limited by that limitation, must also be so, which will go against the view of the Advaitins themselves.

(E17; S82) "An objection may be raised here; If the self be atomic in size it must be without form, without parts. But in that case how can the Lord be said to be pervading it and abiding within it? For to pervade is to pervade something definite with a form of its own, to abide within it is to abide within something which occupies space.

"The answer to this objection is that even if the self be atomic and without parts, still it can be pervaded by the Lord who pervades everything. The fact is that the relation of controller and controlled, pervader and pervaded, does not depend upon the a thing's having or lacking parts, but on the power inhering in it. That is, if one thing possesses the power of pervading and controlling something else, it does so whether that thing is with or without parts, or whether it itself is with or without parts. Conversely, if a thing possesses the power, i.e. fitness to be pervaded, and is controlled by something else, it is so irrespective of whether it is with or without parts, or whether that which pervades it is with or without parts. Hence the Lord, possessing as He does the power of pervading and controlling everything, pervades and controls the self.

(E18; S106) ""An objection may be raised here: The grace of the Lord must be either limited or all-pervasive. But it cannot be limited, because then it must be dependent on some initiating cause (as the favor shown by a self) and not of much

worth as such. Neither can it be all-pervasive, because the there will result universal liberation and the scriptural injunctions regarding the means (*sādhana*) thereto will become useless...

"To this objection we reply: The Lord's favor is undoubtedly all-pervading, yet it is manifested not to any and everyone indiscriminately, but only to those who having approached a preceptor have had recourse to the *sādhanas*. A thing may be universal, yet its actual manifestations may depend on certain conditions, et.c., according to the Nyāya view the universal cow-ness (*gotva*) is all-pervading (all universals are all-pervading according to this view), yet all things are not found to be pervaded by it (a pot, e.g. has no *gotva* in it, nor a horse) but only a certain species of animals having a dewlap , etc...Again, according to the Advaita view Brahman is all-pervading, yet any and every one cannot possess it, but only those who are fit for knowing it. Such is the case of the universal grace of the Lord.

(E18-22; S82-83) "Next, the number of selves. The selves are many, while the Lord is one–herein lies one great difference between the self and Brahman. The selves are, in fact, infinite in number, and hence it is that in spite of the fact that more and more selves are being freed from the world, the course of mundane existence still goes on and will ever do so.

(E19; S87) "The doctrine that there is only one self does not stand to reason. If there were only one self, when one sleeps, faints or dies, everyone else would have been found to be sleeping, fainting and dying simultaneously–but this is never found. Sothis doctrine is absurd, and there is really a plurality of selves.

(E19; S83) "Finally, the kinds of selves. The selves are broadly of two kinds--selves in bondage and those that are free.

"The selves in bondage are connected with various kinds of bodies through the beginningless impressions [traces] of past works, and are possessed of a strong sense of egoity, i.e. falsely regard themselves to be independent of the Lord. They are of

two kinds: *mumukṣus* or those who, after having undergone all sorts of pains and miseries in the world have lot all attachment to it but wish to get rid of their earthly existence and attain salvation, and *bubhukṣus* or those who hanker after earthly enjoyments.

(E21; S107) Another objection may be raised: If it be said that the grace of the Lord, though all-pervading, depends on certain conditions (viz., the *sādhanas*) the view that the Lord's grace is the chief cause of liberation can no longer be held. There will arise also the logical fallacy of mutual dependence: grace depends on the *sādhanas,* and the latter on the former.

"To this we reply The Lord is without an equal or a superior, thence the grace of the Lord does not *really* depend on any other condition besides Himself, but in order that He may not be accused of wantonness–or partiality, cruelty, etc. in His bestowal of favor and also in order that scripture, dealing with the *sādhanas,* may not be useless--the Lord depends on those *sādhanas apparently* only in His bestowal of favors, and this dependence being but a mere semblance (and not a reality), in no way disproves His absolute independence.

(E22-23; S 83) "Those desirous of salvation, again, are of two kinds, viz. those who desire liberation which implies attaining the nature of the Lord, and those who desire for salvation which implies attaining their real nature. The *bubhukṣus* also are of two kinds, viz. those who hanker after future happiness (i.e. perform sacrifices, etc. for attaining heaven) and those who hanker after ordinary earthly enjoyments only.

"The freed selves are of two kinds: *nityamuktas* or those who are ever free, i.e. are never subject to transmigratory existence and its miseries, are never in contact with matter, but ever abide in supreme bliss, intuiting and worshiping the Lord; and *baddhamuktas* of those who were in bondage previously but are now freed. The *nityamuktas* are, again, of two kinds:

ānantarya, viz. the crown, the ear-ornaments and the flute of the Lord considered as living beings; and *pārṣada*, viz. Garuḍa, Viśvakṣema and the rest. The *baddhamuktas*, too, are of two kinds, viz. those who have attained supreme bliss consequent on their attaining the very nature of the Lord, and those how are content with the bliss consequent on their attaining their own real nature.

(E23-37; S88-94) Non-conscious things (*acit*) are of three kinds. The first is prākṛta. *Prakṛti* or primal matter is also called '*māyā*', '*pradhāna*', '*tamas*', '*avyakta*', etc. It is the locus of three *guṇas*, viz., *sattva rajas* and *tamas*. *Sattva* is the cause of knowledge, etc. As such it is the best means to liberation, and also because it, surpassing the *rajas* and the *tamas*, gives rise to self-control etc. which lead to emancipation. *Rajas* is the cause of avarice and rest. As such it is the cause of the self-deviation from the path of truth. *Tamas* is the cause of delusion, etc. As such it is the main cause of the voiding of its own nature, as well as that of others. *Prakṛti* is in a state of equilibrium of these three *guṇas*. Then, when through the wish of the Lord–who is all along guided by the beginningless *karmans* of the self–this equilibrium of the *guṇas* is disturbed, and they enter into a natural relation of subordination and co-ordination, *prakṛti* begins to produce various effects."

In the succeeding paragraphs the Sāṃkhya theory of the twenty-four principles or categories is reviewed, followed by a cataloguing of the fourteen worlds, the process of creation (*pañcīkaraṇa*) and the process of dissolution.

(E37-38; S94-95) "The second kind of inert being is time, "which is different from the *prākṛta* and the *aprākṛta*. It is eternal and all-pervasive, and persists even before creation and during dissolution. It is the cause of such conventional distinctions as the past, present and future, the simultaneous, the eternal, the quick, etc. It is, further, instrumental in the creation and destruction of the universe, which evidently involves time, and the specific instrument of such

measurements as the atom (*paramāṇu*) up to *parārdha*. Thus time is the basic principle of the entire cosmic existence. But though the regulator and controller of everything it itself is entirely under the control of the Lord. Though time is indivisible and ever continuous and ever present in its own nature, yet it is non-permanent in the form of its effects which are due to the limiting limitation being the sun's revolution.

(E39-40; S95-96) "*Aprākṛta* is a kind of non-sentient different from *prakṛti* and *kāla*. It is termed variously as *nitya-vibhūti, paramātma-loka, parama-vyoma, viṣṇu-pada, parama-pada*, etc. It is luminous or refulgent by nature, i.e. does not veil itself or anything else, absolutely unlimited and eternal. It is called "bliss" because it manifests bliss. It is the stuff of the Lord's *nityavibhūti* or eternal manifestation, e.g. the manifestation of the *viśvarūpa* by Lord Kṛṣna to Arjuna. It is also the stuff of the region and forms of the Lord and of the ever-free selves. It constitutes, in short, the objects of enjoyment such as the implements of enjoyment–such as ornaments, weapons, carriages, seats, flower, leaves, fruits, etc.–and the places of enjoyment–such as gateways, courtyards, ramparts, crystal palaces, forests, glens, lakes, etc.–of the Lord and the ever-free selves, just as *prakṛti* (as shown above) constitutes the object, implements and places of enjoyment of the selves.

"The body of the Lord and the bodies of the ever-free selves are due to the Lord's own eternal wish and are, as such, eternal and natural. The freed selves, too, when they are released from their earthly bodies, i.e. from all connection with *prakṛti*, are endowed with such eternal and celestial bodies which are subject to no change or decay. Just as during a festival the king gives clothes, ornaments, etc. to his servants, so when the freed selves are freed from matter, the Lord endows them with eternal bodies as instruments of His own service.

"The body of the Lord, like His own nature, is the locus of infinite auspicious qualities such as beauty, grace, sweetness

and the rest–every one of them immeasurable and infinite. But though the Lord possesses a body, He is not in need of the sense-organs for seeing etc.–as He can do so without the help of sense-organs. Similar is the case with the freed selves too, who are similar to the Lord. And they are all beyond the influence of time.

(E40-44; S71) "The Highest Reality is Brahman or Kṛṣṇa. He is called 'Brahman' because He is great in nature and qualities, and He is called 'Bhagavān' because He is possessed of supreme excellence.

"On the one hand the Lord is absolutely free from all defects and faults due to beginingless matter, viz. from the five kinds of *kleśas*, such as ignorance or *tamas* (i.e. ignorance which veils the real nature of things), *asmitā* or *tamas* (i.e. confounding the body to be the self), *rāga* or *mahā-moha* (i.e. hankering after enjoyment), aversion or *tāmiśra* (i.e. malice), and *abhiniveśa* or *andha-tamiśra* (i.e. death); from the six kinds of *vikāras*, such as *janma* (birth), *astitva* (existence), *vṛddhi* (growth), transformation, decay and *maraṇa* (dying); from the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, viz. *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*; from all the numerous effects of connection with *prakṛti*. In this sense alone Brahman is attributed.

(E44-47; S71-72) "On the other hand, He is an abode of infinite auspicious qualities and powers like *jñāna, śakti, bala,* lordliness *(aiśvarya),* tejas), *vīrya, sauśīlya, vātsalya, ārjava,* etc. etc. Thus *jñāna* means the power of directly intuiting all space, time and objects; *śakti* means the power of making the impossible possible; *bala* means the power of supporting the universe, etc.; *aiśvarya* means the power of controlling [or lordliness]; '*tejas*' means tirelessness or absence of exertion in spite of continued and immense labor; and *vīrya* means the power of defeating all enemies without being ever defeated by them. These six qualities of the Lord lead Him to undertake the creation, maintenance and destruction, etc. of the universe. Further, *sauśīlya* means His willingness to associate even with

the lowliest and the most unworthy, in spite of His own greatness; *vātsalya* means overlooking the faults of His servants; *mārdava* means not being able to tolerate the miseries of those who have resorted to Him; *ārjava* means the coincidence of mind and speech; *sauhārdya* means the attempt to protect others; *sarva-śaraṇyatva* or *saumya* means the one common resort of all; *kāruṇya* means removing the faults of others; *sthiratva* means remaining steady in wars; *dhairya* means keeping promises; *dayā* means feeling grieved at the grief of others and the wish to allay it, and *mādhurya* means infinite nectar-like sweetness, etc. All these qualities of the Lord lead him to undertake the protection of His devotees.

(E48-49; S72) Thus, negatively, the Lord is devoid of all the qualities of the self in bondage, i.e. of the qualities due to ignorance or matter and *karman*; and positively, He is possessed of infinite numbers of the greatest and worthiest qualities–which are majestic on the one hand, sweet on the other. Hence just as He is called 'Brahman' and 'Bhagavat' because of His supreme might and majesty, so He is called 'Hari' also because of His infinite beauty and sweetness which captivates (*harati*) the heart of His devotees.

(E50-52; S72) "The Lord is called 'Hari' also because He removes (*harati*) all sins of His devotees. He is called 'Kṛṣṇa' for the very same reason. He is, thus, essentially devoted and solicitous to His devotees, and goes out of His way to help and please them. He removes not only the sins but the merits as well of His devotees, i.e. frees the self from the bondage of beginningless actions. In this sense the Lord is the giver of salvation.

(E58-59; S77-78) "If Brahman be devoid of all qualities and particulars He will be outside all instruments of knowledge. Thus the attribute-less Brahman is not, evidently, a content of perception, since He is beyond the sense-organs; nor is He a content of an inference, since He is without any mark; nor is He even a content of scripture, for what is devoid of attributes

cannot be expressed in words. Thus the attribute-less and non-specific Brahman cannot be a content of the power existing in a word as a whole (*rūḍhavṛtti*), as He is devoid of class, property and action, nor a content of the derivative meaning (*yogavṛtti*) of a word, as He can have no root-meaning, nor a content of secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*), as He is devoid of any connection with anything else, nor lastly a content of *gauṇavṛtti*, as He is devoid of qualities. Such a Brahman, therefore, incapable of being established by any proof, is but a myth, and not a reality. The real Brahman is essentially possessed of attributes, as shown above.

(E60-63; S78) "Brahman is by no means unknowable (*aprameya*) and outside the *pramāṇa*s, for in that case He would be completely imaginary like a sky-flower–as pointed out above. Texts like 'He is known by one who does not know Him, but he who knows Him does not know Him. He is not known to the knower and known to the non-knower' (*Kenopaniṣad* 11), 'From Him speech turns back with the mind, not getting Him' (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.4.1), etc. do not prove that Brahman is never an object of knowledge, but they only deny any possible limit to the Lord. Thus the first texts (the *Kena*) means that those really wise men never know Him in his real nature, i.e. as absolutely unlimited, while those who, in pride of their little knowledge know Him as limited, fail to know Him. The fact is that the nature and qualities of the Lord being infinite, are really outside the sphere of ordinary logical thinking, and the wise recognize this fact instead of thinking that they have grasped the Lord fully. But they know the Lord through realization. Otherwise, how can we explain such texts as "Knowing Him alone one surpasses death"? (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 3.8). Hence the conclusion is that though Brahman surpasses ordinary comprehension, yet He is known through scripture and direct realization.

(E63-64; S73-74) "The Lord is the cause of the universe, both the material and efficient cause.

"Several objections may be raised to this view: Firstly, it may be argued that He cannot be the material as well as the efficient cause, because we do not find ordinarily that the material and the efficient causes are identical, e.g. the clay, the material cause of a pot, is different from the potter, its efficient cause. To this we reply: we do find instances of the material and the efficient causes being identical; e.g., the self is both the material and the efficient cause of its own awareness. Hence we may argue thus: Brahman is the one *identical* material and efficient cause of the world, because He possesses the power of being so, just as the self is of its own awareness.

"Secondly, it may be objected that if Brahman be the one material and efficient cause of the world, then the nature of the effect, the world, becomes a riddle indeed. Thus, the world cannot be of one form of collection, nor something produced or begun, for scripture declares the universe to be beginningless; nor, finally, can it be a transformation of Brahman, for no transformation is possible on the part of an all-pervading Being like Brahman who is devoid of parts. Hence we may argue thus" Brahman cannot be subject to transformation, because He is all-pervading and devoid of parts, like space. hence the world is not a real transformation of Brahman, but an illusory appearance.

"To this objection, the reply is as follows: Firstly, there is no rule whatsoever that an all-pervading object can have no transformation; e.g. space, which is all-pervading, is declared by scripture itself to be transformed into air.

"Secondly, even what is devoid of parts can have transformations, provided it is possessed of such a power of having transformations; e.g., in the case of the transformation of milk into curd it is not the milk really but the milk-atoms, which are devoid of parts, that undergo transformation. The fact is that it is the power inherent in a thing which determines whether a particular thing can be transformed into something else or not, and not the fact of its having parts or not. Hence

water though possessed of parts is never transformed into curd, because it lacks the power of being so transformed, while the milk-atoms, though devoid of parts, are transformed into curd because they possess the power of being transformed.

"Thus, the two reasons cited in the above argument, viz. all-pervasiveness and not having parts, are both logically fallacious; and finally, the parallel instance cited, too, viz. space, is not correct, because as shown above space can have transformation. Hence the above argument that Brahman can have no transformation because He is all-pervading and without parts is not a valid one. On the contrary we argue as follows: Brahma is capable of having transformation, because He is all-pervading like space.

"Thirdly, it may be objected that either the entire Brahman must be transformed into the world or Brahman must have parts, both of which are impossible. Purusoṭtama refutes this objection just Nimbārka does.

"Thus we conclude that the world is a transformation of Brahman who is its one identical material and efficient cause.

(E63-65; S74-75) "The Lord is the material cause of the universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient ans the non-sentient into gross effects. That is, during dissolution the entire universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state has His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, developing them into gross effects and producing, thereby, the universe of names and forms.

"And the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe in the sense that He unites individual selves with their respective *karmans*, their results, and the instruments for experiencing them, i.e. He regulates the destiny of individuals in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution the beginningless traces of past actions get dimmed and confused, and at the time of a

new creation the Lord revives these traces in particular individuals thereby making each individual undergo the results of his past acts.

(E65-69; S96-97) "The doctrine that the world is simply illusory and not a real transformation of Brahman is absolutely untenable. The Lord is, undoubtedly, one and without a second, but that does not imply by any means the falsity of any and every thing besides the Lord. It implies that the Lord is without an equal or a superior. How can the world be falsely superimposed upon Brahman, seeing that there can be no superimposition of what is unreal? The rule is that a thing existing in one place is superimposed upon another, but a sky-flower is never superimposed on anything.

"If it be said that the only requisite for making the superimposition of one thing upon another possible is that the thing superimposed mut be *perceived* and not necessarily that it must be real, we reply that the very perception of what is unreal is not possible.

"If it be said that just as there is the perception of a snake in place of a rope, so the perception of the world, too, is a false perception, due to faults (*doṣa,* viz. ignorance, etc.) and not a real perception, we reply that the unreal world can never be the *cause* of the perception of the world, the effect. The fact is that an unreal object can never be the *cause* of anything, for the cause must be possessed of certain powers of producing the particular effect The unreal snake is not the cause of fear, trembling etc., but the real *knowledge* of the snake. And the unreal snake is not also the cause of this knowledge of the snake, but the real *doṣas*–such as distance, absence of proper light, defective eyesight, etc.–are the cause of that knowledge. Similarly, the knowledge of past rain is not produced by the non-existing rain, but by the existing effects of the rain, such as a muddy road, wet grass, etc., and the knowledge of future rain, too, is produced by the real science of astronomy. So, nowhere is the unreal a cause. Hence the superimposition of the unreal being impossible, the theory that the world is merely apparent is absolutely untenable.

"If it be said that the following process of inference proves the falsity of the world, viz. the world is false, because it is perceivable, like the shell-silver, we reply that in that case Brahman too, being perceivable (by the knower) must be false, on the ground of the inference: Brahman is false, because He is perceivable, like the world. That Brahman is perceivable by knowers is proved from many scriptural passages.

"The famous passage '*Vācārambhanavikāra*' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.5) by no means proves the theory that the world is only an appearance. The use of the term '*vikāra*' ('change') leaves no room for doubt that the effects are real transformations of the cause, otherwise the term '*bhrānti*' ('error') would have been used. Moreover, the *vivarta* [manifestation] illustrations, viz. snake-rope etc., do not fit in with the above text which professedly teaches the doctrine that through the knowledge of one (viz., the cause) there is knowledge of all (viz., its effects). Now this fits in very well with the [transformation] *pariṇāma* doctrine, e.g. through the knowledge of clay there is the knowledge of all the effects of clay; but how can it be said that through the knowledge of a rope there is knowledge of a snake?

"Hence the [doctrine of the cause asmanifestation] *vivartavāda* is supported by neither reason nor scripture.

(E70-84; S97-99) "There are three sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*, viz., perception, inference, and testimony. Perception is the knowledge arising from the connection of sense-organs with objects e.g., 'I see my teacher', etc.; inference is the knowledge from the knowledge of *vyāpti*, e.g., the mountain is on fire, because it smokes, and smoke involves fire, as in an oven; and testimony is the words of the wise (*āptavākya*). A wise person is one who is free from the four causes of error, viz. weakness of intellect, etc., and speaks the truth.

"There are three kinds of the wise–the wisest is the Veda, and the Vedic texts are the most authoritative. A little less wise are the *smṛtis*, like the Manu *smṛti* and the rest, and the *smṛti* texts are a little less authoritative, while the commentators and expositors of *śruti* and *smṛti* are one degree less wise, since they have to depend on both *śruti* and *smṛti* and their words are one degrees less authoritative.

"Now, among these three sources of knowledge perception and inference are liable to error, e.g. on seeing a magic head, one may take it to be a real head, or again, simply on seeing smoke issuing from a hill one may infer that the hill is on fire, although the fire may have been long before extinguished by rain. But testimony is more authoritative and trustworthy than these two.

"Comparison and the rest are not to be taken as independent *pramāṇas*, since they really fall under one or another of the above three.

"There are two kinds of [linguistic functions] *śabdavṛttis*, viz., *mukhya* and *gauṇa*. The former is of the form of *śakti* or the inherent power of a word to express its meaning. It is of three kinds, viz. conventional (*rūḍhi*), *yoga* and *yogarūḍhi*. The first implies the [collective power] *samudayaśakti* of a word, as 'Hari', 'Nārada', etc. It, again is of two kinds, viz., *paryāya* (synonyms or having one sense), e.g., 'hand' ('*hasta*') etc. and *anekārtha* (having many senses), e.g., 'Hari' (which means a variety of things like horse, lion, the sun, etc.). The second implies the *avayavaśakti* of a word, e.g., Mādhava, Ramākānta, etc. The third is a combination of the first two, e.g., *soma, paṅkaja*, etc.

""The second kind of *śabdavṛtti* again is of two kinds, viz. *lakṣaṇā* and *gaunī*. The first implies something connected with the actual object (*śakya*) implied by the word (and not the actual object itself). It is of three kinds, viz. *jahat* , e.g. 'the village situated on the Ganges' does not mean that the village is situated on the river Ganges but that it is situated on the

coast of the Ganges (which is connected with the Ganges); *ajahat*, e.g., 'Protect the curd from crows' does not mean that the curd is to be protected from crows alone, but from other pests as well as dogs, etc.; and *jahadajahat,* e.g. 'Thou art that'–here the peculiar attributes of the self and Brahman are overlooked, while both are regarded in their common features alone.

"The second implies connection with the qualities of the actual object (and not the actual object itself) implied by the word, e.g. 'Devadatta is a lion'. Here, evidently it is not meant that Devadatta is actually a lion, but simply that he possesses some qualities of a lion–great strength, fearless-ness, etc.

(E85-87; S99) "On the one hand, consciousness and the inert are non-different from Brahman on the following three grounds:

(a) because they have Brahman for their essence (*brahmātmaka*), and whatever has something else for its essence is non-different from it, as, e.g., a gold ear-ring from gold.

(b) because they have their existence and activity under the control of Brahman(*tadāyattasthitipravṛtti*) and whatever is under the control of something else for its existence and activity is non-different from it, e.g., the sense-organs are non-different from the *prāṇa*;

(c) because they are pervaded by Brahman (*tadvyāpya*), and whatever is pervaded by something is non-different from it.

"On the other hand, consciousness and the inert are different from Brahman, for there is an essential difference between the nature of these three: Brahman is the controller (*niyantṛ*), the consciousness (*cit*) the experiencer (*bhoktṛ*) and the inert the experienced (*bhogya).*

*(*E89-90; S100) "Hence the truth of things is a natural difference-cum-non-difference (*svābhāvikabhedābheda*).

"In this way alone can the difference and non-difference texts be reconciled. There are two kinds of existence, *svatantra*

(or independent), *paratantra* (or dependent). An independent being has its existence and activity under its own control–the Supreme Brahman alone is such an independent Being. A dependent being has his existence and activity under the control of someone else: a self and *prakṛti* are such dependent beings. The self is *kūṭastha* and *nitya*, i.e., unchangeable and permanent; *prakṛti* is *pariṇāmī* and *nitya*, i.e., changeable yet permanent. Now the non-difference texts, upholding non-difference and denying difference, refer to the independent existent, the Lord. The Lord is self-subsistent and needs nothing besides Himself–hence there can be nothing outside Him, nothing other than Him–and it is in this sense alone that there is unity–the one without a second, and no plurality outside and independent of Him. Hence if we look from the point of view of Brahman there is non-difference. The difference texts, affirming difference between Brahman and the universe, refer to the dependent existents, consciousness and the inert. The sentient and the non-sentient are not self-subsisting, but point beyond themselves to something else. Hence if we look from the point of view of the universe there is difference–i.e. at least two realities–the universe, the dependent, and Brahman, the locus dependent upon. Thus difference and non-difference are equally true–only due to different viewpoints.

(E91; S100) "In the light of the above discussion alone can the great text '*tat tvam asi*'" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.7 etc.) be properly interpreted. Here the word 'tat'" refers to the Lord, '*tvam*' to the self, and '*asi*' to the relation between them; and this relation is that the self is non-different from the Lord, which non-difference is compatible with a difference between them.

(E94-96; S100-101) "There is a variety of [paths] *sādhanas*–viz. through action, through knowledge, devotion, surrender and *gurvjñānānuvṛtti*.

"1. *Karmayoga*. There are three kinds of actions–viz., *nitya, naimittika* and *kāmya*. The *nityakarmans* are those which

are to be performed always, such as evening prayer, ablution, muttering of sacred formulae, etc. Of these, the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity, and Vedic study are obligatory for the upper three classes, while conducting and assisting sacrifices, receiving gifts, and teaching the Vedas are special duties of the Brāhmaṇas alone. Thus the Brāhmaṇas have six obligatory duties, while the Kṣatriyas and the Vaiśyas only three. And sense-control, visiting holy places, fasting, fruit-diet, distribution of food, etc. are obligatory to everyone equally. As to the different results achieved through these duties performed in different spirits, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.

"The *naimittikakarmans* are those which are to be performed on special occasions only, such as the ceremony in honor of the dead.

"The *kāmyakarmans* are those which are undertaken with worldly ends in view, e.g. the performance of sacrifices with a view to attaining heaven, etc. Such actions lead one to endless births and rebirths, and are, hence, to be avoided by one who desires for final release. But the other two classes of acts–viz. the *nitya* and *naimittika*–are to be performed by those as entitled in accordance with their respective classes (*jāti*) and stages of life. The upper three classes are to perform those which are enjoined in the Vedas, while the Śūdras are to satiate gods and deceased persons by libations of water, distribution of food etc. as laid down in the Purāṇas.

(E97) "2.*Jñānayoga*. *Jñāna* is a special kind of direct experience (*anubhavaviśeṣa*) regarding the nature, attributes, power and majesty etc. of the Lord. It is generated through the repeated and continuous practice of the *sādhanas*, *śravaṇa* etc. (hearing of Vedic texts, etc.) by one desirous of liberation who, having his mind purified by the disinterested performance of the daily and occasional duties as befitting his caste and stage of life has come to be entitled to the study of scripture.

"3. *Bhaktiyoga*. Devotion is a special kind of direct

(*sākṣātkāra*) realization consisting in an unceasing meditation on the Lord, continuous and uninterrupted like the flow of a river, increasing day by day so long as life lasts.

"There are two kinds of devotion, viz. *sādhanarūpikā* and *phalarūpā*. The *sādhanarūpikā* devotion is so called because it is generated through the continuous performance of *sādhanas*, i.e. through the accumulated mass of *puṇyas* or meritorious deeds like penance, charity, self-control etc.

"*Phalarūpā* devotion is that which is generated through the grace of the Lord Himself. A man who conscientiously performs his duties as best as he can pleases the Lord and gains thereby a true knowledge of his own self, and then, through the grace of the Lord, again, this knowledge of his self–by convincing him of the utter worthlessness of his own self and of the absolute greatness of the Lord, naturally generates a supreme devotion to the Lord. *Phalarūpā bhakti* is also called '*parābhakti*', '*dhruvā smṛti*', etc. It is a kind of mental mode continuous and lasting so long as the self does–regarding the nature and attributes of the a Lord, just like the modes of sense-organs regarding particular objects lasting so long as those objects do. It leads to a direct realization of the Lord. The attainment of this kind of devotion is facilitated by keeping company with the good and hence those who wish to attain it, must always seek the company of the good or those whose sole end of life is the realization of the Lord and who have consequently given up all worldly pursuits and who never act contrary to the Lord's command.

(E97-102; S103) "4. *Prapattiyoga or Śaranāgati. Prapatti* is the complete entrusting of one's own self to the infinitely merciful Lord through the means recommended by the good, when one is convinced of one's incapacity for resorting to other *sādhanas* like knowledge and the rest. It has six parts:--

"(a) The resolve to treat everyone with good will and friendliness, being convinced of the great truth that everyone and everything, down to as tuft of grass, is the body of the Lord

and as such deserves respect.

"(b) Discarding what is contrary to the above solemn determination, i.e. refraining from all violence, malice, back-biting, falsehood, etc.

"(c) Strong faith in the protection of the Lord,

"(d) Praying to the Lord for protection, being aware of the fact that the Lord, though all-merciful, does not release anyone who does not pray to Him but is, on the contrary, adverse to Him (otherwise there would have resulted universal release),

"(e) Discarding all false pride and sense of egoity, i.e. assuming an attitude of utter humility,

"(f) Complete entrusting of one's own self and whatever belongs to one's self to the Lord, being convinced that such a complete resignation of the 'I' and the 'mine' to the Lord alone induce the mercy and grace of the Lord.

"As to the qualifications of a person entitled to the *prapattiyoga*, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.

(E103-117; S104) "The object of surrender, i.e. He to whom a man is to surrender himself, is the Lord Kṛṣṇa alone, and not any other deity like Brahmā, Śiva and the rest, who are all subordinate to the Lord.

"It is not to be apprehended that the self, poor and puny as it is, can have no access to the Supreme Lord, the abode of infinite might and majesty and worshiped by great deities like Brahmā and the rest, for the Supreme Lord is not only all powerful, but all-merciful as well and essentially devoted to His devoteees. Hence although the Supreme Lord is not easily attainable even to great deities like Brahmā and the rest, He is nevertheless easily attainable by those who have had recourse to Him. And no reason can be assigned why the Lord, in spite of His unsurpassed greatness, should stop low to please His devotees, for the motives and doings of the Lord are beyond all explanation and are not to be judged by ordinary standards.

"The peculiar efficacy or virtue of surrender consists in

the following: Through the grace of the Lord all the sins of the devotee are washed off at once. He immediately attains the results of all meritorious deeds, as if he has practiced every penance immediately, performed every sacrifice, visited every holy place and practiced every charity. What others attain through one or another of the *sādhanas* after a long period of continuous effort, he attains at once without any direct effort on his own part. He becomes entirely free from all fears and all embarrassment, and is ever protected by the Lord Himself. Through the grace of the Lord he obtains the supreme sphere, where there is no return. In this way, complete surrender leads to salvation.

(E118-122; S104-105) "5. *Gurūpasatti* or *Gurvājñānuvṛtti*. As to the nature and practitioners of this means, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka. He points out that everyone is not to be a preceptor or a disciple. both must be endowed with certain qualities. He who has resorted to a teacher has everything looked after by the teacher, who helps him in all matters, whether in relation to this world or to the next. This will be made clear from the analogy of a mother and her child....

(E123-133) "It remains to consider the part played by the grace of the Lord as a means to release. It is emphasized again and again that it is the grace of the Lord which is the ultimate and the most immediate cause of liberation in every case without distinction. Whatever path a man may follow–knowledge, meditation, or self-surrender, etc., *in every case* he must somehow or other invoke the grace of the Lord, otherwise all his efforts will be in vain, all his time and energy wasted. Liberation means attaining one's own real nature as well as attaining similarity with the Lord, and unless the Lord is pleased to free the self from the fetter of beginningless actions, thereby enabling it to realize its real nature fully and to have direct vision of Himself, no amount of unaided effort on its own part, however great and earnest, will be of any avail in

bringing about the desired end.

"The successive states in the attainment of liberation (*mokṣaprāptikarman*) are as follows: A man who is looked at with favor by the Lord at the time of his birth becomes *sāttvika* from the very beginning, i.e. has a tendency to a life of purity and knowledge. This inborn *sāttvika* tendency in him leads him to give up all worldly pursuits and hanker after liberation alone. This leads him to devote himself whole-heartedly to the *sādhanas*, which has the effect of pleasing the Lord, who manifests Himself before him, and thereby he becomes free...

(E132ff.; S107) "Here Puruṣottama brings forward no new points, except that he gives a detailed account of the obstacles which prevent the attainment of liberation–which have already been noticed above. The attainment of liberation implies, thus, the performance of the *sādhanas* on the one hand, and the rejection of the *virodhins* on the other."

7. ŚRĪKAṆṬHA or NĪLAKAṆṬHA (1200?)

The most complete discussion of the question of this writer's date is to be found in S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's introduction ("Some General Considerations") to his *The Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha* (Madras: University of Madras, 1972). It is a complex question, relating to relationships with a variety of other writers. We shall try to summarize the main points Suryanarayana Sastri (SS, used here to indicate the author and the introduction) makes.

After an extended discussion SS concludes that Śrikaṇṭha is most likely a contemporary of Rāmānuja and, specifically, likely to have been alive around 1113 A. D, when Rāmānuja is held to have died. This is supported by Śrīkaṇṭha's apparent contemporaneity with one Haradatta, also known as Sudarśanācārya, the author of *Śrutisūktimaḷā*, otherwise known as *Caturvedatātparyasaṃgraha*, who is cited by Appayya Dīkṣita (in his *Śīvādvaitanirṇaya*, verse 42), who takes Haradatta as

"following" (*anuvṛtti*) Śrīkaṇṭha (whether chronologically or in his thought, or both, is unclear). Haradatta is supposed to have written a commentary on Śrīkāntha's commentary, and the date of his death, argues Suryanarayana Sastri, is most plausibly interpreted to mean 1119 A.D. SS provides an appendix specifying the doctrinal affinities between Haradatta's work and Śrīkāntha's. The conclusion is that Śrīkānta was alive at or soon after 1119 A.D.

Such dating will make Śrīkāntha, Haradatta and Rāmānuja all contemporaries. But none of them, as far as we know, refers to the others. SS explores the relationships among these three writers, showing the resemblances between Śrīkāntha's text and those of the other two both in their theses and their readings of the text of the *Brahmasūtras*. In the case of Rāmānuja he remarks (p. 40) "The presence of doctrinal and verbal affinities between the commentaries of these two has been noticed in the past and charges of plagiarism have been made against the one and the other." He goes on to specify one or two of each. He performs the same task with regard to our author's relation to Śaṃkarācārya.

"There is, however, one topic treated distinctively by Śrīkaṇṭha which has the appearance of clinching the whole question [of the relationship between Rāmānuja and Śrīkāntha]. The discussion in II1.3.27-30 relates to the state when the enlightened person's accumulated merit and demerit (*karman*) leave him, there being scriptural authority apparently for both positions, that they leave at death or at a later stage. The *prima facie* view is that there being no further use for *karman*, there is no object in its continuance after death. It ceases therefore at that stage. This is also the final view of Śaṃkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vijñāna Bhikṣu...Rāmānuja and Nimbārka believe, along with Śrīkaṇṭha, that even the enlightened one has to proceed along the path of light, etc. before attaining Brahman. The gross body being destroyed at death, and there being no *karman* left to form a

subtle body, how can there be departure along a path? Hence, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, the cessation of *karman* has to be understood to take place in two instalments, partly at death and partly at a later stage, on the crossing of the river Virajā. This position, however, is not acceptable to Rāmānuja and Nimbārka; not so, they reply: though *karman* ceases, a subtle body may yet continue by the very potency of the meditation on Brahman. This is comparable to the attainment of special favors by those who serve the king (an illustration found alike in Nimbārka's *siddhānta* and Śrīkaṇṭha's *pūrvapakṣa)*. Further, though the subtle body may require *karman* for its creation, it may be kept on independently thereof, just as a tank dug for irrigation purposes may continue to exist (when that purpose has been otherwise fulfilled) and serve as a source of drinking water. This latter is an illustration used by Rāmānuja. Thus is established what is the conclusion for Rāmnānuja and Nimbārka...

"The final view of Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is what is refuted by Śrīkaṇṭha; and to this end, even the relative position of the last two *sūtras* of the topic is changed, the penultimate *sūtra* of all the other commentaries figuring as the last *sūtra* in Śrīkaṇṭha's reading. Śrīkaṇṭha notices the difficulty about a body being required for departure; he is also aware of the reply which postulates a subtle body as resulting from the very potency of the mediation. The answer, he says, does not meet the case. For, as long as departure along a path is admitted, the continuance of bondage must also be admitted as only on the final attainment of Brahman does the intellect expand and the self manifest its full stature. Prior to that the intellect is in a state of contraction, such as is characteristic only of *saṃsāra*. And *saṃsāra* cannot persist in the absence of *karman*. So long as *saṃsāra* persists, the presence of some residual *karman* must be admitted. This state of affairs lasts till the river Virajā is crossed; that is, in other words, till Brahman is attained; for, the Virajā runs along the confines of Viṣṇuloka, beyond which is the

abode of final release. Nor does it make any difference to appeal to the will of the Lord as accounting for the continuance of bondage, for, it is that same will to which we appeal through the medium of *karman*; there is, indeed, no merit or demerit except such as is consequent on the Lord's will, as determined by the performance of what is enjoined or forbidden.

"Logically, Śrīkaṇṭha's position seems quite clear...What is logically more perfect may well, in this case, be the chronologically later view also, since it recognizes, states, and meets the other position. We have seen that Śrīkaṇṭha is aware and makes use of the explanation based on the power of meditation (*vidyā-sāmarthya* or *māhātmya*) and the illustration of those who serve the king. It is natural to consider the statement of such explanations and illustrations as anterior to the view which criticizes them.

"Apart from the explanation itself, there is the change in the position of *sūtras* 29 and 30, for which presumably Śrīkaṇṭha is solely responsible, as no other known commentator adopts that order. It is exceedingly unlikely that such a procedure would have escaped the attention of Rāmānuja, if Rāmānuja came later and was aware of Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*; for, apparently, we have here an instance of text-twisting in a very literal, almost a physical sense. The conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable, that Śrīkaṇṭha came later than Rāmānuja." (SS, pp. 54-56)

Rāmānuja's dates themselves are somewhat uncertain: SS p. 61 says he is "credited with a life of 120 years from 1019-1139 A.D.").

Despite his extensive arguments toward the above conclusions, SS (p. 56-57) remarks: "There is still, however, considerable room for doubt, which will continue until the hypothesis of a common original from which both Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha may have drawn is finally disestablished."

SS's conclusion (p. 66) is that Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha were contemporaries. "The hypothesis of contemporaneity

would thus seem to provide a satisfactory basis for (i) Appayya's statement that Śrīkaṇṭha followed Haradatta, (ii) Appayya's belief that Rāmānuja followed Śrīkaṇṭha, (iii) the allegation made even in early works like the *Śuddhādvaitamārtāṇḍa* that the Śaivite commentator was the plagiarist, (iv) the lack of effective and detailed criticism of either commentator by the other. The semblances...may well derive from a common original", but to this point no such common source is known to us.

The dating of 1150 provided above is merely conjecture. It is predicated on the extensive agreements in readings of the stanzas and sections of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha indicated, e.g., in Radhakrishnana's comparisons cited below. It would seem we must make Śrīkaṇṭha a successor to Rāmānuja, though it remains open what the length of the gap between them might have been. The arguments of T. R. Chintamani in the Journal of Oriental Research 1,.1, 1927, pp. 67-76, who opts for the middle of the 13th century as Śrīkaṇṭha's date on the grounds of that author's "borrowing" from Rāmānuja, should also be considered.

7.1 ŚRĪKAṆṬHA, *Bhāṣya* on Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras*

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1960) provides summaries of various portions. We indicate this in what follows by "R". The entire work is translated by Roma Chaudhuri, *Doctrine of Śrīkaṇṭha*, Vol. II. Prācyavāṇī Research Series Vol. XI (Calcutta: 1959). This is "T". It is a volume of close to 500 pages, too long to be provided in its entirety here.

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, in the work referred to as SS in our introduction to the section above on Śrīkaṇṭha, has picked out the passages in which Śrīkaṇṭha provides treatment different from Śaṃkarācārya or Rāmānuja. At the end of such sections, in block parentheses we provide these with references

indicated by "SS pp. ....".

Summarized by Roma Chaudhuri and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

BOOK ONE

1.1.1 (R229) "Śrīkaṇṭha adopts the view that a knowledge of religious duties is a necessary antecedent to the inquiry into Brahman for the two stand in the relation of *ārādhana,* worship, and *ārādhya,* the worshiped, *sādhana,* means, and *sādhya,* end. Works purify the mind and help the growth of the knowledge of Brahman."

1.1.12 (R258) "For Śrīkaṇṭha, the self of bliss is the *parāśakti.*, otherwise called *paramākāśa* of which Brahman is the support. The *sūtrakāra* refers to Brahman itself as the self of bliss since there is no fundamental difference between *parāśakti* which is the property of Brahman and that which possesses the property. The property-possessor is referred to on account of its essential non-difference from its property."

1.1.14 (R258) "The self of bliss is *citśakti,* the energy of consciousness, while the Brahman spoken of as one tail or the support is the Supreme Brahman."

1.1.16 (R259) "Śrīkaṇṭha makes out that Hiraṇyagarbha, world-self, is not the cause of the world, on account of inappropriateness. He begins a new section here consisting of *sūtras* 17-20, to deal with the question of whether the supreme *īśvara* is the cause of the world or someone else, viz. Hiraṇyagarbha. 'Prajāpati'" in the context is equivalent to *paśūpati.*"

1.1.17 (R260) "This and the previous *ṣūtra* relate to the difference between the Highest Self and the individual self, for in his view the two are the same. The difference between the individual self and the Absolute Self cannot be regarded as fictitious according to this *ṣūtra,* though Śrīkaṇṭha holds that there is no difference in reality between the individual self and

Brahman."

1.1.18 (R260) "Though Hiraṇyagarbha is said to have created the world, it does not stand to reason, for it is the Lord himself who is said to have created the world in the form of Hiraṇyagarbha."

"(Another interpretation of *sūtras* 12-19): We cannot hold that the affix *-mayaṭ* means product or modification with reference to food, life, mind and understanding and means something different, "abundance", when we come to *ānanda.* The words belong to one series and it would be wrong to suggest that only the last word of the series refers to Brahman. If 'ānandamaya' ('made of bliss') denotes Brahman then *'annamaya'* ('made of food') should [also] denote it. If it is argued that for other members there is an inward self, while no such inner self is mentioned for *ānandamaya,* limbs are attributed to it and Brahman is said to be its lower part or support. It is not *ānandamaya* that is Brahman but its support is Brahman."

1.1.20 (R262) "Śrīkaṇṭtha identifies the golden person within the sun with Śiva and accounts for the mention of two eyes only and not the third by saying that the third eye is ordinarily closed."

1.1.17-20: "The whole topic disposes of the notion of Hiraṇyagarbha as the First Cause. The expression 'Prajāpati' is equated with 'Paśupati'. The *sūtra 'kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā'* receives a novel interpretation, to the effect that the creation ascribed to the desire of Prajāpati is only *avāntara sṛṣṭi* and that Prajāpati is only the *śeṣa* of Brahman, as seen from *śruti.*" [SS p. 299]

1.1.31 (R268-269) "Śrīkaṇṭha follows Rāmānuja in holding that the three kinds of meditation on the Lord are (1) *svarūpeṇa,* in his essential nature, (2) *bhoktṛśarīreṇa,* as having the totality of enjoying selves for his body, (3) *bhogyarūpeṇa,* as having the objects and means of experiencing for his body."

1.1.31 "While Śaṃkara takes *śāstra drsṭi* to reveal

identity, Rāmānuja holds that the knowledge attained is to the effect that all names denote Brahman, all other objects being His bodies, as it were. Śrīkaṇṭha gives both interpretations, the latter first. That he himself believed in the realization of *parāhambhāva* is shown in his commentary on IV.1.3; IV.4.19 and so on." [SS, p. 299]

1.2.3 (R271) "Śrīkaṇṭha begins a new section (3-8) here, which considers whether the passage in the *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* (11.3) refers to Nārāyaṇa or Śiva. Śrīkaṇṭha concludes that it refers to Śiva and not to Nārāyaṇa."

1.2.4 (R271) "The Supreme Self is Śiva and not Nārāyaṇa as he is the object to be worshiped and Nārāyaṇa is the worshiper."

1.2.3-8 "Nārāyaṇa is not Brahman, the former being an *upāsaka* and the latter *upāsya*, and for various other reasons. The *Mahopaniṣad* identifies Parameśvara with the Supreme Brahman; the mention of Nārāyaṇa comes later and cannot avail to disturb the identification already effected." [SS, p. 299]

1.2.9-10 "The cause of destruction must also be the cause of creation. Hence, Parameśvara alone is the First Cause." [SS, p. 300]

1.2.11 "The two selves that entered the cave are the *jīva* and Parameśvara as enjoyment may be predicated of both, though the object of enjoyment is different in either case. The real difference between the two is not in respect of enjoyment, but in that the former is dependent while the latter is *svatantra*, the former ignorant, the latter knowing, the former *anādimalabaddha*, the latter *anādimalamukta*." [SS p. 300]

1.2.17 (R277-278) "Śrīkaṇṭha takes this as a separate section dealing with the question whether the Person of the size of a thumb (*Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* 10.6.3) is the Lord or someone else and concludes that he is the Lord and not any other on account of the non-permanence of others and the impossibility of any other view."

1.2.18 "The Self that is of the size of the thumb is

Brahman." [SS p. 300]

1.2.20 "A jumbling together of different constructions is seen here. *Pradhāna* and the *jīva* are excluded from identification with the inner controller, the former on the ground that what it possesses, viz., inertness, non-intelligence, etc. which are incompatible with being an inner controller, the latter because of what it does not possess, viz., *sarvaniyāmakatva* etc., which are qualities required in the internal ruler." [SS p. 300]

1.2.30-31 "Śrīkaṇṭha like Śaṃkara takes "*abhivyakti*" to mean 'manifestation', and 'anusmṛti'" to be 'remembrance', unlike Rāmānuja who understands thereby 'definiteness' and 'meditation' respectively. But in *sūtra* 31, Śrīkaṇṭha, unlike Śaṃkara (and like Rāmānuja) is thinking not of the *pradeśamātra* but the description of head and limbs in a human being. In *sūtra* 30 Śrīkaṇṭha seems to agree with Śaṃkara." [SS p. 300]

1.2.33 "The declaration of *śruti* that the Lord is present within as experiencer is illustrated by reference to the text "*śivo māviśāpradāhāya*" etc." [SS p. 300]

1.3.1 (R287) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha take this and the next *sūtra* as one."

1.3.1 "The objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) relates to air (*vāyu*), according to our author, not to the *pradhāna* as for Śaṃkara or to the *jīva* as for Rāmānuja. Further, this exemplifies a peculiarity of Śrīkaṇṭha's *Bhāṣya*–the attempt to confine each *sūtra* to a consideration of a particular topic of view or. Thus, the *pūrvapakṣa* about *pradhāna* and the *jīva* is considered in 1.3.3." [SS p. 300]

1.3.3 "The reading of the *sūtra* corresponds to Rāmānuja's, but the mode of interpretation differs. The syntactical construction of a single *sūtra* would suggest the application of the same reasoning to both the alternatives contained therein; that is to say, non-mention by *śruti* would be applied equally to *pradhāna* and the *jīva*, as a grounds for

excluding them; but in one case, non-mentioned is urged, and in the other the incompatibility of omniscience, etc. Where two different sets of grounds are given, the reading as two *sūtras* would be preferable. Śrīkaṇṭha gives the reading of Rāmānuja, but not his interpretation." [SS p. 301]

1.3.7-8 *Samprasāda*, according to Śaṃkara, means deep sleep and since *bhūmā* is taught in addition to the bliss of deep sleep, it must mean Brahman. The reference cannot be to *prāṇa*. The *pūrvapakṣa* about *prāṇa* is set out and refuted elaborately. "*Prāṇa*" is used throughout as meaning vital air, not as denoting the *jīva*. For Rāmānuja, the suggestion to be refuted concerns the *jīva*; the contention that the vital air is here meant is lightly brushed aside, even by the *pūrvapakṣin* as a preliminary to the main argument. Śrīkaṇṭha apparently refutes both suggestions at one breath; for to him *prāṇa* means *jīva*. Thus, the greater part of Śaṃkara's argument and some part of Rāmānuja's become for him irrelevant. Either suggestion is possible, that Śrīkaṇṭha takes Rāmānuja's conclusion for grated, or that the latter expounds in detail what was set forth concisely by the former. Śrīkaṇṭha subjoins a disquisition on the freed self, whose vision is of the world harmonized with Brahman, though the world does not cease to exist for him." [SS p. 301]

1.3.10 (R289) "There is a difference between the support and what is supported. The former is Brahman and the latter is *citśakti*."

1.3.12 "*Parameśvara* is the person that is seen (the object of realization), not Hiraṇyagarbha or Nārāyaṇa. Between Śiva and Viṣṇu there is a difference only of function, as between the operative and the material causes of the world." [SS p. 301]

1.3.14 (R293) "The passage stating that what is within *daharākāśa* is to be sought suggests that the seat is *citśakti* and what is seated is Brahman."

1.3.16 "Both the *daharākāśa* and the being that resides therein are prescribed as objects of meditation, since freedom

from sin etc. are predicated of both. The two are related as property (*dharma*) and property-possessor, not as abode and he who abides." [SS pp. 301-302]

1.3.41 "The [Supreme Person] *uttama puruṣa*, said to be attained to when the self's own form is manifest in Brahman, i.e. *Parameśvara*,. not Nārāyaṇa, though the latter is generally denoted by the expression '*puruṣottama*'. The etymological significance has to be taken here, and that refers to Śiva, who alone is higher than the world; higher than the *jīvas*." [SS p. 302]

1.4.5 "To refute the Sāṃkhya appeal to the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* Śaṃkara shows that the context refers to the Self by citing several texts such as '*avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ*' and so on, and incidentally mentioned *yaccedvāṅmanasi prajña*' etc. Rāmānuja does not mention this verse, presumably because it relates to the wise man, not the highest Self. Śrīkaṇṭha, however, quotes only that verse, departing in this respect even from Śaṃkara, who apparently takes it to refer to the individual. Appayya [Dīkṣita] argues that the citation proves Śrīkaṇṭha to have held the individual and Brahman to be non-different." [SS p. 302]

1.4.14-15 "These, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, form part of the preceding, of *saṃkhyopasaṃgraha* topic which determines the sense of the expression *pañcajanāḥ* to be the sense-organs. Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja take both *sūtras* to establish that Brahman alone is the cause; they meet difficulties raised on the ground of conflicting accounts of the order of creation or conflicting statements about the cause, that it was '*sat*' and again that it was '*asat*'. The former class of objections has little weight; and as for the latter, it can be shown by *upakrama, upasaṃhāra* etc. that it '*asat*' means not non-being but Brahman. On this, Śrīkaṇṭha would appear to introduce a refinement; just as by *upakrama* and other marks it is shown that '*asat*' means Brahman, similarly it must be determined with reference to what precedes and follows that *pañcajanāḥ* refers to the senses. The procedure is rather clumsy, goes against the

usual practice of Śrikaṇṭha to refer each *sūtra* and topic clearly defined, and so the whole seems a needless refinement." [SS pp. 302-303]

1.4.27 "The doctrine of *apūrva pariṇāma* has distinctive features in that it rests on the doctrine of Śiva and Śakti, the former of whom existed in the beginning, while the latter followed from Him. As a result of this, the Lord who, in his *kāraṇāvasthā* had name and form for his body only in a subtle state, then desired to have for his body the distinctions made manifest. Parameśvara is qualified by *māyā*; the latter is an *aṃśa* of the former. Both are necessary for the production of the world, just as both self and body are necessary for the growth of hair, nails, etc. *Māyā* in the capacity of experiencer is called *puruṣa* (and this collective *puruṣa* is called Nārāyaṇa)." [SS p. 303]

BOOK TWO

2.1.4-7 "Both Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja mention the production of scorpions from cow-dung in answer to the objection based on dissimilarity of alleged cause and effect. They also meet objections to the validity of the instance; it may be said that scorpions could not come out of dung, but for some identity of nature between two. Śaṃkara investigates and demolishes the alleged identity, proves that mere reasoning can lead nowhere and appeals to *śruti*. Rāmānuja prefers to adduce what he considers to be a more satisfactory instance, viz. the production of worms in honey. It is not known how this is a better instance. Śrīkaṇṭha has recourse neither to the worm nor to *śruti*, since he does not notice the difficulty at all. But he too mentions another instance, the growth of air, nails etc, and he has already shown that this effect, though non-different from the body, comes into being only when the body is presided over by the self. If he had noticed the difficulty he could hardly have given a more effective reply." [SS p. 303]

2.1.8-12 "Constitute a new topic, the *apītyadhikaraṇa*."

[SS p. 303]

2.1.14 (R349) "Śrīkaṇṭha, after Rāmānuja, adopts the Viśiṣṭādvaita view: What has been set out already as to Śiva alone, without a second–the Self qualified by the universe both conscious and non-conscious, becoming both cause and effect, that constitutes the doctrine of the qualified non-dualism of Śiva."

"Śrīkaṇṭha explains *vācārambha* in two ways: That which is the beginning, i.e. the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and of practical activity. So the text means that an effect (*vikāra*) is a name (*nāmadheya*), which is the cause of speech and practical activity. Another explanation is that which has speech for its beginning. So the text means that an effect is just the content of such expressions as 'this is a jar', i.e. a special condition which the clay has assumed for practical purposes. It is not a separate entity from the clay."

2.1.18 "In refuting the theory that *asat* is the cause, the doctrine of Śiva and Śakti is set forth again." [SS p. 304]

2.1.19 "The expression '*paṭavacca*' is explained in the light of a folded piece of cloth being unrolled and set up as a tent the illustration is also found in the *Śivajñānasiddhi* and the *Ratnatraya*." [SS p. 304]

2.1.24 " In disposing of the objection that instrumental causes are required for creation, an irrelevant suggestion is introduced about diversity in the effect possibly requiring diversity in the cause too; and this is refuted by appealing to the instance of the growth of hair, nails etc. (diverse effects) in the single *puruṣa*." [SS p. 304]

2.1.26 (R383) "Śrīkaṇṭha begins a new section here. This *sūtra* and the next deal with the refutation of the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the traces left on our mind by it. But a momentary and therefore non-existent entity cannot produce any traces."

2.1.28 "The word '*ātman*' in '*ātmani caivam vicitrāś ca hi*' is taken to refer to the *jīva*, not Brahman as interpreted by

Rāmānuja. Śaṃkara too understands the reference to be to the *jīva*, but there the similarity stops, the purpose of the present argument being the same as that understood by Rāmānuja, viz., to show that Brahman, who is known through *śruti* alone, may quite conceivably possess diverse attributes. The argument [of Śrīkaṇṭha] is slightly different from Rāmānuja's. The non-intelligent world itself is not homogeneous, but contains elements with diverse attributes; the *jīva* possesses attributes different from these, such as being agent, experiencer and so on. Hence Brahman may well have manifold diverse attributes." [SS p. 304]

2.1.34 following "These are treated as a separate topic, different from that inaugurated by *sūtra* 32, '*na prayjonavatvāt*'; a full discussion of *karman*, release and the need for creation is introduced at this stage." [SS p. 304]

2.2.11 "The expression '*ubhayathā*' denotes having regard to *vipāka* (of *adṛṣṭa*)" or not having regard thereto; while Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja take the alternatives to relate to the inherence of *adṛṣṭa* in selves or in atoms." [SS p. 304]

2.2.25-26 "These are treated as a separate topic concerned with the refutation of the Sautrāntikas." [SS p. 305]

2.2.31 "In the criticism of Jainism, Śrīkaṇṭha makes no reference to the *pañcāstikāya* doctrine, though Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja refer to it, the former as of secondary and the latter as of primary importance." [SS p. 305]

2.2.35-38 "Though recognizing the fact that a Śaiva Āgama doctrine is here refuted, Śrīkaṇṭha claims authority for both Vedas and Āgamas, the only difference being that the former may be studied by the first three castes alone, while the study of the latter is open to all; he also suggests that the criticism is directed only against the Hiraṇyagarbha Āgama or that it may even be an answer to an *avāntara śaṃkā*, a casual doubt, as to whether the Lord may be the efficient cause alone." [SS pp. 305-306]

2.2.37 (R390) "Śrīkaṇṭha refers here only to those Śaivas

who look upon the Lord as the efficient cause only, while *māyā* is the material cause and *śaṇkti the instrument.*".

2.2.40 (R391) "According to Śrīkaṇṭha the study of the *āgamas* is open to all cases, while the study of the Vedas is permitted only to the three upper castes."

2.2.41 "Śrīkaṇṭha takes this *sūtra* to be not a criticism of the Pāñcarātra but a modified statement of that doctrine, which even as thus modified is unacceptable, as seen from *sūtra* 42." [SS p. 306]

2.2.44 (R395) "This *sūtra* represents only the *prima facie* view. It is not contended that there is the origin of the individual self, etc., but only that *saṃkarśaṇa*, etc. assume the forms of the individual self."

2.2.45 (R396) "Śrīkantha stresses the opposition of the Pāñcarātra doctrine to scripture."

2.3.8 " The discussion as to the origination of air is set out more elaborately than need be. This shows that our author does not always go in for conciseness; nor is he always careful, for in discussing a similar problem with reference to *ākāśa* the claims of eternity made on behalf of it is neither investigated nor refuted." [SS p. 306

2.3.9 (R400) "For Rāṃānuja, the *sūtra* teaches the origination of everything else except Brahman, the latter alone being non-originated. Śrīkaṇṭha seems to agree with this interpretation. Hence non-origination applies to Brahman alone; origination applies to all else, on account of failure otherwise of the premise that everything will be known."

2.3.14 (R402) "Śrīkaṇṭha begins a new section here and reads *pāramparyeṇa* in the place of *viparyayeṇa*. He deals with the question of the origin of sense-organs, mind and the like."

2.3.15 "Though *prāṇa* and the senses are elsewhere spoken of as having originated either before or along with the elements, that is not irreconcilable with the order here set forth, as the sense-organs are constituted out of the elements and are of their inner being." [SS p. 306]

2.3.16 (R404) Śrīkaṇṭha, with Rāmānja, interprets as follows: "The forms denoting moving and non-moving beings are primary with regard to Brahman since the denotative power of all forms depends on the being of Brahman."

2.3.30 (R410) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha hold that because it is seen that all cows are hornless and so on and are called cows since they possess the generic character of cowness, knowledge [awareness?] is an attribute which is met with wherever a self is, there is no objection to the self being designated by that attribute."

2.3.37 (R413) "Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, Baladeva interpret the *sūtra*" as follows: 'If *prakṛti* were the agent and not the self, then there would be non-restriction of actions as in the case of perception. Just as it is shown that, if the self be all-pervading, no definite perception will be possible, so also if *prakṛti* be the agent, no definite activity will be possible; for if *prakṛti* be all-pervading and common to all, all activities would produce results in the case of all selves or produce no results in the case of any self. For if each self is held to be all-pervading, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of *prakṛti*. We cannot say that the distribution of results will depend on different internal organs for the all-pervading selves cannot be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.'"

2.3.41 "Śaṃkara refutes the charge of *vaiṣamya*, Rāmānuja that of *vaiyārthya*; Śrīkaṇṭha meets both. The illustration employed is also distinctive; a young lad employed to carry a log of wood along with an older and stronger partner, without whose help he cannot even move the log, is yet the subject of commands, insofar as the lad has to make an effort to co-operate." [SS p. 307]

2.3.43 (R417) "Śrīkaṇṭha says, if it is declared of the class of intelligent beings that it is an *aṃśa* or part of Brahman, as a particular mode of what is qualified, being of the same nature as inseparable attributes like light, etc., it may be true of the ideas of non-intelligent things as well."

2.3.48 "This is read as '*asantateśca'vyatirekaḥ*' while the others [Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja] read the latter half as '*avyatikaraḥ*'. Śrīkaṇṭha understands from his reading that though the selves are manifold and discontinuous there is yet a common feature of all their experiences. They all say 'I am short, I am a Brahmin' and so on. Experiences of the state of bondage are thus essentially similar, *though not mixed up* (*asaṃkīrṇam*). The absence of mixing up or confusion is what is meant by the reading '*avyatikaraḥ*' as adopted and understood by Rāmānuja. It is difficult to see what occaison there is in the present context for Śrīkaṇṭha to deny the possibility of confusion. Rāmānuja's statement is direct–that there is no confusion as the merit and demerit of the various selves, as they are all distinct. Our author [Śrīkaṇṭha] says, first that though they are distinct, their experiences are essentially similar; and having so read and interpreted the *sūtra* he adds, as an after-thought, that in spite of the similarity the experiences are not mixed up. And there is a further after-thought offered as an indication of the purpose of this *sūtra*; it shows that the eternal infinite experience of released selves is very different in kind from that of the limited entities in bondage[1]." [SS p. 307]

2.2.49 (R420) "Śrīkaṇṭhas reads [the *sūtra*'s] *avyatirekaḥ* for *avyatikaraḥ*". Though the selves are distinct, their experiences are similar. The experiences, though similar, are not mixed up."

2.2.50 (R420) "Śrīkaṇṭha follows Rāmānuja in criticizing the reflection theory."

2.4.1 (R423) "Śrīkaṇṭha takes this *sūtra* as setting down the *prima facie* view that (as the individual self is eternal) so are the vital breaths."

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[1]Suryanarayana Sastri adds: "Śrīnīvāsa cuts a rather poor figure as interpreter, though as the statement of a logical position what he says is intelligible."

2.4.2 (R423) "Śrīkaṇṭha follows Rāmānuja, takes this and the next *sūtra* as forming one and holds that it answers the *prima facie* view."

2.4.14 (R428) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha read this and the next *sūtra* as one and argue that the fire god and the rest as well as the individual self rule over the sense-organs but their rule depends on the mind and will of the Lord."

BOOK THREE

3.1.13 (R438) "Śrīkaṇṭha adopts Śaṃkara's interpretation."

3.2.7-8 "Discussing the resting place of the self in deep sleep, Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja conclude that Brahman alone *directly* is the place of deep sleep, while adding that the other places mentioned are subsumed, not excluded. Śrīkaṇṭha does not state this or any other conclusion explicitly, contenting himself with the formula '*samuccaya eva*', meaning that all the statements made about the resting place should be taken together, not as exclusive of one another." [SS p. 308]

3.2.10 "Śrīkaṇṭha mentions only three states besides that of swoon, while Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja enumerate four, death being the fourth. It is only on this enumeration that the statement about swoon being halfway to death is intelligible." [SS p. 308]

3.2.16 (R454) "Śrīkaṇṭha follows Rāmānuja's view."

3.2.17 "Śrīkaṇṭha cites passages which describe the qualities of Śiva and glorify Him; the passages cited by Rāmānuja glorify Nārāyaṇa." [SS p. 308]

3.2.20 (R456) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha take this and the next *sūtra* as one."

3.2.21 "Śrīkaṇṭha commences a new topic, the *prakṛtaitāvattvādhikaraṇa*, while for Rāmānuja a fresh topic commences only with *sūtra* 26. The manner in which the transition is effected from *sūtra* 21 to 22 is also different in the two. The opponent, according to Rāmānuja says that the denial

of forms by the words '*neti neti*' may be interpreted to mean the exclusion of all the attributes perceived as apparently belonging to Brahman; to this the reply is that Brahman is not the content of perception (*sūtra* 22). Śrīkaṇṭha's *pūrvapakṣin* says that Brahman is but the existence that is revealed in all our judgments like 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists', and so on; and the denial is intended to show that pot, etc., do not as such qualify Brahman. But Brahman cannot be the content of perception; hence the existence that is perceived as an accompaniment and an implication of our existential judgments is not Brahman." [SS pp. 308-309]

3.2.24 "The phrase '*karmanāṇyabhyāsat*' is interpreted in the light of the sense of identity with Brahman achieved by Vāmadeva and others, and after the analogy of the magician who acquires immunity from snake-poison by his incantation of the Garuḍa *mantra*." [SS p. 309]

3.2.25 (R459) "Śrīkaṇṭha says that there is no difference between their [i.e., Brahmā's and the individual self's] attaining knowledge, bliss and rest like the Supreme and attaining lordliness and so on like him."

3.2.26 (R459) "Śrīkaṇṭha follows Rāmānuja's interpretation."

3.2.27 (R461) Śrīkaṇṭha follows Rāmānuja."

3.2.28 "Though agreeing with Rāmānuja in the general position that the non-intelligent world is also an attribute of Brahman, a different ground is assigned for not accepting the relationship of species and genus mentioned in II1.2.27. On this view as well as on that of II1.2.26 it is thought that the defect of the world would attach to Brahman. Śrīkaṇṭha would seem to have treated the genus as a concrete universal; not so, Rāmānuja." [SS p. 309]

3.2.36 (R464) "Śrīkaṇṭha begins a new section here dealing with the question whether there is anything equal to the Lord, as the doubt whether there is anything superior to the Lord has been disposed of in the previous section. This section

says that there is none equal to the Lord."

3.2.37 (R465) "Śrīkaṇṭha points out that the Lord Śiva pervades the entire universe through Nārāyaṇa, the material cause who is but a part of himself. So it is known that the Lord himself is all-pervasive."

2.2.40 (R467) Śrīkaṇṭha assumes from the start the identity of the deities with the Supreme Lord, *parameśvarātmakatayā vāyuvādīnām.*"

3.3.4 "In showing that *śruti* teaches the identity of the contents of the meditative sciences. Śrīkaṇṭha, unlike Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja, cites complimentary passages, anticipating in part the purport of the next *sūtra.* Incidentally he utilizes the opportunity to choose such passages as glorify Śiva. The passages selected are the *Mahānārāyaṇa* and the *Kaivalya* texts descriptive of the physical attributes of Śiva and the *Chāndogya* passages descriptive of the other perfections which He possesses, though endowed with bodily form." [SS p. 310]

3.3.5 "This prescribes *guṇopasaṃhāra* and is treated as a distinct topic by Śrīkaṇṭha." [SS p. 310]

3.3.9 "In recognizing a new topic Śrīkaṇṭha takes for granted the conclusion of Śaṃkara that *vyāpti* is [a relation between a qualified thing and its qualifier] *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva,* and proceeds to set out arguments similar to Rāmānujas." [SS p. 310]

3.3.11 "All the attributes–bliss, truth, knowledge, etc.-should be understood in every meditation on Brahman; their number does not conflict with the unity of Brahman. It is only the attribution of contrary qualities like blue and white or short-horned and long-horned of the same subject that introduced contradiction into the subject; not the predication of qualities like blue, sweet-smelling, large and lily in the case of a blue flower. Śrīkaṇṭha strikes an independent note and his argument is more subtle than [those] of Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja." [SS p. 310]

3.3.13 (R474) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha interpret

'*arthasāmānyāt*' [in the *sūtra* as] 'on account of their equality with the object itself'. The qualities of bliss and the rest determine the very nature of the thing (Brahman) and are therefore similar to the thing itself and so are included in all meditations just like the thing itself."

3.3.14 "Begins a new topic, the question being whether the sheaths of food, etc. are to be contemplated, they being apparently stages on the path of bliss; the answer is in the negative, since their contemplation is of no value, and is excluded besides, for these are not sheaths, but selves, and contemplation of any self except Śiva is excluded by *śruti.*" [SS p. 310]

3.3.15 (R475) "Śrīkaṇṭha continues the topic whether the selves consisting of food, vital breath, etc., are to be meditated on perpetually or not and gives another reason why they are not to be so meditated. The term 'self' applied to each of the selves of food, etc., denotes the presiding deities. Brahman alone is to be meditated on and no other deity."

3.3.16 (R476) "...(O)nly the Supreme Brahman is to be meditated on and not other selves..."

3.3.17 "Śrīkaṇṭha agrees with Rāmānuja only to the extent of considering the *viṣayavākyas* to come from the *Taittiriyopaniṣad.* While the latter says that the expressions 'self' as denoting Brahman is to be understood as what is imminent in the *annamaya,* etc. sheaths, the former would have it that the expression is used in different senses in the two cases; the *ānandamaya* self is the Supreme Being, while the other selves are merely limited and particular and should not enter into the meditation of the Highest; it is these that are excluded by the text '*sarvam anyatra parityajya*'." [SS p. 311]

3.3.22 (R479) "Śrīkaṇṭha takes this as a new section dealing with *maṇḍalavidyā* (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* I.6.6 and the *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad*) and concludes that the two *vidyās* are identical since scripture shows their identity."

3.3.25 "This *sūtra,* according to Śrīkaṇṭha, discusses

whether the introductory passage of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* '*śam no mitras śam varuṇaḥ*', etc. is part of meditative science, the answer being in the negative, on the ground that as seen from the sense of the passage it is part of Vedic *study*, not meditation. " [SS p. 312]

3.3.27-29 (R482) "Śrīkaṇṭha takes 27, 28, 29 [or 30, see below] as the statement of the *prima facie* view."

3.3.29 (R484) "Śrīkaṇṭha reverses the order of the *sūtras* 29 and 30, makes 30 the *prima facie* view and 29 the correct conclusion...There is meaning for the journey on two ways only if the self discards a part of its *karman* at the time of its departure from the body and the rest after crossing the river *Virajā*, for otherwise there is contradiction. If all the *karmans* of the self are destroyed completely at the time of its departure from the body it will become freed immediately and it would not be necessary for it to travel along the path of the gods, attain Brahman and then be freed. Thus there will be contradiction between passages which speak of travelling along the path of the gods to attain Brahman and release. Again, if the self becomes freed as soon as it leaves the body, the texts which indicate that the self attains its real form on approaching Brahman will also be contradicted. To avoid these twofold contradictions, we must say that all the *karmans* of the self do not decay completely as soon as it leaves the body. Though the meditative knowledge (*vidyā*) of the self leads it to travel along the path of the gods, yet as actual release is not attained until one directly approaches Brahman, some part of *karman* still clings to the self until it crosses the sphere of matter and actually attains the Lord."

3.3.32 "At the end of the commentary on the *sūtra* there is a reference to *niranvaya-upāsakas* for whom there is no departure by the *devayāna*." [SS p. 312]

3.3.38 "constitutes a new topic raising the question of the propriety of importing physical qualities like blue-throated-ness into every meditative science, and deciding in favor of the

importation." [SS p. 312]

3.3.39 "This is again a fresh topic. The qualities mentioned in the last *sūtra* should on no account be omitted, since there is emphatic repetition. *Śruti* being our only source of information, whatever is taught thereby should be recognized." [SS pp. 312-313]

3.3.40 (R492) "Śrīkaṇṭha takes it as a separate section. He argues that the attribute of physical form, etc., of Śiva are true and eternal and not fictitious and impermanent."

3.3.41 (R492) "For Śrīkaṇṭha, attainment of equality with Śiva is Supreme release."

3.3.42 "Though the content of meditative sciences is one, viz. Brahman, the sciences (*vidyā*) themselves are different, because of difference of attributes. Brahman is likened to a king who demands different services from different servants. This illustration is distinctive." [SS p. 313]

3.3.44 (R494) "Śrīkaṇṭha deals with the matter in the same way as Rāmānuja [who] takes this *sūtra* as an independent section dealing with the question whether the *daharavidyā* of *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* XI is the same as that which is mentioned in the previous section of the Upaniṣad (X), appealing to the many specific indications that Nārāyaṇa is the object to be meditated on in all *brahma-vidyās*, only for '*Nārāyaṇa*' he [Śrīkaṇṭha] substitutes Rudra accompanied by Umā (see *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* XIII)."

3.3.51 (R497) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha hold that the transference of the property of one thing to another does not indicate an identity between them."

3.4.20 Śrīkaṇṭha discusses rather fully the justfication for *saṃnyāsa* and the stage when it may be adopted, whether one may or should pass to it straight from *brahmacarya* and so on.

3.4.26 (R513-514) "The *sūtra* reads (partially): 'And there is need of all (works) on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like; as in the case of the horse.' Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha interpret 'as in the case of a horse'

differently [from Śaṃkara]. Just as a horse, though the real means of going, depends on some other assisting factors, such as the saddle, attendants, grooming and the like, so knowledge, though the real means to salvation, depends on the co-operation of works."

3.4.32-35 "*Āśrama karman* should be performed even by those how have knowledge (*not* desire for release). Action may both lead to knowledge and reside as an element thereof. The two kinds of action are identical because action posseses both the above characteristics (*not* because it is both enjoined and not prohibited *nor* because it is mentioned by both *śruti* and *smṛti*. They prevent knowledge from being overpowered (*not* the individual from being overpowered by passion etc.). The words in brackets indicate the interpretation offered by Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja." [SS p. 313-314]

3.4.38 (R518) "Śrīkaṇṭha interprets the *sūtra* to mean that *āśrama-dharma*, the duties prescribed for each stage of life, has a special efficacy in promoting knowledge."

3.4.47 "*Śruti* closes with the mention of the householder's state to show that meditative knowledge is attainable at all stages, not because the householder has to practice the virtue of all the stages of life (Śaṃkara) nor because *pāṇḍitya, bālya,* and *mauna* apply to all, not merely to ascetics (Rāmānuja)." [SS p. 314]

3.4.48 "The Pāśupata *vow (vrata)*, if practiced in the end and not merely for a limited period, leads to liberation. Though this is not expressly included in *āśrama dharma*, the virtues of chastity, begging, control of the senses, etc. are associated with this vow." [SS, p. 314]

3.4.49 (R522) "Śrīkaṇṭha begins a new section of two *sūtras* here dealing with the topic whether those who practice the view of Pāśupata and do not belong to any particular stage of life are entitled to liberation and answers that they are entitled to liberation. For the Pāśupata vow includes calmness, self-control and the rest."

3.4.50 "Liberation may take place even in this life if there are no counter-acting conditions; there is, however, no restrictive rule, as we see that Vāmadeva and others gained knowledge in this life as the result of a previous life." [SS p. 314]

3.4.51 (R523) "Śrīkaṇṭha speaks of the time of the rise of liberation and not of knowledge. He reads: '(The result of meditation, viz. liberation, arises) in this life (i.e. as soon as the present body ceases) if limitation be not present, on account of that being seen.' If there be no contrary works, then a knower attains release as soon as he dies. If there be such works he has to be reborn and exhaust them before he can attain release. So even knowers like Vāmadeva are seen to have rebirths."

3.4.52 (R524) "Śrīkaṇṭha holds that salvation means attaining similarity with the Lord. As the Lord is the same, salvation is the same though there may be gradations in the meditations."

BOOK FOUR

4.1.3 (R526) "Śrīkaṇṭha who generally adopts the *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva*, the relation of God to the self on the analogy of the self to the body, here gives it up and supports the view that the Lord is to be meditated on as identical with the self...."

4.1.8 (R528) "Śrīkaṇṭha defines release [i.e. liberation] as the attainment of supreme self-hood which is free from the state of the bound creature, characterized by love of bodily conditions such as that of [a] Brāhmaṇa, etc., which is full of essential unsurpassable bliss, and is of the form of Śiva, the self-luminous witness."

4.1.19 "The question whether the cycle of rebirth is never-ending is discussed only with reference to 'persons in office', possibly because Śrīkaṇṭha considers the general question to have been already raised and answered." [SS p. 315]

4.2.7 "This relates to non-difference between the

ignorant and the enlightened one in respect of departure. The *sūtra* is read as a fresh topic. The last word of the *sūtra* '*anupoṣya*' is not found in some manuscripts and is not commented on by Śrīkaṇṭha. It seems to mean 'unburnt' (*adagdha*), and is used by Śaṃkara to confirm and by Rāmānujas to refute the Advaitin's position." [SS p. 315]

4.2.14 "The subtle elements to which the *jīva* is united are merged into Brahman, not as in their material cause, but only to the extent of their being indistinguishable therefrom. The alternatives contemplated are not return to Brahman and to causal substances (Śaṃkara) or return to Brahman as opposed to their persistence and production of effects in conjunction with some other self (Rāmānuja), but merger or being contrasted with merger of function. In adopting this interpretation Śrīkaṇṭha anticipates in part *sūtra* 14 '*avibhāgo vacanāt*'." [SS p. 315]

4.3.2. (R545) "Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha take '*aviśeṣa-viśeṣābhyām* [in the *sūtra*] as stating the reason why the air is to be placed after the year and before the sun. For them 'the world of gods denotes air which is the dwelling-place of gods. Scripture specifically stays that the self comes to the air."

4.3.6-15 "Śrīkaṇṭha considers Bādari, Jaimini, and Bādarāyaṇa to discuss the state which is led up to by the person in the lightning. To this extent, he agrees with Śaṃkara, but the latter considers Bādari's view to be the *siddhānta* and Jaimini's the *pūrvapakṣa*." [SS p. 316]

4.3.12 (R549) "Śrīkaṇṭha says that (the selves are led to Śiva) higher than (Hiraṇyagarbha)."

4.3.15 (R551) "According to Śrīkaṇṭha those who mediate on the Highest Brahman alone are led to him but not those who meditate on Hiraṇyagarbha or on Nārāyaṇa."

4.4.4 "Śrīkaṇṭha: equally with Brahman is in respect of the fulfilment of all desires." [SS p. 318]

4.4.14 (R558) "Śrīkaṇṭha considers the objection that, when there is enjoyment in the nature of the perception of the

things of this world by released selves, then by their experience of what does not serve the goal of man, the absence of bondage and suffering cannot be secured, and answers that there is no perception of the world by the liberated ones in the form in which it does not serve the goal of man, for it is perceived as of the form of Brahman."

4.4.17 (R560-561) "According to Śrīkaṇṭha the contemplation of oneself as Śiva continues, even in him who, in the world of *paramaśiva*, has attained union with him, after the complete extinction of merit and demerit. He says: 'Wandering about freely in the world of the (celestial) rulers from Sadāśiva up to Brahmā, eating what he chooses, taking on what forms he desires, rid of the desire for human and other bodies, functioning with the three energies (*icchā, jñāna* and activity *(kriyā)*) uncontracted, he enjoys the splendor of perfect self-consciousness, immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of Brahman, the harmony of Śiva with Śakti, which abounds in supreme bliss, light and power..."

4.4.22 (R563) "Śrīkaṇṭha says that the bodies assumed by liberated selves are the products of pure *mahā-māyā*."

8.DEVĀCĀRYA (1450?)

VPSVK III, pp. 107-108: "Devacārya was twelfth after Nimbārka. Of the previous teachers who flourished between Puruṣottama and Devācārya, we know nothing. Devācārya was supposed to be an incarnation of the lotus of Viṣṇu (*padmāvatāra*) and to have flourished in Tailaṅga in the Vaikrama Yuga-rudrendu 1112, i.e. 1112 *saṃvat* or 1056-57 A.D. But this view is untenable, since it is clear from internal evidences that he could not have flourished prior *at least* to Rāmānuja and Madhva, i.e. not prior to the thirteenth century A. D., as he criticizes the views of these latter philosophers."

Agrawal 2000, Volume 4, has a section on Devācārya in which he repeats the above information and adds: "He is said

to have studied the *Vedāntaśāstra* under the supervision of Śrīkṛpācārya–eleventh teacher after Nimbārka. In fact, he was the immediate disciple of Kṛpācārya."

8.1 DEVĀCĀRYA, *Siddhāntajāhnavī* on Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras*

"E" references are to the edition of the text with Sundarabhaṭṭa's *Dvaitādvaitasiddhāntasetukā,* edited by Damodara Lala Gosvamin, Ratna Gopala Bhatta and Gopala Sastri Nene, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Nos. 94, 99 and 358, Benares, 1906-1927. The first Book of this work has also, more recently, been published with English Introduction and comments in Agrawal 2000, Volume 4. Roma Bose, in VPSVK III, pp. 108-115, provides an account of the positions taken in there.

Summary by R. N. Mukherjee

Lord Vāsudeva, who is the cause of the entire universe, abode of mercy, and endowed with endless auspicious qualities, powers and riches, having taken an incarnation as Vyāsa, divided the Vedas of the nature of his breath into different branches for the attainment of the goals of life. Since women and *śudras* were not entitled to read the Vedas, for them he ordained the *Mahābhārata;* then, for those with required qualifications and who are entirely desirous of God's grace and knowledge about Brahman, and who have renounced all other aims of life, he put the meaning of the entire Vedas in four chapters of *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā* (i.e., the *Brahmasūtras).* There are other commentaries on the text, but in the present one the matter has been made easier to follow.

1.1.1 (E13) Here *atha* means sequence [*ānantarya*], and *ataḥ* the reason; the two signify that having learnt and engaged in religious rituals, and realized their fruits as perishable, and having determined that knowledge of Brahman alone can lead

***to the highest imperishable goal, so that "Having folded space like leather and having known the Supreme, he escapes misery" (as has been stated in the Upaniṣad).

(E27) Brahman is Ramākāntha Śrī Puruṣottama with unthinkable, innumerable, exceedingly high nature and qualities. He is without a cause and omniscient, to whom scriptures attribute knowledge, pure, and activity as intrinsic nature. About Him it is said that He is to be inquired into, to be sought, seen, heard, and meditate on.

How is Brahman to be taken? According to some, in the *śruti* passage "in the beginning only the real, of the nature of one without a second, existed, the real of the nature of diversity; difference is due to beginningless limitation, and ignorance is removable by utterances like "*tattvamasi*".

(E30) To this another rejoins: "The above is not logical, being beset with the following alternative":

The individual self cannot be Brahman divided by limitations, as Brahman is not divisible, and the individual self has no beginning. Nor can it be maintained that in undivided Brahman contact with an atomic limitation in a specific location is *jīva.* The idea of specific location in Brahman in relation to any limitation is vitiated by many defects. If the limitation be mobile, as it will come into contact with different points off and on, bondage and liberation will result. In case the view that the limitation attracts be accepted, the entire Brahman would be attracted since It is indivisible. Again, due to non-division of locations in Brahman all *jīvas* will be in contact with all limitations in one location of Brahman, thereby getting united (mixed up).

Nor can it be maintained that *jīvas* are different consciousnesses associated with limitations. If indeed such difference is to be admitted, the additional admission of limitations would be pointless, and the contender would slide into the position of his opponent. Nor can it be said that the limitation itself is the *jīva,* as that would admit an external

entity.

(E33) Hence all Vedānta texts establish Brahman of the nature of cognition free from all determination, differing from both the perishable and the imperishable, and free from all differences whether of the same class, of another class, or within itself.

Another rejoins, "This is not correct, as it contradicts thousands of texts asserting differences. Nor will it do to state that non-difference of God and *jīva* is perceived and hence the statements on difference are weaker than those maintaining non-difference and that non-difference is also supported by six marks (*liṅga*) like beginning, etc. (in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2).

(E36) Actually, both types of statements, viz., maintaining difference and non-difference are equally conducive to the attainment of one's ends and their preservation (*yogakṣema*).

Moreover, the difference between the self and God is not perceptible, being beyond the senses. The eye is determined by the content of perception. Since the difference between God and self is established to be non-perceptible, the meaning of the utterances propounding difference stands self-explained.

Nor does it follow from six marks that words indicative of non-difference establish Brahman, because (according to the objector himself) Brahman, being non-specific and free from all qualities, is not expressible in words, since words express objects with some qualities. Being beyond all instruments of knowledge (literally, immeasurable), it would be like (an attempt) to measure the sky.

(E36-37) Even if it be conceded to be expressible in words and hence perceptible, then despite acceptance of our position, it cannot be maintained that the six conditions (beginning, etc.) establish non-difference, because they establish difference also, as may be known from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7. To be explicit, "Kāpya, do you know the inner-controller?" is the beginning, "This self is the inner-

dweller" is the conclusion (*upasaṃhāra*), "This self made one into twenty" is repetition, "Unattainable as inner-dweller" is originality (*apūrvatā*)", "He is the knower of Brahman" is the result, "O Yājñavalkya, if you take the cows of a knower of Brahman knowing the *sūtra* and the inner-dweller, your head will fall off" is *arthavāda* of the nature of censure, "Of whom the earth is the body, but whom the earth does not know" is the demonstration (*upapatti*).

(E37) Thus having established the equal meaningfulness of words denoting difference and non-difference, Brahman is different from both sentient and non-sentient things, due to the strength of sentences indicating different.

But then one writer does not accept this. According to him, *śruti* asserting non-difference is likely to be cancelled. In fact, sentient and non-sentient objects are qualities of Brahman, and, as such, Brahman is qualified one, omniscient, omnipotent, unexcelled repository of all auspicious attributes. Sentience and non-sentience are both qualities of Brahman, but due to their differences there is no mix-up between them.

(E43) About this theory we maintain that this is no better, because of incompatibilities. All accept that a quality differentiates (*vyāvartaka*). If the sentient and non-sentient are qualities of Brahman, a question arises as to what they differentiate? They cannot possibly differentiate themselves, nor anything else, there being none.

Moreover, the difference between the sentient, the non-sentient, and Brahman being obvious, to avoid their mix-up the admission of qualifications beside difference is prolix.

As such, Brahman that is related to the world of the sentient and the non-sentient in the relation of difference-cum-non-difference is to be inquired into.

Now an objection may be raised that due to the above relation (due to the aspect of non-difference) the defect of selves might affect Brahman. But we are assured this is not the case, due to the other aspect, difference. And that Brahman is

different from both sentient and insentient things is made abundantly clear in the text when Brahman is said to be neither gross nor subtle, thus distinguishing it both from matter, which is gross, and selves, which are subtle.

(E44) In fact, Brahman is non-different being the Self of all, governor of all, free pervader of all and their support. Brahman as inner dweller and self of all regulates them. Nārāyaṇa pervades both outside and inside of all that is perceptible or audible in the universe.

(E53) The Self is the supreme principle and all the worlds are based on Him. That which is without a self, regulated, pervaded, provided basis and dependence, is non-different from its support like the relation between earth and the pot, fire and smoke, breath and sense, elements and their products. For instance, pot is substance and earth is substance and here that which is common between what is determined by substantiality, pot-ness, and earth-ness is the primary entity; the specific being non-different from the common.

Similarly omniscient Brahman, determined by infinite qualities and with unrestricted power and affluence is non-different from sentient and non-sentient in his Self and as their inner-dweller. This is the meaning of utterances like "*tattvamasi*".

(E54) In conclusion, the object of inquiry of the person desirous of liberation is the Supreme Person (*puruṣottama*), who is the resort of the goddess of wealth (Ramā) and is, by nature, free from all defects and possessed of intrinsic unthinkable infinite wonderful self-modes of auspicious attributes, powers and glory, the cause of the birth etc. of the universe, solely knowable through scriptures, resort of the liberated, known as supreme Brahman, God, etc. and different-cum-non-different locus of the sentient and the non-sentient.

(E56) Hence, different from the body, senses, mind, intellect and breath, of the nature of knowledge, knower, ego, its nature, state and tendencies derived from God, of the

dimension of an atom, different in different bodies and imperishable are the individual and conscious individual selves, subject to bondage and liberation.

Jīva is *manomaya* (made of mind) whereas God is *vijñānamaya* (made of intelligence), all-pervasive inside and outside. He (God) is perceiver, hearer, experiencer, smeller, attender, knower, whose consciousness and power never abate. By His light everything is lit up, and He metes out rewards and punishments according to deeds that affect only *jīvas* and not God.

(E77) The non-sentient has three categories: natural, unnatural, and time. The natural is the basis of three *guṇas*, permanent and changeful. It is the cause of the self's bondage and an obstacle to liberation. The world of the intellect etc., the universe, is its product, and is perishable.

(E84) The unnatural is different from the natural and time, and is mentioned in *śruti* as "bright, like the sun beyond darkness". This region is different from *prakṛti*, and referred to as eternal power and great space or region. The Lord of this region is called Viṣṇu or Paramātman, His decisions result in many transformations for the delight of eternally liberated selves. All these are beyond time.

(E86) Time is eternal and all-pervasive. It has neither beginning nor end. While all nature is governed by time, time is governed by God. While God's sportive expression (*līlāvibhūti*) simulates temporality, his eternal expression (*nityavibhūti*) is not affected by it.

1.1.2 The word "*janmādi*" in this *sūtra* means creating, maintenance and dissolution. The word "*asya*" represents the effect, viz. the world, while "*yatas*" means the cause of the nature of Brahman.

This *sūtra* indicates inquiry into Brahman who is the supreme God, omniscient, omnipotent, the ultimate cause, regulator of all, the highest person, who brings about the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the world of

variegated names and forms, with different experiencers in different places and times, with diverse results of actions. The word "*yataḥ*" ("from which") indicates Brahman which is to be inquired into.

(E95) Could it be that the general word '*yatas*', which here denotes the *jivā* as the source etc. of the world? This cannot be the case, as it is said that the first cause is one: "In the beginning the real was there, one without a second" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1). The selves, being innumerable, would introduce multiple causation.

(E96) Can Hiraṇyagarbha or four-faced Brahmā be the first cause, since he is referred to as self-created (*svayambhū*)? and the first among gods? This is actually not the case, as his priority (to everything else) has not been established. Moreover Hiraṇyagarbha comes after Śiva because his birth is said to have been perceived by Śiva in some Upaniṣad.

(E97) Time may be said to be the cause of the world, as stated in the scripture–"Others uphold time..."..." Again it has been said by Bādarāyaṇa "Realizing that the world is based in time, have patience, O Arjuna", and "Realizing that the world is based on time equanimity is good". This is not the case, as scriptures declare that the upholds of time are deluded persons.

There are others who regard the world as an expression of self-nature. But this theory that the world is by itself is not correct. For according to it the world has not become, the effect does not depend upon any cause but is by itself. To this we ask "If the world is by nature, is there a ground for it or not?" If the first alternative is accepted, then this (ground) is the cause, to which self-nature is auxiliary. In the latter alternative, the original assertion "from whom this is born etc." is lost. Thus the doctrine of *svabhāva* becomes untenable.

Above, different possible causes have been disproved. Would it be that the origin of the world was from the unreal (*asat*) as postulated in *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, whence the genesis, stay, and the dissolution of the world would be alike accidental

events? There is also no single absence of the cause of the world, like the prior absence of the cause of a product like a pot in Nyāya.[1] The "unreal" cannot be the cause of the world, as a non-entity like a sky-flower or hare's horn cannot produce anything.[2]

Since all the above cases are given up, it does not follow that a position similar to the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyavāda*) has to be accepted. There are frequent utterances in the scriptures maintaining that one reality Brahman or Nārāyaṇa is the first cause, and this is the position to be accepted. As in *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* the ultimate cause is stated to be without a further cause, and in *smṛti* the ultimate cause is mentioned as Viṣṇu.

Then what is the subject of all the scriptural statements quoted above mentioning *jīva* and others as causes of the world? "*Jīva*" is not opposed to the original statement if taken in the etymological sense of what lives. But it would not apply if "*jīva*" is taken as different from *ātman*, and bound by the rules of restraints (*yama*) and regulations.

"Hiraṇyagarbha" is also not opposed to the original statement, if the word is taken in the meaning of "that which has golden eggs in its womb", for that is supported by Parāśara's utterance about God.

(E106) Nor is "Śiva", by itself, foreign to the original statement, for the word stands for bliss, which indicates Brahman as stated in the scripture "Brahman is consciousness-bliss (*vijñānānanda*)". Otherwise such statements as "One Nārāyaṇa exited, neither Brahmās nor Śiva", and words in

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[1]Here the wording appears to be confused. The effect is absent in the cause according to *asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya. What the author means is that this implies the origin of effects from the unreal (*asat*).

[2]Probably it means that creation and dissolution being cyclical, there is no single absence from which the world could originate for the first time.

Kālīya's hymn "from whom (Nārāyaṇa) Brahmā, fire, Rudra originate" would be contradicted.

Nor is time opposed to the original statement of scripture as it is a power of God, and power is non-different from the holder of the power. God himself has also stated "I am time among the destroyers" (*Bhagavadgītā* 10.30). Thus "time" and "the regulator of time' come to have the same meaning.

Nor is there self-discrepancy in the causality of self-nature (*svabhāva*). "*Svabhāva*" denotes that entity which possesses natural uncommon qualities and states. (The word is a *bahuvrīhi* compound.) In scripture there is the expression that knowledge, power and activity are natural to Brahman.

Nor should one apprehend that the utterance "Non-being was in the beginning" to be hostile to the original statement. The letter "a" represents Brahman in *śruti*. Also God states in *smṛti* (the *Bhagavadgītā*) "Among letter I am 'a'". With "*sat*" it has entered a *karmadhāraya* compound (*s* which is *sat*), meaning "Brahman of the nature of the real (*sat*)". By the above derivation, the negativity of the question "How can being be born of non-being? is resolved.

As regards the assertion that the world comes into existence accidentally (*akasmāt*), it creates no difficulty, as the word "*akasmāt*" can be explained in a similar way. "*Akasmāt*" means "from *aka*", i.e. Vāsudeva or Brahman (denoted by "*a*"), who is full of bliss (denoted by "*ka*").

It is wrong to think that the words like "*jīva*", "Hiraṇyagarbha", etc. denote God (Bhagavat) conventionally. The ultimate causality of *prakṛti* and other things will be refuted later.

(E109) Next the question arises "what is the mode of causation whereby the world is born from Brahman?" Is it collection (*saṃghāta*), new origination (*ārambha*), or transformation (*pariṇāma*)? It cannot be the first and second, as they are based on wrong reasoning and opposed to the Vedas (being Buddhist doctrines); nor can it be transformation.

Brahman being all-pervasive, like space, and invisible, its transformation cannot be experienced.

To this objection we reply that because of transformability by nature, like milk, it is not impossible that God as omniscient and omnipotent can transform at will.

It might be objected that an example like milk (turning into curd) is not applicable to part-less Brahman, as milk gets transformed because it has parts. To this the reply is that milk does not get transformed into curd because of parts, but because it has the required capacity or potency for transformation.

(E110) It requires to be reflected on whether the potency is in the whole composed of parts or in the parts. The first alternative is not possible because liquids do not have such bodies distinct from the parts. Hence the potency is in parts that are themselves part-less, as otherwise there would be infinite regress. Those who deny transformation to part-less parts base their arguments on the fact that milk is perceptible in curd. (?)

Hence the part-less undergoes transformation and, thereby, Brahman also is proved to be capable of transformation. In *śruti* Also it is said "God's various transcendent (*parā*) powers are natural; similarly natural are His knowledge, power, and activity". In scripture also it is said that creation etc. are Brahman's hundredfold powers; they are unthinkable like the power of heat in fire.

(E115) Even so (it might be objected), on the analogy of milk, to argue for Brahman's transformability is not proper. Moreover, if the part-less undergoes transformation, then Brahman is likely to get transformed entirely, thus becoming non-eternal. Thereby words like "eternal", "all-pervasive", "changeless", "inactive" and "peaceful" as applied to Brahman would be contradicted. Moreover, the transformed Brahman, as the world, being perceptible to all, would be attained by all, leading to universal liberation, making scripture redundant.

The above is not the case. We do not attribute

transformation to Brahman on the force of reasoning, but on the basis of scriptural utterances like "the Self itself did", "having transformed Himself". Nor does transformation affect Brahman in its entirety, any more than it affects the spider spinning out its web, a body growing hairs, or the earth generating herbs. The world springs from the unchanging. Hence Lord Hari is remembered by His transformation into the world, this transformation being a projection (*vikṣepa*) or capacity (*śakti*). The doctrine of *pariṇāma* (defined as *śaktivikṣepa*) is expressly stated in authoritative passages dealing with creation (two such passages quoted here) by using the word "*kṣobha*", and Bhīṣma also stated in the *Mahābhārata* that creation and dissolution are similar to the projection and withdrawal of limbs in a tortoise.

Thus it is established that Brahman is the non-different instrumental cause of the world.

(E121) The material capacity (*upādānatva*) lies in changing through power the natural subtle states of matter and *jīvas* into corresponding gross manifestations.

The instrumental causation (*nimittatva*) lies in bringing about a union of respective very faint (literally, contracted) consciousness, based on memory traces from past deeds (during previous creation)by means of the corresponding results of action, out of an awakened sense of accountability .

The idea is that God's material causality of the world lies in providing out of Himself matter and individual selves, and His instrumental causality lies in so combining them that individual selves get the results of their past action in previous creations.

(E121) Free and non-different combination of both these causes (of the world) flowing from the essential nature of Brahman (*brahmasvarūpagatatvena*) establishes its essential nature. There is no question of an accidental definition (*tatastha lakṣaṇa*), as held by some (Advaita Vedāntins).

The following objection might be raised. The purpose of

a definition is to distinguish an object from what is different. The (definition based on) creation etc. (having already established the essential nature of Brahman and thus fulfilled this purpose, the further definition of Brahman as "truth, knowledge, and infinity" would be prolix.

The reply is that "creation etc.", while bringing out the essential nature of Brahman, still does so in relative terms of cause and effect; whereas "truth etc.", giving definition in absolute (non-relative) terms, has its own significance. In the latter definition, if only "truth" were mentioned, it would cover also the insentient, and if "knowledge" were added it would cover also the sentient. But to distinguish Brahman from both "infinity" has been added to the definition.

(E122) It should not be said that instead of truthfulness (*satyatva*) the statement of the properties truth etc. in the *svarūpalakṣaṇa* passage "*satyaṃ jñānam anantam Brahma*" is prolix, for if truth etc. as attributes are unable to indicate the essential nature that (essential nature) might get reduced to untruth, unconsciousness, and limitedness.

Hence the above conclusion remains. Brahman that is to be inquired into is defined as truth etc. and as the non-different instrumental and material cause of the world.

1.1.3 (The *sūtra* means that *śāstra* (i.e., the Vedas) is the cause, i.e. the means that reveals Brahman. Though in the *sūtra* there is no word for taking scripture as the only means for knowing Brahman, yet this restriction is to be accepted, for the authoritative passages on which this *sūtra* is based speak of scripture as the only means. It implies that other instruments of knowledge do not reveal it. As has been said, "I inquire into that *puruṣa* of the Upaniṣads who is approached by all Vedas; the non-knower of Vedas does not know the great one (Brahman)." Also *smṛtis* refer to Brahman in utterances like "I am known through all Vedas" and "Where all words have perpetual basis".

(E130) To establish the point that scriptures also give knowledge of Brahman, arguments follow to show that other

instruments of knowledge are not competent for the purpose.

Brahman is not revealed in perception, being beyond the senses. This is not because Brahman is limited, for Brahman, being all-pervasive and so both inside and outside the senses, cannot be revealed by the senses that are themselves lit up by Brahman, just as taste and hearing cannot reveal shape and smell, and a glow-worm cannot reveal the sun.

Nor is Brahman revealed by inference, as inference lacks the capacity of proving independently. As stated in *smṛti* Without co-operation of *śruti* inference proves nothing with certainty."

(E137) (It might be objected why Brahman as creator of the world may not be inferred after the analogy of *prakṛti* in other systems, on the basis of the fact that products like the elements earth etc. must have a cause, while by the method of difference non-products like time need no cause.

The reply is that from products like the elements we may infer sentience (in the cause), but not the attributes of unnatural order, qualities and power. The inference is also vitiated by the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi* because, according to you (the Nyāya logician) space, while an element, is not created, so that the argument that "elements, being created, imply a creator" fails. Hence Brahman is not known by inference.

(E140) Nor can Brahman be known by comparison, as there is no known similar thing. This does not vitiate what has been said about "that thou art" (*tattvamasi*), because comparison is not of a universal character, being specific, and as there is no second object with omnipotence and omniscience, the original difficulty persists.

However, it is accepted that, comparatively, one may know things by excluding what is different, for instance "a horse is unlike a cow","an elephant is unlike a camel", etc. But such comparative knowledge is based on well-known objects of comparison. But, in case of Brahman, there is no such means

except scripture. Hence Brahman cannot be known by comparison. Even if by contrast Brahmā is known as different from sentient and non-sentient is changeful and changeless, Brahman thereby cannot be known as omnipotent and omniscient, regulator of all, and creator of the world.

(E144) Nor is Brahman knowable by presumption, as that is also a form of logical deduction like inference.

Nor is it possible by non-perception, that being dependent on perception.

Hence Brahman is knowable only by the word (of scripture).

1.1.4 But then an objection might be raised that it has been stated in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* "For where words return together with the mind, unable to attaint it." It has also been said to be non-verbal, non-tactile, and beyond word. Again it has been said "about Brahman) "Unheard by the ears". In this way the scriptures themselves declare Brahman as beyond the Vedas. Then how can Brahman be known through verbal testimony? This is answered in the next *sūtra*.

The word "*tu*" in *sūtra* 1.14 is used in order to refute the above argument. Brahman (*tad*) with the above-mentioned signs of omniscience etc. is established by the Vedas only. How? By a union of appropriate statements (*saṃyag vācyatayā anvayaḥ samanvayaḥ*). Vedāntic utterances are appropriate for establishing Brahman. "From what all these elements have originated"; "from joy all these elements are born", "from It have been born life, mind and senses", "the real existed in the beginning, one Brahman without a second"; "that desired to generate many", from Nārāyaṇa life, Brahmā, and Rudra were born"; "Brahman was in the beginning"' "It became self-conscious and thereby became all" "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinity, consciousness, bliss, etc.".

(E153) It cannot be maintained that the scriptures establish the above principle by negation of the opposite. In fact, the above scriptures establish correctly the attributes and

power of Brahman, in coherence that eliminates the opposite without contradiction.

Else there would be opposition to scriptural statements like "the self is to be seen, heard, thought and meditated on","He who is situated in the heart is known by the heart", "having realized It death is transcended", "the *puruṣa* who resides in the abode body (*pur*) and who is higher than the highest is seen by the resolute".

If indeed Brahman were beyond all instruments of knowledge it would be reduced to Buddhistic non-substance, like a hare's horn.

Nor should it be maintained that if Brahman is revealed by words it would become perishable like a cloth or a pot. Being revealed by Vedic utterances, whose power is inseparable from Brahman and thereby self-revelatory , it is in no way revealed by another light, and in no way goes against self-luminosity. What is perception etc. are also accepted as Brahman's powers and hence defect-less in the matter of revealing Brahman? The reply is that these powers are actually restricted by the intelligence of the knower and hence, being liable to illusions, the above view that they might also reveal Brahman is not appropriate.

About the utterance "from where words return, together with the mind, unable to attain it ", the explanation is as follows: Just as a man might take a dip in unfathomed water and come ashore without realizing its actual depth, so language and mind, trying to grasp Brahman, might halt in their efforts to comprehend It, according to the above definition, as the cause of the world. It is *aśabda* (non-expressible in words) and *avacana* (undenoted by denotative words) as found in scriptural passages meaning that It cannot be comprehended in sounds or words of limited range. For the same reason it is "unheard".

The implication is that reality in its true nature is unbounded. Power etc. that represent the essential nature,

while being beyond ordinary words, can yet be revealed by scriptures that are revealed.

Or "*yato vācaḥ*" etc. means the incapacity of the popular (current) usage of the word (*vāc*), and this in no way contradicts the capacity of scriptures to establish Brahman; the phrase "with the mind" in the *śruti* passage clearly indicates popular usage. The Vedas, stated to be the breath of Brahman, are not in the same category.

It might be further objected that the view of Brahman regarded as with attributes will go against the *mantras* maintaining Brahman as quality-less (*nirguna*). This is not correct, because the attributes due to *māyā* (delusion based on egoism) only are denied.

Brahman, endowed with intrinsic powers, attributes and activities, is to be heard, thought and meditated on. It is also stated in the scripture that "he who loves the (great) self also gets his love'."

It is said in the Upaniṣads that by such meditation and love "the knot of the heart is loosened, all doubts are dispelled, and the bondage of activities (*karman*) are gone". According to the Vedic *mantras*, by direct vision of the Lord there is release from *prakṛti*'s hold, based on cause-effect nexus.

(E165) As indicated by Parāśara liberation, which means attainment of God, is medicine for unsurpassable joy and bliss.

Attainment of God can; also be characterized thus: "Two letters (namely *mama*, mine) represent death, and three letters (namely *na mama*, not mine) represent eternal Brahman.

As told in scripture, "Non-egoist (*nirmama*) and non-self-appropriative (*nirahaṃkāra*), having destroyed the feeling of ownership or self-appropriation in the relation of the field and the knower thereof (*kṣetrakṣetrajña*), and having realized that *jīva* is a part of Brahman, and having established the proper relationship with God as indicated in scripture, the liberated selves stay in uninterrupted proper relation to God, like the free flow of the Ganges. This state is indicated by words like

"similarity" (*sāmya*) or "union" (*sāyujya*).

It is said that he who has known the Self transcends sorrow. Scriptures declare that the knower of Brahman becomes like Brahman. God also has said (in the *Bhagavadgītā*) "the wise attain my attributes". When it is said "the knower of Brahman becomes like Brahman" it means greatness due to vast knowledge; it does not mean intrinsically like Brahman.

(E175) Here verbal knowledge is not likely to lead to liberation. It has to be made interior through meditation leading to direct perception, else a sick man would get cured by hearing the name of the medicine. The plea that in the rope-snake illusion mere verbal knowledge that it is not a snake suffices to dispel fear won't do. In such illusions also fear goes when verbal knowledge is supplemented with the perception of truth. That is why unloosening of the knot of the heart is mentioned for the realization of Brahman, through abstract vision following on meditation.

(E177) Nor is there any basis for an apprehension that meditation being mental activity its result must be perishable like a pot etc. Meditation is meant to remove limitation to direct vision, and hence it does not generate something that is perishable.

Meditation should not be taken as an action depending upon a person. It being about Brahman, endowed with unthinkable and unlimited power and like knowledge only attainable through the Vedas, it is itself of the nature of knowledge that establishes reality. By such knowledge of Brahman death is transcended.

(E178) According to the scripture the great self is to be taken as different from the individual self that it regulates. While the individual self is united with God, yet difference is perceived, there is the distinction between the experiencer and regulator (God) and the experienced (*jīva*). God is the experiencer (*bhoktṛ*), worshiped in *yajñas*, Lord of all the worlds and friend of all beings. He who realizes this becomes

like God and attains peace. All these show that meditation is not different from knowledge, though it is mental. If it is not accepted then knowledge, being mental, cannot be a means of attaining Brahman.

(E181) Can it be that Brahman, as defined, being located in experience, and its object could be non-eternal?

Of this experience, its locus, the one who attains it) is the knower, the self. It is not created like a bangle, being unborn as stated in scripture. nor is it unattainable, being by nature always attainable, not being dependent on any other means of knowledge.

Nor is this experience subject to change like words etc., being free from the six kinds of change (*vikāra*), as stated in the scriptures.

Nor is it capable of purification of two types, growth of merit and removal of defects: not the former as it is endowed with eternal knowledge, not the second as, being of the nature of knowledge, it cannot be touched by defects.

(E182) Here an objection might be raised: If the knower (*kṣetrajña*) is altogether free from relation to the defects of *prakṛti* there will be a failure of the system of bondage and liberation. While the above is true, there is provision for the effects of purificatory rites (*saṃskāra*). It is *dharmātmakajñāna* which has got contracted due to ignorance born of beginnngless actions. By God's grace, when the cause in the form of *prakṛti*'s relation is dispelled and the natural knowledge dawns it is liberation. Hence bondage and liberation do not imply any intrinsic fault in the knower. Liberation lacks the nature of being a product of action on two counts: it is based on God's experience, and its object is Brahman. Hence liberation has no trace of changefulness.

(E187) Meditation is of the nature of worship, and Brahman is the object of worship. Hence the *śruti* that states "It is not Brahman that you worship" would seem to refute the above. But actually it is not so. The denial is of what is

superimposed, and not of what is valid. Hence the aforesaid scripture refers to Brahman, as distinct from the world of diversity of the nature of "this" as the content of meditation.

(E189) If Brahman is to be worshiped, it would seem to imply that It has a body. Then there wold arise a cancellation of scriptural utterances that state Brahman to be without body, mind and life, great, all-pervasive, and alone. These actually deny bodies made of *prakṛti* but do not deny bodies altogether, as is implied in *śruti* passatges such ass "Perceiving, playing, and enjoying with Brahman".

Otherwise (if a body made of *prakṛti* be associated with Brahman) there might be experiences but there will be loss of omniscience. This will go against scriptural statements of omniscience and intrinsic knowledge, power and actions.

(E192) It might be objected that scriptures mention Brahman as not an object of knowledge in e.g. "that which knows others is itself unknown" and "who knows the knower of all this?". So how can Brahman become the content of meditation? In reply to this position of the Advaita Vedāntin the author maintains that these scriptural statements are indicative of the fact that Brahman cannot be restricted in terms of appearances and attributes.

If the position (of the Advaitin) was to be accepted, then other scriptural statements like "a knower of Self transcends sorrow", "a knower of Brahman becomes like Brahman" etc., that indicate the nature of liberation would be contradicted, leading to non-liberation as has been stated repeatedly. If this is not accepted, Brahman would not be proved by scriptures.

(E194) There are scriptural passages saying "He who thinks that it (the Supreme Principle) cannot be a content of the mind, i.e. known is the person who knows; he who holds the opposite view knows not", "he who thinks It is knowable know not", "the seer is not seen", "the knower of knowledge is not known". The above scriptural passages purport that the Supreme Principle is unknowable, but does not thereby

postulate non-liberation on knowledge, else a dog, insects etc. that do not know would also be eligible for liberation, making scripture superfluous.

(E193) In the utterance "if another is known..", etc. there is no denial of knowledge, for after "non-knowledge" at the end of the statement, non-knowledge is also denied. Elsewhere at the end of the statement on "*dharma* etc." what is seen is said, the end is made with perception and knowledge. Hence both types of statements having equal force in the scripture, both have to be admitted to avoid contradiction, just as we may see the ocean and yet not see its mysteries.

These (opposing attributes of knowable and non-knowable) are similar to the attribution of opposite qualities to *prāṇa* and Brahman-power, as they are said both to be with sight, hearing, movement, mindfulness with vital breath, and also without all these.

The individual self (*puruṣa*) knows his own self as "I am". The utterance "for what desire does the body get feverish?" indicates the lack of bodily vanity in the wise man.

(E196) The wise man with the above marks is free from bodily attachments despite relation with *prakṛti*. This is not the state of liberation while living (*jīvanmukti*), because liberation takes time. The acquisition of knowledge does not lead to liberation, for in meditation also Brahman can be experienced.

(E200) Thus it is established that by proper coordination of Vedāntic statements, Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, with omniscience and natural (intrinsic) innumerable powers, is seen be the Brahman who is indicated by the scriptures.

1.1.5 In the first four *sūtras* Brahman, indicated by the definition "from which these elements are generated", etc., omniscient, omnipotent, provable only by scriptures in co-ordination, has been established as the object of inquiry. Now, the present *sūtra* (1.15) refers to deliberation (*īkṣaṇa*) to indicate that the definition does not extend to the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya.

In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (6.1.2) it is said "Real (*sat*) was there in the beginning, one without a second. It decided 'I shall generate many'."

Here a doubt is cast that the real referred to here is Sāṃkhya's *prakṛti* which is inferred and unconscious, and to which the Vedāntic co-ordinated idea of Brahman is attributed.

It should not be objected that causation (of the world) cannot be attributed to the unconscious *prakṛti* without knowledge and action, for *sattva's* being the cause of knowledge, omniscience and due to *rajas* capacity for action is not contradicted. Hence *prakṛti* is the cause of the world. Ths conscious entity should not be called the cause because the "conscious is essentially inactive and changing.

We may reply that the inferred *prakṛti* cannot be the cause of the world, as it is not accepted in the scriptures. The word "*īkṣaṇa*" (deliberation) is used while referring to the creator. This shows that the cause of the world looks and hears all the factors involved. *Īkṣaṇa* (the act of seeing) means deliberation and decision. It being the common property of conscious agents, its location in insentient *prakṛti* is impossible. Nor are the powers of knowledge and action possible in *prakṛti* due to *sattva*, because that *guṇa* is absent (quiescent) in the state of equilibrium which is known as *pradhāna*.

Nor is Brahman attribute-less, as its intrinsic powers of knowledge and action are accepted in scripture (*Śvetāśvatar-opaniṣad* 3.19). In other texts also (*Aitareyopaniṣad* 1.11, *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.3) the word "*īkṣaṇa*" has occurred in the context of creation. Hence conscious, omniscient Brahman, denoted by "*sat*", is the cause of the world.

Here an objection might be raised. Maybe *īkṣaṇa* is a common property of conscious agents, yet merely on that basis Brahman cannot be held to be the cause of the world. Even for insentient things the acts of seeing, etc. are seen to be used in a secondary sense (*upacāra*), as "the bank is about to fall' or, on observing as dry field, when it is said "the farm awaits rain". In

this way for insentient *prakṛti* also "*īkṣaṇa*" can be used in a secondary sense. Such secondary usage is seen elsewhere also as in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.3 where it is said "thatī decided (*īkṣaṭa*) 'I shall create many, and created water'."

This objection is answered in the next *sūtra*.

1.1.6 The objection that the word "*sat*" here applies to *prakṛti*, deliberation (*īkṣaṇa*) being used secondarily, is not possible because of the word of *ātman*."All this is the self, this is real", "that art thou, Śvetaketu" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.14.3), and "*ātman*" ("self") cannot be applied to insentient *prakṛti*. The secondary use as in examples like "the bank is to fall" is applicable to doubtful cases. As Jaimini has said "in doubtful cases common usage is to be taken (*Mīmāṃsāsūtras* I1.3.16). Hence "real" (*sat*) in the Upaniṣadic passage is not to be taken as applicable to prakṛti.

1.1.7 As in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.14.2 liberation is stated to be the result of reliance or devotion to the "real" and the "existent", it is only possible by Brahman, who is omniscient and omnipotent, and not by *prakṛti*. If by reliance on *prakṛti* liberation were possible, everyone would attain it by attachment to the insentient.

1.1.8 If the word '*sat*' in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* expressed *prakṛti* Śvetaketu, desirous of liberation, would instead have his self reduced to the insentient. But in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* texts like "that thou art" elevation is indicated. In Sāṃkhya also it is accepted that those who are attached to the insentient get involved in the world. In the *śruti* it is stated that one becomes as he worships. In the *Bhagavadgītā* (8.6) also it is said that one acquires the state on which his mind is fixed at the time of death. Hence in the section under consideration reduction to the state of *prakṛti* is not indicated.

1.1.9 If the Sāṃkhyan *prakṛti* is accepted as the cause of the world, the initial resolve that "by knowing it everything is known" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.1-3) is contradicted. As *prakṛti* is not the cause of the sentient, by its knowledge one might

know its non-sentient products, but not the sentient.

1.1.10 In *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.1 it is stated that in deep sleep the individual self merges with reality (*sat*). This merger is in one's own cause. As the non-sentient cannot be the cause of the sentient, the merger is in Brahman.

1.1.12 By concordance of scriptures the inner-dweller of all, remover of all sins, Nārāyaṇa who is omniscient, is established. Therefore Supreme Brahmnan is the cause of the world and not *prakṛti*. As stated in the *śruti* "True source, peaceful God, all-productive, established in truth. All that is and all that is not are included in it. This self..has projected all the names and forms (of the world)."

1.1.13 In *Taittirīyopaniṣad,* interior to four sheaths belonging to food, life, mind and *vijñāna* there is stated to be the sheath of bliss. A question might be raised whether this refers to Brahman or to the individual self. It cannot refer to the individual self for two reasons. The individual self cannot be its own inner-dweller, and blissfulness has been attributed to Brahman repetitively in the scriptures.

That blissful is said to be embodied is no reason for taking it to refer the individual self, because Brahman is the inner-dweller of all. In the same section of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* it is said that out of its fear the wind blows and the sun shines. This cannot be possible out of fear of the individual self.

1.1.14 The use of the suffix "*mayaṭ*" in "*ānandamaya*" might generate a doubt whether the word is applied to Brahman, because the suffix indicates modification in common usage. But this apprehension is not well-founded, because the suffix "*mayaṭ*" is also used in the sense of abundance, and this latter use is indicated here

1.1.15 That the suffix "*mayaṭ*" in the word "*ānandamaya*" indicates abundance is also confirmed by the fact that the scripture (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7) states that It (Brahman) gives bliss to the individual self. Only abundance of bliss in Brahman would make that possible..

1.1.16 In the sentences of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.1, such as "truth, knowledge and infinity", "from it the *ākāśa* is born", "It is the cause of the world", "It is within the (sheath)of the understanding (*vijñānamaya*), "the learned who know Brahman to be bliss fear none", Brahman alone is referred to.

Some may object that in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7.23 it is said "there is no other perceiver", and hence there is no *pratyagātman* other than God. Why is then there the distinction of seeker (the individual self) and the sought (God)? Just as one may distinguish the space inside a pot from the larger space according to worldly practice, so the difference between understanding the individual self and the great self is not ultimate. The next *sūtra* answers the objection.

1.1.17 The individual self, other than God, cannot be described in the Vedic *mantras* alluded to in the previous *sūtra* because epithets like "self of the learned" and "originator of the world" etc. cannot apply to the individual self. The passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* "there is no other observer" is in no way opposed to the words here, because it denies the capacity of the individual self to see or hear independently of God. Hence the difference (between the individual self and God) is obvious even through popular (*laukika*) means.

1.1.18 Difference between God and the individual self has been designated as the direct meaning. Hence Brahman described in the above *mantra* is not the individual self of intelligence. The *mantras* like "knower of Brahman attains the highest", "having known Brahman of bliss, he fears now" etc. clearly distinguish between the obtained end (*prāpya*) and the obtainer (*prāptṛ*), the known and the knower, the higher and the lower, the regulator and the regulated, the attained and the attainer, the fearful and the afraid as not-secondary and hence their direct meaning.

As for the statement that the difference is due to an limitation, like space in a pot, it may be asked: Is the individual self, being concealed God, by such an expression as space inside

a pot conceived of as active or passive? Not the last, for then it would be debarred from movement etc.; not the first, being all-pervasive on account of being non-different from God. Thus both the alternatives are disproved.

If it be argued that while like space there is essentially no mobility due to an limitation like space in the pot, there is superimposed mobility dependent upon the motion of the pot, similarly motion would be superimposed on pure consciousness (*cetana*) due to movements of Devadatta. Then there would arise arbitrary bondage and release due to this movement irrespective of merit. Hence differences due to limitations are products of imagination. The same fate awaits the theory of reflections (*pratibimbavāda*). Hence difference between God and the individual self is the direct meaning.

1.1.19 God does not require *prakṛti* for creation, unlike the individual selves such as Brahmā and others, because He is capable of creating by mere desire, as is known from *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.3 "He desired to create many". None other can create by mere resolve; hence the *mantra* describes God only.

1.1.20 "He is of the nature of taste (*rasa*)". The statement "having attained taste It becomes blissful" indicates that an individual's union with God becomes a union of bliss. Thereby it is established that Brahman is of the nature of bliss.

To this one may object that Brahman cannot be bliss because in the Vedic word "*ānandamaya*" the suffix *mayaṭ* indicates change (*vikāra*). Since the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* uses it in this sense from the references to the sheath of food to that of understanding, in the same context it cannot be used in a different sense in the reference to the sheath of bliss.

Moreover in the same Upaniṣad it is said "the beloved is the head, joy is the right wing, enjoyment is the left wing, *ātman* is bliss, and Brahman is the tail" (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.5). Here bliss is something that has undergone change as the head and other parts and, since Brahman is the tail of that bliss It

cannot be bliss itself without equating the part with the whole.

Moreover only "bliss" has been repeated, and hence the blissful cannot be Brahman on that basis.

Even if the suffix "*mayaṭ*" is taken in the sense of abundance, thereby an indication of slight suffering is inevitable. And only the percipient (*kṣetrajña*) or individual self can present such a mixed state of plentiful bliss and slight suffering.

In the above-quoted Upaniṣadic passage the tail, Brahman, is undoubtedly combined with bliss, but elsewhere it is united with the blissful. In the same section, in the sequel (2.6) Brahman, having discarded the blissful, It (Brahman) is described in cognitive terms as being and not-being, merit and demerit. Hence Brahman is not blissful. However, the qualified Brahman may be taken as blissful, while unqualified, pure Brahman is what is stated to be "unapproachable by speech and mind".

To these objections we reply that the statement that Brahman is blissful is correct, and that the suffix "*mayaṭ*" does not indicate any defect or change. For *annamaya* (the sheath of food) *mayaṭ* indicates change, but not even for *prāṇamaya* (the sheath of life) because, *prāṇa* having five modes, there is no possibility of change in self-identity of *prāṇa* (*prāṇasya ekātmakatvāt*). For the individual self represented by the sheath of understanding there can be no change without violating the scriptural statement (in the *Bhagavadgītā*) "the individual self is neither born or subject to death". This, of course, does not mean that even during bondage there is perfect understanding. it only means that intrinsically the individual self is imbued with perfect understanding, which gets contracted under the influence of worldly activity.

As the suffix *mayaṭ* indicates abundance right from *vijñānamaya* (the sheath of intelligence), it is not that the meaning of the suffix is changed in *ānandamaya* (the sheath of bliss). There is no rule that even in the case of words in a

sequence having the same suffix the meaning of the suffix may not change.

The contention that abundance is relative to scantiness is true, but that does not entail having the opposite quality to abundance. Else if everywhere one concept also entailed use of its opposite for the same object, self-contradiction would silence all speech.

Whether Brahman is referred to as blissful or Brahman is called the tail (*puccha*) thereof, the meaning is the same, only the former has precedence as it is more often repeated.

Nor can the expression (unreal Brahman) etc. entail a denial of bliss, because when the qualified is indicated qualities are easily included, omniscience presents blissfulness as the terminal virtue.

The contention that blissful Brahman is qualified (determinate) Brahman is even worse; for in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.9 "Brahman as bliss" is the highest state in an estimation of pleasures. Nor can the statement "from where speech returns with the mind" indicate the indeterminate, for it only denies any limitations on the blissfulness of Brahman, unlike other joys.

1.1.21 A question is raised whether the person residing in the sun and the eye is Brahman or a *kṣetrajña* (particular percipient). It is argued that he should be a particular percipient because he is referred to in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* as in possession of a golden body .

The reply is that it cannot be any particular percipient, for qualities like "basis of all", "free from all sins", and "remover of all sins", and "established only in His self-glory" are applicable only to Brahman, and not to any particular percipient.

Having a body is no hindrance, because what is denied of God is a body of natural materials, and not a unnatural body. Nor is the form of God only imaginary due to *māyā*, for it has been said in scripture that "when God's invisible golden

form is observed, then the learned acquires equanimity, having discarded merits and demerits."

A form due to *māyā* cannot ensure liberation. God's form is eternal, glorious, unnatural, and it grants all the goals of the devotees.

In Pāñcarātra it has been said "He who regards Kṛṣṇa's body as physical is confined (only) to externals in all religious observances".

When God is said to be "*adhideva*", etc. it does not follow that He is limited. It is like regarding the Lord pervading endless universes as "king of Ayodhyā (Rāma)". When it is said about God that He is inside the sun, it does not mean that he is dependent on another. The above usage follows from the fact that God pervades all and regulates them from within. The unnatural attributes of God have been stated: all-doing, all-fulfilled, all-fragrant, all-taste (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.14.2)

If it is said that God cannot act for action requires a body, this is a very trivial objection. He pervades all as their regulator.

Particular gods may have greater happiness, yet their happiness is restricted by fear, as it is said in the *śruti* "by His (God's) fear wind blows, sun shines". Because of this element of fear, Supreme God is different from all other particular gods. Also it the rationale for undeviating devotion to God to the exclusion of everything else. As stated in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7, liberated selves get release from all fear. God Himself has said in *Bhagavadgītā* 9.12 "to those who are devoted to me without any other thought, I grant union and felicity. In this state, fear is overcome because fear arises from attachments to others. All these show that it is the Supreme God (and not any particular percipient) who resides in the sun etc.

1.1.22 The Highest Self is different from the individual selves of the sun and others, as is indicated in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.7.9: "Who abides with the sun, and controls it from within, and whom the sun does not know, in

our internal self, who controls from within".

1.1.23 In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* it is said that everything originates, exists and merges in space. A question is raised whether it is physical space or Brahman that is meant? The word "*ākāśa*" is used to indicate both, but it more frequently represents the physical entity. It rarely indicates Brahman, that being a secondary usage.

Nevertheless here *ākāśa* represents Brahman because of its associated mark, which is an invariable property. The latter is mentioned in this section as "all-creative", which is not possible for physical space. Physical space may generate air, but cannot generate everything. For instance, it cannot generate itself, which would involve the logical fault called self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*).

To the charge that in Nimbārka's system also going from cause to cause, self-dependence would arise, the answer is that it would arise in the case of *prakṛti*. But in the case of God in the Nimbārka system He is never an effect but only cause. In scriptures also God is said to be self-dependent and uncaused by anything else.

To the contention that while "*ākāśa*" might have both the meanings, the meaning of physical space, being more common and of frequent usage, should be taken, the answer is that it is not so, whether the meaning is taken analytically or etymologically or as a single word. Etymologically "*ākāśa*" means "shining everywhere", which is used for Brahman also in scripture when it is said "by Its light everything is lighted". Also as a single word "*ākāśa*" has been used for Brahman as in *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2.7 "if *ākāśa* were not joyful who would live by what?", and in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.14.1 "from *ākāśa* originated names and forms".

Here another objection might be raised. According to Jaimini (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.3.14) *śruti* is stronger than *liṅga*, and so *ākāśa* as *śruti* should be given more importance than its *liṅga* for fixing meaning. The answer is that here this will be

overridden by the fact that without taking the *liṅga* into consideration the activity attributed to *ākāśa* is not possible for physical force. It is as if the weakness of a man compared to another citizen is set aside by state protection.

1.1.24 Next there is the question whether in the statement "All these things enter and arise from vital breath (*prāṇa*) (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* I.145), "*prāṇa*" stands for air (vital breath) or Brahman? Here again *prāṇa* is more commonly used for air, but none except God can regulate the insentient *mahābhūtas* (great elements) and conscious selves, and therefore, here "*prāṇa*" stands for Brahman.

1.1.25 When in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.13.7 it is said that the excellent light (*jyotis*) that shines in the highest region is also within *puruṣa*, a question arises whether this means the physical light that removes physical darkness, or Brahman?

By more common usage it would appear to be physical light also which, inside a person resides as the fire that digests food. But actually this interpretation is not satisfactory, because it is said in the previous text that one foot of this light has all beings, which is not possible for ordinary light but only for Brahman.

1.1.26 As in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 3.12.1 it is said that "Gāyatrī is all this:, the possibility arises that here the reference is to the meter *gāyatrī* rather than Brahman. But this cannot be the case, for a mere collection of letters cannot be "all this". Hence, here "gāyatrī" stands for Brahman."Gāyatrī" also denotes Brahman because of similarly having four feet of six syllables each like Brahman having four feet, because such usage is found.-

"E" breaks off here. However, the commentary on the final five *sūtras* (BS 27-31) are found in the publication by Agrawal 2000, pp. 137-140

9.1 SUNDARABHAṬṬA (1470), *Siddhāntasetukā* on Devācārya's *Siddhāntajāhnavī*

Nothing is known about the author. See pp. 115-122 of VPSVK. "E" is the same publication that constitutes the "E" of Devācārya's text, preceding.

Summary by R. N. Mukherjee

The text begins with a benedictory couplet that has been interpreted in two ways to apply to both God Kṛṣṇa and the preceptor.

Kṛṣṇa as preceptor of the world pervades all reality covered by time, space, and objects, which is indicated by the expression *niyamānanda*. Etymologically the root *kṛṣ* indicates the world, and the suffix *na* indicates fulfilment (*nirvṛti*). The two together as Kṛṣṇa stands for the redeemer of the world. As applying to the preceptor, who is taken as an incarnation of God, it indicates the person whose teaching on blissful Brahman unfailingly enlightens the entire world.

1.1.1 (E13) The word "*atha*" has different meanings like auspiciousness, commencement, introducing the subject, and sequence. As has been said, from Brahman (the creator) *oṃ* and *atha* were the first words to break out and, hence, both are auspicious. But the *Brahmasūtra* being holy throughout, further addition of an auspicious epithet would be prolix. Commencement as a subject also is impossible in the case of Brahman. Nor can "*atha*" mean commencement, Vedānta being beginningless. Hence it means sequence of succession.

The suffix *-tavya* in the word "*kartavya*" (in the *Siddhāntajāhnavī*) is in the sense of an injunction (*vidhi*) and not in the sense of competence (*yogyatā*) and, despite the non-presence in this *sūtra*, it has to be taken from the scriptural utterance "*ātman* is to be seen (*draṣṭavya*)". (In *draṣṭavya* the suffix *-tavya* shows an injunction.)

The inquiry into Brahman is to come after the inquiry into religious occurrences or *dharma*. About the latter Sundara Bhaṭṭa adds that these actions are of various kinds like obligatory (*nitya*), occasional (on special occasions), conditional (for specific purposes) etc. and the means are *yajña* with its parts, the results are heaven etc. Study lies in the knowledge of words, meaning, and definitions. The auxiliaries of the Veda are prosody, grammar, manuals on ritual, astronomy, phonetics, etymology, which are compared to the different limbs of the body, as e.g. prosody is the feet, etc.

Having mastered the above disciplines of religious observances, and understood that despite conflicting views on the duration of the results of these actions, in fact these results are only temporary, one should undertake inquiry into Brahman for everlasting good.

In understanding the text mere study is not enough, it is necessary to consider the six marks, namely *upakrama* etc., for grasping the meaning of the sentences.

(E16) Some hold that the author of the *Brahmasūtras* advocates a synthesis of action and knowledge. But without a knowledge of actions one does not know which of them can be synthesized with knowledge and which cannot. For instance, actions that are prohibited or done for fulfilment of desires are inferior and cannot enter into such synthesis, but obligatory (*nitya*) duties can enter it.

However, in Vedānta the end or goal of life is liberation, of the nature of likeness to God, that is attainable only by the grace of God. A spiritually enlightened man is as dear to God as God is dear to him (as stated in the *Bhagavadgītā* 7.17).

"Succession" as indicated here means after the four means for release, via. (1) awareness of what is transitory and what is permanent, (ii) six-fold treasure of self-control etc., (iii) renunciation of any results here and hereafter, and (iv) eagerness for liberation.

Coming to "*atas*" (the reason for the inquiry) it cannot be said that the scriptural utterances about the results of actions

being short-lived are countered by scriptural utterances claiming eternal results, so that the utterances about the results fail to provide a reason not vitiated by a countervailing reason The utterances claiming impermanence are stronger due to the support of reason. Hence we have valid inference: The Kingdom of blessed enjoyments is transitory, those enjoyments being the results of actions, like enjoyments on earth. Transitory things are ruled by time. The eternal and supreme results arise from knowledge of Brahman.

(E21) Detachment from the world can be of two types, due to a cause or without a cause. The first arises from the perishing of dear ones or property, the second by the grace of God, followed by steadfast pursuit of the path laid down in scriptures and devotion to God, so that there is no deviation.

It can also come by learning acquired through merit earned in thousands of past lives; constantly remaining in awareness of the highest truth; aspiring for immortality; getting auspicious birth and the favor of God; and perceiving of suffering in bodies.

(E23) Sufferings are of two types, due to life in the womb etc. and due to psycho-physical (*ādhyātmika*) and other causes. The first arises from repeated life as men or animals. The latter has three classes: psycho-physical (*ādhyātmika*), due to natural forces (*ādhidaivika*), and due to other creatures (*ādhibhautika*). Under the first class come physical illnesses like fever etc. and mental suffering due to hankering, anger, fear, hatred, greed, delusion, sadness, sorrow, resentment, insult, jealousy etc. In the second class lie sufferings due to cold, heat, wind, rain, lightning etc. In the third category are the sufferings due to animals, birds, men, demons and serpents etc.

(E24) Again, detachment (*nirveda*) may develop in two ways. By perception of the futility of the cycle of birth and procreation we may turn to God. Or one may develop detachment, like Yayāti, by perceiving that indulgence does not satiate the senses and that, with old age, every faculty weakens

except hankering.

(E25) Of these detachment based on reasons, being transitory and deviant, is not suitable for liberation; the detachment without such (special) reason is suitable.

Having gotten such detachment one has to approach a proper preceptor for a vision of God leading to liberation, while the worship of other (minor) deities does not help. The preceptor has to be well-versed in scriptures, so that he can remove all doubts of the students, and should possess a mind full of Brahman's form and attributes. The disciple has to be free from attachment and arrogance, entirely reliant on the teacher, and must have a mind composed by renunciation of all desires for worldly wealth.

(E28) Brahman is said by Devācārya to be unthinkable and infinite. When Brahman is said to be unthinkable (*acintya*) it means that it is beyond the capacity of discrete thought, but that does not imply that it is beyond all instruments of knowledge. Infinity means without limits in space or time, being all-pervasive. As stated in scripture, Nārāyaṇa pervades inside and outside of everything seen or heard. It is also indicated by the scriptural utterance "neither gross nor atomic" and, thus, distinct from all finite objects. The latter is the real meaning of infinity, as non-limited by objects together with all-pervasiveness with respect to space and time.

Brahman is endowed with the highest nature, with attributes of an unthinkable, infinite, and unsurpassable kind. he is omniscient, uncaused, and with unnatural power, intrinsic knowledge and activity.

(E29) On the question of Brahman's nature the options are: Is It (1) in limitational (*aupādhika*) difference-non-difference with the world, or (2) entirely different from the world, or (3) entirely non-different from the world, or (4) qualified with the sentient and the non-sentient as its body, or (5) naturally the different-non-different support of the world?

(1) is the view of limitational difference-non-difference

of Bhāskara etc., here refuted from the standpoint of Advaita Vedānta (*māyāvāda*).

(E30) It is stated that the above position of limitational difference-non-difference is vitiated by five-fold alternative possibilities. These are: (1a) The individual self is part of Brahman isolated by an limitation; (1b) non-isolated, but atomic special locations of Brahman with limitation is the individual self; (1c) Brahman itself united with limitation is the individual self; (1d) a different consciousness associated with an limitation in the individual self; (1e) the limitation itself is the individual self.

(E32) (1a) is vitiated by two defects. The indivisible has been divided, because Brahman has been said to be "phaseless, inactive". The second defect lies in taking the unborn individual self as born. Thus the statement that the individual self is "unborn and beginningless" is contradicted.

(1b) has the following defects: Do the limitations attract Brahman by their movements and disparateness or not? If the second, the region that has always been free suddenly faces bondage (due to advent of an limitation), and the region that has been under bondage from beginningless time suddenly gets free (as an limitation moves away). In the case of the first possibility, of Brahman being attracted by the limitation, if the whole of Brahman is thus attracted then Brahman would lose its nature. If it is said that attraction endows the limitation with Brahman's all-pervasiveness, then all individual selves would feel as one, having attained unity (through the limitations). If difference is still maintained due to difference of location then they would at once have both unity and diversity.

On the third alternative, the following objections arise. Is the relation between Brahman and the limitation due to some cause or without any cause? The first possibility is ruled out as it is not held by anyone, and leads to infinite regress. Nor is the second alternative possible, as then even the liberated might become accidentally bound, accidents not bound being

selective. Nor can beginningless results of actions be regarded as in the category of cause here. if Brahman was to get limited by such bondage of activity there would never be liberation.

(E33) To the fourth objection the following comments are added. Here three defects arise, viz. (i) If the difference consciousness is admitted, the rule (of non-difference) is broken, (ii) The rule that the differences are due to limitations is broken, and (iii) entry into the opposite (our) camp follows.

The fifth position is not supported by any scriptural text.

Having criticized the theory of limitations the Advaita Vedānta states his own views thus:

Brahman is the locus of apparent projection of the diversity of changing and unchanging entities. it is itself free from three types of difference, viz. (i) difference within the same class like one pot from another in the same class, (ii) difference between objects of different classes, such as that of a pot from a cloth, and (iii) difference within the same body. There being no other consciousness, there is no difference of the same class; there being no other non-sentience, there is no difference of a different class; and Brahman having no parts there is no difference of parts.

(E34) The above doctrines of the *māyāvādins* is refuted by the upholders of difference, who are followers of Madhva, by pointing to many scriptural passages upholding differences, specially three-fold distinctions, namely the experiencer (the individual self), the experienced (the world of nature), *prakṛti*), and the regulator (God); or the changing (*kṣara*), the unchanging pure consciousness (*akṣara*), and the supreme person (*puruṣottama*), or other similar triads.

(E35) Even so, when it is argued that the statements on differences are weaker because differences can also be perceived, the reply is that the difference between God and an individual self, which is relevant here, is also not perceptible and hence weakness due to perceptibility does not attach to scriptural texts on difference.

(E38) Moreover, all language is discreet and hence based on difference. Hence the monist is faced with a dilemma. If any scriptural text applies to the real, it must have duality, else no scriptural text will apply to it.

So far as the utterance of non-difference is supported on the basis of six marks expounded on the basis of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, the same process when applied to other texts such as *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7 establish difference.

The Advaitin's claim, that in the great saying *tattvamasi* ('that thou art'), by the indication in which the expressed sense is partly retained and partly given up (*jahadajahallakṣaṇā*) the difference between God and individual selves are cancelled and pure consciousness remains, is not accepted. It is refuted thus:

(E39) The monist contends that "that" (*tat*) refers to the omniscient, omnipotent originator and regulator of the world, Brahman. "Thou" (*tvam*) refers to the particular consciousness conditioned by the intellect with limited power indicated by words like "self" or "knower of the field" (*kṣetrajña*). Here "art" (*asi*) is the reality common to both. Thus the non-difference is residual after cancellation of the opposed attributes of th other two terms. It is like a sentence, "This is the same Devadatta", where the specific space and time references are cancelled to identify the person.

To this the pluralist (the follower of Madhva) retorts: This is not so. It is not possible to give up the attributes associated with the two terms including the attributes of omniscience, true will and resolve, endowed with knowledge, power and activity intrinsically, applied to Brahman and thus referred to repeatedly in scriptures. Such cancellation is unsupported by scriptures and hence unproved. Nor does a scriptural utterance that there is no diversity whatever go against reality. It only established the unity of God with superior power and attributes. The statements that Brahman is quality-less should be taken to deny those attributes to it that are caused *prakṛti*. The account of different levels of bliss in the

Chāndogyopaniṣad is mentioned in this connection. The highest bliss of Brahman is presumably to be taken as unnatural as it is without break and hence one that delivers from fear.

The denial of intrinsic attributes (of Brahman) amountsd to a disregard for scriptural statements. Arguments not based on scriptures or going against them are not to be relied upon..

Let us consider whether the entity denoted by the great saying [*tattvamasi*] can be stated in other words. If so, there will be a case of duality; if not, there will result a case unproved and completely imaginary.

(E41) Whether what is indicated by "*tat*" and "*tvam*" are denoted by different (other) words or not? If so denoted [those] words would be ambiguous. If not so denoted there would be complete imaginariness. If to escape this dilemma it is contended that they are not denoted but indicated by other words, then there would arise the infinite regress of indication of indication.

Could it be that in the example "This is the same Devadatta" the changeful times and places associated with Devadatta are to be discarded while the person who endures is to be retained (*upādeya*)? Similarly, in the case of Brahman also, by discarding the inferior aspect and by retaining te superior aspect, an indication that gives up a part of the express sense is possible.

In reply it could be said that because, in reality, the relation between attributes and substance is nothing to be discarded, and the implied sense, being indeterminate and hence inexpressible, has nothing worth retaining in it. In this way, for want of what is to be discarded and what is to be retained, implication that retains a part of the expressed meaning is not possible, the instance cited being dissimilar, the rule being that what is expressed and what is implied should have the same locus.

The case of "truth, knowledge and infinity" is similar. In its case how is "implication" to be taken, (i) giving up meaning,

(ii) not giving up meaning, or (iii) partly giving up meaning and partly not giving up meaning? The first alternative would leave us with "untruth, ignorance, finitude". The second would lead to duality; and the third would be beset with the problem of what to discard and what to retain, as above.

Moreover, the attribute-less is without relations and hence without indication. Nor can the case be defended on the basis of a dissimilar example like "the moon on the bough", the bough being something perceptible, unlike the case here. The example is free from all particularity, and no instrument of knowledge is applicable to it, and for such an entity, like a hare's horn, there is no scope for thinking of a relation. Also, only what can be stated in words is capable of giving indication. Hence the aim is not the inexpressible, being the meaning of words like "flowering tree on the Ganges" (instead of the on the bank of the Ganges). Hence, "that thou art" is properly expressed in terms of differences, being in the sixth case-ending, i.e., "*tat*" means "*tasya*", "of it", "you belong to it, viz., Brahman".

(E42) To the above position, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin objects, because the above account amounts to a dismissal (*bādha*) of scriptural texts maintaining non-difference, and to a failure to take note of the fact that differences have been frequently decried in the texts. The accepted fact is Brahman with individual selves as (E43) its body or attributes (*prakāra*). Here "thou" (*tvam*) is the individual self, existing in the body of Brahman as a distinct attribute, where Brahman is the inner-dweller of the individual self. "That" (*tat*) indicates the cause of the world, repository of all auspicious virtues. The reality is Brahman as locus of both.

(E45) To this position the following objections are raised. Attributes have the property of exclusiveness by which they distinguish one thing from others.. But Viśiṣṭādvaita accepts only non-dual Brahman with attributes of sentient and non-sentient. Unlike the Nyāya doctrine there are no other

entities to be distinguished. And Brahman, as qualified by the sentient, cannot be distinguished from Brahman as qualified by the non-sentient without introducing duality in the system.

Further, the system already accepts the three-fold difference of sentient, non-sentient and God. Hence the further doctrine of attributes is prolix and runs counter to the principle of economy. And, in case the differences between the three are denied, there will result utter confusion due to mix-up for instance, the non-sentient also acquiring the properties of the sentient and God, etc.

(E46) All scriptures accept Brahman as the self of the sentient and the non-sentient, standing in the relation of difference-cum-non-difference with the world. The scriptural utterances like "The real existed in the beginning, one without a second", etc., postulate non-difference, while "That which, at will, appears as permanent and changing, sentient and non-sentient, one and many", etc., indicate differences.

(E47) Even utterances based on denials like "neither gross nor subtle" cannot be regarded as cancelling both. By equality (of denial) both ways a balance is established. In their diversity they all contribute to difference-cum-non-difference.

Scriptural utterances like "that thou art", "all this is Brahman" teach that Brahman is the inner-dweller of all sentient and non-sentient things, their inner self, all-pervasive, the Supreme Person as the free (*svatantra*) support of all, the reality regulating all.

(E49) The sentient and the non-sentient world is dependent on Śrī Kṛṣṇa and regulated by his rules. Dependence lies in having existence and activity based on another. This dependence is of two types, unchanging and changing (*vikārin*). The first indicates that which is eternally free from birth and death, and is represented by the individual selves (*jīva*) or knowers (*kṣetrajña, puruṣa,* etc.). The second is called insentient *prakṛti, māyā* etc. It is eternal but changeful and made up of the three *guṇas*. The dependent entities are covered

by the scriptural mention of differences. Advaita Vedāntins, on the basis of their blanket negation (*neti neti*), deny all such differences.

(E50) Hence the meaning of "that thou art" is that Brahman, free, omniscient, omnipotent, self of the world, determined (conditioned) by being represented by "that" (*tat*), is in union with the universal self Vāsudeva as non-different inner self of the (individual) conscious being, addressed as "thou" (*tvam*).

"Thou" no doubt normally indicates the individual self, but the inner self of all is Brahman and so ultimately it also refer to Brahman like all words.

"All this is *ātman*". Brahman is called the experienced, experiencer, and being, by which statements it is expressed that Brahman is the essence of everything..

(E51) The world is pervaded by Brahman and from Brahman also are the origin and continuation of the world, so that that which is pervaded and that which pervades are one.

(E52) The sentient individual self is limited (*paricchinna*) in nature and is atomic. The insentient is gross and diverse. Brahman is different from both, and free from the three types of limitations.

(E54) Whatever is identical with something is not seen separately from it. Just as the earthen vessel is not seen without earth, similarly the world, being identical with Brahman, cannot exist without Brahman. Just as the body that is governed by the self appears as non-different from the latter, what is non-different is like that. As in the case of pervasion, the pervaded is not seen separately from the pervader, for instance, smoke is not seen without its support, viz., fire, and organs do not function without life or vital breath (*prāṇa*). That which is supported cannot appear unsupported by the elements. Thus non-difference indicates non-possibility of independent existence. Thus "the pot is a substance" means that there can be no existence of what is limited (*avacchinna*) by pot-ness without

being also deterrmined by substantiality (*dravyatva*). Similar is the identity of the world with Brahman, as the world of sentient and non-sentient cannot exist independently of Brahman.

(E55) Devācārya mentions that God dispels all faults. The commentator adds that these faults are of three types: afflictions, activities (*karman*) and their maturation (*vipāka*). Afflictions are of five types like ignorance etc. Actions can be classified in two ways as meritorious or faulty, or in three ways as accumulated, active (*kriyamāṇa*) and those that have started bearing fruit. Results of actions are of different types like happiness or suffering, heaven and hell etc.

(E59) In Devācārya's commentary the individual self has been stated to be different from the body, senses, mind, intellect, life (vital breath) etc. This is because others have equated the self with these, and their theories are next being dismissed by Sundara Bhaṭṭa.

Cārvāka (Lokāyata) regard the self as (a product of) four elements; the Jains hold that self to be of the same size as the body; one of the schools regard the self to be the same as the senses, because without them form etc. cannot be known and the self itself would not be perceived. But in sleep it is not the case that the sense function specifically, and yet experiences occur. So some have held that the mind that regulates the senses is the self. According to Yogācāra there is nothing except momentary ideas, and the self also falls in the same category. According to the Vaibhāṣikas the self is like momentary external ideas; according to Sautrāntika the external momentary entities are inferable according to the forms of consciousness; and according to the Mādhyamikas the self is empty since none of the other positions are tenable.

Of the above doctrines, the body cannot be the self as it is physical like a pot, the senses are mere means of knowledge, and as such not the self, and similar is the case with the mind. The intellect again is an internal organ like the mind and, as such, not the self. The vital breath again is like air.

Devācārya holds that the self is of the nature of awareness (*jñānasvarūpa*). Thereby the Nyāya conception of the self as a particular all-pervasive substance with fourteen qualities such as awareness, volition etc. is discarded. When Devācārya mentions the self as awareness it implies consciousness as the locus of awareness. This is to distinguish it from the Advaitin's theory of the self as Brahman of the nature of consciousness, pure being that is eternally pure and liberated. Both the individual selves and God have this in common, they are the locus of consciousness and are conscious.

Objection: The self of the nature of consciousness need not again be the locus of consciousness, but awareness arises through its reflection in the intellect, just as water mixed in water or light mixed with light have no distinction, so consciousness leaves no further distinction between itself and its repository.

Answer: No. The conscious self and its consciousness are distinguishable like a gem and its brightness.

Nor is it a fact that water mixed with water is not distinguishable; it is like sesame mixed in a pot of sesame.

Nor can a reflection of consciousness perform the function of consciousness, anymore than the reflection of the sun can dispel darkness and cold.

Moreover, both consciousness and the intellect are formless and featureless and, as such, they can cast no reflections. Equally defective is the theory of Brahman being reflected in ignorance.

(E61) It should not be stated that the above argument is disproved by the fact that despite lack of form and feature the sky is reflected. The sky is reflected due to the presence of the sun and the stars and water etc. Moreover, by a five-fold process (*pañcīkaraṇa*) earth and other elements are present in the sky, so that it is not formless, and its blue color is also not illusory.

(Objection:) Couldn't it be that Brahman as determined

by ignorance and the internal organ is the individual self? Just as space in a pot does not actually isolate everything in the larger space, so the internal organ does not in any way really affect the non-duality of Brahman.

(Answer:) That theory is not correct, because in it difficulties arise due to alternative possibilities and complete imaginariness. Does the limitation, in the form of the internal organ, pervade everywhere, or is it confined to one spot, thereby cutting up the pure, conscious, eternal, free and non-specific Brahman? If it is held to cut it, then the job is impossible in part-less Brahman, and this goes against scriptural position. If it does not cut Brahman, then either it covers Brahman all over or moves all over it. In the first case the whole reality would be plunged into darkness; in the second case, as the limitation moves there would arise bondage and liberation without any cause.

About Devācārya's statement that the self is of the nature of I-consciousness (*ahamartharūpa*) the opponent might raise the objection that if the self were by nature I-consciousness this awareness would never lapse, as it does in deep sleep. Hence the ego is a product of *prakṛti* as it is stated in *Bhagavadgītā* (7.4) that egoism is God's *prakṛti*. The opponent further states that in deep sleep no one feels "I am sleeping happily"; it is only recalled later through memory of happiness. Hence in deep sleep there is no specific I-consciousness besides one of happiness. Hence the theory that I-consciousness is intrinsic to the self is disproved.

To this objection the author replies: Even for (its) memory the I-consciousness must be implicitly present. Besides, it is known as different from the body etc., and as an immediate awareness associated with God, it is also known as free from the body, while it is endowed with the body etc. Thus the I-consciousness is all-enduring. Else one would have felt "I was not on such an occasion", which is never felt. thus I-consciousness as distinct from the knower is established. it is

also implied in the *Gāyatrī*, where God is prayed to regulate the understanding of selves dependent on Him. Hence the I-consciousness is not a superimposition of the intellect on the self.

(E65) Far from lapsing in deep sleep, the I-consciousness persists even in liberation. In the state of cosmic dissolution only non-dual, eternally free Brahman endures, but it also has I-consciousness besides the capacity of a knower; and, by similarity, the free selves also have it, as seen in *mantras* like "I am Brahman", "I shall create many", etc.

In this only scriptural testimony is not the source, but also the sayings of liberated selves like Vāmadeva when he said "I am Manu", "I am the sun".

In *BG* also, in numerous places, God refers to Himself as "I". It is also said (in BG 14.2) that the liberated selves attain the likeness of God (*mama-sādharmya*). Non-attainment of God is said to be the cause of remaining in the world. When it is said (in BG 15.8) "I am known as the Supreme Person", and "there is nothing higher" (BG 7.7), it indicates the highest excellence; "I am the self and the knower (BG 13.2) indicates the self of the world.; "I pervade all" (BG 9.4) indicates support for all; "There is nothing that has not originated from me" (BG 10.39) indicates all-pervasiveness; "Through the Vedas I am known (BG 15.15) indicates knowledge through scriptures; "Known as my *parāprakṛti*" (BG 7.15) indicates the support of both sentient and non-sentient; "Take shelter in me, I shall release (you) from all sins" (BG 18.66) indicates the resort of all and remover of all sins. These statements show that the world-self Vāsudeva, and by extension the individual selves, are non-different from I-consciousness.

(E66) (Objection:) Maybe activity should be attributed to the mind which is wrongly transferred to the self, for otherwise the scriptures that deny activity to the self would be opposed.

(Answer:) This is not the case, for, mind being

insentient, if activity could be attributed to it it could be attributed also to other insentient things like a pot. Even when wise men hear of activity by the mind, they understand that ultimately the activity rests in the self. That, in deep sleep, such activity lapses is no ground for rejecting the above theory, for cognitions also lapse in deep sleep, and cognition and conation go together. In the state of bondage, due to contraction of knowledge, etc., specific activity being dependent on instruments like the mind and *antaḥkaraṇa*, when in deep sleep these instruments lapse, the lack of activity is not unexpected.

To the suggestion that attribution of activity to the instruments (like mind) could serve the purpose of parsimony, the answer is that they are incapable of the role due to inertness. Thus, like knowability, the capacity for action is also a natural power of the self. Similarly, the capacity of enjoyment also belongs to it.

(E68) To the objection that the above definition would extend to cover God, the answer is that the individual self is dependent on God and as such, exercises his capacities.

It might be held by some that God having to deal differently due to the attachment etc. of individual selves, merit and demerit accrue to Him. This is not the case, because difference arises due to conditionality of *karman*, i.e. of the actions of the individual selves.

As activity is purposive, does it then make God superfluous? Activity being inert it cannot by itself direct and induce the conscious selves. Else a pot and other things, sharing inertness, could also do so. When *karmans* accrue to consciousness (conscious selves), there is only difference of designation, and so they (the karmans) do not induce difference of objects in God.

It might be objected that in the state of dissolution, there being no *karmans* left, there can be no conditionality arising from them. The answer is that the series of *karmans* have no

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beginning, else there could be no creation, and further there would result destruction of deeds and accretion of undeserved results.

It is not that the liberated self, being released from the bondage of *karmans*, is no longer dependent on God. The capability of being regulated is based on its intrinsic and normal characteristics based on self-nature. If liberation meant removal of the capability of being regulated, it would mean a destruction of its nature.

Being regulated by God is not called conditionality to action (*karman*). This conditionality rests on the potency of beginningless meritorious or unmeritorious activities, based on the law of karman and the results thereof. In the liberated self, the results being absent, God's regulation of it is free from the above fault.

If individual selves are not free in their actions, it does not follow that the teaching of the scriptures is futile, for the teaching gives us knowledge of our dependence on God.

Since God also regulates His own activity in His freedom, lest the above definition of the liberated self extend to Him also, it is pointed out that the individual self is atomic, like the hundred-fold division of the hundredth of a hair. The question arises as to how it can pervade the whole body. it does this through *dharmabhūtajñāna* (awareness-as-property) that is all-pervasive, like the sun that lights the whole world, as stated in *Bhagavadgītā* 13.34.

(E71) The self cannot be of intermediate dimension, because then it would be perishable like the body ; nor can it be all-pervasive because of impossibility. In the latter case, a self's plurality or singularity has to be considered. If the selves are many and all-pervasive, no matter whether minds are atomic or all-pervading due to contact with all, there would be realization of the state of joy etc. in all, making Brahman superfluous. Without the regulation of the state of joy etc. in all, making Brahman superfluous without the regulation of an I-

consciousness, partitions wold not be possible, as mere association with minds would lack particularity. It should not be said that despite the unity of selves the consequences of past deeds, resulting in different traces, bring about divisions. Even granting the differences of *karmans*, if all the selves are common division would involve infinite regress.

If there is only one self that gets divided due to limitations in the form of internal organs, its omniscience has to be conceded. Else Devadatta would be inherent of the pain in his own organs, and so get reduced to inertness.

If limitations are accepted in the matter of knowledge, the limitation has to be conscious. If the limitation be taken as atomic, there cannot be simultaneous awareness of pain or pleasure in the head and the hands. If the limitation is taken as of middle size, it will be discrete, leading to a position like that of the Buddhists. Acceptance of atomicity in the limitation would lead to giving up of the theory of atomicity of the individual self, and acceptance of its (the limitation's) all-pervasiveness would lead to universal blindness and non-liberation.

(E72)That the self is atomic does not mean that it is not pervaded by God, as it is without parts. God pervades everything. In the matter of regulator and the regulated pervader and the pervaded, part-less-ness or having parts are not relevant, else God could not regulate time, sound, and touch that are part-less. Rather it is the power of the object that determines its pervasion etc.

Having thus settled the atomicity of the individual self, next their number has been mentioned as different in every body from Brahman to the immovable.

When it is said in the scripture that one (self) just looks on while the other experiences the resuls, it shows the great difference between God and the individual self. The theory of one self is set aside when it is said in the *Bhagavadgītā* by the Lord to Arjuna, "Neither I nor you are destructible" (BG 2.12).

Else one individual self going to sleep, swooning or dying would plunge all into the same state, and there would be a mixup of joys and sorrows of all.

The number of selves is said to be infinite, thus eliminating the possibility of creation getting exhausted due to liberation one by one. Thus there remain innumerable selves in bondage in many forms according to their *karmans*.

Selves are of two types, those seeking release and those not seeking it. The first are those who, having experienced different forms of misery such as bodily and mental etc., get non-attached to the world and seek release. They are again of two types, those who try to attain a god-like state and those who seek to realize their own nature. For the aforesaid second type, the path is more a arduous as stated in *Bhagavadgītā* 12.5.A *vaiṣṇava* resorts to none other than Viṣṇu (lit. the destroyer of the demon Madhu).

Those not desirous of liberation are again of two types and infinite in number. The first type is of those who will eventually aspire for enlightenment, and the second type is of those who will always remain attached to the world. The latter will be thrown into endless worldly lives.

(E74) Liberated selves are of two types, liberated forever and liberated from bondage. The eternally liberated are free from birth etc. and related sufferings, and always engaged in vision and hymns of God like Garuḍa and Viśvakṣeṇa. For them it has been said "the wise always perceive Viṣṇu". Those liberated from bondage are released from the activities of *prakṛti* based on ignorance. About that it has been said (BG 4.10) "Many devoted to knowledge and penance, purified and having attained my (God's) likeness". They have attained God's likeness and made their desires an embodiment (*avatāra*) of God's will in various ways.

Regarding the bound selves who get liberated it is to be known that the individual self, bound by beginningless *karmans* and moving in the world in godly, beastly or human bodies,

receives a glance of God's spontaneous, uncaused grace, and form the teacher in his godliness, having doubts dispelled by the flow of the nectar of scriptural knowledge, and having meditated on God's nature, attributes and powers, and having destroyed *karman* by God's vision, he becomes fit for liberation and likeness to God, as stated in the scripture "The self loves him who loves the self".

(E75) Despite the all-pervasiveness of God's grace, the above transformation occurs only in those who have heard the scriptures and acquired the other necessary means, and are devoted to God and teacher, and not in others. Hence the scriptures are not in vain.

Thereby gets countered the argument in the form of a dilemma that is God's grace be all-pervading, all should get liberated, and if limited in extent, then there is complete imaginariness.

It is like the universal property such as cow-ness in Nyāya. It is all-pervading but still appears in creatures with dewlaps etc. Similarly the all-pervasive grace of God is attracted by the devotee.

(E76) Hence there would not arise the dilemma that God's grace, if dependent on means, would become mutually dependent, and if not so dependent, would thereby become all-pervading and thereby end all sorrow and joy.

Despite the fact that scriptural utterances like "Neither equal nor greater than that (God) is perceived" would indicate that the Supreme Person, who is the Self of the world and unsurpassed in his equanimity, is free in His grace, yet the scriptures enjoining other means (for the grace) are also His own declarations and, in disobeying them, His own declarations would be set to naught, unless they are retained as subsidiary conditions of grace.

(E78) Insentient entities are said to be of three types, natural, unnatural and time. The natural is of the three *guṇas* and permanent.

As (in the scripture it is said that) being existed at first, which alone is stated to be true, the view that the natural world is falsely superimposed on Brahman like shell-silver is incorrect, for the unreal cannot be superimposed; what is superimposed must be real somehow. No one has seen or heard of superimposition of something intrinsically unreal like a hare's horn. Else like sesame seed sand also could yield oil Nor can superimposition be said to be mere appearance (*pratīti*) and not likeness to the object. Even an appearance of the unreal is not possible.

It won't do to state that like shell-silver the perception of the world is faulty. The faulty cause, being completely imaginary, is also unable to produce an appearance (*pratīti*). The rule is that the cause is relative to the effect. Nowhere is an unreal cause seen.

It cannot be said that the false serpent yet produces real fear. What is essentially unreal has no capacity for producing an effect. In the case of fear due to the illusory serpent, it is not an illusory entity that causes the fear, but knowledge about serpents. Else even children, without knowledge of serpents, would also exhibit fear of the illusory serpents, which is not the case. In fact, children are ready to touch even real serpents.

(E80) Nor should the scriptural statement "These (pots of earth) are *vikāra* only, based on words, while the earth alone is real" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.1.4) be taken as a ground for taking the world as only apparently changing due to wrong projection (*vivarta*). If that was meant, the word "illusion" (*bhrānti*) would be used for the appearance of the world. But in the place of "based on words" the actual word used in the statement is "*vikāra*" which means "change".

The [theory of the world being only an appearance, the] *vivarta* theory also goes against the import of the text of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* where it is said that by knowing earth all earthen objects are known and by knowing iron all materials made of iron are known. For, by knowledge of ropes all about

serpents (which are the appearances of ropes) cannot be known, and by knowing about shells silver objects (the appearances of shell) are not known.

About the creative *prakṛti*, without beginning or end, and which produces the elements, it is likened to the eternal *aśvattha* (*ficus indicus*) tree, with the roots above and branches down; it is based on the real, and the vital breath is real, and hence the world is real.

(E81) God in His greatness produces the real. As stated in the *Bhagavadgītā* (16.8) "The godless regard the world as unreal and without a basis"

What about the scriptural text "the unreal was in the beginning"? How is its contradiction to be avoided? For the latter purpose, in Devācārya's commentary, "subject to change and transformation" is added to the account of the world. The "unreal" here is applied to the earlier subtle state from which transformation starts.

As state in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* "Since the cause of the world that is subject to transformation is in its causal state, unexpressed as names and forms and without the express experienced form that is (generally) indicated by "reality" etc., there is no contradiction in the scripture (when it is said that the real is born of the unreal). Else there wold be contradiction with the terminal sentence (*vākyaśeṣa*) "How can the real be born of the unreal?" Or as Dhruva said in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* "The world is like the huge banyan tree growing from a slight seed". Or as the author of BS has stated "Like a cloth" (BS 2.1.18) that is not known as a cloth when folded.

Nor will it do to say that the world is false like shell-silver because it is perceptible. This reason is too wide, as it would cover Brahman also, which is also stated to be perceptible in many scriptural utterances like "*Ātman* is to be seen".

However, it might be objected that Brahman has been said to be not perceptible to the eyes, and beyond all means of

proof; and hence cannot be made an instance of the perceptible. But Brahman has been said to be perceptible to the wise. The passages denying perceptibility to it mean non-perceptible to the physical eye, as stated in *Bhagavadgītā* 11.8.

(E83) About the *guṇas*, all of them cause bondage. *Sattva guṇa* generates bondage due to conceit of knowledge and happiness; and by overcoming *rajas* and *tamas* produces discrimination (*viveka*) that leads toliberaiotn resulting out of inhibition and self-control (*śama-dama*). *Rajas* deviates men from the path of truth due to greed, and *tamas* produces delusions.

Unnatural *guṇas* are distinguished from the natural *guṇas* that produce bondage. Unnatural *guṇas* have the brightness of the sun (*ādityavarṇa*), in the sense of capacity for unobstructed revelation. When said to be beyond *tamas*, its distinction from *prakṛti* and time is indicated. In sport there is no real deviation from the eternal state, because there is only a semblance of dependence on *prakṛti*.

The third permanent insentient entity is time. When in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* it is said that "the real *was* in the beginning", the past tense is used for time, which is applied to destructible objects. On this ground one might object that "time would appear to be destructible". Actually there is no rule that the past tense must be used only for what is destructible, for it is used here for Brahman also.

(E88) Time is eternal and indivisible *per se* and yet divided by limitations, determined by the earth's rotating around the sun.

The knower (*jñātṛ*) means omniscient, the repository of general knowledge about all times, places and objects. As *kālakāla* (the time of time) God is the regulator of time also. He is the inner-dweller of all.

The qualities of God, namely knowledge, power glory, strength, mercy, pardon, tolerance, tenderness, virtue, straightforwardness are intrinsic, supreme unbounded self-

modalities and He is the repository of endless blessed qualities and the knower of all particulars.

In creation many individual selves, with various backgrounds of past activities leading to different kinds of experiences, are brought together. The beginninglessness of these, together with that of the world-process, ensure the reality of the effect in the cause (*satkāryavāda*).

1.1.2 (E93) When it is said in the *Bhagavadgītā* (15.1-2) that the world is like the eternal *aśvattha* tree with roots above and branches below, a true creation is indicated. God always acts and creates the world. Not that the unchanging aspect of God undergoes change, but the diversified aspects, of the nature of the non-sentient and the sentient, change. The inert changes from gross to subtle state according as it is manifest and unmanifest, and according to these changes in form, of the nature of permanence-within-transformation (*pariṇāminitya*); they are called creation and dissolution respectively. In the case of the sentient, from its store of beginningless past actions, the one that is most prominently matured for satisfaction of its results, by combining with a gross body in readiness for enjoying the results of action, is called birth; its departure from the vesture of enjoyment is death. *Smṛtis* teach that death is a delusion, else there would arise destruction of the results of actions and the advent of the unmerited. Hence the wise take life and death as no more than appearance and disappearance, and attain equanimity.

(E93) It is not that actual birth of the Ṛg and *Sāma Vedas* is meant by the root *jan* (*jajñire*); it also means appearance as when it is said that the Vedas are like the breath of Brahman. Hence the present *sūtra* maintains *satkāryavāda* as this doctrine is supported by the *śruti*.

(E98) It might be argued that in the sentence "*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti*" ("From which the objects arise and in which they stay after birth"), the word "*yataḥ*" is general while "*jīva*", life" is particular; and hence the

general will be governed by the particular, making life [i.e., the individual self] (*jīva*) the first cause.

But, if the individual self is accepted as the first cause there would arise the possibility of many causes. The sub-commentator here adds that in this argument there is this more subtle meaning. If everything were a cause of everything, and so every effect would be reduced to the same cause, ultimately it would have to explain its own peculiarity and hence become arbitrary or self-dependent. In contrast, when the Nimbārka system accepts Brahman as the only cause of everything its self-dependence, supplied by scriptures, is a merit.

Upholders of the theory that Brahmā Hiraṇyagarbha is the first cause of the world claim to arrive at him as the first cause through the definition of cause as "not otherwise explained constant precedent of the effect". This claim, however, is contested by Śaivas because in *śruti* it has been stated that God Śiva witnessed the origin of Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā) *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 4.12.

Thus there is the theory of origin by self-nature. This is vitiated on two counts. It actually gives no reason, and there is the countervailing reason that the world is an effect, being changeful like the body.

Then there are those who think that the world originated from absence or nothing, such as the Naiyāyikas who believe in *ārambhavāda* or *asatkāryavāda* which are interpreted to mean that the effect is a new entity which did not exist earlier. But nothing can account for nothing; else one could be hurt by a hare's horn. The Nyāya theory is also not acceptable because even if it might apply to the instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) it will not apply to the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*). (The point is that in the case of an earthen pot, while the special shape (induced by the potter) did not exist before the pot originated, its material, earth, clearly existed.)

(E103) As none of the above theories are tenable, with a penchant for negation, like the upholders of the *māyā*

doctrine, we might arrive at the theory of emptiness. But the theory of emptiness, as the other theories discussed above, is dismissed on the basis of the scriptures.

According to Devācārya causality in some sense (*kayācid vivakṣayā*) implies that one cause leads to another, as pot to the earth, earth to water, water to fire, fire to space. To end such a series, scripture is relied upon for knowledge of the first cause. As stated in *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* (cited in the Devācārya's text) by the seer of Brahman (*brahmavādin*) the series of causes is dependent on time of which God is regulator. God has neither a cause nor any regulator. In this way fate (*niyati*), absence with causation at will (?), Sāṃkhya's *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* Hiraṇyagarbha, time etc. severally or jointly fail to provide a cause for the world.

The objective world is for the enjoyment of the self, but the individual self is not its cause, itself being subject to joys and sorrows. God's supreme powers are selves who experience non-supreme power with the three *guṇas*. How are the elements, as earlier thought by God, related to time? One single God enters the changing world and the selves. God is the experiencer, experienced, and regulator, the Lord of both *prakṛti* and the selves.

(E111) The next question is about the nature (*prakāra*) of causation (by which Brahman created the world). There are various theories of causation. The first mentioned by Devācārya is the theory of collection (*saṃghāta*) of the Buddhists. Here causation is taken as free combination of elements (*bhūtasaṃhananapūrvaka*) producing the effect, like betel with powder (*cūrṇa*) etc. producing red color. As this theory will be considered in detail in the second chapter [this portion of the commentary is not available now] its criticism is not taken up here.

The theory of the new origination of the effect (*ārambhavāda*) is that of the Naiyāyikas.

The theory of transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*) is of two

types, transformation of *prakṛti* and Brahman's transformation of the nature of projection of power (*śaktivikṣepa*). The former is the theory of Sāṃkhya, the latter of the Upaniṣads [and accepted here].

Here an objection might be raised that transformation is not possible in Brahman because It is part-less and all-pervasive like space. Here the intention of the *māyāvādin* (the Advaitin) appears to arrive at the theory of the world's being an appearance.

To this the reply is that such transformation is not impossible due to Brahman's nature of getting transformed. Just as milk, because of its nature of getting transformed, changes into curds, similarly Brahman with the power of bringing about everything however unlikely (*sarvāghaṭanaghaṭanārhaśakti*) changes into the form of the world. Because of Its required unthinkable power Brahman, with the potency of arriving at the form of the world, becomes so. That the above argument is not vitiated by a countervailing one is next shown by pointing out the inapplicability (*vikalatā*) of the example given [of milk and curds. It has to be proved either that milk, with parts, does not change into curd, that even in the case of milk what is actually part-less changes. Devācārya chooses the latter]. By pointing out the fault in the example, and thereby showing its inapplicability, the fault attributed to his own theory is being removed. For this it will be shown that being composed of parts (*sāvayavatva*) is not the reason for change. To prove his point what is cited in the objector's reason (an instance of causality) should have parts, else it cannot disprove the position of Brahman's transformability. The property resides in its locus, and is relative to the latter. Of the two possibilities, the power residing either in the whole or the parts, the latter is clearly the right alternative. The first alternative of *māyāvāda* is rejected.

In consequence it follows that the remainder is acceptable, viz., that power resides in parts. The last parts arrived at must themselves be partless, "free from the absence

of part-less-ness" (*niravayavatvābhāvābhāvasaṃpanna*). For if they also are supposed to have further parts there would result infinite regress. A further reason is that if the parts are also taken as composed of parts there would arise the equality of milk in a pot and in an ocean of milk [because their parts would be equally innumerable]. So it is established that the final parts are part-less.

Since it has been already established that the power of change resides in these parts, it follows that for change it is not necessary to be composed of parts, and hence Brahman is capable of transformation.

In short, Devācārya's interesting argument is as follows: A liquid (*dravadravya*) has no whole of its own, and hence is only (a) part, [because the whole is determined by external circumstances like the size of the container and the amount of liquid]. Hence its properties, like changeability, must reside in the parts. If again, these parts have parts *ad infinitum* then a part will have as many parts as a whole, and hence will be equal to it. Hence in a liquid there must be ultimate partless parts with the capacity for change.[1]

However, Brahman's transferability into the world is not based merely on arguments from examples like milk changing into curds, but on scriptural testimony. According to scriptures the transcendent powers of Brahman are various, infinite, unthinkable, and inexpressible extending to knowledge, power and activity. It is as natural as heat in fire.

(E117) The *sūtra* discussing all-pervasive Brahman's transformation is explained in the second chapter [which isnot available]. In case this change is total, there would be no

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[1]In his subcommentary Sundara Bhaṭṭa seems to make two omissions. He makes no mention of the argument that a liquid has no whole of its own. He also breaks up the argument about partless parts into two, one of infinite regress, and another of the equality of milk in a pot and that in the ocean of milk. (RNM)

Brahman outside the world, and by changing into what is transitory Brahman would also become non-eternal, thus contradicting the scriptural statement of the eternality and unchangeability of Brahman. Also, if the world is a form of Brahman, by experiencing it liberation would be ensured, making scripture superfluous.

(E118) These objections might have had force if the theory were based merely on arguments, but actually it is supported by scripture, as stated in "the self made itself' (*svayamātmānam akurute*). By such scriptural authority the baselessness and illogicality of the theory of the world's being illusory is exposed. In Devācārya's commentary the second objection above is refuted in the statement "not entirely" (*nāpi kṛtsnaprasaktiḥ*) etc., giving the reason that in an example such as the spider, in which since its web is part of its being there is no sign of deviation from the original state of the insect, showing that real projection need not involve the whole of the cause. Nor is Brahman's part-less-ness, as mentioned in scripture, violated if creation is taken in the above sense, as already exemplified by changefulness of part-less parts of milk. This change of Brahman is of the nature of projection of power (*śaktivikṣepa*), of the nature of extension for union and separation of others [such as atoms and individual selves].

(E119) The example of space as all-pervasive and changeless is not applicable, because space has been held (in scripture) to be changeable [into air (*ākāśād vāyuḥ*)].

(E120) In the case of the example of the spider the appearance and disappearance of the web exemplifies the process of creation and dissolution. Similarly with the other examples, like hair, herbs etc. Disturbance (*kṣobha*) in consciousness is the same as mental projection (*vikṣepa*).

(E121) Next arises the question of the role of Brahman as material cause, instrumental cause, and both.

(E122) By the expression "*parāparā*" Devācārya indicates Brahman's subtle state of powers, at the time of dissolution,

that are intrinsic and extraordinary in their capacity to produce effects, the idea being that a product is generated by a pre-existing corresponding subtle state of its cause. *Parā* and *aparā* represent *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* that are sentient and insentient respectively. The similarity of cause and effects is stated in the section beginning with "*ārambhaṇa*" in the *Brahmasūtras*. The four of them are stated here (BS 2.1.15-18). [According to the printed reading these *sūtras* are five in number, but actually according to the Nimbārka text they are four in number.]

The instrumental cause lies in uniting selves whose *dharmabhūtajñāna* has contracted due to beginningless traces of past actions, leaving their nascent memories and leading to corresponding desires, with bodies appropriate to these states.

The material and instrumental causes have the same base in Brahman that is exceedingly great. It establishes the nature of Brahman, defining it by eliminating the opposite.

Since a definition is meant to differentiate a thing from others, and the above definition of Brahman [i.e., BS 1.1.2] suffices for it, where is the necessity of a further definition like "truth, knowledge and infinite" (*satyam jñānam anantam*)? Will the latter not be superfluous?

But it should not be thought or said that if a fresh end cannot be achieved a means becomes useless. Here "creation, etc.", (*janamādi*) states Brahman's intrinsic nature, but does so in terms of creation, etc., that occur in time, and hence the definition is relative, based on knowledge, dependent on time

(E124) The definition in terms of truth, etc., is not relative, hence it is meaningful and not useless.

About truthfulness in *śruti* we have the utterance "This *aśvattha* tree (of the world) is with roots above and branches downwards", and in *smṛti* "The *aśvattha* is said to be imperishable". About this perpetuity of creation the commentator in this section appears to try to prove that it is real and not an illusion based on ignorance as Advaita Vedāntins think.

According to the beginninglessness stated in the above utterance, taking ignorance as beginningless, like six entities accepted by the Advaitins as beginningless but with an end, in our (Nimbārka's) system, in the case of beginningless ignorance also, you Advaita Vedāntins have reluctantly to concede positivity (*bhāvarūpatva*). But being positive, its destruction cannot be inferred. The destruction of a prior absence does not provide an instance (in the Advaita system) of a positive entity turning negative, as in Advaita theory absence is not a different kind of entity [as it is, e.g., in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika].

Not only the above argument but scripture also supports the reality of action leading to real creation of the world in utterances like "Hence it is stated that by true activity it has enacted the real world".

To prevent pervasion of the definition to the non-sentient, both truth and knowledge (consciousness) are stated together. Further, to prevent application to the individual self, infinity is also added.

Here Devācārya, anticipating a further difficulty, answers it beforehand. He asks the Advaitin" Are "truth" etc. indicative of essential nature or are they qualities? Not the first, for then their threefoldness would affect monism, for the three cannot have the same meaning without becoming synonyms. It might be said that even one thing can have different terms applicable to it relative to others; thus, the same man may be son, brother, and father together relative to different persons. In practice, non-relative entities like men are indicated by such relative designations, but not the inexpressible.

"True" ("*satya*" has an ambiguity of meaning. it can mean what is a real entity and also correct knowledge, As in the definition of Brahman "knowledge" has been separately mentioned, "*satya*" should mean the real here, and correspondingly "*asatya*" the unreal.

Next the question arises whether the unreal itself is real or unreal? This leads to a dilemma as the first alternative

cancels it and the second makes it completely imaginary like the "sky-flower" that is hardly worth refuting by scripture.

Again, if "true" etc. indicates the intrinsic nature of Brahman, Brahman would ecome expressible in words, contrary to its nature according to Advaita Vedānta. Hence they ("truth" etc.) should indicate Brahman's qualities. In that case we get untruth as a property of what is true, "inert" as a property of what is conscious, being limited as a property of what is unlimited.

If Brahman cannot be expressed in words it is inexpressible. Since *māyā*, an illusory object, and a limited object are also inexpressible according to Advaita, how can Brahman escape becoming false like them?

Hence, about the above definition, it is better taken as representing the intrinsic nature of Brahman as mentioned in scripture, rather than properties. Hence Brahman's nature is given by the above definitions mentioned.

1.1.3 (E126) About the subject of inquiry it is Brahman with the above definitions. Next mentioned is the instrument of knowing It.

"*Yoni*" in the expression "*śāstrayoni*" stands for source. From this it may appear that "*śāstrayoni*" indicates that *śāstra* is the cause of Brahman. But it has been said in scripture that Brahman is the uncaused highest cause of all. This apparent contradiction is resolved when it is noted that the scripture is the cause of the knowledge of Brahman. Scriptures cover not only the Vedas but also the Purāṇas that follow the Vedas.

To understand the full implication of what Devācārya means by "*namo vedāntavedyāya*" the complete sentence–"of the nature of reality, consciousness and bliss, (we) bow to Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the unlimited doer, the Teacher, and the Witness to intelligence"--has to be understood. When it is further corroborated with statements like "O Dhanāñjaya, there is nothing beyond Me" and "Where all names enter", it follows

that even in the case of references in scriptures to other deities like Brahmā, Rudra and Indra the ultimate object of reference is Brahman or Śrī Kṛṣṇa.

Since in the *sūtra* it is not mentioned that scripture alone gives knowledge of Brahman, what justification is there for such a claim? Scriptural statements could indicate this matter either in positive or negative terms. Even if it does not do so in the former manner, it does so in the latter method when it is said that "the non-knower of the Vedas does not know Brahman".

(E132-133) For a positive statement the declaration in *Bhagavadgītā* "I alone am indicated by all the Vedas also" (BG 15.15) should serve the purpose. It should not be objected that it only says that God (Brahman) alone is knowable through the Vedas, but not that the Vedas alone reveal Him, for "the knowable (*vedya*)" has the implication that the Vedas alone are fit to give knowledge of Brahman.

Brahman has been said to be unknowable by other instruments of knowledge. It is not revealed to perception so it is beyod the senses, like a stone and unlike a man with many qualities such as birth, etc.

Here a question arises: Is Brahman pervasive of the senses or not? If it is thought to be so, why is there no perceptual knowledge of Brahman; if not, why is Brahman not limited thereby? The answer is that Brahman pervades and also lights up the senses but is not revealed by them, just as the tongue and the nose are unable to reveal the shape and color of objects in contact with them, because they are not their contents, as a glow-worm and a candle are unable to reveal the sun that reveals them.

Brahman is beyond the senses as It is subtler than the subtlest. The individual self is atomic. Brahman, as its inner-dweller, is sub-atomic.

(E136-140) If Brahman cannot be revealed to the senses, it is not knowable by inference as well, as inference is unable to prove anything with certainty unless supported by scriptures.

This is because what inference establishes and its opposite would both remain equally doubtful.

Could not inference from the elements, that are products, to their cause–Brahman–not be possible, in the same way as in Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* is inferred?

The answer is that Brahman cannot be inferred thus for two reasons. It is not perceptible like natural causes; and inference, if at all possible, would be of a conscious self, as in the case of the potter, but not of Brahman with unlimited capacity to produce the most unlikely things. In case it is argued that the cause must be as stated in scriptures, inference ceases to be independent.

Again Nyāya is not consistent in its inference from the elements, as effects, to their cause, because it itself does not accept *ākāśa*, one of the elements, as an effect. Hence the argument is vitiated by the *svarūpāsiddha* fallacy, because the reason (viz., being created) is non-existent in one of the elements, namely space. In case Nyāya accepts space as produced, it would give up its own theory and adopt that of Vedānta.

(E140-142) If inference cannot give knowledge of Brahman, what about comparison? But comparison is based on similarity, and there is nothing similar to Brahman to provide the analogy. It should not be objected that *mantras* like "that thou art" establish similarity between Brahman and the individual self, and similarly when God assures that on liberation the individual self attains similarity to Him (*mama sādharmyamāgatāḥ*, BG 14.2). No doubt similarity in the matter of consciousness is established between the individual self and Brahman. In the same way in the *mantra* "All is Brahman" there is similarity with the insentient world with respect to reality. But these similarities are based on general properties. Everything has some general properties in common with everything else. But knowledge by comparison is based on specific similarity with specific qualities. And nothing else has

the special qualities of Brahman like omniscience, etc..

(E143-144) Knowledge may be had by contrast also, as here might be indicated by contrast with a cow. But "non-cow" covers a much wider range than merely (e.g.) "horse". Similarly, if Brahman be indicated as different from the sentient and the non-sentient, it still would not provide for Brahman's special properties of omniscience etc.

(E145-146) Presumption, being based on arguments, is equivalent to inference. Non-perception is based on the perception of the counter-positive of an absence. Hence, only verbal testimony remains to convey knowledge of Brahman, which is supplied by the Vedas.

1.1.4 (E147) There is an initial objection that, like other instruments of knowledge, verbal testimony also is unable to give knowledge of Brahman, according to certain statements in scripture themselves.

In this connection it should be noted that the function of words is of two kinds: primary and secondary. The primary function is called "power" (*śakti*), which is threefold, namely *rūḍhi*, the power existing in the whole word, *yoga*, the power existing in the component parts, and *yogarūḍhi*, both *yoga* and *rūḍhi* combined. *Rūḍhi* is found in words like "cow" (*go*) and so on. Examples of *yoga* are found in words like "Mādhava: (*dhava*, husband of Mā, Lakṣmī). Examples of *yogarūḍhi* are found in words like "*paṅkaja*" ("born of clay"), which denotes a lotus and a thing born of clay as well.

The secondary function is two-fold: implication and metaphorical description (*gauṇī*). Implication,. defined as the appropriate relation with the primary meanings of (the above) three types is found in such sentences as "(there is a) hamlet on the Gaṅgā", where "Gaṅgā" indicates the bank of the Ganges. The Mīmāṃsā view that implication must have an invariable connection with the primary meaning is untenable, since no such relation is acceptable. According to grammarians implication is unnecessary as all kinds of meaning fall under

"power" (*śakti*). This is rejected on the ground that it would create confusion and the word "jar" ("*ghaṭa*") may be used in the sense of a cloth (*paṭa*).

(E150) The second kind of secondary power is called "*gauṇī*". It is the relation of qualities (*guṇa*) existing in the entity denoted by a word. As, for example, in the sentence "the boy is a lion", "lion" stands for bravery and other qualities existing in a lion.

(E150) Next, a question arises as to which of these six varieties of words can indicate Brahman. It cannot be conventional (*rūḍha*), because Brahman is not a class like cow, as it is one without a second.. It cannot be a quality like white, as It is qualityiless (*nirguṇa*). It cannot be of the nature of a motion, as it is inactive. And it cannot be a substance as it is unmanifest. Nor can the derivative (*yoga*) meaning serve the purpose, as the meaning of the root and the suffix is inappropriate for Brahman. Similar is the case of the *yogarūḍha* class of words.

The power called "suggestion" (*vyañjanā*) is accepted by rhetoricians. as the function of suggestion can be included in *lakṣaṇā* or *śakti*, it is needless to accept suggestion as an independent function of words.

According to grammarians words are of six kinds: (i) *yaugika* (bearing derivative sense), (ii) *yogarūḍha* (having a sense partly derivative and partly conventional), (iii) *aupacārika* (having metaphorical meaning), (iv) *mukhya* (having primary meaning), (v) *lākṣaṇika* (having an indirect sense) and (vi) *gauṇa* (having metaphorical sense). This division seems to be based on the two-fold divisions of words stated above.

(E151) Nor is it possible by implication to indicate Brahman, as there is no similar thing to establish the relation, nor is memory of help here to provide the indicated image, as it has to come from previous experience. Suggestion (*vyañjanā*), held by some as capable, is also not possible for

what is non-relational like Brahman. Metaphorical conveyance of meaning is also excluded from application to Brahman , as Brahman is without anything else similar to it.

As thus none of the modalities of meanings of words has the capacity to do so, as with the other instruments of knowledge words also are incapable of giving knowledge of Brahman, and so Brahman is not knowable through scriptures. Further, this position has the support of the Upaniṣadic statement that words return from It being unable to attain It. This is the position of the contender (*pūrvapakṣa*).

This position is discarded when it is asserted that the Vedas alone can give knowledge of Brahman. Brahman is indicated in the definition given in the second (*Brahma)sūtra*, Who[1] in His omniscience is the repository of both general and particular knowledge of all times and places as their inner-dweller everywhere, and a witness of all, and Who has the unthinkable power of doing all things. Brahman is so-called as He is a supremely great entity in matters of intrinsic attributes and powers. This has been established by Bādarāyaṇa by proper synthesis of materials in the Upaniṣads. Here "proper" (*saṃyak*) means that words without losing their own meanings do not yet deviate from indicating their objects correctly.

(E154) The statement about words returning without attaining Brahman would seem to indicate that the words of scripture are also unable to give knowledge of Brahman. This is said to be not the case, because the scriptural words (in this case) have purport which means that Brahman cannot be brought within limits (*iyattāvacchedasya niṣedhaḥ*). Therefore it has to be read along with passage in the Upaniṣads where it is said that "Brahman has to be heard, seen, and meditated on" and "to be known by the mind".

(E154) About the unattainability of Brahman by words,

[1]As in the Nimbārka system Brahman is Śrī Kṛṣṇa, here "who" has been used to refer to Brahman to preserve the authenticity of the text.

Sundara Bhaṭṭa gives the example of those residing by the shore of the ocean of milk, where there is no limit to the milk but its drinking etc. is prohibited, yet in popular usage people living by it use it and get satisfaction. Similarly, Brahman's nature and qualities cannot be brought under limitation, yet it is brought to the grasp of people according to capacity granted by itself for liberation from the world. In this way all aspects are harmonized.

About Devācārya's argument that the unchangeable would be a non-entity, Sundara Bhaṭṭa gives an argument. If not knowable by the Vedas Brahman would be a non-entity, as unknowable by any instrument of knowledge, like a sky-flower. And, as a result, for want of any object of inquiry, the inquiry in the *Brahmasūtras* would be pointless.

It might be objected that, if Brahman could be revealed by words it would lose self-luminosity and, thereby, become perishable like a pot, etc.. This objection would apply in the case of worldly words. But the power of Vedic words is Brahman's own power, and thereby Brahman reveals (lights up) itself.

If so, then what about the other instruments of knowledge like perception? Since they are also pervaded by Brahman, they could also serve as means of Brahman's self-revelation. The answer is that this is not the case, because they are obstructed by the personal factor of limitations of individual selves, and hence subject to errors and illusions.

(E158) About the mention (on p. 156) of the example of unfathomable waters in the context of unattainability of Brahman by words, Sundarabhaṭṭa adds that "*agādha*" means where the bottom of (the water) cannot be touched. In such a matter, even if the bottom cannot be touched, such activities as bathing, drinking, with their visible and invisible effects, are attainable and, hence, these efforts are not wasted. Similarly the Vedas are able to describe the nature and properties of Brahman sufficiently well to enable people of all capacities to

attain the four-fold ends of human life according to their abilities even though it cannot set a limit to Brahman.

This incapacity only brings out the endlessness of God's powers. In case a limit existed and the Vedas did not know it there could bel reproach, but actually there is no limit. So its non-knowledge is like the ignorance of a sky-flower's scent, or the sight of a hurt caused by a hare's horn.

(E159) The inexpressiblity of Brahman means being incapable of being made the object of what is discrete or limited. In this connection the section in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* is referred to where Brahman's unknowability is mentioned.

Ears can receive and grasp only discrete words like "pot", but Brahman, being all-pervasive, is different from all things and therefore Brahman cannot be grasped by the ear. [This explains the *Taittirīyopaniṣad's* declaration that words with the mind return without attaining Brahman.]

(E160) So far as inexpressibility due to both oneness and diversity is concerned, what is one as cause assumes diversity in its projection of power in the world. Śrīnivāsācārya's *Khyātinirṇaya* is quoted: "According to situation all things like unity and diversity can be assumed by Brahman without conflict".

This matter can be interpreted in a different way also. Brahman is inexpressible in worldly or popular language, which is associated with the mind, while the scriptural words are not so associated; that is why the Vedas are said to be the breath of the great being (*mahābhūta*) Brahman.

(E162) It cannot be maintained that, when in contact, the mind may also grasp Brahman, because it has been declared in scripture that Brahman is non-mental and not vital-breath.

As revealed by the Vedas Brahman is not a content of the three main senses of words, viz., conventional, etc. Being one, Brahman cannot belong to a class like cow, and as quality-less it cannot be a property like white. Such concepts, their contents

being completely imaginary, do not apply to Brahman, whose color has been called golden as a token of reverence.

(E163) When Brahman is called quality-less it is not contrary to scripture, as it implies being free from *guṇas* (qualities) subject to *māyā*. Nor is it a fact that Brahman's intrinsic nature cannot be expressed, for all accept that "truth, knowledge, and infinity" or "knowledge and bliss" give its intrinsic nature. Nor is activity foreign to it, as it is said to be faster than the mind. When it is said in scripture that all names enter It, conventional meaning of words are also accepted. Nor is a derivative (*yoga*) sense discarded when it is said that Brahman is growthful and great, as the word is derived from the root *bṛhi* or *bṛṃhi* meaning growth..

The power of words, called *yoga* and *yogarūḍhi*, can refer to Brahman, and thus the incapacity of the power of words to denote Brahman stands refuted. The relation between speech and its purport, word and corresponding object, is accepted in scriptures, as stated in "I bow to that wherein all languages have their permanent basis". It is also not a fact that the indicated (*lakṣya*) should be of the same form as the indicator (*lakṣaṇā*), the latter's function being to remind only. Hence it is not necessary for this indicated sense to be similar, the indicator word has only to arouse the idea. Earlier the inclusion of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) in indication has been stated. In this way where is the impossibility of the Vedas indicating Brahman who is omniscient, unthinkable and with infinite power. This matter will be dealt with further in the fourth chapter [which is not now available].

(E167) Commenting on Devācārya's quotation from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (2.2.5) about loosening of the knot of the heart, the author adds that it means release from all worldly bonds whether subtle or gross. This results in the removal of all doubts about the self and others, and exhaustion of all activities at the sight of the Supreme Person (*puruṣottama*), who is beyond both the sentient and the insentient.

It is also not correct to object that the statement about the "perception of God" is not correct due to impossibility. Scriptures declare "The wise always perceive (Him)", and in the *Bhagavadgītā* (11.54) God himself has said "Undeviating devotees are able thus to see and know me". About such persons, who are unswervingly devoted to God, it has also been said that God bears the responsibility for their attainment to ends and their preservation (*yogakṣema*).

It is also stated in the *Bhagavadgītā* (11.53-54) that those who attain this state are few. Neither charity nor penance nor rituals lead to it, but only devotion, and caste is no hindrance to it.

(E171) For attainment of God purity of both subtle and gross bodies is required.

Liberation is attainment of God, which means uninterrupted experience of Him. This excludes occasional experiences during meditation. It will also cover what others regard as liberation while living as it also accepts uninterrupted awareness.

(E173) About Devācārya's remarks about the self and the other as the knower and the known, Sundarabhaṭṭa adds that the experience of God is the normal state, but it is observed due to the effect of *prakṛti* on individual selves. It is like the sun's being invisible to a man born blind. This limitation is removed on liberation.

The feeling of independence on the basis of the sense of "mine" and "thine" is bondage due to *prakṛti*, and release from it is the seed of liberation. As said in scripture "Man in the clutches of death utter 'mine'".

(E174) The arrogance of mine and another's is delusion (*pramāda*). Non-myself is eternal Brahman in the sense that liberation is uniformity of likeness to Brahman.

The individual realizing itself in direct vision as an eternal part of God attains uninterrupted experience of Him like the flow of the Ganges. Content with whatever state he is

placed in, of steady joy, he will discard all excessive joys. Attainment of God is for him a medicine for the disease of worldliness. According to Parāśara the devotee thereby attains a semblance of godliness, but not godliness itself, due to his knowledge of his duty.

The next section refutes the view of those who think that liberation means revelation of an already free state of the self on removal of the obscuring ignorance when hearing the truth, like a man being told "you are the tenth" when in a group of ten counting himself, or as in recognition such as "this is that same Devadatta".

(E176) Merely knowledge on hearing is not by itself capable of insuring release, despite the fact that such knowledge is the means thereof, as in scripture it is said that Brahman is to be heard. But this has to be followed by thinking about it and meditation for attaining the purpose.

In the case of the example given of release from fear of a snake on a wise man's assurance that it is not a snake, prior to it there is, similarly, an intermediate stage of perceiving the rope etc. This confirms rather the stand taken here by Sundarabhaṭṭa.

In scripture also are stated such stages as loosening of the knot of the hear, and also that "even by such hearing, it is not revealed unless it owns itself" (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1.2.23).

(E179) A fresh objection might be raised from the side of Advaita Vedānta: Just as the pot etc., as the result of phyiscal work, are perishable, similarly awareness of Brahman, if the result of mental labor in meditation, would be perishable.

The answer is that since in the Advaitin's case knowledge does not generate the experience of Brahman but helps to remove limitation to it due to ignorance, so in the case of Nimbārka's doctrine also meditation does the same. Hence, here also the result is not perishable.

As in the case of AdvaitaVedānta scriptural words do not generate effect because of the effort of the speaker but due to

the motives or the instruments of knowledge, similarly for the Nimbārka follower the meditation, as it is on Brahman unlike meditation on worldly matters, produces an effect due to itself and not on the efforts of meditation.

(E180) However meditation is different from activity, as it is itself non-different from knowledge. Brahman that is different from everything else is knowable through meditation and knowledge born of scriptural words.

If this is not acceptable to the contender, the same objection can be brought against him by maintaining that knowledge also is an activity of the mind.

(E183) As neither the locus nor the nature of a thing is the product of activity, neither of them is non-eternal. There is absence of four forms of action [viz., creation, obtaining, to modification and purification] in respect of them. Of these both the locus and the nature are already existing entities. Hence, the nature of the attainment has to be considered.

(E184) The locus of this realization, the individual self, is not born and is eternal. Unlike curds, etc., it is unchanging and independent of any other instrument of knowledge. The changes like anger, etc., are functions of the internal organ.

(E185) Being of the nature of consciousness it is untouched by defects and also incapable of improvement, as endowed with permanent knowledge.

(E186) If so, how is the following dilemma escaped? If the individual self is touched by defects and changes, it becomes changeable and perishable; if not so touched, there will be no bondage or liberation. This dilemma is escaped by the fact that bondage and liberation depend on contraction and expansion of awarenesses of properties (*dharmabhūtajñāna*), which does not affect the intrinsic nature of the self.

The content (*viṣaya*) of the realization is Brahman, which is free from birth, change and destruction.

Both locus and content being thus, the experience of Brahman, which is eternal, uncreated, and with intrinsic

knowledge, power, and activity, is natural like Brahman.

(E188) "What you worship is not Brahman": construing this Upaniṣadic statement as a denial of Brahman as defined here is not correct. What is denied there is the object of superimposed worship, not Brahman as established by scriptures, which is unfit for denial, for Brahman as established by scripture is not capable of denotative reference.

(E191) If we were to accept both knowledge and ignorance as imagined and thus seem to accept God as affected with ignorance, then He would become like an individual self. But is it correct to regard knowledge and ignorance as imagined? Is ignorance located in the individual self or in God? Not the first, as you Advaitins regard an individual as a reflection and inert, and do not accept it as different from Brahman. Nor the second, because Brahman is self-luminous and ignorance is of the nature of obscurity, and as such they are opposed like light and darkness. Further, Brahman as affected by ignorance would be like an individual self.

Again, is ignorance with a cause or without a cause? On the first alternative there would result infinite regress; on the second alternative, even a liberated self could be affected by ignorance.

Nimbārkans also accepts the beginnnglessness of the bonds of action but for escape from it they accept God's grace.

Brahman has been said to be"bodiless in bodies" as inner-controller, due to the immensity-of inner-dwelling Brahman, the steadfast don't worry about anything. As inner-dweller Brahman is unrelated to the gross body, as non-vital breath It is unrelated to the subtle body.

(E192) It is being considered whether Brahman can be made a content of meditation. It is to be determined if Brahman can be cognized, for if It cannot be known then there would arise a serious contradiction to the scriptures. Hence it has been repeatedly stressed that Brahman is known, seen etc. Else the *sūtra* on *śāstrayoni* (BS 1.1.3) also would be disproved. When

it is said that "another (than Brahman) is known" what is meant is that Brahman is not an object of discrete awareness.

(E193) Brahman is beyond the Sāṃkhya's *prakṛti,* the intellect etc., and the individual self, and by its knowledge everything else is known. Being dependent upon Brahman, by no other means than devotion can the individual self know It, as stated in BG 13.18 "My devotee knows me".

(E194) Nothing is equal to It, and It is the innermost and different from all qualities, merits, demerits, causes like *prakṛti* etc.; and effects like space etc.; it is different from past, present and future.

(E196) About Devācārya's discussion on want of knowledge of the Supreme Principle in scripture, does it mean lack of knowledge of Brahman, or lack of knowledge about the limits of Brahman? If it is the second, that is the Nimbārkan position. It cannot be the first, for if lack of knowledge of Brahman could bring liberation, then animals etc. would be eligible for it.

Actually the meaning is that he who knows Brahman in terms of discrete concepts does no know, and he who does not know Him in terms of discrete concepts knows.

When Yājñavalkya states that the perceiver is not perceptible he means not perceptible by the physical eye that is circumvented by the law of *karman*. Hence for the purpose of perceiving God, Arjuna has to be granted blessed vision (*divya cakṣus*) (see Bhagavadgītā 11.8).

(E197) Here in this context both knowability and non-knowability of Brahman are stated which would seem to verge on nihilism (*śūnyavāda*). Similarly about properties and awareness (*vedanā*). The incomprehensibility of such dichotomies is compared at a popular level to a statement like "Is see the ocean but don't know its depths".

(E198)Next is stated the attainment of the learned on dissociation from *prakṛti*, with the example of a serpent's skin discarded on an ant-hill (from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.7).

Just as the snake does not identfiy itself with its discarded skin even though it is a part of itself, so a wise man bears his body till death without attributing egoism to it. The skin is like the whole body, so that the example illustrates the wise man's attitude in general. Just as a snake does not attribute the feeling of "mine" to the discarded skin, so the wise man does not attribute egoity to his body, having discovered by God's power that it is egoism that leads to the feeling of "mine" or ownership. He becomes "bodiless" in the sense of being free from bodily arrogance, and endowed with the effulgence of Brahman due to realizing himself as part of Brahman and immortal in the sense of freedom from bodily deluson. Having thus considered detachment to the gross body, next the same process is stated with respect to the subtle body.

(E198) He hears, sees, thinks, lives without hearing, seeing, thinking or living in the sense of performing all these activities without attachment. All these activities are performed in the spirit of dependence (*pāratantrya*) on God, and not with the egoism of freedom.

(E199) Having become a part of the God of omniscience and infinite, unthinkable power, guided by Him, having identified with His nature as truth, consciousness and bliss as direct ego, not like two-fold bodies (gross and subtle) nor related to them, and hence not affected by their merits or demerits, and with no desire here or hereafter for perishable thing,.

(E199) having realized himself as united with Brahman of unsurpassed bliss and by this identification having achieved all the goals of man.

Jaimini has said "the righteous person is one with eagerness, capacity, and learning". Of these he (the man of realization) has no eagerness knowing their perishability; he is not rightful for want of that attribute; nor has he any sense of capacity as he has surrendered means, ends, conations and enjoyments to God; while he has wisdom of the results of

actions, still he is without them due to dependence on God.

Such a state while in the body should not be doubted, as that would be non-acceptance of scriptures, but nothing is gained by calling it liberation-while-living.

(E202) Śrī Kṛṣṇa, knower of all times, is the object of all Vedānta. The scriptures establish him as possessed of unsurpassed intrinsic power and auspicious qualities and so the Supreme Person. He is all that is unexpressed and all that is expressed. He is Bhagavat where "*bha* stands for one who fulfils (*bhartṛ*) "*ga*" stands for the goal (*gati*) of the world, and "*va*" stands for the sustainer (*vasanti yatra*))..

10.1 GIRIDHARA DĀSA (1490), *Laghumañjūṣā* on Nimbārka's *Daśaślokī*

!The work is translated in Khurana, 27-112, which is our "T". "E" references are to the edition of the *Daśaślokī* with Giridhara Prapanna's commentary is edited by Dhundiraja Sastri, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 358, Benares 1927. Geeta Khurana divides the work into 69 sections, the titles of which provide a key to the topic discussed. The titles of sections below are based on these. The work contains quotations and references to other texts many of which we omit, since the translation of the entire work is too long to reproduce here.

Ms. Khurana introduces this commentary as follows (Khurana, p. 19): "While preserving the structure of Nimbārka's systematics, Giridhara follows Puruṣottamācārya in developing its content...Puruṣottamācārya is the author of *The Jewel Box of the Vedānta Gems (Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā)*, and Giridhara's work, *The Little Jewel Box (Laghumañjūṣā)* is intended to be a summary of it. *The Little Jewel Box* is divided into four chapters, corresponding to those of Bādārayaṇa: they are metaphorically described as 'compartments' of the 'box'. The following is a summary of Giridhara's exposition. We have found it convenient to divide it under sixty-two subtitles, which indicate

the main themes of his thought."

Translated by Geeta Khurana

(E2; T27-30) "The excellent weapon of the Supreme Person..., Sudarśana, through the command of the same Lord desirous of uplifting the world, descended on earth, on the Telugu land, in the form of a Brahmin, and was called by names such as Niyamānanda, Nimbāditya, and Nimbārka. This Brahmin then received the Royal Eighteen-Syllable incantation from Nārada, who had been initiated by (the four youths) Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra, disciples of the Flamingo-formed (creator-god) Brahmā, himself the disciple of Viṣṇu (Nārāyaṇa)."

"Then, from among the Three Categories...the Conscient, the Inconscient and the Absolute (the Brahman), Nimbārka himself proceeds to describe the nature of the individual (conscient) selves, signified by the word 'You' [*tvam*] (of the great Upaniṣadic pronouncement 'You are It') in" [verse 1 of the *Daśaślokī*, which we provide again here:

1 (E2-3; T29) "(The texts of revelation and the great sages) declare the soul to be in essence knowledge, as well as dependent on God, unitable with and separable from the body, infinitesimal indeed, distinct in each body, actively knowing and which they call eternal."

"What kind of soul? Anticipating this question Nimbārka replies with the words 'in essence knowledge'.If, for this reason, knowledge or consciousness is its essence, then the scriptural texts call the Self self-illuminant by nature, as in the following [passage from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.5.13:] "Just as a mass of salt has no interior and no exterior, but is entirely one mass of taste, thus too is th is self without interior or exterior entirely one mass of intelligence; hence this person is self-luminous. Hence the position of the Logicians who maintain the inconscient character of the soul is baseless, because it lacks the

support of revelation and tradition (and so does not satisfy their first criterion, word), and because their remaining criteria, perception, inference and analogy also lack authority in this matter.

(E3; T30-31) "The words 'as well as' (in Nimbārka's text) include the sense of self-awareness, and so signify the essential nature of the self.

"[Objection:] Can it be argued thus the fact that self-awareness is caused by the [unconscious] *māyā* (an aspect of matter) is an established one, and if the soul partakes of its nature, then it too is established as being unconscious in essence. How then can you conclude that it is 'in essence knowledge'?

[Answer:] "You are mistaken. In the state of liberation, beings like Vāmadeva are free of the bonds of unconscious matter, yet Scripture declares that they have self-awareness. Selves are therefore essentially self-awareness, and that awareness is not intrinsically an effect of matter...

(E3-4; T31-34) [Objection:] "Can one argue that since both the soul and the Supreme Lord, in an undifferentiated manner, are 'in essence knowledge', then, since there is no difference between them in this regard, why then does one not maintain that the self is the Lord himself?

[Answer:] "To this doubt Nimbarka replies by distinguishing between the qualities of independence and dependence, with the words "dependence on God". Since the self is dependent on God, who is the Supreme Person or Vāsudeva, dependent for the knowledge of all places, times and things, and for all activity connected with stability and change at all times, its entity is therefore dependent on the Supreme Person. As for the Supreme Person Himself, His entity is independent. There is, therefore, a great distinction between them indeed. Hence too the fact of their possessing a common characteristic, consciousness, cannot be unwarrantably stretched to demonstrate that a common entity unites both God

and the self...

[Objection:] "Let us grant that a stretching of principle (of a common consciousness between God and the self) is not warranted (for proving their common entity), precisely because the self is dependent on God. But such a stretching of principle, in the matter of a common dependence characterizing both the self and the inconscient, is warranted (for proving their common unconsciousness).

[Answer:] "To this Nimbārka replies with the words 'unitable with an separable from the body'.

"The word 'body' indicates things that possess outer and inner organs, as well as breath. It also indicates things which, through non-differentiation between cause and effect, possess matter and ignorance that are characterized by beginningless karman (matter being the cause and the body the effect). The self is 'unitable with' this body and consequently 'separable from' it. Accordingly, it becomes capable of separation from all these things. In consequence, even though it share the quality of dependence with the insoncient, its essence is not unconsciousness, precisely because it is the receptacle of the special attribute of separability. Such is the meaning of the text.

"Thus, with ignorance, whose essence is beginningless karman, dispelled through the grace of God and the teacher, the self is liberated and its devotional nature is ascertained.

[Objection:} "Let us grant that the dependence common to the self and to the inconscient cannot be stretched to prove that the self is unconscious also. However, the self is indeed immense, because it is declared to be so by the authority of revelation and The Aphorisms [i.e., the *Brahmasūtras*] of Bādarāyaṇa. And if that is so (it) will not serve to define the self (for) there will be an unwarranted stretching of the definition to time, space, and the Supreme Lord (which are also immense).

[Answer:] "To this Nimbārka replies with the word 'infinitesimal'. Since the scriptures speak of the individual self

as 'infinitesimal' or infinitesimally measurable, the doctrine of its immensity is not appropriate...

[Objection:] "Is it arguable that as one mustard seed on Mount Meru takes up only a little of its space and not all of it, so also the self takes up a tiny space in bodies ranging in size from those of elephants to those of ants, and not all their space, that being impossible?

[Answer:] "No. For there is the Nyāya syllogism [proving the contrary]. Premise: Even though the self is in essence infinitesimal, it has the attribute of knowledge, which is limitless [or immense], and so its pervasion of the entire body is not impossible. Reason: Because all-pervasiveness is the quality proper to knowledge. Analogy [i.e., Example]: As it is in the case of light (whose sources, such as lamps, may be small in size, while the light they emit is limitless in range).

(E4-5; T34-35) [Objection:] "It may be that (the Sāṃkhya evolute) instinct [*buddhi*] (which emanates from the prime Sāṃkhya category matter) is the real limiting cause of the infinitesimal; hence it is the limiting quality superimposed on the (essentially immense) selves that renders them infinitesimal. As scripture [*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 5.8] declares: The individual self appears to be (as tiny as the tip of a goad and insignificant, through the qualities of instinct and of the self. (Therefore, of itself) the self is immense and not infinitesimal. Is not this reasoning valid?

[Answer:] "No. Only those disputants whose eyes are covered with dust are unable to understand the meaning of the above scriptural statement. But those of subtle vision see the self as insignificant and infinitesimally limited both by instinct's capacity to limit infinitesimally as well as by its own intrinsic infinitesimal limitation. That is why it is '(as tiny as) the tip of a goad', or extremely subtle (in extension). Such is the meaning of the scriptural text.

"The word 'indeed' in Nimbārka's verse excludes the doctrine of those who hold that the self is of a medium size

(neither infinitesimal nor infinite).

Examination of the Self

(E5-7; T35-41) [Objection:] "Let us grant that the self is not immense. However (it is conditioned by ignorance, and that) ignorance is one in essence. The self conditioned by it must therefore be one in all bodies.

[Answer:] "To this Nimbārka says: 'distinct in each body', which means that there is a distinct self for every individual body. Consequently, as the self is distinct in bodies, such as those of gods like Brahmā, of stable substances (earth, water, fire, air, and plants) and in the other fourfold bodies (those born of sprouts, sweat, eggs, and wombs), it is not one in essence. Such is the meaning of Nimbārka's words. If this were not true, were any one person to sleep, to faint, to die or to be affected by fear or disease, all other persons would do likewise, but such emphatically is the experience of none. This reasoning also expels the doubt that all may experience the same joy, sorrow, and compassion, a phenomenon observed in none.

[Objection:] "The self is in essence knowledge but different in each body. Phrases like the latter ['different in each body'] will not give us the description of a flawless self as will happen if our own (non-dualist or illusionist) position is scrapped, because (in your description, as opposed to ours) the self is infected by imperfections. To explain, all our discourse is possible only at the three levels of reality–the absolute, the illusory, and the pragmatic. In our system, significant discourse on all these levels is possible. It is possible on the absolute level as we speak of the self's essence as knowledge; it is possible on the illusory and pragmatic levels, as we speak of its dependence on God. Such description will be free of all the flaws alluded...

[Answer:] "To this doubt Nimbārka, with the words 'actively knowing", indicates the flawless character of the self in his description of it–flawless because being constituted of multiple substrata of knowledge is an external and imminent

attribute of the self, coterminous with its existence. Since Nimbārka defines the self as being 'actively knowing', that is, as the locus of the quality of knowledge, [its primary attribute,] his definition cannot be legitimately stretched to apply to the illusionists' position as well. For they describe the essence of the self as devoid of attributes. The secondary attributes of the self, of being an agent and experiencer, can be known from Revelation, reasoning and the word of the Lord in the *Gītā*...[Several passages quoted from the *Bhagavadgītā* .and the Upaniṣads.]

[Objection:] "Can['t] one reason that just as water poured into water and fire added to fire are indistinguishable, [the self, compared to] light and the Self whose essence is light, in whcih the self is united, are indistinguishable also?

[Answer:] "No. the fact that a substance and its attribute are entirely homogeneous does not determine them as totally non-different. When the mere awareness of some difference exists, granting that there is non-difference as regards intelligibility, heterogeneity enters through the notions of substantiality and attribute-ness. Accordingly the analogies offered are not conducive. For just as the sun and its splendor share a common energy, they are qualified by the respective attributes of solarity and splendor. Evidently then the states of substantiality and attribute-ness are not illogical. In fact, in the case of water and fire there is no total homogeneity. While homogeneity could lead to lack of awareness of difference, difference is real enough, because of the partite character of the substance (concerned, space, water, or fire). If this is not so, why not postulate the non-difference of (its) earthenware in a pot? Hence there is the following inference: Premiss: Water poured into water has to be established as different; Reason Because it is a partite substance. Analogy: Like earthen dust poured into earthen dust, or a sesame seed thrown on a heap of sesame seeds.

[Objection:] One can object that, .on the basis of the

simile of the resemblance of the sun (or moon, in water, as the *Brahmabindūpaniṣad* puts it) the unique Self of being, abiding in every being, is perceived as simple and multiple, like the moon in water, and on the authority of the scripture and the [*Brahmasūtras*] of Bādarāyaṇa [the self is no more than] the reflection of the Supreme Self in instinct (an evolute of matter), said to be endowed with knowledge only inasmuch as it is a modification of instinct (caused by the reflection). How then can you say that it is a receptacle of qualities like essential knowledge, or indeed, [as being['in essence knowledge'?

[Answer:] You are mistaken. Revelation and the [*Brahma]sūtras* have a different sense and therefore cannot signify that the self is a reflection. To explain: Just as the one moon subsists in water in the form of a reflection, while being unaffected by the qualities of coolness and wetness inherent in water, but rather producing a cool radiance by means of the qualities of coolness and radiance inherent in itself, so too the unique self in beings, but [it] is unaffected by the qualities of birth, age, illness, and death inherent in them, rather endowing these beings with the qualities of knowledge and joy inherent in itself. Such is the meaning of revelation; such is the sense of the [*Brahma]sūtras*. And the simile of the presence of the self of beings in those very beings, based on the resemblance to the sun, is to be understood in the sense of the presence of the sun in water [in the form of a reflection).

"Furthermore, if the objector is obstinate in applying the sense of reflection to the relationship between God and the self, such a sense will be meaningless, because his example is not proved. To explain: It is possible for the sun and the moon, qualified as they are by shape and form, to subsist in water, which itself is qualified by the shapely character of the reflection. But in the objector's example reflection is impossible, as it is a case of a formless and quality-less limiter (the Self). Accordingly, the doctrine of limitationism is an illogical one, since a limiter that has the nature of the inner organ,

constituted by ignorance, which is nonexistent by nature (according to the Limitationist theory), cannot immediatley envelop the Brahman, who is both wise and devoid of attributes. On the other hand, it is possible for a substance like) space to envelop huts and pots that are themselves substances (and can thus be congruently interrelated). (Such incongruity) is lacking in the objector's example, and is therefore not proved.

[Objection:} "Granting all this, an unwarrantable stretching of your definition (beyond the object you seek to define) would persist, since, according to your view, the supreme Lord is also the receptacle of qualities like knowledge.

[Answer:] "To this Nimbārka replies with the word 'eternal'. Since what is referred to is an eternal being devoid of numerical limitation, non-numerical by nature (unlike the self), there is no unwarrantable stretching of definition to the supreme Lord, who is one in essence.

[Objection:] "But revelation also speaks of the supreme Lord's eternity with the words 'The Brahman is reality, knowledge and eternity'. Thus there would still be an over-extension of your definition.

[Answer:] "You are mistaken. Revelation speaks of the nature of the Supreme Lord as devoid of the restrictions of size and, in virtue of his qualities and power, as devoid of the limitations of number There is therefore no occasion for postulating an unwarrantable stretching of definition...

[Objection:] "If the self has qualities such as 'being in essence knowledge', how is it that they are not experienced by all?

[Answer:] "Refuting objections of this kind Nimbārka specifies his position by [Verse 2 of the *Daśaślokī,* viz.]

2 (E8; T41) "Through God's grace, however [the followers of the Vedic tradition] know its [the soul's] being to be indeed invested by the beginningless *māyā*. They must understand it to be in truth freed, devoted and bound, and to be particularized by numerous subdivisions.

(E8-9; T41-44) "Nimbārka's meaning is that 'its being' is invested by the beginningless power of *māyā*, 'power' endowed with the three *guṇas sattva, rajas* and *tamas,* a power capable of realizing the unrealizable. Alienated from the august supreme Person, the same self, through the beginningless *māyā*, becomes restricted in its quality of knowledge.

[Objection:] "If that were true, then such a quality would not be really knowledge. The desire to know and the sacred sciences proclaiming that knowledge would be fruitless.

[Answer:] "To this objection Nimbārka replies with the sentence that includes the words 'however...indeed'. 'However' rebuts the objection; 'indeed' conveys certainty; 'its' refers to the individual self...demonstrated by the norms of the sacred sciences. 'They must understand', that is, know it 'through God's grace', that is, through the favor of the Supreme Power.

"Who are 'they'? Those who follow God's eternal tradition (or community of believers), not others...

"The freed selves are of two kinds, the eternally free or the liberated (that is, 'freed' in the proper sense of the word).

"The 'eternally free' are those selves devoid of any connection with the nature that leads to birth in the womb, to age and death and to the experience of a body (deriving from such a nature). Their sole delight is the bliss of experiencing the eternal vision and praise of the Lord.

"The 'liberated' are those who are emancipated both from any connection with matter, a substance qualified by ignorance, which is beginningless karman in essence, and from its defects, like pain. They also are of two kinds. The first kind is characterized by an attainment of God's true nature (BG 4:10, 14:2 quoted). The second kind comprises those who are satisfied solely by attaining the joy of their own in being.

"The word 'and' (in Nimbārka's text) refers to the 'bound' selves, who are firmly implanted in bodies such as those of gods and animals, bodies that are the effects of the latencies (or seeds of transmigratory activity)of the beginningless karman, as

well as in the self-centeredness and pride connected with those bodies. They are designated by the word 'greedy' meaning those avid for the pleasure of material things. They also are twofold, the bound and the eternally bound. The bound are those ultimately destined for happiness the eternally bound, those who transmigrate for all eternity.

"The word 'devoted' connotes the seeker after liberation who is worthy of devotion (or praise),and who is inclined to a devotion consisting in practices of the senses directed to a connatural and limitless object of contemplation. "Seekers after liberation" are those who, though born with experiences 'arising' from personal and other multiple worldly pains, are rendered immune to them by God's power, and w ho seek freedom from rebirths. Those devotees are themselves of two kinds: those who yearn for a liberation that consists of the attainment of God's true nature, and those who yearn for the attainment of their own being. Hence, even if the self is established as twofold through the distinction of bound and free, even so 'they', that is, the followers of Viṣṇu, must understand that these selves are particularized by numerous subdivisions such as 'liberated', 'eternally free', 'bound', 'eternally bound', 'seeker after liberation' and so forth...."

Nimbārka's Verse 3 is:

3 (E9; T44) "The inconscient is conceived to be immaterial, material and temporal in essence. [The material inconscient is] described by the terms "*māyā*" and "*prakṛti*". And the distinctions of white [red and black, signifying matter's triple attributes] are also equally found in it.

(E9-14; T44-52) "The immaterial inconscient is an inconscient substance that is totally different from matter and time, luminous in essence and unconcealed by nature...

"Through the Lord's eternal will, immaterial substance is a multiple object of enjoyment for Himself and for His eternally freed ones, through the form of delectable possessions. It subserves the enjoyment of the Lord's form; it is the locus of his

adornments", etc....Established by the Lord's will that has no beginning or end, it is innately existent. Of those freed from bondage it is the link by means of the divine form, with the beginningless blessed beings. There is in it not the slightest suspicion of change through causality, as it impervious to change. And just as at the time of a festival gifts of clothes, adornment and jewelry...are given by kings to their servants, so too, at the time of the separation (of the liberated ones) from matter, the eternal objects are given them by the Supreme Person, objects that are free from all modifications, like the divine body and the forms that subserve it. This august body, like the divine essence, is the abode of endless auspicious attributes, that are unrestricted and infinite–like unsurpassed beauty, perfume, and youth. Applicable to it are texts of revelation" (a number of which, from the *Gītā* and various *Upaniṣads*, are provided).

"With the word 'material' Nimbārka introduces material substance, which is described by the terms '*māyā*' and "*prakṛti*". The word 'and' also includes categories like darkness and the unmanifest.

"Nimbārka then clarifies this teaching through a description of characteristics with the words "and the distinctions of white (red and black...) are also equally found in it.'...All this means is that matter is the receptacle of the attributes...The *guṇas* are *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*.

"Nimbārka first describes the phase of creation. In the beginning, at the end of dissolution and the beginning of creation, a great threefold motive for activity, differentiated in to the *guṇas* of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, originates in the independent entity of matter, the attributes being activated by the glance of the august supreme Person. Then arises egoism, the specific cause of the formation of self-awareness in the bodies of individual selves. That, too, is triply differentiated by the *guṇas* of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* and is identified respectively by the terms 'the modified' (or 'bright'), 'the fiery',

and 'the elemental'. From the modified proceed the deities presiding over the faculties and also mind, which, though a differentiation of state and of position in space, acquires the fourfold characteristic of the inner organ. Mentality (or 'mind-ness') is the cause of mental acts. This entity identified by words such as 'mind' is the cause of real bondage, but as related to renunciation and as inclining to the Lord and to His associates is the cause of liberation.

"Instinct, or the Prodigious, is the cause of (instinctual) knowledge. Egoism is the cause of [the] sense of 'I' in the body. The position of mind is in the throat; of instinct in the face, of egoism in the heart, of reflection in the navel. These are the positions of the faculties. Their presiding deities are respectively the moon, Brahmā, Rudra, and the knower of the field. The gods of the primary incarnations (described in the Pāñcarātra scriptures) Vāsudeva, Sankarṣana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are the respective inner controllers of these faculties, and accordingly are deserving of worship.

"Of the fiery mode of egoism the effects are the ten inner organs, which form two groups according as they have perceptual or motor characteristics. The five perceptual faculties are ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose; their presiding deities, respectively, are sky, air, sun, water and the *aśvins*; their respective objects are sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. The five motor organs are those of speech, the hands, the feet, the anus and the genitals; their respective deities Agni, Indra, Viṣṇu, Death, and the Creator; their respective objects are speech, grasping, walking, evacuation, and pleasure.

"From the elementally characterized darkness [*tamas*] mode of egoism arise the five subtle elements of sound, touch, for, taste and smell; and five gross element, space, air, fire, water, and earth. The substance of the darkness mode of egoism, concealed in intermediary space and subtly modified in essence, is to be identified by the term 'subtle element' in the same way as milk and curds and water in the atmosphere are

modified. Likewise, when the subtle elements attain a gross state they are to be described by the word "gross elements". Thus, from the darkness mode of egoism arises the subtle element sound, from which arises space; from space arises the subtle element touch; and from it air; from air arises the subtle element form, and from it fire; from fire arises the subtle element taste and from it water; from water arises the subtle element smell and from it earth.

"The qualities are sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. Earth has all these five qualities; water (only four) up to taste; fire (three) up to form; air (two) up to touch; space has only (one), sound.

"The breaths are five, the respiratory, the downward, the digestive (in the navel), the rising (in the throat), and the diffusive (or circulating). Animals like serpents and tortoises possess these breaths and are therefore not classified separately.

"There are thus twenty-four material categories: matter, the prodigious (or instinct), egoism, mind, and the ten faculties (five perceptual and five motor), the five subtle and the five gross elements. Of these the categories of matter, the prodigious intellect, egoism and the five gross elements are the material causes of the (gross) body, while the faculties (inherent in it) are like jewels in an ornament. With the gross body as the starting point are the five subtle elements, mind, the ten faculties and breath, all of which form the material cause of the subtle body. The world is shaped like a *kapittha* fruit (*feronia elephantum*); it is pentagonally formed, that is, started as a composite of the five great elements, constituted of the fourteen worlds, material in essence and worthy of being shunned by the seekers of liberation. The deities (that preside over the faculties) divide the five gross elements into two, and further divide the halves; they then unite each part with other peripheral parts and thus witness their pentadic aggregation: such is the character of the pentadic formation.

"All beings beginning with the prodigious and

proceeding down to the gross bodies, are transformed by food, which is why the body is said to be the food person. Endowed with perceptual faculties it is called the mind person; endowed with the motor qualities and the breaths it is called the breath person. The individual self is the knowledge person and the supreme Self, the bliss person.

Then follows the order of dissolution. Earth through the subtle element of smell merges into water; water through the subtle element of taste into fire; fire through the subtle element of touch into space; space, consisting of the subtle element of sound, is dissolved. The faculties merge into the darkness mode of egoism, air into its fiery mode, and the deities into the modified mode. The threefold egoism then merges into the prodigious (or instinct), and the prodigious into the unmanifested (or matter), and it into spirit (or person) who merges into the supreme Person.

"...Time is an entity characterized by unconsciousness and totally distinct from material and immaterial substance. It is eternal and all-pervading. It is the cause of past, present, and future, of slow and fast, as also of creation and dissolution; it is the specific cause of all activity starting with atoms and ending with the highest number (a hundred thousand billions, the second half of Brahmā's life, *parārdha*). The amount of time that the sun takes to cross the space occupied by an atom is called atomic time. Two atoms make a double-atom (*dvyaṇuka*); three atomic binaries, one *trasareṇu*; three *trasareṇus* one *truṭi*; a hundred *truṭis* one *vedha*; three *vedhas* a *lava*; three *lavas* a *nimeṣa*; fifteen *nimeṣas* a *kaṣṭha*; thirty *kaṣṭhas* a *kāla* (1.6 minutes); thirty *kālas* a *muhūrta* (48 minutes); thirty *muhūrtas* are [a] human day and night. Fifteen days equal a fortnight and two fortnights a month. Two months make a season and six months a half-year. The winter solstice is a night of the gods and the summer solstice a day. Three hundred and sixty days formed by the nights and days of the winter and summer solstices make up a year of the gods.

"The four *yugas* (or eons) consist of twelve thousand years of the gods, of which the *kṛtayuga* is made up of 4800 hundred years, and two *sandhyās*; the *tretāyuga*, of 3600 years, and two *sandhyās*; the *dvāparayuga*, of 2200 hundred years, and two *sandhyās*; the *kaliyuga*, of 2200 years and two *sandhyās*. A thousand cycles of these four *yugas* is one day of Brahmā; fourteen Manus are born on one such day as well as the seven *ṛṣis* and Indra. What fulfills the cycle of four *yugas* is a period of 71 such cycles, known as the duration of a Manu. Fourteen times this measure is a day of Brahmā; equal to the same period is his night. A hundred years according to the measure of such [a] day is the lifetime of a Brahmā. Half of it has passed, and of the remaining half, now current, the first eon is the eon of the boar. All that is material is dependent on time, and while time controls everything, it is itself controlled by the Supreme Person. In the playful manifestation of divine power the Supreme Lord's dependence on time is for the sake of appearance only, in the eternal manifestation of His power, the very suspicion of time's potency is nonexistent. For time is characterized by minutes and seconds and does not affect divine power...

7 (E21; T67) "The knowledge of all things derived from the texts of revelation and tradition is therefore wholly true, because it is in essence the Brahman itself. This is the belief of the knowers of the Vedas. But the triformity [of the categories] the Absolute or the Brahman, the Conscient or Soul, and the Inconscient or Matter] is also established by revelation and by Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras*.

(E23-24; T72-73) [Objection:] "If all of reality is none but... Brahman, then the categories of the conscient and the inconscient would be non-existent. Why then do you not abandon your insistence on the triad of categories and declare the all reality is indeed the one Brahman?

[Answer:] "Nimbārka advances his distinctive doctrine with the support of scripture and by affirming the truth of the

triad of categories with the words 'but the triformity' etc...The triformity of experiencer, experience, and control corresponds to reality.

[Objection:] "How so?"

[Answer:] "To this question Nimbārka responds with a rationally justifying qualification 'established by revelation and by Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtras*'.., which are the specific norms of determination, 'established', that is, determined as certain.

"Nimbārka refers to the authority of those who are worthy of the greatest trust with the words 'This is the belief of the knowers of the Vedas'. Hence, since Brahman is not different from the Brahman nature, from creation, maintenance and activity, and from its immanence in these functions, and since the triformity of categories is distinct in form according to scriptural proclamation and meditation, the universe that is different and non-different from Brahman, conscient and inconscient by nature, is 'the belief' or the ascertained truth 'of the knowers of the Vedas', that is the noble Sanatkumāra, Nārada, Vyāsa and other such persons.

(E25-26; T76-77) "Here ends the second compartment (chapter)...Now (in the third chapter) the means to liberation are explained. These are various, and are divided into (the practice of) works, knowledge, devotion, surrender and obedience to the teacher's command.

10 (E35; T92) "These [then] are the five themes that the good must meditate on: (1) the nature of the adored being [Kṛṣṇa]; (2) the nature of the adorer [the soul]; (3) the effect of God's grace; so (4) the supreme savor of devotion; and (5) the nature of the [two] factors hindering the realization of God."

(E36-37; T93-95) ""The effects of God's grace', that is to say, liberation–a sequence of experiences characterized by release, the destruction of all karman, the freeing of all ignorance without any residue, plenary in essence, its object the nature of ...Brahman, which is coterminous with the self itself.

This liberation is described in terms like the 'attainment of the Lord's being', 'communion' and 'similarity'...

"To explain: At the start the Lord turns His compassionate glance on a man who is being born. Then this man, from the moment of his birth, will be of a pure nature (or endowed with the quality of brightness) and become a seeker of liberation...

"Accordingly, since he has a yearning for liberation, the seeker strives for its attainment. Then, worshiped by salvific means like works and knowledge, the supreme Person Puruṣottama is pleased; under the semblance of supreme devotion or supreme knowledge He reveals Himself. The seeker after liberation, through experiencing the vision of the supreme Lord, attains to His being. The meaning is that those who are endowed with knowledge and devotion, entering into the Lortd through the vision generated by His grace, become participants in liberation...

(E37-39; T97- 106) "The hindrances ['the (two) factors hindering the realization of God' mentioned as the fifth theme in DS 10] are twofold, general and particular. The particular ones are spoken of first. They are the hindrances to the realization of the Lord which, due to the ignorance of the Self, run counter to His essence and knowledge, because they persist in attributing to God a mode of being alien to His nature. They also consist in the superimposition of ideas of non-self-hood and self-hood on the body, the senses, the mind, and reason; pride in acknowledging dependence with regard to the Lord and the teacher; indifference to...ignorance of the Lord, which takers the form of implausible reasoning and interpretation of scripture and tradition, an ignorance which relates to the divine character of the Self; a desire, based on false scriptures, to praise and worship other gods; and a persistence in egoism and possessiveness deriving from a conception of one's independence. Other hindrances may be added to this list, such as attributing to the Lord equality with the other gods; a sense

of eminence to other gods like Brahmā and Śiva; the characteristics of men or animals of the Lord's incarnations; the nature of the unconscious, as of stone and iron, to figures carved for the worship of the Lord, or to *śāligrama* stones; the general character of sound and word to the divine incarnations; the concept of similarity to popular narrative of the chants of the Lord; and the attributes of quality-less-ness, magic power, and affection by the three strands of matter to the august Vāsudeva, the supreme Brahman itself, the ocean of salutary attributes that are eternal, immaculate, innate, inconceivable, and coterminous with His existence. All these features conceal the essence of the Lord and act as hindrances to His realization... [Other such features are specified in subsequent sections.]

(E46-end; T106-end) "Now dispassion will be discussed. It is of two kinds–induced and spontaneous. The induced is that kind that arises from attachment to one's spiritual perfection and leads to separation from beloved son, wife and wealth, and to a yearning to esteemed poverty, which is opposed to wealth. If it comes about through lack of discrimination, it results in one going astray. But if it is aided by the compassionate glance of the Blessed Lord, Kṛṣṇa the august, the ocean of mercy, then an association is formed with the devotees of the Lord, who are adorned with knowledge and renunciation and are the recipients of the Lord's grace. Then he himself becomes an object of grace and states on the way prescribed by sacred teaching. On that way he praises the Lord and strives greatly to persist in it. He then fulfills in a proper manner; otherwise, through unsteadiness and by keeping company with evil persons, he lapses from the way.

"The second kind of dispassion is that of a person who has acquired a heap of merit after a thousand lives...Thus the man who has acquired the human state praised by scripture and tradition is unwilling to throw it away through a childish whim. In the course of his progress and mindful of faults, he listens to

conversation that takes place in the company of the good, where he comes to hear of the intrinsic painfulness of actions' results. He also experiences the pain arising from the wheel-like revolution of births and deaths, occurring in the present body both of himself and of other selves ('knowers of the field').

"The tremor that then arises in this seeker of liberation occasions a dispassion that is spontaneous. Because it springs from discrimination, it is an infallible means to liberation."

11.1 NANDADĀSA (1568), *Nimbārkatattvanirṇaya*

See NCat 9, 327 for citation of manuscripts.

11.2 NANDADĀSA, *Tattvasāra* on Nimbārka's *Daśaślokī*

Cf. NCat VIII.71, 356; IX, 32i 7.

12. VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU (1575)

See Volume Four of this *Encyclopedia*, pp. 375-376, for what is known or guessed (not much!) about this author, who contributed to the literature on Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta.

12.1 VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU (1575), *Vijñānāmṛta* on Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtras

The text is edited, for example, by Kedaranātha Tripāṭhī as Prācyavidyā Series: First Issue, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi 1979.

Surendranath Dasgupta, in HIP 3, the third volume of his History of Indian Philosophy, pp. 450 ff., provides the following information concerning the contents of this work.

Analyzed by Surendranath Dasgupta

"In the *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya* IV.1.3 Bhikṣu says that at the time of dissolution or emancipation the individuals are not

associated with any content of knowledge, and are therefore devoid of any consciousness, and being of the nature of unconscious entities like wood or stone they enter into the all-illuminating great self just as rivers enter into the ocean. Again, it is this self that out of his own will send them forth like sparks of fire and distinguishes them from one another and goads them to action. [Dasgupta provides the passage in Sanskrit.]

"This great self or *paramātman* is the inner-controller and mover of our selves. But it may be remembered that this great self is not also the ultimate Principle, the pure consciousness, but is the manifestation of the pure consciousness in association with the *sattvamaya* body. Under the circumstances the metaphysical position does not allow of any personal relation between the human beings and the ultimate Entity. But yet the personal relation with the divinity as the ultimate consciousness not being philosophically possible, that relation is ushered in more out of a theistic tendency of [Vijñāna]Bhikṣu than as a necessary natural conclusion...

"In the conception of *jīva* or individuals...there seems to be an apparent contradiction. For while the *puruṣas* are sometimes described as pure consciousness, they are at other times described as inert and wholly under the domination of *paramātman*. The contradiction is to be solved by the supposition that the inertness is only relative, i.e. the *puruṣas* are to be regarded as themselves inactive, being goaded to action by the inlying controller, *paramātman*. They are called "*jaḍa*", resembling stone or wood only in the sense that they are inactive in themselves. But this inactivity should not be associated with want of consciousness. Being sparks of the eternal consciousness they are always of the nature of consciousness. Their activity, however, is derived from the *paramātman*, so that, drawn by Him, they come out of the Eternal consciousness and play the role of a mundane individual and ultimately return to Brahman like rivers into the

ocean at the time of emancipation. This activity of God is an eternal activity, an eternal creative impulse which is absolutely without any extraneous purpose (*caramakāraṇasya kṛteḥ nityatvāt*).(I1.133)

"It proceeds from the spontaneous joy of God in a spontaneous manner like the process of breathing, and has no reference to the fulfilment of any purpose. In the *Vyāsabhāṣya* [on the *Yogasūtras*] it is said that the creation of God is for the benefit of living beings. But [Vijñāna]Bhikṣu does not support any purpose at all. This activity is sometimes compared with...purposeless playful activity. But Bhikṣu says that even if there is any slight purpose to play that also is absent in the activity of God. The action also proceeds spontaneously with the creative desire of God, for which no body or senses are necessary. He is identical with the whole universe and as such His action has no purpose outside of Himself, as in the case of ordinary actions. It is He who, depending upon the beginningless *karman* of human beings, makes them act for good and for evil. The *karman* itself, also, being a part of His energy and a manifestation of His impulse, cannot be regarded as limiting His freedom. (I1.133).

"The analogy of the doctrine of grace where the king bestows his grace or withholds it in accordance with the good or bad services of his servants is also regarded as helpful to conceive of the freedom of God in harmony with the deeds of the individual. If it is argued now, if the creative activity of "God is eternal, it can depend on the *karman*, Bhikṣu's reply is that the *karmans* act as accessory causes determining the eternal creative impulse of God as producing pleasurable and painful experiences. Following the trend of the Purāṇic method Bhikṣu further suggests that it is the Hiraṇyagarbha created by God who appears as the law-giver of the law of *karman*, as manifested in the spontaneous activity of God. It is He, therefore, who is responsible for the suffering of humanity in accordance with the *karmans*. God helps the process only by

letting it go on in an unobstructed manner. (I1.133).

"In another passage (I1.113) he says that God perceives within Himself as parts of Him the *jīvas* and their conditioning factors (*upādhi*) as associated with merit and demerit, associating these conditions with their *jīvas* He brings them out of Himself. He is thus the makers of selves, just as the potter is the maker of pots.

"The self is regarded as being itslf untouchable and devoid of any kind of attachment. The association between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, therefore, is not to be interpreted in the sense of a direct contact in the ordinary sense of the term, but the association is to be understood only as transcendental reflection through the conditioning factors which make the pure self behave as phenomenal self or *jīva*. The self has no knowledge as its quality or character, and is in itself pure consciousness, and there is at no time a cessation of this consciousness, which exists even during dreamless sleep. But in dreamless sleep there is no actual knowledge, as there is not content present at the time; and it is for that reason that the consciousness though present in the very nature of the self cannot be apperceived. The traces existing in the *antaḥkaraṇa* remain in a dissolved condition. Knowledge of contents or objects is possible only through reflections from the states of the intellect. The pure consciousness being identical with the self, there cannot also be the self-consciousness involving the notion of a duality as subject and object during dreamless sleep. The pure consciousness remains the same and it is only in accordance with changes of mental state that knowledge of objects arises and passes away. (2.3.5)

"The *jīvas* are thus not to be regarded as themselves the products of the reflection of *paramātman* as the Śaṃkarites suppose;' for in that case the *jīvas* would be absolutely unreal, and bondage and emancipation would also be unreal.

"The production, existence, maintenance, modification, decay and destruction of the world are from Brahman as God.

He holds within Himself all the energies constituting the *prakṛti* and *puruṣas*, and manifests Himself as other diverse forms. Brahman as pure consciousness is associated with the conditioning factor of His own being, the *māyā* as pure *sattva* quality in all this creative activity, so from that being who is devoid of all afflictions, *karmans* and their results are also produced. The fact that the *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2 says that Brahman is that from which the world has come into being and is being maintained implies that the world as it is in its own reality is an eternal fact in the very being of the ultimately real and the unmanifested. The production, the transformation and the destruction of the world are only its phenomenal aspect. (1.1.2)

"Brahman is also regarded as the *adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa*. This means that Brahman is the basis, the ground, the container (*ādhāra*)as it were of the universe in which it exists as undivided and as indistinguishable from it and which also holds the universe together. Brahman is the cause which holds together the material cause of the universe so that it may transform itself into it. (1.1.2)

"Brahman is the principle or ultimate cause which renders all other kinds of causality possible. In the original Brahman, the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* exist in the eternal consciousness and as such are held together as being one with it. The Brahman is neither changeable nor identifiable with *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It is because of this that, though Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness and unchangeable, yet it is regarded as being one with the universe and as the material cause. The material cause or *upādānakāraṇa* is the name which is given to changing material cause (the *vikārikāraṇa*) and to the causal locus (*adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa*). The underlying principle of both the ground cause and the material cause is that the effect is held in it as merged in it or indistinguishable from it. (1.1.2)

"The idea involved in *avibhāṅga* or oneness with the

cause is not regarded as an ordinary relation of identity but as a sort of non-relational relation or a situation of uniqueness which cannot be decomposed into its constituents so that a relational bond may be affirmed of them. The upshot of the whole position is that the nature of the universe is so founded in Brahman which forms its ground that it cannot be regarded as a mere illusory appearance of it or as a modification or a product of it; but while these two possible ways of relation between the cause and the effect fail, the universe as such has no existence, significance or meaning without the ground in which it is sustained and which helps its evolutionary process. The ordinary relation of the sustainer and the sustained is inadequate here, for it implies a duality or independent existence; in the present case, however, where Brahman is regarded as the ground cause there is no such duality and the universe cannot be conceived as apart from Brahman which forms its ground and essence while remaining unchanged in its transcendent reality. Thus, though it may have to be acknowledged that there is a relation between the two, the relation has to be conceived as the transcendental one, of which no analogy is found elsewhere. The seeming pictorial analogy which falls far short of the situation is to be found in the case where water is mixed with milk. Here the existence of the water is dependent upon the existence of the milk so long as the two exist in a mixed condition; and neither of them can be conceived without the other. (1.1.2)

"The nature of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* is also manifested from the essence of God's nature as pure consciousness. The causality of substance, qualities and actions is also due to the underlying essence of God which permeates all things. The difference between the relation of [inherence] *samavāya* and this unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground is that while the former applies to the case of the intimate relation of the effects in and through themselves, the latter refers only to the special fact of the indistinguishable

character of the effect in the cause, and has no reference to the relation of the effect-parts among themselves with reference to the whole as an inseparable concatenation of effects. The ordinary organic relation such as that which subsists between the parts of a living body is thus different from that which is referred to here as the indistinguishable character of the effects in the ground. The parts of the universe as comprising the living and the non-living may be regarded as inseparably united with one another in the whole, but such a relation is an intimate relation between the effects, and the whole is nothing but an assemblage of these. This is what may be called the special feature of [the] *samavāya* [inherence] relation. But in the unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground the effect subsists in the ground in such a manner that the effect has no separate reality from this cause. (1.1.2)

"He also describes this type of causation as being a locus, "*adhiṣṭhāna*", a term with which we are familiar in Śāṃkara Vedānta. But the difference between the two kinds of conception of causal locus (*adhiṣṭhāna kāraṇa*) is indeed very great, for while Bhikṣu considers this to be the unchangeable ground which sustains the movements of the principle of change in it in an undivided unity, Śamkara regards *adhiṣṭhāna* as the basis of all changes which are unreal in themselves. According to Bhikṣu, however, the changing phenomena are not unreal, but they are only changes which are the modifications of a principle of change which subsists in an undivided unity with the ground cause. When they say that the world is both being and non--being (*sad-asadrūpa*), and is hence unreal and illusory, the Śaṃkarits suffer from a grave misconception. The world is called *sat* and *asat* (being and non-being) because it represents the principle of becoming or change. It is affirmed as 'this' and yet because it changes it is again not affirmed as "this'. The future forms of the changing process are also non-existent as it were in the present form and the present form is also non-existent as it were in the future forms that are to be. Thus, any

of its forms may be regarded as not existing and hence false when compared with an entity that always exists and in the same form. All objects of the world so far as they are past and future are contradicted by the present states, and are therefore regarded as false, but so far as they are perceived in their present state they are regarded as real. (1.13)

"The universe has, however, an eternal and immutable form as pure consciousness in the very nature of Brahman from which it is separated out as the world of matter and selves. The pure consciousness in itself is the only ultimate reality which is every the same and is not subject to any change or process of becoming. Both the individual selves and the world of matter are ultimately dissolved and merged in Brahman, the pure and ultimate consciousness. These, therefore, are regarded as being names and forms which compared with the ultimate changeless Reality, Brahman. (1.13)

"But this does not mean that the universe of matter and selves is absolutely unreal and mere *māyā* or illusion. If all that appears were absolutely false, then all moral values would disappear and all notions of bondage and emancipation would become meaningless. If the falsity of all things except the pure consciousness can be proved by any means, that itself would prove that such proofs have validity and that therefore there are other things over and above pure consciousness which may be valid. If such proofs are invalid but can establish the validity of pure consciousness as against the validity of all other things, then such proofs may also prove the reality of all other things in the world. It may be held that what ordinary people consider as true can be proved to be invalid by what is regarded by them as valid means of proof; but on the Śaṃkarite view nothing is regarded as valid and therefore there are no proofs by which the validity of the world-process can be maintained. But the reply that naturally comes to such a view is that though the validity of the world may not be proved, yet that does not lead to the conclusion that the world-process is unreal; for even if its

validity is not proved, its validity or reality may at least be doubtful. There is, therefore, nothing by which we may come to any conclusion about its invalidity or unreality. The reality of the universe is of a different order from that of Brahman, which is the nature of pure consciousness, as the former consists of practical efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). But even though in the state of a changing process the reality of the world is only its reality as beginning and as causal efficiency, yet it has also an ultimate reality in itself, since it has come into being from the ultimate reality, Brahman. The world of matter and selves exists in God as pure consciousness and therefore as one with Him. When from out of its state as pure consciousness it is manifested as the world of matter and selves, we mark it as the state of creation. When again they retire back into God as being one with His consciousness, that is marked as the state of dissolution. (1.14)

"When the scriptural texts speak of the identity of the world and Brahman they refer to this ultimate state in which the world exists in the pure consciousness–Brahman as one with it. But it is not only in the state of dissolution that the world exists in Brahman in undivided unity, but in the state of creation also the world exists in Brahman as one with it, for all the so-called mechanical and other kinds of forces that are to be found in matter and which constitute its reality are but the energy of God. and as the energy is always conceived as being one with that which possesses it, it is believed that the world with all its changes exist in God. (1.14)

In the state of dissolution the world-energies exist in God as some form of consciousness or conscious energy which is later on manifested by Him as material energy or matter. The unity of the world-energies in God is such that though these retain some kind of independence yet it is so held up and mixed up as it were in the reality of God that it cannot be separated from Him. Their independence consists in the fact that they are of the nature of energy, but as God possesses them they can

have no existence and they cannot be conceived as apart from Him. As thus described the world of matter has no permanent reality, and consciousness of this fact may be called the [sublation] *bādha* or contradiction (*pāramārthika-sattvā-bhāva-niścaya eva bādhaḥ*) (1.14).But in spite of this *bādha* the universe has a relative or *vyāvahārika* existence (*tādṛśa-bādhe'pi sati jñāna-sādhanā-dīnāṃ vyāvahārikasatattvāt).*

"The causality of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is limited to their specific capacities which determine the nature of modifications. But God is the universal all-cause behind them which not only shows itself through these specific limitations but which regulates the inner harmony and order subsisting in them and in their mutual relations. Thus the visual organ is limited in its function to the operation of vision, and the tactile organ is limited in its function to the operation of touch, but the functions and activities of all these are organized by the individual self which operates and manifests itself through them. Thus Brahman in this sense may be regard as being both the instrumental and the material cause. (1.1.2)

"According to Sāṃkhya and Yoga...*prakṛti* is supposed to be associated with...*puruṣa* through the inner and inherent teleology, but according to the Vedāntic view as interpreted by Bhikṣu their mutual association is due to the operation of God. (1.1.2)

"It is urged that the individual selves are derived from God just as sparks come out of fire or the son comes out of the father. The individual selves resemble God so far as they are of the nature of pure consciousness. But though they have come out of Him, yet they retain their individuality and thus peserve..the sphere of their moral career. The individual selves are free and emancipated in their own nature, they are all-pervasive and they also hold the universe within them in their consciousness. In all these they share the nature of Brahman. But in association with the limiting conditions (*upādhi*) they appear as finite and limited. When the entire career of the

individual selves is known as existing in Brahman as part of it, as being manifested out of it as separate entities, as leading a career of their own in association with the limiting conditions and ultimately dissociating themselves from them and realizing their own natures as one with Brahman and in a sense different from it, this is the true philosophical knowledge and realization of their own nature. When the individuals start their career and destiny in life they are different from Brahman; but there was a time when they remained in one undivided unity with Brahman. But in spite of this unity ...Brahman is always felt as different and as the other of the individuals, and this difference is never cancelled. (1.1.2)

"The difference that exists between the individuals and Brahman is most apparent during the mundane career on account of the fact that the world of nature has a separate existence in the consciousness of the individual centers and each one of them is limited to his own experiences. But at the time of dissolution, when the world of nature merges in...Brahman as a potential level of its energies, the individuals are also merged in it and have no separate spheres of experience for themselves and thus cease to have any descriptive definition of themselves.

"The nature of the relation of part and whole that exists between the individuals and Brahman is regarded as that subsisting between the son and the father. The father is reborn in the son. Before birth the son lies in a state of undivided unity in the vital energy of the father and yet when he separates out of him it is the same vital energy of the father that repeats itself in its new career and has a sphere of activity which is definitely its own. Again, when it is said that the individuals are parts of Brahman, it should not be interpreted to mean that they have any share in the existence of Brahman as God or world-creator. God is not homogeneous in His nature, but the element of individuation and differentiation always exists in Him. Had He been a homogeneous being His parts would have no specific

differentiation and they would be like the parts of space which are always indistinguishable from one another. But the fact that God has within Him the principle of differentiation explains the fact that the individuals resemble Brahman only in the aspect of this consciousness but have no share in His creative functions or omnipotence. The Sāṃkhyists hold that salvation is attained through dissociation of attachment as 'mine' to one's experiences, mental faculties, senses, understanding and body, owing to one's knowledge of the fact that the self is the self-shining entity to which all experiences appear and within which they are held together as one with it though they are all different from it. But the Vedānta as herein interpreted holds that the attachment as 'mine' vanishes with the knowledge of self as pure consciousness, with the knowledge of God as the being from which they come into being, by which they are maintained and into which they ultimately return, and with the knowledge that they all exist in the consciousness of God as parts of it; and that the self is not the real experiencer of the experiences but is only the consciousness in which the universe and its experiences shine forth. Thus, though both in the Sāṃkhya and in the Vedānta as herein interpreted salvation is attained through the dissolution of the false attachment as 'mine-ness', the dissolution of mine-ness' is here due to an entirely different philosophical conception.

"Consciousness is not a quality but it is the very substance of the self. Just as light is a substance which illuminates other things, so consciousness is also a substance which illuminates other things. When one says "I know it', knowledge appears to be a quality of 'I' which is neither self nor a homogeneous entity. The 'I' is a complex of sense-faculties, understanding, etc., to which a quality can be attributed; the self is not a complex entity but a homogeneous simple substance—consciousness. The complex entity, the 'I', expresses all things by a manifestation of consciousness. Bliss or happiness, however, cannot be regarded as a self-revealing

substance, but it is an independent substance like sorrow which is revealed by consciousness. Neither Brahman nor the self can therefore be regarded as being of the nature of bliss or happiness as this is a modification of *prakṛti* and has therefore to be regarded as visible (*dṛśya*) and not as vision. Consciousness requires the intermediary of intellectual functions for the illumination of objects, but consciousness in itself does not require the intermediary of any other functions, as such a view would lead only to an infinite regress without solving the point at issue. It is also wrong to suppose that the principle of consciousness exercises any operation in order to reveal itself, for an entity cannot operate on itself (*karman-kartṛ-virodhāt*). If for the above reasons the self cannot be regarded as being of the nature of bliss, then at the time of salvation also there cannot be any bliss in the self. There is only a cessation of sorrow at that time, or rather a cessation of both happiness and sorrow which is technically called a state of happiness or *sukha (sukhaṃ duḥkha-sukhā-tyayaḥ)*. (1.1.2)

"At the time of emancipation all conditioning factors such as the intellectual functions and the like are dissolved and as a consequence thereof all experiences of pleasure and pain also vanish, for these are substances belonging to objects which were presented to the self through these conditions. When the Upaniṣads say that the self is dearest to us, it need not necessarily be supposed that it is the pleasure that is dearest to us, for the self may be regarded as being valued for its own sake; it may also be supposed that pleasure here means the cessation of pain. (1.1.2)

"The desire for immortality or conditioned existence of the self illustrates the feeling of fondness that we all have for ourselves. The other view, that the ultimate object of realization is extermination of all sorrow is also not open to any objection on the ground that pleasure and pain never belonged the selves; for the association of pleasure and pain is only with reference to their enjoyment and suffering and not directly as

a bond of attachment to the self. The term "*bhoga*", which may be translated only semi-accurately as "experience", has a twofold application as referring to the intellect and to puruṣa. *Prakṛti* is composed of *sukha, duḥkha* and delusional substances, and the intellect is an evolute of *prakṛti;* therefore when the intellect is in association with *sukha* or *duḥkha*, such an association supplies the intellect with the stuff of which it is made and thus sustains and maintains its nature and constitution. But when the word '*bhoga*' has a reference to *puruṣa* it means that the pleasure or sorrow held in the intellect is reflected on it and is thereby intuited. It is this realization of pleasure and pain through their reflection in the *puruṣa* that is regarded as their *bhoga* or experience by *puruṣa*. The intellect cannot have any *bhoga* or experience, even in a remote sense of the term, for the simple reason that it is unconscious. But it may well be argued that since the *puruṣa* is not in reality the ego it cannot have any experience in any real sense of the term; and since it cannot in reality have any experience of sorrow, it cannot in reality regard its cessation as being of the utmost value to it. The reply to such an objection is that the realization of the fact that the cessation of sorrow is of ultimate value to the experiencer, the *puruṣa*, leads the intellect on its onward path of progress. Had it not been so there would be no movement of the intellect on lines of utility. So though pleasure and pain do not belong to *puruṣa*, they may yet be experienced by it and the intellect may be guided by such experiences.

"When the Upaniṣad says 'that art thou', the idea at the back of it is that the self is not to be identified with any of the elements of the intellect–or with any of the evolutes of *prakṛti*. The self is part of the pure consciousness–Brahman. When a man learns from the Upaniṣad text or one's teacher that he is a part of Brahman he tries to realize it through a process of meditation. The difference of the Vedāntic view from that of Sāṃkhya is that the latter rests with individual selves as the ultimate entities whereas the former emphasizes Brahman as

the ultimate reality, and also the fact that the reality of all other things, the selves and matter, depends ultimately on the participation in it.

"'Cause' may be defined as the productivity due to direct and immediate perception of the material cause. The intellect is regarded as an effect because, like jugs and other things, it is produced through some direct and immediate realization of its causal material. This naturally implies that the intellect has a causal material which is directly produced by some Being and to which His creative activity is directed and this Being is God. It is said in the *Brahmasūtras* that Brahman can be known by the testimony of the scriptures. But this cannot be true, for the Upaniṣads say that Brahman cannot be expressed by words or known by intellect. The reply to this is that the denial contemplated in such passages refers only to the fact that Brahman cannot be known in entirety or in its uniqueness by the scriptural texts, but these passages do not mean that it is not possible to have a generic knowledge of the nature of Brahman. It is only when we have such a generic knowledge from the scriptures that we enter the sphere from which we may proceed further and further through the processes of *yoga* and have ultimately a direct intuitive apperception of it. 'The specific nature of God is devoid of any utility or character' only means His nature is different from the nature of all other things, and though such a nature may not be realized by ordinary perception, inference or other sources of knowledge, there cannot be any objection to its being apprehended by the realization of yogic meditation. There are some Vedāntists who think that Brahman cannot be felt or apprehended intuitively, but there is a mental operation which has Brahman as its object. Such a mental state destroys ignorance and as a result of this Brahman shines forth. But Bhikṣu objects to this and says that the mental operation is admitted for relating the consciousness or the self with object, but once this connection is effected the objects are directly apprehended; so, in order to bring Brahman

within the sphere of knowledge, the intuitive apperception is in itself sufficient for the purpose. It cannot be held that, since Brahman is itself of the nature of pure illumination, no special intuitive apprehension is necessary and that the existence of the mental function or *vṛtti* was admitted for explaining the dissolution of *ajñāna;* for Brahman, being of the nature of consciousness, can be realized only through intuitive apprehension which is itself of the nature of knowledge. Since all apprehension is direct and immediate, self-knowledge must also be of the same kind is also no need to assume a principle of limitation which has to be overcome as a condition of the rise of knowledge. In the state of deep dreamless sleep a principle of limitation in the shape of the function of *tamas* has to be admitted in order to explain the absence of knowledge which leads to the absence of all cognitive or practical behavior. To the opponent's idea that since Brahman is self-luminous it cannot have any relation with anything else, and that since Brahman and the self are identical there cannot be any self-knowledge of Brahman, for Brahman cannot be both the knower and the known, Bhikṣu's reply is that self-luminousness does not mean unrelatedness; and the absolute identity of the self and Brahman cannot also be admitted, and even if it be admitted we can explain the method of Brahman-knowledge in the same manner in which our experiential knowledge or self-consciousness can be explained.

"Bhikṣu thinks that since we do not find in the *Brahmasūtras* any account of the origin and growth of knowledge, the Sāmkhya-Yoga account of knowledge may well be accepted on account of the general affinity of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga ideas with the Vedānta. According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga there is first a contact of the senses with their respective objects and as a result the *tamas* aspect of the intellect is subordinated at the time; and the intellect as pure *sattva* assumes the form of the object This state of the intellect is called an objective state or a sensory idea or state (*sā buddhyavasthā viṣayā-kārā buddhi-*

vṛttir ity ucyate). During dreams and contemplative states images of external objects arise in the mind and are direct perceived and therefore valid. The connection of the *puruṣa* with the external objects is thus effected through the intermediary of the intellect So long as the intellect remains impure the *puruṣa* cannot get itself related to objects through it. It is for this reason that during deep sleep when the intellect is dominated by *tamas* the *puruṣa*-consciousness cannot manifest itself or make itself related with other objects. As soon as the intellect is modified into a sensory or image-state it is reflected in the *puruṣa,* which then reveals it as a flash of conscious state. It is in this manner that the pure infinite consciousness can manifest itself into finite forms of objects. As the intellect is constantly transforming itself into various forms and reflecting them on the *puruṣa* from beginningless time there is a continuous flow of conscious states only occasionally punctuated by dreamless sleep. The *puruṣa* in its turn is also reflected in the intellect and thereby gives rise to notion of ego. In this connection Bhikṣu criticizes the view of Vācaspati that the reflection of the *puruṣa* in the intellect is sufficient to explain the cognitive situation, and says that a reflection of consciousness cannot itself be conscious and hence cannot explain why the states of the intellect should appear as conscious. But the assumption that the states of the intellect are reflected in consciousness explains their real connection with consciousness. It may be said that since it is only the reflections that are associated with consciousness, the things as they exist are not known. The reply to such an objection is that the states of the intellect are but copies of external objects; and if the copies are intelligized, we have in the validity of such direct acquaintance of the copies the guarantee of their application to objects. It may be said again that when the reflections of the states of the intellect in consciousness appear as one with it and therefore produce the phenomenon of knowledge we have in such phenomena an illusory unity of consciousness with the

state; our knowledge then becomes illusory. The reply to such an objection is that even if there is an element of illusion in knowledge, that does not touch the reality and validity of the objects to which such knowledge refers. Valid awareness (*pramā*) thus consists of this reflection of the states of the intellect in the *puruṣa*. The result of the cognitive process (*pramāṇa-phala*) belongs to the pure consciousness or the *puruṣa* who thus behaves as the knower, though he is absolutely unattached to all experiences. The Vaiśeṣikas lay stress on the appearance of knowledge as produced and destroyed and therefore regard knowledge as being produced or destroyed by the collocation of causes. The reflection of the mental states to *puruṣa* is explained by them as if knowledge belonged to the self. The Vedāntic epistemological process in which the *puruṣa* appears to be the knower and experiencer is explained by them as being due to a separate cognitive process called after-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*).

"The transcendental experience of God has also to be explained on the basis of the origin of ordinary experiential knowledge. Through the understanding of the meaning of the scriptural texts and by the processes of *yoga* there arises in the intellect a modification of the form 'I am Brahman'. This valid form of modification being reflected in the *puruṣa,* is revealed as an intuitive apperception of the fact as true self-knowledge belonging to *puruṣa*. The difference between ordinary experiential knowledge and this knowledge is that it destroys arrogance. In such a conception of self-knowledge the objection that the self cannot be both the knower and the known does not hold good; for the self that is known, being a mental state, is different in character from the transcendent self which knows it. The transcendent self as such is the knower, while its reflection on the intellect as coming back to it is the self that is known. (1.13)

"The objection that the admission of the possibility of self-knowledge stands against the doctrine of the self-luminosity

of the self is not valid. The self-luminosity of the self simply means that it shines by itself and does not require the aid of any conditions to manifest itself.

Citsukha has defined self-luminosity as that which not being knowable may yet be treated or felt as immediate (*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam*). Bhikṣu argues that such a definition of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) is quite inadmissible. It is nowhere so defined in the Upaniṣads and its does not follow from the etymology of the word "*svaprakāśatva*". The etymology only indicates the meaning 'known by itself'. Again, if a thing is not known or cognized, it cannot for that simple reason have any relation to us; and such a meaning would be directly against the scriptural testimony which affirms that the ultimate truth can be apprehended or intuited. It may be suggested that though the Brahma-state of the mind cannot be directly known yet it will sill have the effect of removing the ignorance in the *puruṣa*. But this is open to various objections. Firstly, the self-luminous is a valid means of knowledge–a *pramāṇa*; but the mere removal of the ignorance from the *puruṣa* cannot be regarded as knowledge or a *pramāṇa*. In this connection it is also relevant to ask the meaning of the term "*avidyā*". If it means an illusory mental state, it must be a state of the intellect, and its destruction must also belong to the intellect and not to the *puruṣa*. If it means the psychical instincts or root-inclinations which are the cause of errors, then also since such root-instincts belong to the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* the destruction of such root-instincts must also qualify *prakṛti*. If it is regarded as a *tamas*-substance which covers the self, the supposition would be inadmissible, for if the *tamas* inherent in the intellect is not removed there cannot be any modification of the intellect copying the object in it, and if the *tamas* in the intellect is once so removed then there cannot be any reflection of it in the *puruṣa*. Thus the view that knowledge leads to the dissolution of the veil of ignorance cannot be supported. The veil is only related to the instruments of

knowledge, such as the eye, and cannot therefore be regarded as having anything to do with pure consciousness. The explanation of the rise of knowledge as being due to the removal of the veil in pure consciousness cannot therefore be justified. There cannot be any veil in the self. If the self be of the nature of pure consciousness, there cannot be any veil of ignorance inherent in it as the two suppositions are self-contradictory. Again, if it supposed that the world-appearance is due to the operation of the principle of ignorance in the mind and if it is supposed that knowledge dispels such ignorance, then we are led to the absolutely unwarrantable conclusion that the world may bye destroyed by knowledge, or that when one self attains knowledge the world-appearance as such ceases, or that when emancipation is attained during the lifetime of a saint he will have no experience of the world around him. If it is held that the emancipated saint has still an element of ignorance in him, then the theory that knowledge destroys ignorance has to be given up. Moreover, if the self be regarded as being absolutely unattached to anything (*asaṅga*), it is wrong to suppose that it would be associated with ignorance. The veil can have reference only to the mental states, but it cannot have any relation to pure and unchangeable consciousness; for we have no analogy for such a thing. Again, if it is held that there is natural association of ignorance with pure consciousness, such an association can never be broken off. If such an association be regarded as the consequence of some causal condition, it may well be said that such causality may be found in the mental states themselves. At least this would be a much simpler supposition than the primary assumption of a relationship of ignorance with pure consciousness and then to assume the operation of the mental states to dissolve it. The association of a veil with the mental states has to be admitted at least in the case of deep sleep, swoon or senility. Thus, if the veil has to be associated with the mental states as the instrument of knowledge, it is quite

unnecessary to assume it with reference to the self or pure consciousness. Patañjali, in his *Yogasūtras*, has defined ignorance as a mental state which apprehends the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, pleasure as sorrow. It is not, therefore, to be regarded as a separate substance inseparably associated with pure consciousness. In the same way it is wrong to define knowledge as the cessation of ignorance, which belongs to the *puruṣa* in this capacity. The proper way of representing it would be to say that knowledge arises in the *puruṣa* with the cessation of ignorance in the mental states. With the rise of the final knowledge as 'I am Brahman' towards which the whole teleological movement of *prakṛti* for the *puruṣa* was tending, the ultimate purpose of *prakṛti* for the sake of the *puruṣa* was realized, and that being so the teleological bond which was uniting or associating the intellect with the *puruṣa* is torn asunder and the mind or the intellect ceases to have any function to discharge for the sake of the *puruṣa*. With the destruction of false awareness all virtue and vice also cease and thus there is the final emancipation with the destruction of the integrity of the intellect. Ignorance, egoism, passion, aversion, self-love (*abhiniveśa*) may all be regarded as ignorance which is their cause, and ignorance may also be regarded as *tamas* which is its cause. This *tamas* obstructs the manifestation of *sattva* and it is for this reason that there is false awareness. When the *tamas* is dominated by the *sattva*, the *sattva* manifests through its instrumentality the ultimate self. The words '*jñāna*' and '*ajñāna*' are used in scriptures to denote *sattva* and *tamas*. The word '*tamas*' is used to denote *ajñāna* and there is no such *ajñāna* as indescribable or indefinite entity as is supposed by the Śaṃkarites. In ordinary experiential awareness this *tamas* is only temporarily removed, but in the case of the rise of true and ultimate knowledge the power of the *guṇas* to undergo modification for the sake of the relevant *puruṣa* is destroyed. Before the *sattva* can show itself in its own *vṛtti* or state, it must dominate the

tamas which would have resisted its actual state (*tattva*). Thus the ontological opposition of the *sattva* and the *tamas* must settle their differences before a psychological state can make its appearance.

"The ordinary classical Sāṃkhya is well known to be atheistic and the problem arises as to how this may be reconciled with theism and the doctrine of incarnations. In interpreting *sūtra* 1.1.5 of the *Brahmasūtras*, Bhikṣu says that since the scriptures say that 'it perceived or desired', Brahman must be a Person, for desire or perception cannot be attributed to the inanimate pre-matter (*prakṛti*). Śaṃkara , in interpreting this *sūtra*, asserts that the purport of the *sūtra* is that *prakṛti* is not the cause of the world because the idea of *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is unVedic. Bhikṣu quotes a number of passage from the Upaniṣads to show that the idea of *prakṛti* is not unVedic. *Prakṛti* is spoken of in the Upaniṣads as the cause of the world as the energy of God. *Prakṛti* is also spoken of as *māyā* in the *Śvetāśvatara*, and God is spoken of as *māyavī* or the magician who holds within Himself the magic power. The magician may withhold his magic, but the magic power lies all the same in him (*māyāyā vyāpāra-nirvṛttir evā'vagamyate na nāśaḥ*). (1.1.5) The ordinary *prakṛti* is always undergoing change and transformation and it is only the special *sattva*-stuff associated with God that is always regarded as unchanging.

"A question that may naturally arise in this connection is, if God is Himself unchangeable and if the *sattva*-body with which He is always associated is also always unchangeable, how is it that God can have a desire to produce the world at any particular time? The only explanation of this is that the attribution of will to God at a particular creative moment is only a loose usage of language. It means only that when the proper collocation of the causal conditions is ready for emergence into creative production at any particular point of time, it is designated as the manifestation of the creative will of God. God's knowledge and will cannot have a beginning in time

(1.1.5) But if God's creative will be regarded as the cause of the movement of *prakṛti*, then the Sāṃkhya view that the movement of *prakṛti* is solely due to its inherent teleology to be of service to the *puruṣa* becomes indefensible. The *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* in the intellect are indeed regarded in Sāṃkhya as the triad of three persons, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara–the three created gods as it were (*janeśvara*). But the Sāṃkhya does not believe in any eternal God (*nityeśvara*). According to Yoga the *sattva* part of theintellect associated with eternal powers and existing eternally in the emancipated state is the person called *īśvara*. His *sattva* body is, however, of the nature of an effect as it is derived from the *sattva* part of the intellect and His knowledge is also not timeless.

"In justification of Sāṃkhya, Bhikṣu maintains that the denial of God by the Sāṃkhya may be interpreted to mean that there is no necessity of admitting God for salvation. Salvation may be achieved by self-knowledge also. If this process is to be adopted, then it becomes quite unnecessary to prove the existence of God. It may, however, be remarked in this connection that this explanation of Bhikṣu can hardly be regarded as correct, for the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* [of Vijñānabhikṣu] is not merely silent about God, but it makes a positive effort to prove the non-existence of God, and there is not one redeeming statement that can be interpreted to mean that Sāṃkhya was not antagonistic to theism. Bhikṣu, however, further reiterates that Sāṃkhya was not atheistic and refers to the statement in the *Śvetāśvatara* (VI.16) that salvation can be obtained by knowing the ultimate cause as declared in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and to the statement of the *Gītā* where atheism is regarded as a demonic view.

"In referring to Yoga, Bhiksu says that it is curious that though the Yoga admitted the existence of God yet it did not make any effort to repudiate the idea that He might be partial or cruel; and instead of giving God His true cosmological place accepted a naturalistic view that *prakṛti* of itself passes through

the transformatory changes, being determined by its own inherent teleology in relation to the *puruṣas*. *Īśvara*, in Patañjali's *Yogasūtras*, is an object of Yoga meditation and He shows His mercy to his devotees and other beings. Bhikṣu, however, thinks that unless God is made to serve cosmological purpose the association of *prakṛti* with the *puruṣa* cannot be explained.

"In the *Gītā* Kṛṣṇa says that He is the highest *puruṣa* and that there is nothing higher than Him. Bhikṣu gives two explanations of such statements which seem to be in opposition to the concept of God explained above. One explanation is that the reference of Kṛṣṇa as God to Himself is only a relative statement, made in a popular manner which as no reference to the nature of absolute God who is unrelationable to ordinary experience. The other explanation is that Kṛṣṇa calls Himself God by feeling Himself as identified with God. There is thus a distinction between *parabrahman* and *kāryabrahman*. When other beings identify themselves with *brahman*, such identification is true only with reference to *kāryabrahman*, Śrī Kṛṣṇa or Nārāyaṇa. They therefore have no right to speak of themselves as the absolute God. Beginingless absolute Brahman is unknown and unknowable, even by the goḍs and the sages. It is only Nārāyaṇa who can know Him in His absolute nature. Nārāyaṇa is therefore to be regarded as the wisest of all beings. (1.15)

"Those beings who in the previous creation became one with God by *sāyujyamukti* exist in the *Vāsudevavyūha*. In the *Vāsudevavyūha* Vāsudeva alone is the eternal God; the other beings are but His parts. The other *vyūhas*, such as Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, are but the manifestations of Vāsudeva and they are to be regarded as partial creations of God or as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. The power of the lesser gods, Viṣṇu or Śiva, is limited, since they cannot produce any change in the regulation of cosmic affairs. When they speak of themselves as the Supreme God they do so

only by a process of self-identification with the absolute God. The category (*tattva*) of the intellect, with its threefold aspects as *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, forms the subtle body of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva or Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. These three gods, therefore, are supposed to have the one body, the intellect, which forms the basic foundation and locus of all cosmic evolution. It is for this reason that they are said to have the cosmos or the universe as their body. These three deities are regarded as mutually interdependent in their operations, like *vāta, pitta* and *kapha*. It is for this reason that they are said to be both different from one another and yet identical. (1.15) These three deities are identical with the intellect, which again is the unity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. It is for this reason that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara are to be regarded as the partial manifestations (*aṃśāvatāram*) of gods and not direct incarnations.

"The penetration of *īśvara* into *pradhāna* and *puruṣa* is through His knowledge, will and effort by which He rouses the *guṇas* and helps the production of the intellect. Bhikṣu takes great pains to show that Bhagavān or absolute God is different from Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu who are direct manifestations of Him just as sons are of the father. Bhikṣu here differs from the opinion of the Pāñcarātra school and of other thinkers such as Madhva, Vallabha and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas who regard Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa as identical with God. The other *avatāras*, such as the Matsya, Kūrma, etc., are regarded by Bhikṣu as the *līlāvatāra* of Viṣṇu and the *āveśāvatāra* of God as *bhagavān* or *parameśvara*.

"Bhikṣu says that since without power God alone is unable to create the manifold universe it has to be admitted that God does so by a power distinct from Him, and this power if *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. If it is said that this power is ignorance, then also since it is a dual factor separate from Brahman that may as such nullify the monistic doctrine as the admission of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It cannot also be said that in the time of

dissolution ignorance is non-existent, for in that case there being only Brahman the world would have to be admitted as coming into being from Brahman alone, and the selves that lie identified with Brahman and one with Him would, even though emancipated, undergo the world-process (*saṃsāra*). If it held that bondage and emancipation are all imaginary, then there is no reason why people should undergo so much trouble in order to attain an imaginary emancipation. If it is held that ignorance may be said to have a secondary or *vyāvahārika* existence at the time of dissolution, and if it is argued that under the circumstances bondage and emancipation may also be regarded as having a merely secondary existence, the view of monism would be unexceptional. But if such an ignorance be admitted which has mere *vyāvahārika* or secondary existence, the same may be supposed with regard to *pradhāna*. If we inquire into the meaning and significance of the term *vyāvahārika*, we find that its connotation is limited to the power of effectuation and service towards the fulfilment of a purpose. If that is so, then *prakṛti* may also be admitted to have a similar kind of existence (1.4.3)

"It is true no doubt that *pradhāna* is regarded as eternal, but this eternality is an eternality of ceaseless change. Ignorance is regarded by the Vedāntists as *apāramārthika*, that is, ignorance is not true absolutely. This negation of absolute truth may mean that it is not immediate and self-apparent or that it cannot manifest itself as being or that it has no existence in all times. But such limitations are true also of *pradhāna*. The *pradhāna* is eternal as changeful, but it is non-eternal in all its products. All the products of *prakṛti* are destructible; being unintelligent by nature they can never be self-apparent. Again, though *pradhāna* may be said to be existent in any particular form at any particular time, yet even at that time it is non-existent in all its past and future forms. Thus, since "*vyavahārika*" cannot mean absolute non-existence (like the hare's horn) and since it canot also mean absolute existence it

can only mean changefulness (*pariṇāmitva*) and such an existence is true of the *pradhāna*. Thus Śaṃkarites do not gain anything in criticizing the doctrine of *pradhāna*, as a substitute of ignorance is supposed by them to be endowed with the same characteristics as those of *prakṛti*...

"In commenting on the *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.1-3, Bhikṣu says that Manu speaks of the original cause as being *prakṛti*, and so also does the Sāṃkhya, and both of them are regarded as authoritative. But since the Sāṃkhya doctrine of atheism is contradicted by the opinions of Patañjali and Parāśara, the view of the *Brahmasūtras* cannot be interpreted merely on the atheistic suggestion of Sāṃkhya. It has also to be admitted that the atheistic portion of Sāṃkhya has no authoritative support either in the Vedas or in the Purāṇas and has therefore to be regarded as invalid. (2.1.1)

"It is wrong, however, to suppose that Kapila really intended to preach atheism. He quoted atheistic arguments from others and showed that even if God were not accepted emancipation could be obtained by differentiation of *prakṛti* from *puruṣa*. The Sāṃkhya also emphasizes the fact that emancipation can be obtained merely by knowledge. This, however, should not be interpreted as being in conflict with the Upaniṣadic texts which declare that emancipation can be obtained only by the..knowledge of God. For these signify only that there are two ways of obtaining emancipation, the inferior one being through knowledge of the distinction of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, and the superior one through the... knowledge of God.

The Yoga also shows two ways of emancipation, the inferior one being through the ordinary Yoga processes, and the superior one through the renunciation to God of all actions and through devotion to Him. It is also wrong to suppose that the Sāṃkhya is traditionally atheistic, for in the *Mahābhārata* (*Śāntiparvan* 318.73) and *Matsya Purāṇa* (4.28) we hear of a twenty-sixth category, God. So the difference between the theistic and the atheistic Sāṃkhya is due to the difference of

representation as the true Sāṃkhya doctrine and the Sāṃkhya doctrine which proposes to ensure emancipation even for those who are not willing to believe in God. In this connection Bhikṣu admits the probability of two different schools of Sāṃkhya, one admitting *īśvara* and the other not admitting it, and it is only the latter which he thinks to be invalid. (2.1.2) He also refers to the *Kūrma Purāṇa* in which the Sāṃkhyists and the Yogins are said to be atheistic.

"The chief defect of the Śāṃkara school is that instead of pointing out the invalidity of theistic Sāṃkhya, Śaṃkara denies all theistic speculations as nonVedic and misinterprets the *Brahmasūtras* accordingly. Bhikṣu refers to *Praśnopaniṣad* 4.8, where the twenty-three categories of Sāṃkhya are mentioned and only *prakṛti* has been omitted. The 'great' (*mahat*) category is not mentioned directly, but only as the intellect and consciousness (*citta*). The fourfold division of the *mahat* category as the mind, the intellect, egoity and consciousness is also admitted there. In the *Garbhopaniṣad* eight *prakṛtis* and sixteen *vikāras* are mentioned. In the *Maitryupaniṣad* we hear of the three *guṇas* and their disturbance by which creation takes place. We hear also that the *puruṣas* are pure consciousness. In *Maitryupaniṣad* V.2 it is said that the *tamas*, being disturbed by the supreme being, gives rise to *rajas* and that to *sattva*. In the *Cūlikopaniṣad* the categories of the Sāṃkhya doctrine are also mentioned in consonance with the monistic doctrine of the Vedānta. It also says that there are various schools of the Sāṃkhya, that there are some who admit twenty-six categories, others twenty-seven, and again others who admit only twenty-four categories. There is also said to be a monistic and also a dualistic Sāṃkhya and that they find expression in three or five different ways. Thus Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the Sāṃkhya doctrine is definitely supported by the Upaniṣadic texts.

"Concerning the Yoga also it can be said that only that part of it may be regarded as opposed by the Upaniṣads which holds a separate and independent existence of *prakṛti* as apart

from *īśvara*. In the [*Yoga*]*sūtras* of Patañjali it is said that God helps the movement of *prakṛti* only by removing the obstacles, just as a ploughman enables water to pass from one field to another. But the Upaniṣads definitely say that God is the generator of the movement and the disturbance of *prakṛti*. The *sattva* body of God is thus there held to be a product of *prakṛti* as it comes into being from *prakṛti* through desire in a previous creative cycle. The *sattva* body of God is thus derived from *prakṛti* through the will of God serving as the vehicle [of] God for removal of the limitations in the course of the evolutionary process of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* in itself therefore is not regarded by Patañjali as the *upādhi* of *īśvara*. (2.1.2)

Bhikṣu seeks to explain this part of the Yoga doctrine also in the same manner as he did with the Sāṃkhya by accepting the so-called *abhyupagamavāda*. He maintains that Yoga holds that even if its considered that *prakṛti* is independent and runs into evolutionary activity by herself, undetermined by the eternal knowledge and will of God, and even if it be admitted that the eternal God has no eternal knowledge and will and that the movement of *prakṛti* is due to an inner teleology in accordance with karman, and that in the beginning of creation *prakṛti* is transformed into the *sattvopādhi* of God, even then by self-abnegation to God *kaivalya* can be attained. Thus, in the Yoga since the *upādhi* of *īśvara* is a product and not the material or the instrumental cause of the world, whereas in the Vedānta view as propounded by Bhikṣu the *upādhi* of *īśvara* is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, and this *upādhi* which forms the material stuff of the world is *prakṛti* herself and not her product. In the Yoga view God is eternal, but His thought and will are not eternal. This thought and will are associated with the *sattva* part of *prakṛti* which lies embedded in it at the time of dissolution which only shows itself at the beginning of a new creative cycle through the potency left in it by the will of God in the previous creative cycle. God, in the view of Yoga, is thus

not both the material and the instrumental cause of the world as the Vedānta holds. According to Vedānta as explained by Bhikṣu, *prakṛti* plays her dual part; in one part she remains as the eternal vehicle of the eternal knowledge and will of God, and through the other part she runs through an evolutionary process by producing disturbances of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas.* This also explains the Purāṇic view of the gradual derivation of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* as stages in the evolution of *prakṛti* through which at a later stage the cosmic evolution takes place. Thus *prakṛti* which remains associated with God as the vehicle of of His knowledge and will is unchangeable and eternal.

12.2 VIJÑAṆABHIKṢU, *Bhāṣya* on the *Īśvaragītā* (i.e. the first eleven chapters of the *Kūrmapurāṇa*)

Summarized by Surendranath Dasgupta

On p. 482-495 of Volume III of his *History of Indian Philosophy* Surendranath Dasgupta explains: "In the second part (*uttaravibhāga*) of the *Kūrma Purāṇa* the first eleven chapters are called *Īśvara-gītā.* In the first chapter of this section Sūta asks Vyāsa about the...knowledge leading to emancipation as originally instructed by Nārāyaṇa in his incarnation as a tortoise...The real discourse begins with the second chapter. Vijñāna Bhikṣu wrote a commentary on the *Īśvaragītā;* he thought that since the *Īśvaragītā* contains the main purport of the *Bhagavadgītā* it was unnecessary for him to write any commentary on the latter...The philosophy of the *Īśvaragītā* as dealt with here is based upon Bhikṣu's commentary...which was available to the present writer as a manuscript by courtesy of M. M. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, of the Benares Sanskrit College.".

"Vijñāna Bhikṣu seems to acknowledge the doctrine of absolute absorption or assimilation of the individual self within the universal and infinite self. And even during his existence in this world, the self is said to be merely a witness. He explains

that in the answer to the eighth question in the Kūrma Purāṇa, (II. l. 7, p. 453 of the 1890 Bibliotheca Indica edition), the word '*ātmā*' refers to the Godhead, though in ordinary usage it stands only for the finite selves, and suggests the self-sameness of the finite and infinite selves. The reference here is thus to the *prākṛtātmā* and not to the *jīvātmā*. God is called *sarvāntara* as He has already entered the hearts...of the diverse living beings and exists there in the capacity of being only as witness (*sarveṣāṃ svabhinnānām antaḥsākṣitvenānugataḥ*). A witness is he who illumines (*svapratibimbitavastubhāsakaḥ*), without any efforts on his part (*vyāpāraṃ vinaiva*). He is called 'inner controller' on account of his association with finite intelligences and through this association even the individual self shares the greatness of the highest self..

"Vijñāna Bhikṣu says that the line '*asmād vijāyate viśvam atraiva pravilīyate*' occurs here by way of giving a reason for the *śāktiśaktimadabhedatva* doctrine so ably put forth by calling the ultimate Reality or *paramātman* the inner controller and then explaining the doctrine a little by giving him a few adjectives more to bring out the significance of the esoteric doctrine or suggestion of *śaktiśaktimadabhedatva*. Now it is said that as it is from Him that the adverse effects are created , in Him they exist and in Him they are annihilated. He is non-different (or better, inseparable) from *puruṣa* and *prakṛti,* because of his being the support and the ground of the whole universe beginning from *puruṣa* and *prakṛti,* i.e. of the effects right down from *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and inclusive of them. If like the body He had not superintended all the causal agencies, then the cause, like the *dravya, guṇa, karman,* etc. could not have effected any causal function. If it said that the sentence speaks of effected-ness (or causality) as common to all tangible manifestations, then the idea of the previous sentence maintaining the identity between Brahman and the world would not be admissible.

"Brahman is the *upādānakāraṇa* of the universe, but this

universe is a *pariṇāmirūpa* of Brahman. His is not therefore the *pariṇāmirūpa,* because that will contradict the statements made by the scriptures declaring Brahman to be unchangeable. Then Vijñāna Bhikṣu defines God as being the ultimate locus of all, the functioning of all types of causes is helped in its operation by Him and it is this that is called the *adhiṣṭhānakāraṇatā* of God.

"Then he maintains his doctrine of *jīvātmaparamātmanor aṃśāṃśyabheda* by the line "*na māyī mayayā baddhaḥ karoti vividhās tanūḥ*' and says further that *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* and *Vedāntasūtras* also preach the same doctrine. *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* says the same thing. Then comes the elaboration of the same idea. A reference to Śaṃkara by way of criticizing him is made. *Māyāvāda* is called a sort of covert Buddhism and for support a passage from *Padmapurāṇa* has also been quoted.

"*Adhiṣṭhānakāraṇatva,* or the underlying causality, is defined as that in which, essence remaining the same, new differences emerge just as a spark from the fire. This is also called the *aṃśāṃśībhāva* for, though the *niravayava* Brahman cannot be regarded as having parts, yet it is on account of the emergence of different characters from a common basis that the characterized units are called the parts of the common basis. It should be noted that Vijñāna Bhikṣu is against the view that Brahman undergoes any transformatory change. Though Brahman does not undergo any transformatory change, yet new differences emerge out of it. In the sentence '*Sa māyī māyayā baddhaḥ*' the idea is that *māyā* itself is an integral part of the divine entity and not different from it. *Māyā* is like an *aṃśa* which is identical with the *aṃśin.*

"Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual from Brahman that ultimate emancipation can be attained.

"The self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is not in any way bound by its experiences. The assertion of Śaṃkara that *ātmā* is of the nature of joy or bliss is also wrong; for no one can always be attached to himself, and the fact that everyone seeks to further his own interest in all his actions does not imply that the self is of the nature of bliss. Moreover, if the self is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot at the same time be of the nature of pure bliss; at the time of acquiring knowledge we do not always feel pleasure.

Arrogance also does not belong to the self but like *sukha* and *duḥkha* belongs to *prakṛti,* being wrongly attributed to the self. The self is, however, regarded as the one who experiences pleasure and pain through a reflection of them on it through the *vṛtti,* and such a reflection of pleasure and pain, etc., through the *vṛtti* is regarded as the realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of the experiences. Such experiencing, therefore, is to be regarded as *anupādhika* or unconditional. This is also borne out by the testimony of the *Bhagavadgītā* and Sāṃkhya. Such an enjoyment of the experiences does not belong to *prakṛti.* The passages which say that experiences do not belong to the *puruṣa* refer to the modifications of [the] *vṛtti* in connection with the experiences. The assertion of Śaṃkara, therefore, that the *ātman* is incapable of experiences as of the power of acting (*kartṛtva*) is therefore false.

"*Ajñāna,* according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, means *anyathājñāna. Pradhāna* is so called because it performs all the actions for the sake of the *puruṣa*; and it is through the fault of his association with *pradhāna* that the *puruṣa* is associated with false awareness.

"The *ātman* remains unchanged in itself and the differences are due to the emergence of the association of intellect and other faculties which give rise to experience. At the time of emancipation *jīvas* remain undifferentiated from Brahman. *Prakṛti, puruṣa* and *kāla* are ultimately supported in Brahman and yet are different from it.

"There are indeed two kinds of scriptural texts, one emphasizing the monistic side, the other the dualistic. A right interpretation should, however, emphasize the duality-texts, for if everything were false then even such a falsity would be undemonstrable and self-contradictory. If it is so argued that one may accept the validity of the scriptural texts until Brahman is realized and when that is done it matters little if the scriptural texts are found invalid, the reply to such an objection is that, whenever a person discovers that the means through which he has attained the conclusion was invalid, he naturally suspects the very conclusion arrived at. Thus the knowledge of Brahman would itself appear doubtful to a person who discovers that the instruments of such knowledge were themselves defective.

"The individual self exists in the *paramātman* in an undifferentiated state in the sense that the *paramātman* is the essence or ground-cause of the *jīvas*; and the texts which emphasize the monistic side indicate this nature of *paramātman* as the ground-cause. This does not imply that the individual selves are identical with Brahman.

"Pleasure and pain do not belong to the self; they really belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa* and they are ascribed to the self only through the association of the *antaḥkaraṇa* with the self. In the state of emancipation the self is pure consciousness without any association of pleasure and pain. The ultimate end is the cessation of the suffering of sorrow (*duḥkhabhāganivṛtti*) and not the cessation of sorrow (*na duḥkhanivṛtti*); for when one has ceased to suffer sorrow, sorrow may still be there and the avoidance of it would be the end of other persons. The assertion of Śaṃkara that there is bliss in the state of emancipation is wrong. For during that state there is no mental organ by which happiness could be experienced. If the self be regarded as of the nature of bliss, then also the self would be both the agent and the object of the enjoyment of bliss, which is impossible. The ascription of *ānanda* in the state of emancipation only refers to

it in a technical sense, i.e., '*ānanda*' means the absence of pleasure and pain.

"Bhikṣu admits a gradation of realities. He holds further that when one entity is stabler than another, the former is more real than the latter. Since *paramātman* is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, He is more real than the *prakṛti* or *puruṣa* or the evolutes of *prakṛti*. Ths idea has also been expressed in the view of the Purāṇas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the *paramātman*. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which are changing forms.

"*Prakṛti* or *māyā* has often been described as that wich can be called neither existent nor non-existent. This has been interpreted by the Śaṃkarites as implying the falsity of *māyā*. But according to Vijñāṇa Bhikṣu it means that the original cause may be regarded as partly real and partly unreal in the sense that while it is unproductive it is regarded as unreal, and when it passes through the course of evolutionary changes it is regarded as real .

"Now coming to *sādhanā* he says that by *āgama, anumāna* and *dhyāna* one should attain self-knowledge. This self-realization leads to the *asamprajñātayoga* which uproots all the *vāsanās*. It is attained not only by the cessation of *ajñāna* but also by the destruction of *karman*. He also maintains that the emphasis of Śaṃkara on the understanding of the Upaniṣadic texts as a means to the attainment of self-realization is also wrong.

"In the state of *mukti*, self having dissociated itself from the *liṅgaśarīra* becomes one with Brahman, just as the river becomes one with the seal. This is not a case of identity, but one of non-difference. Here in the state of *mukti* the identity and difference of *jīva* and Brahman have been indicated on the analogy of the river and the sea...

"According to Bhikṣu, though *īśvara* transcends the

guṇas, yet through his body as pure *sattva* he carries on the creative work and the work of superintending and controlling the affairs of the universe. Though his agency is manifested through his body of pure *sattva* as a directive activity, yet it is without any association with passion, antipathies, etc.

"In the third chapter of the *Kūrma Purāṇa* it is said that *pradhāna, puruṣa* and *kāla* emerge from *avyakta*, and from them the whole world came into being. Bhikṣu says that the world did not emanate directly from Brahman but from *pradhāna, puruṣa* and *kāla*. There cannot be any direct emanation from Brahman; for that would mean that Brahman undergoes a change. A direct emanation wold imply that evil and hell also sprang from Brahman. The emanation of *prakṛti, puruṣa* and *kāla* is explained on the supposition that Brahman is a kind of ground-cause of *prakṛti, puruṣa* and *kāla (abhivyaktikāraṇa* or *ādhārakāraṇa)*. But this emanation of *prakṛti, puruṣa* and *kāla* is not through modificatory processes in the manner in which curd is produced from milk. In the time of dissolution *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are unproductive of any effects and may therefore be regarded as it were as non-existent. It is through the will of God that *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are drawn out and connected together, and the point of motivation is started for the processes of modification of *prakṛti*. This point of motivation is called *kāla*. It is by such a course that all these three may be regarded as producing an effect and therefore as existent. It is in this sense that *prakṛti, puruṣa* and *kāla* are regarded as brought into being by God.

"*Avyakta* as God is so called because it transcends human knowledge. It is also so called because it is a state of non-duality, where there is no difference between energy and its possessor, and where everything exists in an undifferentiated manner. *Avyakta* used in the sense of *prakṛti* is the basis of change, or change as such; and *puruṣa* denotes the knower.

"The *paramātman* is spoken of as the self of all beings. This should not, however, be taken to mean that there is only

the *paramātman* which exists and that all things are but false impositions on his nature. The *paramātman* or *parameśvara* is both different and identical with *kāla, pradhāna* and the *puruṣa*. The essence of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* has to be regarded as less ultimate than the existence of God, because the existence of the former is relative as compared with the existence of God. Time is regarded as an instrumental cause of the connection of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Time is a superior instrumental agent to deeds, for the deeds are also produced by time. Though time is beginningless, yet it has to be admitted that it has a special function with reference to each specific effect it produces. It is for that reason that at the point of dissolution time does not produce the evolutes of *mahat*, etc. The *mahat* category is in itself a combination of the conscious centers and the material element.

When the word '*purusa*' is used in the singular number, such a use should not be interpreted to mean a denial of the individual *puruṣa*. It only means that in such instances of scriptural texts the word '*puruṣa*' has been used in a generic sense. *Puruṣas* are also of two kinds–the *apara* and the *para*. Both are in themselves devoid of any qualities and of the nature of pure consciousness. But there is this difference between the higher (*para*) *puruṣa* and the lower *puruṣa* , that while the former never has any kind of association with any experience of pleasure and pain, the latter may sometimes be associated with pleasure and pain which he at that time feels to be his own. It must be understood, however, that the experiencing of pleasure and pain is not an indispensable part of the definition of puruṣa , for at the stage of liberation while living the *puruṣas* do not identify themselves with the experiences of pleasure and pain, but they are still *puruṣas* all the same. God, however, who is called the superior *puruṣa*, does not associate Himself with the experiences that proceed as a result of karman and which are experienced in a spatial-temporal manner. But God continues to enjoy eternal bliss in association with His own

special *upādhis* or conditions. When the scriptural texts deny the enjoyment of the experiences of pleasure and pain with regard to the Supreme *puruṣa,* the idea is that though the Supreme *puruṣa* underlies the ordinary *puruṣas* as their ground yet he is not in any way affected by their experiences. So the Supreme *puruṣa* has in common with ordinary *puruṣas* certain experiences of his own. These experiences of pure eternal bliss are due to the direct and immediate reflection of the bliss in the *puruṣa* himself, by which this bliss is directly and immediately experienced by him. By such an experience the *puruṣa* cannot be admitted to suffer any change. He can, however, be aware of the mental states of ordinary persons as well as their experiences of pleasure and pain in a cognitive manner (such as that by which we know external objects) without being himself affected by those experiences. The enjoyment of experience is of course due to the action of God's mind through the process of reflection.

"The monism of such a view becomes intelligible when we consider that the *puruṣa,* the intellect, the *ahaṃkāra* and all its products exist in an undifferentiated condition in the very essence of God. The ultimate *puruṣa* as the supreme cognitive principle underlies the very being of *puruṣa* and the faculties such as the intellect and the *ahaṃkāra,* and also all in later products. For this reason, by the underlying activity of this principle all our cognitions become possible, for it is the activity of this principle that operates as the faculties of the origins of knowledge. In the case of the experience of pleasure and pain also, though these cannot subsist outside the mind and may not apparently be regarded as requiring any separate organ for their illumination, yet in their case also it is the mind, the *budhi,* that behaves as the internal organ. So though pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as having an unknown existence, yet their experiences are also interpreted as being due to their reflection in the mind.

"When the intellect becomes associated with the *puruṣa*

and not distinction is felt between it, the *puruṣa* and the original ground-cause, it is then that the cycle of world-existence appears. It is the super-consciousness of God that holds together the objective and the subjective principles. The objective principle, *prakṛti,* and the subjective centers, the *puruṣas,* are held together in a state of non-distinction. It is this that gives rise to all experiences of sorrow and bondage with reference to the conscious centers. It may be asked how it is that the intellect and the *puruṣa* are held in non-distinction instead of being distinguished from one another. The reply is that distinction and non-distinction are both possible elements in the intellect and the function of Yoga is to destroy the limitation in the way of the realization of such a mutual distinction.

"Love of God proceeds in two states: first, from the notion of God as satisfying our highest needs; and, secondly, in the notion of Him as being one with the self of the devotees. These highest needs find their expression firstly in our notion of value as pleasure and satisfaction in our experiences; secondly, in our notion of value in our emancipation; thirdly, in our notion of value in the satisfaction that we achieve in our realization of the sublimity in experiencing the greatness of God.

"*Māyā*. as identified with *prakṛti,* should be regarded as substantive entity. *Prakṛti* has two elements in it, *sattva* and *tamas.* Through *sattva* wisdom or knowledge is produced; through *tamas* is produced delusion or false awareness. It is this aspect of *prakṛti* as producing false awareness that is called '*māyā*'. *Māyā* is described as being *triguṇātmikā prakṛti* or *prakṛti* with three *guṇas*. but though *māyā* is identified with *prakṛti,* yet this identification is due to the fact that the *tamas* side of *prakṛti* cannot be taken as apart from *prakṛti* as a whole. When it is said in the scriptures that God destroys the *māyā* of *yogins,* it does not mean that the *triguṇātmikā prakṛti* as whole is destroyed, but only that the operation of the *tamas* side is

suspended or destroyed or ceases only with reference to the *yogin*. *Māyā* is also described as that which cannot produce an illusion in Him on whom it has to depend for its existence, i.e. God, but that it can produce illusion or false awareness in others.

"It is further said that God creates the world by his *māyāśakti* as composed of the three *guṇas*. The significance of the designation *māyā* in this connection implies that it is by the false identification of *prakṛti* and the *puruṣas* that the latter evolutionary process of the formation of the world and world-experience becomes possible. The term '*māyā*' is generally restricted to *prakṛti* in its relation to God, whereas it is called *avidyā* as a delusive agent with reference to individuals.

"Knowledge does not consist in a mere identification with Brahman as pure consciousness, but it means the knowledge of Brahman, his relationship with *pradhāna, puruṣa,* and *kāla,* and the manner in which the whole cosmic evolution comes into being, is maintained, and is ultimately dissolved in Brahman; and also in the personal relationship that he has with the individuals, and the manner in which he controls them and the ultimate ways of attaining the final realization. *Kāla* is, again, here referred to as the conditional *upādhi* through which God moves *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* towards the evolution of the cosmic process.

"The great difficulty is to explain how God who is regarded in essence of the nature of pure consciousness and therefore absolutely devoid of desire or will can be the cause of the great union of *prakṛti* with the *puruṣa*. The answer proposed by Bhikṣu is that in God's nature itself there is such a dynamization that through it He can continue the actualizing process and the combining activities of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* lying dormant in Him. Though *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* may also be regarded as the causes of the world, yet since the combination happens in time, time may be regarded primarily as adynamic agent; the condition existing in God through which He renders

the union is made possible. Since God moves both the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* through his own dynamic conditions, the whole universe of matter and spirits may be regarded as His body in the sense that they are the passive objects of the activity of God. God is thus conceived as dancing in his activity among his own energies as *prakṛti* and *puruṣas*. It may be argued that *puruṣa* being itself absolutely static, how can these be moved into activity consists [because?] of the fact that they are turned to the specific operations or that they are united with *prakṛti*. Sometimes it is also suggested that *prakṛti* is the condition of the *puruṣas* and that the movement of *prakṛti* in association with the *puruṣas* is interpreted as being the movement of the *puruṣas*.

"In the seventh chapter of *Īśvaragītā* Brahman is defined as the Universal. Thus any cause may be regarded as Brahman in relation to its effect. So there may be a hierarchy of Brahmans as we proceed from a lesser universal to a higher universal. The definition of Brahman is '*yad yasya kāraṇam tat tasya brahma tadapekṣayā vyāpakattvāt*'. As God contains within Himself all the universals, He is called *brahmamāyā*. God is always associated with the *puruṣas*. But yet His dynamic activity in association with the *puruṣas* consists in bringing about such an association with *prakṛti* that the objects of the world may be manifested to them in the form of knowledge.

"The *jīva* or individual is regarded as being a part of God, the relation being similar to that of a son and father. When the *jīvas* dedicate all their actions to God with the conviction that if it is God who works through them, then virtues and vices lose their force and become inefficacious to cause any bondage to them. As all *jīvas* are parts of God, there is a great similarity between them in spire of their diversity. God exists in the *jīvas* just as the whole exists in the parts.

"Vijñāna Bhikṣu conceives of the *adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa* as the ground cause, as one which in itself remains the same and yet new differences emerge out of it. This is also his doctrine of

the part and the whole. The parts as thus supposed to be emergents from the whole which does not itself participate in any change. The relation is thus not organic in the sense that the dissolution of the parts would mean the dissolution of the whole. In dissolution the parts are dissolved, yet pure Brahman remains just as it was in the state of creation. So, again, when the parts are affected pleasures and pains are experienced, but the affection of the parts does not involve in the least the affection of the whole. But the whole is not affected by the sufferings that exist in the emergents. It is further stated that it is through the function of the ground-cause that the emergents, e.g. substance, quality and action, can express themselves or operate in their specific forms. The underlying whole, the ground-cause, has really no parts in itself. Yet from this common basis various emergents of appearances as characterized units show themselves, and since they are seen to emerge from it they are in this specific technical sense called the parts of the underlying ground cause.

"It will thus be seen that Brahman, the ground-cause, always remains unchangeable in itself, but it is said that Brahman is associated with *māyā* and is united by it (*sa māyī māyayā baddhaḥ*). The idea is that *māyā* is an integral part of the divine entity and not different from it.

"Though in the scriptures both the distinction [from] and the identity of the individual with Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual from Brahman that the ultimate emancipation can be attained.

'In *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* I1.4.5 it is stated that all other things are desired because we desire the self. Śaṃkara infers from it that we are primarily attached to the self, and since all attachments imply attachment to pleasure, it follows that the self is of the nature of pleasure or bliss. Other things are desired only when they are falsely regarded as ourselves or parts of ourselves. Bhikṣu denies this proposition. He say that firstly it

is not true that we are always attached to our own selves; nor, therefore, is it true that seeking of happiness from other sources is always the seeking of the selves. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that self is of the nature of bliss. If the self is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot be the nature of pure bliss. If bliss and consciousness were the same, all knowledge would imply pleasure, but our knowledge is as much associated with pleasure as with pain. Pleasure and pain, as also arrogance, belong to *prakṛti* or its product, the intellect, and are transferred through its operation to the self, which is the real experiencer and sufferer of pleasure and pain. The self is thus the real experiencer and the experiences therefore do not belong to *prakṛti* but to the self. Through the operation of the sense-contact with the object and light the mental states are generated. These mental states are called *vṛtti* and belong to the intellect and therefore to *prakṛti*, but corresponding to each such mental state there is an realiztion of them on the art of the *puruṣa* (*vṛttisākṣātkāra*) and it is this realiztion that constitutes the real experience of the *puruṣa*. The word '*bhoga*' has an ambiguity in meaning. It sometimes refers to the mental states and at other times to their realization and it is as the former state that experience is denied of the *puruṣa*.

"*Ajñāna* (ignorance) in this system means false awareness. When the *puruṣa* intuits the *vṛttis* of the intellect and thereby falsely regards those *vṛttis* as belonging to itself there is false awareness which is the cause of the bondage. The realization in itself is real, but the associations of the intuitive characters with the self are erroneous. When the self knows its own nature as different from the *vṛttis* and as a part of Brahman in which it has an undifferentiated reality, we have what is called emancipation. The existence of the self as undifferentiated with [i.e., from] Brahman simply means that Brahman is the ground-cause, and as such an unchangeable ground-cause Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is in its nature as pure consciousness that the whole world

may be regarded as existing in Brahman of which *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa,* the one changing by real modifications and the other through the false ascription of the events of *prakṛti* to itself, may be regarded as emergents. The world is ultimately of the nature of pure consciousness, but matter and its changes, and the experience itself are only material and temporary forms bubbling out of it. But since these emergent forms are real emanations from Brahman and over-emphasis on monism would be wrong. Reality consists of both the ground-cause and the emergent form. Śaṃkara had asserted that duality was true only so long as the one reality was not reached. But Bhikṣu objecting to it says that since the monistic truth can be attained only by assuming the validity of the processes that imply duality, ultimate invalidation of the dualistic processes will also nulllify the monistic conclusion.

13.APPAYYA DĪKṢITA (1585)

For an elaborate review of what is known and opined about this figure, see Ramesan.

13.1 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA, *Śivakaraṇidipaṇa* on Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*

Ramesan, pp. 106-107, provides a lot of information and an assessment of this work. We quote: "...(A)n elaborate commentary on the *Śrikāṇṭha bhāṣya.* The Śrīkaṇṭha doctrine is generally called also...'*Śaivaviśiṣṭādvaita*'. There is a close resemblance between the Advaita of ŚrI Śaṃkara and the *Śivādvaita* of Śrīkaṇṭha.

"During the Vijayanagar period, when Rāmarāya was ruling as the all powerful regent, and when the Rājaguru Śrī Tātācārya had a great deal of royal patronage and support, the worship of Lord Śiva as about to be completely extinguished from the land, on account of the vigorous proselytizing activities of the Vaiṣṇavas. In those days Śaivism and Smārthas

were converted into Vaiṣṇavism both by means of force and also by means of several inducements. It was against this background that Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita had to dedicate himself to the noble task of propagating Śaivism in order to save it from being utterly annihilated.

"He started his crusade in favor of Śaivism and against the attacks on it by narrow-minded Vaiṣṇavite scholars after getting for himself the patronage of the Vellore king Chinna Bomma Nayaka. It was for the performance of this ennobling task that he undertook upon himself that he wrote a number of works extolling Lord Śiva, his greatness and the method of his worship, etc.. The foundations for the great efflorescence of Śaiva Siddhānta that is now seen in South India was laid in the *Śrikāṇṭhabhāṣya.* By writing an elaborate commentary upon it, Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita served as the very founder for the propagation of Śaivims in this part of the country.

"Chinna Bomma Nayaka gave a good deal of financial assistance and patronage for the propagation of the work *Śivakaraṇidīpikā* after it was finished. First of all, he called a great *sadas* of pandits and performed *kaṇakābhiṣeka* to Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita. Next he gave all facilities for the five hundred and odd great pandits who came forward to learn *Śivakaraṇidīpikā* under Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita and started its propagation. The *vidvāns* who studied this work from the original found of knowledge of Dīkṣita himself spread themselves in several directions and helped to propagate Śivādvaita. Śrī Appaya Dīkṣita performed this stupendous work in a spirit of missionary zeal for a number of years without tiring. On account of this, he had to undergo a great deal of opposition and trouble. His enemies were at times prepared even to kill him for his work. But he never minded any of these troubles, but went on with his self-appointed mission. He started writing works on Advaita only after setting the Śaiva worship on proper foundations as he had originally planned...

"This work was published in Kumbhakonam several years

ago by Sri Halasyanatha Sastri. It is difficult to get copies now. The number of scholars who have read this work is also very small.

"The *Śivakaraṇidīpikā* displays the most thorough-going knowledge of *mīmāṃsā, vyākaraṇa, nyāya,* rhetoric, and in fact of the whole field of Sanskrit literature. What Vācaspati, Sudarśana and Jayatīrtha have done for the *Bhāṣyas* of *Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva,* Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita has done for the *Bhāṣyas* of Śrīkaṇṭha. In many places the book is more an original discussion than a commentary...The author pronounces Śrīkaṇṭha to have been a practicer of the *dahara-vidyā.* He, detects this fact by a critical examination of Śrīkaṇṭha's references to the different meditative sciences.

13.2 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA, *Śivādvaitanirṇaya*

A lengthy work, it is edited and translated by S. S. Suryanaryana Sastri from the University of Madras, 1903. Suryanarayana Sastri provides a helpful Analytical Table of Contents on pp. 47-64, which we provide below in place of a summary.

Paragraph Number	Topic
1	Brief statement of the subject of the inquiry.
2	The *prima facie* view.
2.1	Support for the above from I1.114 and 15.
2.21	1.15 refutes pure non-dualism; and
2.22	establishes qualified non-dualism.
2.221	In 1.3.8 and 9 all the worlds are shown to enter into Brahman, the variegated universes as perceived by released ones, becoming Brahman himself.
2.222	Elaboration of the above doctrine in IV.4.14.
2.223	The entire world, consciousness and the inert, is said to be a transformation of *śakti.*
2.3	II1.2.11, *et seq.*, and the next section teach that Brahman is related to the world and endowed with auspicious qualities.
2.31	*Prima facie* view that Brahman does not reside in the earth and so on, because of consequent defects.
2.311	Analogy of King not being subject to his own orders does not apply.
2.312	Freedom from *karman* cannot avail to ward off defects, once embodiment is admitted.
2.313	Embodiment involves subjection to injunctions and prohibitions and taint by evils consequent on their disregard.
2.314	Conformity with other texts requires the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa* to be interpreted as *arthavāda.*
2.32	Refutation of the above view. *Śruti* endows Brahman both with absence of flaws and presence of auspicious qualities.
2.321	Connection with bodies does not involve defect, as in the case of the *jīva,* the distinction being made clear by texts from the *Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa,* the *Atharvaśirasi* and the *Śvetāśvatara.*
2.322	Conformity with other texts may not be purchased by sacrificing the truth of any. Texts about the formlessness of Brahman should be understood as comparing Him to what is formless, i.e., *ākāśa.*
2.323	The analogy of the governor of a prison does not hold since suffering is due to control by *karman,* and not to the intrinsic nature of things.
2.324	The subjects of injunctions and prohibitions are the various individuals connected with their respective bodies; the denotative function of terms like "Brahmin", etc., being thus fulfilled, they have no further reference to *īśvara* whose immanence is known only from *śruti.*
2.325	The text "*satyaṃ jñānam*", etc., does not delimit the concept of Brahman to pure intelligence, any more than the words "golden crown" rule out the possibility of its

being set with stones. Texts which declare omniscience, omnipotence, etc., have also to be respected as authoritative. These texts are abundant and are further supported by *upabrāhamaṇas.*

2.326 The non-attachment of defects to Brahman, though immanent in the universe, is shown by *śruti* through two illustrations.

2.33 II1.2.21, *et seq.*, establishes Brahman's possession of the two-fold characteristics with special reference to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text '*neti neti*".

2.331 *Prima facie* view that the negation relates to both the sensible and super-sensible worlds, previously declared to be modes of Brahman.

2.332 Refutation of the above: These modes, being known only from *śruti*, their declaration would be purportless, if the negation be taken to apply to them in entirety Hence, the negation is only of the declared this-much-ness.

2.333 Conclusion supported by consideration of the succeeding passages of the *śruti* concerned.

2.3331 Attempt to harmonize the residual sentences with the negation of both the modes.

2.3332 Refutation of the above. Brahman is not a content of perception like the this-ness of the rope, whereon snake, garland, etc., are superimposed.

2.3333 Devout meditation on Brahman which is said to confer equality with Brahman brings about not only knowledge of Him but also distinctive lordly powers, as in the case of Kṛṣṇa, Agastya, Viśvāmitra, etc.. Hence, in view of the text about equality, Brahman's lordship over the world must also be admitted.

2.334 The world may be understood to be of the form of Brahman in other ways than *adhyāsa*.

2.3341 Relation of a substance, etc., to its states.

2.3342 Of a genus to its species.

2.3343 Or of substance to attribute, the self to the body.

2.34 The texts which deny defects consequent on embodiment would be purportless if Brahman were not embodied.

2.4 II1.3.39 shows that the physical attributes of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, are true and eternal, not fictitious and impermanent.

2.41 *Prima facie* view that the only form of Śiva is that of bliss.

2.42 The *siddhānta* that the physical form and other attributes are true because of purportful repetition by *śruti.*

2.421 (Objection:) Repetition in different *śākhās* cannot serve as a mark of significance.

2.422 (Reply:) Since "*guṇopasaṃhāra:* secures contemplation of all qualities wherever mentioned, their repetition even in different *śākhās* cannot but be purportful.

2.43 Texts declaring absence of qualities indicate absence only of undesirable qualities.

2.5 III.3.40 shows that Brahman is *saguṇa, saprapañca*, etc., and that there is no higher *nirguṇa* Brahman.

2.51 *Prima facie* view based on texts like "*brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati*".

2.52 Refutation of the above: qualities are declared of the faultless one who attains equality with Brahman; hence, negation can apply only to objectionable qualities. And "*eva*" in "*brahmaiva bhavati*" must be taken to mean "*iva*".

2.6 The view that departure on the paths of light, etc., is unnecessary for *niranvayopāsaka*s, being introduced by the words "Some say:, does not represent Śrīkaṇṭha's own final position.

2.7 The identity with the Supreme indicated in the *Śāstradṛṣṭi sūtra* (2.1.131) is but imagined, as that between Garuḍa and him who incants the Garuḍa spell.

2.81 Difficulties due to statements in 1.1.2 and 2.1.5 about Brahman being the content of perception in "*san ghaṭaḥ*" etc..The relationship implied can only be super-imposition.

2.811 Support for the above view from the interpretation of the Yadā tama hymn in 1.2.9, *et seq*..

2.812 Further support for that view in declarations as to finite intelligence and happiness being partts of Brahman's intelligence and bliss.

2.82 Refutation of the above view: Brahman is not the content of perception–3.2.22. The statements in 1.1.2 and 2.1.15 related to the attributive aspect of Brahman, i.e., *citśakti*.

2.821 (Objection:) 4.4.10, et seq., declares the bliss of the liberated one to be the unlimited bliss of Brahman, not a mere part thereof. This is not consistent with difference between Brahman and the *jīva*.

2.822 (Reply:) There is no inconsistency since *citśakti* which is the supreme energy and transcendent bliss of Śiva is of the form of the entire world, intelligent and non-intelligent, and is non-different therefrom.

3.1 Statement of the *siddhānta*: Pure non-dualism is Śrīkaṇṭha's final view.

3.11 Support for the above from the *aniyama* section (3.3.32).

3.12 Further support from 4.1.8, et seq..

3.121 Preliminary view in that section–that for the enlightened one there is no departure. Texts about departure etc. relate to those knowers of Brahman who seek liberation by degrees.

3.122 Refutation of that view: the attainment even of the ever-present Brahman can come about only by stages; nor is there any difficulty in respect of this going, since a subtle body continues to exist. The text "*na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti*" really means "*na tasmāt*", etc..

3.1221 (Objection:) The ground of departure is the body, not the finite self, as implied in "*na tasmāt*".

3.1222 (Reply:) The finite self, not the body, is mentioned as related to *prāṇa*; if a ground of departure has to be understood, the former is preferable. The interpretation

is supported by the Mādhyandina reading.

3.123 But rising and departure do not apply to those who know Brahman without attributes.

3.124 The text "*na tasys prāṇā*", etc., is intended to state some special feature of the enlightened self and is hence inconsistent with rising and departure from the body, which hold of the unenlightened. Nor do principles of interpretation demand a different sense, the sense being determined by the *upakrama*, as in the story of Prajāpati's gift of horses.

3.125 The *Bṭhadāraṇyaka* text IV.4.6 also supports this view. Attainment (*apyeti*) does not necessarily imply distinction, since it means identification like the word "*gamaya*" in "*tamaso mā jyotir gamaya*", etc..

3.126 The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text IV.4.7 also supports this view.

3.127 The Mādhyandina text should be interpreted in the light of the Kāṇva, not vice versa; for, non-departure of the vital airs is made clear by the words "they remain even here", uttered in reply to Ārtabhāga's question.

3.1271 (Objection:) Ārtabhāga's third question relates to the unenlightened on, as seen from his fourth and fifth questions.

3.1272 (Reply:) Mere proximity of questions relating to the *avidvān* cannot counteract the clear indication of characteristic marks pertaining to the *vidvān*. Nor is there unity of context, as seen from the diversity and indirectness of the questions, which were designed to perplex and humble Yājñavalkya.

3.13 Support for the view of pure non-dualism from IV.3.1.

3.131 The *prima facie* view of that section set out.

3.132 The conclusion of that section: the path of light etc. applies to all modes of meditation.

3.133 The paths described in the various meditative sciences are identical.

3.134 The Sāman verses lead us to Brahman, as accessories to

meditation, not as constituting a path.

3.135 The text "by the very same rays he goes up" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.6.5) does not exclude other states of the path.

3.136 Nor does the *tvarā vacana* (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.6.5) exclude earlier stages on the path.

3.137 But the path of light is not for *niranvayopāsakas*.

3.138 Even views acceptable to the *bhāṣyakāra* are introduced with the words "Some say" as in 1.118 *et seq*..

3.14 1.1.29, *et seq*., accepts non-difference in meditation between Brahman and the *jīva*.

3.15 4.1.3 also establishes that non-difference.

3.151 *Prima facie* view in the above section.

3.152 Final view.

3.153 The two-fold statemen tof the Jābāla *śruti* that is cited here, *tvam vā ahamasmi, aham vai tvamasi*", cannot be justified except on the basis of identity. So also of the Aitareya text "*Yo'sau so'ham*" etc.

3.154 Interpretation of *tat tvam asi* compatible with identty, not the *śarīraśarīrībhāva*.

3.155 Nor is the non-difference barely imagined as seen from 1.131, 4.1.3, and 4.4.19. The consciousness of identity persists even when the self in release sings as he pleases "*ahamannam, ahamannam*", etc..

3.16 The commentary on 1.4.6 shows indirectly that non-difference is acceptable to the *bhāṣyakāra*. The Sāṃkhya cannot claim that *Kaṭh(opaniṣad)* I2.15 declares of the unevolved that it is to be known, since that verse relates to *prājña* as seen from *Kaṭha* I2.18. But *prājña* in *Kaṭha* I2.13 refers to the *jīva*, and its citation would be inappropriate except on the basis of [the] identity of the *jīva* and *parameśvara*.

3.161 (Objection:) Even on the hypothesis of identity there is a recognition of distinction of topics as relating to the finite or the Absolute. Hence, the reference to the *jīva*, in

any case, is inappropriate.

3.162 (Reply:) *Śruti* has examples of a reply being given about Brahman when the question is about the *jīva*, e.g., Yama's answer to the third question of Naciketas, which certainly relates to the departed *jīva*. It is equally certain that the reply relates to Brahman. There would be lack of congruity between question and answer but for the non-difference of Brahman and the *jīva*.

3.1621 (Objection:) The question does not relate to the finite self, since Naciketas has already faith in its existence. Even on the basis of non-difference, the reply should not go beyond the terms of the question. In truth, the question relates to the released selves, that being the sense of *preta*.

3.1622 (Reply:) The difficulty about a question being barred by prior knowledge applies even to the released selves, of whose existence and nature Naciketas has knowledge, as seen from his questions about the fires. If partial knowledge alone be admitted, that may hold in the case of the *mṛta jīva* too. The reply goes beyond the question on either interpretation of *preta*.

3.17 The commentary on 1.11 rests on non-difference, it being said that in view of the many apparent differences between the two, their identity is a matter for legitimate inquiry, but not to be discredited.

3.18 The *jivā* is admitted to be non-different from *citśakti* and *citśakti* to be non-different from Brahman.

3.181 (Objection:) *Citśakti* is non-different even from the inert world, but Brahman is not non-different from the latter. Hence, non-difference from *citśakti* is only metaphorical, the two being really different, as support and what is supported, abode and what abides, etc..

3.182 (Reply:) The doctrine of attributeless Brahman is not opposed to the doctrine of transformation. The latter is helpful to the doctrine of illusion, as is seen from the

Śaṃkara (*Brahmasūtra)Bhāṣya* and also the *Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka*. Śrīkaṇṭha too makes judgments like "*san ghaṭaḥ*" rest on the reality not of the world but of Brahman.

3.183 Further, the non-difference of *citśakti* from Brahman is declared in many places, e.g. 1.1.28; 1.3.16; 1.2.1; 3.3.11-14.

3.1831 *(Prima facie* view on III.8.14) The sheaths of *anna, praṇa,* etc., should in all cases be contemplated.

3.1832 (Refutation:) Their contemplation serves no purpose; they are mentioned only to indicate Brahman's superiority to all else.

3.1833 The sheaths of food etc. are not to be thought of as the cave wherein Brahman is present, because each of them is spoken of as a self; and not other self but Śiva is to be contemplated for release.

3.18331 (Objection:) The exclusion enjoined in "abandoning all else" applies to Umā also, the expression "self" in "the self is bliss" being common to the selves of food etc. as well.

3.18332 (Reply:) The self of bliss is the Supreme Self, the expression being used in that sense elsewhere even in the *Ānandavallī* in the statement "from the self, space originates".

3.18333 (Further objection:) *Citśakti* being identical with the entire world–*cetana* and *acetana*–the other intelligent beings like Brahmā etc. are also non-different from Brahman and should be so contemplated.

3.18334 (Reply:) Not so, since then the exclusion enjoined by *śruti* would have no application at all, its logical reference being to such intelligent beings as are mentioned in the context, viz. Brhmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra.

3.18335 (Objection:) The self of bliss is Śiva, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, not *citśakti*. That self is *citśakti*, according to

the second of the interpretations given; and that this is the one acceptable to him appears from 1.1.2. Further, the former identity being evident from the first chapter, there is no need to reiterate it in Chapter 3.

3.1834 Non-difference of *citśakti* and Śiva is established in 1.3.12. (*Prima facie* view): The world led up to by the Sāman verse is Viṣṇuloka, and that the person seen is Viṣṇu.

3.1835 (Refutation of the *prima facie* view:) Between Viṣṇu and Śiva there is a difference not of substance, but of state.

3.18351 (Objection:) The refutation goes beyond the doubt, which is about the worlds of Viṣṇu and Śiva. Further, Viṣṇu is directly identical not with Śiva but with *citśakti*, being a mode thereof.

3.18352 Reinterpretation of the commentary: the "supreme abode of Viṣṇu is Śiva-*citśakti*, and it is the identity of this with Śiva that is asserted.

3.18353 Another interpretation: expressions like "the supreme abode of Viṣṇu", etc., refer to Śiva, proceeding on the basis of non-difference between Viṣṇu and Śiva. Even thus, non-difference of *citśakti* from Śiva is secured.

3.184 *Citśakti* as non-different from Brahman recognized by the *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka* and the *Pañcapādikā*.

3.185 Justification of the treatment of them as different in the *daharavidyā*, Gārgī *brāhmaṇa* etc., also of the statement in 1.1.2 as to the self of bliss being metaphorically spoken of as Brahman.

3.19 The above arguments indicate the conclusion that for Śrīkaṇṭha Brahman is *nirguṇa, nīrūpam, nisprapañcam* and so forth.

3.191 There is not in Śrīkaṇṭha's system anything analogous to the *viśeṣa* of the Mādhvas; nor would such a principle help, for if it did the work of difference, it would be difference itself, and difference is unacceptable to Śrīkaṇṭha.

3.192 From non-difference follows the illusory nature of the non-intelligent world.

3.1921 Nor is empirical difference irreconcilable with this doctrine of illusory manifestation.

3.1922 Nor does it follow that the *cetanaprapañca* is also merely apparent, as then there would be no experience of release.

3.1923 The statement in section 1.4.23, *et seq.*, that *citśakti* transforms itself into beings intelligent and non-intelligent signifies not that intelligent beings are not eternal, but that there is transformation for them in this way of contraction and expansion of knowledge and happiness.

3.2 Reason for a fresh commentary though subscribing to pure non-dualism: realization of the non-specific Brahman can be gained only through non-concentrated meditation, and concentration is gained by the grace of God through worship.

3.21 (Objection:) Inculcation of devotion and worship does not justify condemnation of the Supreme truth.

(Reply:) Such condemnation is justifiable as seen from the procedure of sages like Āpastamba.

3.211 Āpastamba's condemnation of *saṃnyāsa* in the *Kalpasūtras*.

3.212 Untenability of Āpastamba's condemnation in the light of his own statements. The purpose of that condemnation is to secure dull-witted people in the practice of household virtues, so that they may thereby acquire the strength of mind necessary for renunciation.

3.213 Similar condemnation inspired by a like purpose in Chapter 18 of the *Śānti Parvan*..

3.214 Condemnation of early renunciation in the *Manu smṛti* should be similarly explained.

3.215 Śrīkaṇṭha's *saguṇa* interpretation of Vedānta texts and the concealment of their *nirguṇa* bearing are conceived

in like spirit. His interpretation has the merit of not going against the truth, but expounding an intermediate aspect of the final truth.

3.22 (Objection:) If Śrīkaṇṭha acknowledged *nirguṇa* Brahman he should have recognized that alone to be the purport of the *sūtras*, as shown by Śaṃkara.

(Reply: Śaṃkara himself has shown the existence of a reference in the *sūtras* to *saguṇa* Brahman, e.g., in *sūtras* 1.1.1-4, 10-11, and also in the introduction to 1.1.2. So also in the rest of the *sūtras*, synthesis is exhibited of some with *nirguṇa* and some others with *saguṇa* Brahman.

3.23 (Objection:) If Śaṃkara too has exhibited the *saguṇa* bearing of the *sūtras*, where was the necessity for Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary?

(Reply:) The festh commentary goes further than Śaṃkara's in determining the form and nature of *saguṇa* Brahman.

3.231 Śaṃkara himself gives clear indications of his own view that *saguṇa* Brahman is Śiva, a being other than Viṣṇu (1.3.14).

3.232 Or *saṃhāra* Rudra (3.3.32).

3.233 Vācaspati Miśra who knew what the Bhagavatpāda had at heart, identified *saguṇa* Brahman with Śiva in his preliminary invocation.

3.234 All such indications are far too subtle for the average devotee. The specific nature of *saguṇa* Brahman should be determined by examining and discounting references to deities other than Śiva; this is what Śrīkaṇṭha does.

3.235 (Objection:) The need for a fresh commentary shows Śaṃkara's discussion of the *saguṇa* interpretation to have been in vain.

(Reply:) Not so, for these implications had necessarily to be recognized in demonstrating that *śrūti* references were to Brahman, not to the finite self or *pradhāna*, and

in exhibiting the nature of the result of Brahman-knowledge. This result is the attainment of the nature of *īśvara,* i.e., *saguṇa* Brahman.

3.2351 That Śaṃkara holds release to be of the above nature, until the final liberation of all, is seen from his [comments on] 1.3.19, and

3.2352 1.4.10, and

3.2353 2.3.43 *et seq.*, and

3.2354 3.2.3, and

3.2355 4.4.7.

3.2356 (Objection:) If the inquiry into *saguṇa* implicaitons is necessarily involved in the other inquiry, why promise it, as it were, by framing the definition of Brahman in 1.1.2 so as to apply to both forms?

(Reply:) The purport of the promissory statement is to show that there is a *saguṇa* interpretation for the *sūtras* in their entirety. This is indicated clearly in 1.1.3: Śaṃkara alone, on the *sthālīpulāka nyāya,* a principle followed by the author of the *Kalpataru* in commenting on [Śaṃkara's *Bhāṣya* on] 4.1.18.

3.241 (Objection:) Śrīkaṇṭha for his *saguṇa* interpretation relies not only on the *saguṇa* contexts but draws on *nirguṇa* contexts also, making it appear that the *nirguṇa* doctrine has no basis at all. Hence his commentary is opposed to the doctrine of *nirguṇa* Brahman.

3.242 (Reply:) Even Śaṃkara has to speak of Brahman's characteristic marks in establishing his doctrine of the characterless Brahman. The texts about the latter have an intermediate reference to the former.

3.2421 (Objection:) But Śrīkaṇṭha twists even *nirguṇa* texts with much effort to suit his doctrines.

3.24211 Interpretations of the *vācārambhaṇa śruti*–first interpretation.

3.24212 The same–second interpretation.

3.2413 Doctrine of difference expounded in 3.2.11 *et seq.*, and also in 3.4.4; 2.1.22; and 3.4.8.

3.2414 Declarations of non-difference are explained as referring to non-otherness as between the pervaded and the pervaded.

3.24221 Explanation of the above as not inconsistent with pure non-dualism. 2.1.22 implies that the bonds of agency etc. are illusory. 2.1.23 only removes the erroneous notion engendered by 2.1.5 that even the inert world is non-different from Brahman. 1.3.43 and 44 refer to the superiority of Brahman, not to His difference from the finite self.

3.24222 The interpretation set out in 2.3.42 *et seq.* favoring difference is negatived by the interpretation favoring non-difference in 4.1.3.

3.242221 (Objection:) Such negation, being self-contradictory, is inconceivable. Non-difference must be only imagined for purposes of meditation.

3.242222 (Reply:) The interpretation offered in 2.3.42 *et seq.* is opposed to the Jābāla *śruti* cited in 4.1.3, to the drift of the commentary on 3.1.3, and to the commentary on 3.3.14. Nor can both interpretations be accepted, they being contradictory.

3.242223 Non-difference is not merely imagined; the experience thereof persists even in release, as shown by the commentary on 4.4.19.

3.242224 (Objection:) The notion of the relationship of body and the embodied self is of no value either in the knowledge of *nirguṇa* Brahman or in meditation on *saguṇa* Brahman. Why then should it have been propounded?

3.242225 (Reply:) That notion is for those of least capacity who are qualified only for the *dāsamārga.*

3.24223 The interpretation of the *vācārambhaṇa śruti* serves only to strengthen faith in *saguṇa* Brahman. Further, the *aśmādi sūtra* (2.1.23) makes it clear that in the view of

the commentator, the inert world is not non-different from Brahman, and that, consequently , it is to be understood as fictitiously imposed on Brahman.

4 *Vivartavāda* is the view of the *sūtrakāra* [viz., Bādarāyaṇa) too, as seen from *Suvarcalā-Śvetaketu Upākhyāna* in the *Mokṣadharma* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa.*

4.1 Support for the above view from another context in the *Mokṣadharma* and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa,.*

5 The qualified non-dualism of others is not susceptible of being interpreted as favorable to pure non-dualism. Śrīkaṇṭha alone has provided a commentary suitable to all three grades of capacity.

13.3 APPAYYA DĪKṢITA, *Śivatattvaviveka*

Edited by Harihara Sastri. Advaitamanjari Series No. 7, Kumbakonam 1895. This is a sizable work, coming to 63 verses with extended commentary.

According to N. Ramesan (Ramesan pp. 103-104) *Śivatattvaviveka* is a commentary on Appayya's work *Śikhariṇī Mālā*. Here is what he has to say:

"*Śikhariṇī* and its commentary *Tattvaviveka* : These and the other *śaivite* works of Sri Appayya Dīkṣita were all intended to propagate Śivādvaita doctrine. These were mainly written to highlight the great qualities of Lord Śiva. They were written at a time when polemical warfare between the Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaivites in the Vijayanagar days was rampant and these works were intended to support the Śaivite doctrine.

"During the days of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita the Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas were propoagating Vaiṣṇavism along with the help of the ruling king and sometimes through force also. The greatest person behind this movement was Śrī Tātācārya. This became possible because the royal regent Rāmarāya who came to effective power after Śrī Kṛṣṇadevarāya gave a great deal of support to the Rājaguru.

"The *Śikhariṇimālā* is a work in Sanskrit containing 60 verses in *Śikhariṇī vṛtta.* The work seems to propagate the greatness of devotion to Śiva and also enlightens us about the supreme power of Lord Śiva. In the introduction to *Śiva Tattva Viveka* Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita himself says the following:

"In all these 60 verses I have praised Lord Paśupati who is the inner soul of the entire Universe. These verses are full of very interesting inner meanings. They are also quite powerful to strike down the mouths of those critics who go about insulting Lord Śiva and his worship. The verses closely follow also the great principles that have been traditionally followed by elders from ancient times. I am writing this commentary or *vyākhyāna* in order to make known in an elaborate manner their inner meanings, which is based on the authority of the *śruti* and the *Purāṇas.*

"The *Śivatattvaviveka* is an elaborate attempt to establish that Śiva is the Lord of the Universe. For the Śaiva cult no book has done more service than the *Śiva Tattva Viveka...*"

14 MĀDHAVA MUKUNDA (1670)

By Sitanath Gosvami

For the determination of the date of the manuscript we are to start from Appaya Dīkṣita whose date is almost fixed at 1550-1622. Appaya Dīkṣita's *Kalpataruparimala* (in short, *Parimala*) is referred to by Gauḍabrahmānanda at the beginning of his commentary entitled *Nyāyaratnāvalī* on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Siddhāntabindu.* Thus Gauḍabrahmānanda may be placed in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Since Mādhava Mukunda (MM) often refers to Madhusūdana and sometimes utilizes the arguments of Gauḍabrahmānanda for showing his mastery in the refutation of the Advaita view, it is proved that MM is a subsequent author and may be a junior contemporary of

[Gauḍa]Brahmānanda.

On the strength of the succession list of Madhva teachers Surendranath Dasgupta (HIP 3, p. 416) determines that Vyāsatīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta* on Madhusūdana's *Advaitasiddhi* may have been made about a century later. Hence Gauḍabrahmānanda's *Laghucandrikā* might have been written in the first quarter of the seventeenth century A.D., and MM's *Parapakṣagirivajra,* a refutation of *Advaitasiddhi* and *Laghucandrikā* is, in all probability, written in the middle of the seventeenth century A.D.

This view is also corroborated by a popular belief that Madhsūdana, in his early years, went to Navadvipa to meet Caitanyadeva to learn Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism but missed him, for the sad demise of the saint to place in 1533 A.D. Thus Madhusūdana's advent might have been in the second decade of the sixteenth century A.D., and his *Advaitasiddhi* perhaps came from his pen by the end of the sixteenth century. Accordingly MM may be placed sometime in the middle of the seventeenth century A.D.

Although there is no internal evidence as to the native place of MM, it is traditionally believed that he hailed from the village Aruṇaghaṭā which is identified as Āruṃghāṭā village of Nadia district in West Bengal.

In Indian tradition it is customary among the authors, especially those of philosophical treatises, to show reverence to their preceptors. But strangely enough MM has not mentioned the name of any of his teachers on various subjects over which he had absolute mastery. We are quite in the dark on this issue. *Parapakṣagirivajra* the only work of MM known to us.

14.1 MĀDHAVAMUKUNDA , *Parapakṣagirivajra*

The work is also summarized by Surendranath Dasgupta in *History of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 416-440.

Summarized by Sitanath Goswami

"EV" refers to the edition of 1936 published from Vṛndāvana by Amolakarama Sastri.

This work owes much to the two most celebrated works of the Mādhva system–Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā* and Vyaṣatīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta.* It is also called *Adhyāsagirivajra* since all arrows of refutation have been flung with a view to animadverting superimposition or *adhyāsa,* the mainstay of Advaitism. There is no denying the fact that the work is designed to set aside the Advaita view although other philosophical doctrines also have been subjected to criticism here and there, especially on the second chapter. MM himself preferred the appellation *Parapakṣagirivajra* since in the first paragraph, after the benedictory verses, as well as in the colophons to the first and second chapters he has mentioned that name, though in the colophons to the third and fourth chapters he gives the name *Adhyāsaparapakṣagirivajra*.MM has a special liking for the name *Śārīrakahārdasaṃcaya* which means "a collection of the implications of the *Śārīrakasūtra.*". This name is referred to in the first paragraph (EV6) and at the end of all the four chapters of the treatise.

As a dispassionate philosopher MM has represented the views of his main adversary, the Advaitavāda, in real earnestness and sincerity. From his exposition it is clear that he made a thorough study of the Advaita classics. In the presentation of the Advaita doctrine he has made no distortion, and has become very faithful. He has either referred to or quoted almost all important Advaita texts: Vācaspat Miśra (EV 38, 184, etc.), Prakāśātman (EV 85 etc.), Govindānanda (EV 54 etc.), Citsukha (EV 102), Ānandabodha (EV 460), Sarvajñātman (EV 83 (although wrongly printed as *Vivaraṇa*), 93), Sureśvara (EV 83, 88), *Kalpataru* (EV 454), *Vedāntasāra* (EV 283), *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (EV 105, although the relevant line is a definite mixture with *Vivaraṇa,* see p. 395 of the Madras edition).

MM shows reverence to Śaṃkarācārya by referring to his

name as "Śrībhagavatpādabhāṣyakāra" (EV 147, EV 65). It is also to be noted that Śaṃkarācārya writes his introduction to the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* under the appellation "*adhyāsabhāṣya*", but MM devotes many more pages to his refutation of *adhyāsa* in the introductory chapter which is nearly forty times that of Śaṃkara's *adhyāsabhāṣya*.. In doing so MM has dragged in many of the arguments from other topics which have been dealt with later on also. Thus his treatment suffers from the defect of repetition.

MM glosses some of the *sūtras* of the four chapters without taking into account the functions of the individual quarters. This has resulted in a bit of inconsistency, at least in one place (vide the summary of EV 376-378). Perhaps he has indulged in such inconsistency in order to make room for the establishment of the Pañcarātra system. The philosophical doctrine of the Nimbārka school is characterized as *bhedābhedavāda* which has sometimes given rise to confusion with the doctrine of Bhagavad Bhāskara. By refuting that view MM shows the excellence of the *bhedābhedavāda*, the one subscribed to by his own school (vide the summary, EV below, pp. 304-307).

At the time of summarizing this abstruse text of 480 pages I have often been confronted with difficulties which could be thwarted through the blessings of my revered *guru* the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Yogendranath Tarka-Saṅkhya-Vedāntatīrtha. A disciple of my *guru* Pt. Binod Bihari Pañcatīrtha edited and explained this text in Bengali with the active help of *guruji*. I have no hesitation in acknowledging my debt to that edition for this work of summarizing this text.

(EV1-4) The work starts with four benedictory verses to devoted Śrī Mukunda, Hayagrīva, and Nimbārka.

(EV4-5) MM narrates how this work is originated. Śrī Mukunda is identical with Vāsudeva who incarnates in the womb of Satyavatī and is known as Vyāsa for redacting the

entire Veda in four sections. He was so kind that besides the division of the Veda, which was debarred for women and *śūdras*, he composed the Mahābhārata etc. and the *Vedāntasūtra* for persons desiring salvation. Apprehending the break of tradition and with an intent to revitalize the tradition Niyamānanda made a sentence-wise exposition (known as *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*. Śrīnivāsācārya, who is known as Śaṃkhāvatāra, made an easy commentary on it . MM writes this work for an easy grasp of the import of that work of Śrīnivāsa.

(EV6-8) Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras*, indicates through several *sūtras* that a person desiring the result (*arthin*), having physical abilities of undergoing the entire process (*samartha*) and equipped with the necessary background of education (*vidvas*), is qualified for reading a branch of learning (*śāstra*). This view of Jaimini's is expressed in general terms, and a particular branch requires some special qualifications peculiar to that branch. Vedānta aims at a special result (*phala*) to be attained through special means (*sādhana, upāya*). The aim of the Upaniṣad of Vedānta is the attainment of the extreme identity (of *jīva* with Brahman), to know the greatness of Brahman, to have immortality, etc., as propounded in the various texts. Similarly the means to be adopted are special and uncommon. The pursuer of the course has to listen (*śrotavya*) to the nature of *ātman* or Brahman, to reason on it (*mantavya*), and to meditate on it (*nididhyāsitavya*) for having a revelation of it (*draṣṭavya*). For undergoing this *śāstra* the person concerned should have the desire for release which is identity with Bhagavat, ought to be able to perform the task of listening to the nature of Brahman, and should have adequate knowledge and learning as to the means to the fulfilment of the desired results. Such a person is deemed fit to read the Vedānta. In order to attain this eligibility one should sit at the feet of a teacher with a feeling of reverence, should win the power of discrimination of reality from unreal objects, should

develop non-attachment and beseechment for Bhagavat's refuge and grace. This view is supported by more than a dozen quotations from the Upaniṣads.

(EV. 9-11) Since discrimination (*viveka*), etc., are accepted as the agent's contribution to the origination of eligibility, such facts as the reading of the Veda, study of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, performance of the compulsory and occasional duties etc. are not deemed necessary for its (eligibility's)origination because these factors cause directly the discrimination etc., and only indirectly (through the production of the discrimination, etc.) their utility may be accepted. Revered *ācāryas* such as Nimbārka etc. have mentioned these indirect agents too but MM has excluded them. Thus there is no contradiction among the Dvaitādvaita scholars.

Objection: Is there no necessity of the discussion on *dharma*?

Answer: A person endowed with such good qualities as discrimination, non-attachment, etc., does not require the discussion on *dharma*, and performance of good deeds also is not needed for him. One who lacks in the said good qualities has to attain these by performing meritorious deeds as a necessary prerequisite for the eligibility to read the Vedānta. These good qualities may be earned in this birth or in any previous one.

(EV 11-13) If desire for release be considered to be the only prerequisite, the deities also would be eligible for this *śāstra*,and MM promptly accepts this without hesitation because the *Bṛhadāraṇyakiopaniṣad* propounds that the gods that came to know Brahman became Brahman (1.4.10).

Pūrvamīmāṃsā does not consider beasts and birds suitable for Vedic ceremonies, and decides that only human beings are eligible for such Vedic rites. Uttaramīmāṃsā propounds that Brahman is present in the human heart in the shape of a thumb. Since only human beings are entitled to know this *śāstra*, the size of the thumb would be that of a

human thumb (cf. *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.25.)

Objection: Then the view of MM militates against both the *śāstras*.

Answer: The above views are expressed under certain special circumstances. Thus they are not to be known as universal or unconditional. The contention of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is to exclude the beasts and birds, and not to preclude the deities. Again the above-quoted *Brahmasūtra* passage is not the final answer of the Vedāntins; on the other hand, the author of the work immediately starts the next discussion with a view to establishing the suitability of the deities for learning and understanding the nature of *ātman* or Brahman.

The summary of these arguments is (i) the enjoyments of heaven (*svarga*) being temporary, gods are desirous of having permanent bliss or liberation, (ii) they have also bodies necessary for undergoing training in this branch of learning, (iii) they have knowledge of all deeds (cf. *Īśopaniṣad* 18), (iv) Prajāpati taught Indra this self-knowledge, (iv) Bādarāyaṇa expressly mentions the suitability of the deities for this branch of learning in his work (1.3.33).

(EV 13-14) *Śūdras* are not entitled to read the Vedānta because they do not undergo the initiation process (*upanayana*) for reading the Veda. They have also been debarred from the Vedāntic knowledge through the express statements of the *smṛti*, e.g. "Self-knowledge should not be imparted to the *śūdras*". Bādarāyaṇa also frames *sūtras* rejecting the *śūdras*' claim for reading the Vedānta (cf. *Brahmasūtra* 1.3.35-38).

(EV 14-16) The Supreme Self (*parabrahman*) is the purport of the chief contention (*viṣaya*) of Vedānta. He is an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, kindness, affection etc., and is devoid of the least defect. In Him remain the opposed entities as difference and non-difference (*bhedābhedāśraya*).

Advaitins accept that the identity of *jīva* and Brahman is the purport of Vedānta. This identity is either superimposed

(*adhyasta*) or non-superimposed. On the first alternative, the identity being superimposed, difference will be real. On the second, it is to be noted that identity means absence of difference. Reality of the absence of difference presupposes the reality of difference, and in that case Advaitins will definitely made to feel uneasy by the acceptance of duality.

(Objection:) The identity of *jīva* and Brahman is Brahman Himself. So the problem of duality does not arise at all. It is further not accepted that an absence being real, the counterpositive also should be real. Accordingly we Advaitins are not put to trouble.

(Answer:) Identity of two, or absence of difference, is a relative (*sāpekṣā*) term. This cannot be explained away by holding it as equal to Brahman which is Absolute as *per* Advaita doctrine.

(EV 16-25) MM admits Brahman's being endowed with immense good qualities which are both different and non-different from Brahman.

(Objection:) Difference is inexplicable. It is either identical with the locus or different from the locus. Difference from cloth lies in a jar. Here the cloth is different, the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*), and the jar is the locus (*anuyogin*). Difference is always determined by a counterpositive, and thus it is a relational (*sāpekṣa*) concept. A difference which is by nature relational cannot be identical with its non-relational (*nirapekṣa*) locus.. Again, if this difference be different from its locus there is an infinite regress. Further, the difference of the cloth from the jar is established after the establishment of the difference of the jar from the cloth, and vice-versa. So there is another defect of mutual dependence.

(Answer:) Something that is non-relational in some context may be relational in some other context. The jar may be non-relational by itself but it may very well be relational under the context of negation. Thus the first objection is obviated. The next objection of infinite regress is also not tenable, because the

difference of the cloth from the jar and the difference of the difference from the jar are not different: these two differences are one. This identity of the two differences is comparable with the identity of inherence (*samavāya*) in spite of the difference of relata such as universals, qualities, etc..The third objection is also removed by holding that the difference of the cloth from the jar is established by knowing the jar "as jar" but not "as different from the cloth".

Advaitins make much of the contradictory cognitions (*bādhajñāna*), and on the strength of this seek to establish the negation of difference. The contradictory cognitions are: (1) It is not a difference, (2) There is no difference, and (3) Something else appears as difference. If these cognitions include difference as a content, difference is established further. If they fail to include difference as a content of negation, difference is not contradicted. Thus difference remains unassailed.

If there be no difference, how can teaching be possible. The teacher requires a student for teaching. Owing to the acceptance of difference the Advaitins are able to repudiate the views of opponents. Difference and identity are really different, and this difference cannot easily be brushed aside by maintaining the falsity of the difference.

(EV 25-27) Advaitins animadvert difference by showing the untenability of two mutually exclusive alternatives. Does difference lie in anything different, or in non-difference? On the first alterantvie there is the defect of self-dependence. On the second, the defect is of contradictoin (*virodha*).

MM turns the same arguments on the Advaitins. Does identity remain in something identical or different? In the first, there is self-dependence, and in the second, contradiction.

The nature of Brahman is non-individualistic (*nirviśeṣa*) existence. This being cognizable in the perception of a jar etc. as "the jar is existent" there is no ecessity of the Vedānta for knowing this entity. Thus the Advaitins fail to account for the

utility of the commencement of this *śāstra*. Thus Parabrahman or Śrīpuruṣottama, who was determined earlier (EV 14-16) as an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities, is the chief purport of the Vedānta. Advaitins have not been able to establish their stand of the identity of *jīva* and Brahman as the purport of Vedānta. Thus the relation between the *śāstra* and the purport also remains unestablished in their system.

(EV 27-28) The result or ultimate aim of going through this *śāstra* is "attainment of the nature of Bhagavat", which is also known as release (*mokṣa*). It is expressly mentioned in the *Bhagavadgītā* 4.10 and 13.18. The word "*bhāva*' in "*bhagavadbhāva*" is also explained by Bhagavat as absorption (*sāyujya*), equality (*sāmya*), etc..

Advaitins cannot explain their stand as to the result of the study of Vedānta because *jīva* or consciousness being one the pain and pleasure of one will in that case be felt by another. The answer of the difference of the *jīvas* being caused by various limitations is also not tenable since in that case the difference of the limbs as hands and feet etc. of one single *jīva* would have caused separate feelings, and a man would not have been able to feel pain in his hand and pleasure in his feet.

Objection: Difference of mind is the cause of the difference of feeling. Separate *jīvas* have separate minds, but separate limbs have no separate minds.

Answer: Mind is daily subject to dissolution deep sleep. The next day in the morning a person gets a new mind, and as a result he must not be able to recall the incidents of a previous day when another mind was in operation.

(EV 28-32) Advaitins maintain that ignorance, in all its varieties, is the limitation of *jīvas*. In their view bondage remains in consciousness determined by ignorance, and release comes in Pure Consciousness not determined by anything. So a bound man is never released. Exertion is made by one, and release (the result) is achieved by another. Somebody performs but does not get the result, and the person who does not

perform gets the result.

To have resource to the theory of one single *jīva* (*ekajīvavāda*) cannot be a remedy to this problem, because in that case either the release of Śuka etc. would have to be rejected or the release of all persons would have to be admitted, negating thereby the existence of the present world of experience.

(EV 32-34) MM shows that a *jīva* cannot be a reflection (*pratibimba*) of consciousness (Brahman) because in all cases of reflection the image (*bimba*) and the limitation, i.e., the locus of reflection, must be constituted of parts, have form, be a content of valid cognition etc. If the Advaitin accepts the image, i.e. Brahman, as having form, parts and as being the content of valid cogntion, they lose their stand of attributeless Brahman.

(Objection:) Form (*rūpa*) has no form (*nirūpa*), but it is reflected. So formless Brahman will also be reflected.

(Answer:) Formless form is never reflected, but an object with form is reflected.

(Objection:) Space has neither form nor any part, but it is reflected in water, air, etc..

(Answer:) As *per* Advaita doctrine all the five elements are commingled with one another, and thus the subtle elements (*sūkṣmabhūta*) become gross (*sthūla*). Thus the gross space that is reflected is not space alone but mixed with fire, water and earth which have form, parts and visibility. Further, if formless objects are capable of being reflected, time and merit, etc., would have been reflected on sound and touch, and air, a ghost etc. would also have been reflected in time, etc..

Since Brahman cannot be reflected on the stength of the above arguments, the so-called theory of the identity of *jīva* and Brahman owing to the reflection of Brahman on ignorance or the internal organ is totally refuted.

(EV 34-37) According to a section of Advaitins *jīva* is one. But in this theory both the teacher and the taught being

one, there can be no teaching at all, and consequently release becomes impossible. The argument of one single *jīva* being considered as many (i.e., as both the teacher and the taught) is very weak because a non-existent seeming preceptor is not accepted in the *śāstras*. A preceptor must have revelation but the one that is admittted by an Advaitin has some superimposed qualities including omniscience. Such a preceptor with superimposed omniscience fails to impart knowledge leading to liberation.

Further, has anybody as yet been released or not? It there is any released person, all are released, because *jīva* is one, and therefore there should be total absence of the cycle of birth and death, the query of the student, the teaching and the instrument of knowledge. On the second alternative there is the absence of any released or revealed person capable of imparting knowledge. Also, a contradiction with the *śāstra* becomes inevitable because Śuka, Vāmadeva, etc., are admitted there as enlightened persons. Again, the singular number in *ātman* as used in *śruti* and *smṛti* does not prove the oneness of self but it is a device to refer to *ātman* in general. Thus in the theory of one *jīva* release, the result of knowledge, becomes impossible.

(EV 37-39) Some of the sentences of the Veda seek to establish difference. In the opinion of the Advaitins this reference to difference is only an acceptance of our illusory cognition of difference. Here MM says that a cognition may be branded as false only when it is contradicted. The few cases of a denial of difference in the Veda are to be understood as the denial of differences limited as being independent (*svatantra*) but not the denial of there being real, actual differences.

Vācaspati Miśra has established with arguments that the real nature of *ātman* or Brahman is not fully grasped by perception, owing to the imperfection of our sense-organs. But the Veda is free from any blemish, and the cognition arising out of the Veda must be stronger than the one received through perception. Thus, according to the Advaitins, an inquiry and a

discussion about the nature of Brahman requires to be initiated. Here MM's view is that no partial knowledge of Brahman, an integrated whole, is possible.

According to Advaitins the difference of body and Self is non-different from Self; the absence of agency and experiencing is non-different from Self, etc.. Now mutual absence and absolute absence are both absences. Now the question is whether the identity of these absences with the Self is true or false. If true the Advaita theory is lost because two entities are held as true. If it is false, the scripture propounding their identify with the Self will lose its validity. Further, the identity established by scripture being contradicted, its opposite, viz., difference, becomes real.

(EV 39-41) If the difference of body from self and the difference of the absence of attributes from self be accepted as true, there is at least one section of Advaitins, viz. Maṇḍana and his followers, who are not disturbed by this, because in their opinion the theory of non-duality means non-acceptance of any second positive entity (*bhāvādvaita*). This difference (*anyonyābhāva*) being a negative concept, it may be accepted as true without hindering the Advaita concept. MM rejects this view of Maṇḍana, holding that in the said solution positive entites such as absence-ness (*abhāvatva*), container-ness and contained-ness (*ādheyatva*), etc., are to be necessarily admitted. Thus the theory of positive non-dualism (*bhāvādvaitavāda*) is lost. Further, the great Vedāntic sentences (*mahāvākya*) admittedly propound one single indivisible concept (*akhaṇḍārtha*); but the opinon of Maṇḍana is inconsistent because of its propounding two concepts, one positive viz. Brahman, and one negative, viz., absence.

Advaitins argue that self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) Brahman is veiled by ignorance, and that ignorance is revealed by Brahman. Brahman or consciousness determined by a mental mode (*vṛtti*) annihilates ignorance. Ordinary mental modes have ordinary substances such as jars, cloths, etc., as

their contents. But the final mental mode (*caramavṛtti*) has Brahman as its object. This final mode removes ignorance totally. Prior to that Brahman remains an object of inquiry (*jijñāsya*) for its being known partially and also for the origination of doubt. To this MM says that happiness, sorrow, etc., are, according to the Advaitins, revealed by pure consciousness, and this pure consciousness is veiled by ignorance. If that be so happiness, sorrow, etc., should not be revealed at all. If again happiness etc. be revealed, pure consciousness also will be revealed, and there will be no doubt as to Brahman. Thus Brahman cannot be an object of inquiry.

A man oblivious of his necklace of jewels get it back only on awareness of it. Advaitins hold that similarly the attainment of Brahman is nothing altogether new for an inquirer, but he must get his ignorance removed at which time he will understand the identity of his own self with Brahman. For this both inquiry (*jijñāsā*) and teaching (*upadeśa*) are necessary. MM shows the Advaitin's analogy to be wrong by maintaining that the jewels (or the necklace) are external objects and hence may be forgotten, but the self cannot be forgotten since it is a person's very nature. Everybody is always aware of himself, and this shows that there is no one who is ignorant of himself and requires knowledge of it. In this way MM refutes the Advaita theory as to the necessity of the *śāstra* (*prayojana*) and also the existence of any person requiring knowledge (*adhikārin*).

(EV 41-43) Advaitins try to restore their position by stating that all cognitions and their results, viz., expression (*vyapadeśa*) and physical actions (*pravṛtti, nivṛtti*) are possible only through superimposition. Superimposition will always entail logical incompatibility, and it is not an exception in respect of the obbject of inquiry, purpose of inquiry and the inquirer.

MM refutes superimposiiotn itself by pointing out the inconsistency in the locus of superimposition. When we know the general properties, and are unaware of the specific ones, of

something such as a piece of shell (*śukti*), then only we may superimpose a piece of silver on that shell, the locus. Unlike the illustration Brahman can never be the locus since It has no properties at all. Accordingly there is no scope for knowing some other specific ones. The pleas of knowing Brahman by Its nature and not knowing it as complete bliss (*pūrṇānanda*) is also tbe rejected because knowing the nature of Brahman includes knowing it as complete bliss.

(EV 43-45) MM here animadverts superimposition by establishing the incongruity of the concept of the superimposed. In the illusion of the shell as silver the silver is not known now for the first time; on the contrary, a piece of true silver was perceived. That piece of silver is the prototype on the basis of the trace (*saṃskāra*) from which the subsequent false awareness arises, or in other words, the superimposed appears. If the world is to be accepted as false, i.e. as superimposed on Brahman, there should be another world which must be true as its prototype.

Advaitins object to that and say that the prototype does not necessarily have to be true. It may be either true or false. Only the prior cognition of the protoype is deemed necessary. Thus a false cognition of the world caused by a previous superimposition is sufficient for today's illusion of the world.

MM argues that ignorance, being false, must be superimposed on Brahman. Ignorance has no beginning. But how can the superimposition of beginningless ignorance be substantiated without another beginningless ignorance? The postulation of another beginningless ignorance is useless and absurd too. Being thus landed in a difficult situation Advaitins hold that ignorance requires no prototype. MM maintains that on similar grounds Brahman, which has no beginning, may be superimposed on the world without requiring any prototype. As in the Advaitin's view the prototype may be either true or false, similarly in the Dvaitādvaita view the locus (here the world) may be either true or false. The Advaita view of the

prototype being false, though, is not acceptable for another reason. How can a false prototype have sense-contact? Thus a false or non-existent prototype cannot be cognized, and a previous awareness of a false world cannot cause the present false cognition.

(EV 45-48) Superimposition requires a trace as an essential prerequisite. The false cognition of the world from time immemorial must be cause by a trace which is also equally present from time immemorial. The world is cause and it is non-eternal, it has a beginning. But the trace, i.e., the cause, is beginningless. Now Brahman, the locus of the world, and the trace are equally beginningless and true.

MM shows that pure consciousness cannot be the locus of traces since in that case Brahman does not remain pure. Again, *jīva* being cause by superimposition cannot be the locus of a trace which is the cause of the superimposition.

Similarity between the locus and the superimposed is an essential condition, for all superimpositions are dependent on remembered traces (*smaryamāṇāropa*). In the superimposition of the world of ignorance the locus is Brahman. But Brahman has no parallel or similar entity. Thus superimposition is further inconsistent.

MM rejects the possibility of any beginningless superimposition as conceived by the Advaitins in the so-called superimposition of ignorance on Brahman. Wherever there is superimposition there is a beginning, as in shell-silver. Wherever there is no beginning, there is no superimposition, as in Self. In view of the above positive and negative concomitance, superimposition is here refuted.

Śaṃkara's stand of Self being to some extent an content of cognition is repudiated by MM holdling that the said argument suffers from the defect of mutual dependence. "A self is cognizable when there is there is superimposition, and a self is superimposed when there is cognition" is the argument of the Advaitins.

(E48-54) The relation between awareness (*dṛk*) and what is seen (*dṛśya*) cannot be determined, and thus superimposition is not established. According to the Advaitins every known object is superimposed on knowledge. In each case of superimposition one or the other of the two entities must be false. Since knowledge, i.e., Brahman, cannot be false, it is the other entity, viz., the known, which must be false.

MM argues that the admission of the superimposition of all known on knowledge, i.e. Brahman, is useless because in that case all that is known would be revealed to all beings at one time. The Advaita plea of accepting the mental mode (*vṛtti*) for restricting an awareness of a particular object coming into sense-organ contact is also untenable because this particular solution itself is sufficient to explain the awareness of an object without any reference to the so-called theory of superimposition.

(Objection:) The mental mode is necessary for dissipating the veil of ignorance.

(Answer:) Ignorance is removed only at the time of final revelation.

(Objection:) Partial ignorance (*tūlājñāna*) goes away at the time of the revelation of the jar etc. Radical ignorance (*mūlājñāna*) disappears with the final realization. Thus nothing is incongruous.

(Answer:) If the awareness determined by an object such as a jar be revealed to be a result of the dissolution of the partial ignorance and still that awareness is accepted as true, the concomitance of awareness and falsity is vitiated because determined awareness is not being accepted as false although the Advaitins propound that "whatever is seen is false" (*mithyā dṛśyatvāt*). If again this determined awareness is accepted as false, it cannot be the locus of superimposition inasmuch as both the entities are of the same status of existence.

MM argues that the awareness (*dṛk*), on which the seen (*dṛśya*) is said to be superimposed, will either be valid (*pramā*)

or not (*apramā*). If it be valid, the content of the awareness also will exist. And in that case there is no occasion for the superimposition of the known on knowledge. If again the awareness is invalid, it cannot be the locus of the co-called superimposition.

MM asks the Advaitins what they mean by the "superimposition relation"? Do they mean that the relation of the two relata is superimposed? Or is it that the related are superimposed? On the first alternative, let the relation be superimposed: but the related need not necessarily be superimposed (i.e., false). If the Advaitins can accepted one relatum (*sambandhin*), viz., knowledge, to be true, why should we not admit the other relatum, viz., the known, also as true? On the second alternative, the two related being false, the one relatum, viz., awareness, cannot be the locus of the superimposition of the other.

This relation between awareness and content being difficult to pin down (*durnirūpya*) the Advaitins are in favor of branding it as false. Now MM says that Brahman also, being indeterminable, should be accepted as false. Thus the Advaita theory of the superimposed or false relation of knowledge and known is totally untenable.

(EV 54-61) Superimposition is defined by the Advaitins as *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*. This definition is propounded by Śaṃkara, and his followers have held that the words "*paratra*" and "*avabhāsa*" constitute the definition, and the other two words, viz., "*smṛtirūpa*" and "*pūrvadṛṣṭa*", are required to establish the nature of superimposition.[1] However, the word "*avabhāsa*" means "something that is cognized", i.e. silver in the instance of the shell-silver illusion; "*paratra*" literally means "elsewhere" , i.e. in some place in which locus

[1]A long passage of ten lines is quoted here from Govindānanda's *Ratnaprabhā*, p. 11 of the NSP edition. There are minor variations in five places.

the silver is not present or not capable of being present. It is further explained the this incapacity (*ayogyatva*) means either the absolute absence of the superimposed or something having the absolute absence of the superimposed".

Now the definition of superimposition is being explained by the Advaitins. Something that is absolutely precluded in but cognized to be related as present at the same time in one particular section (*avaccheda*) is superimposed. This is the definition of all sorts of superimposition–eternal and non-eternal. In the above definition the term "one particular section" is necessary in order to avoid the defect of the definition's being too-general in one locus and cognized too as related with the same thing but in another section. The expressions "to be related as present at the same time in" is necessary so that this definition be not too wide in the instance where a jar was absent from the floor but later on present there. Superimposition of silver on a shell means that it is absent from the shell at a time when it is cognized to be present there. But that is not the case with the jar referred to just now. Again, the expression "absolute absence" is also essential because otherwise smell appearing at the second of birth of the jar would have been superimposed. But smell which is to appear in the next moment cannot be held to be absolutely absent in the jar at the first moment.

By the word "*smṛtirūpa*" Advaitins mean "being of the nature of memory". As memory is caused by a trace, so is superimposition, but the difference lies in the fact that memory is caused by traces alone but superimposition is caused by three conditions, viz. trace, defect, and *samprayoga*, i.e., awareness of the attribute common to the locus and the superimposed. "*Adhyāsa*" means both a superimposed content and the awareness of a superimposed content.

Now MM points out that the said definition cannot explain the so-called superimposition of *mūlāvidyā*. Something which is existent elsewhere is superimposed on some other

locus; for example, silver present in the shop is superimposed on a piece of conch-shell. According to Advaitins ignorance is present only in Brahman, and so there cannot be the superimposition of basic ignorance from which other partial ignorances emerge and veil the delimited [*avacchinna*] consciousness. Further, any cognition must be supported by our direct experience (*anubhava*). In the illusion of silver on shell there is the experience "this is silver". But in the so-called illusion of ignorance there is no such experience as "this is ignorance". Hence superimposition of ignorance cannot be accepted. Further, similarity required for superimposition is not similarity only but it is to be understood technically here as "being the content of a cognition caused by a trace".But this interpretation offered by the Advaitins is not acceptable because a trace presupposes an experience. Non-superimposed experience of basic ignorance being totally unacceptable to the Advaitin, the trace of it also is impossible, and consequently the technical similarity also cannot be established.

Advaitins object to the above arguments of the Dvaitādvaita school by holding that the conditions for superimposition do not hold good for the eternal superimposition. MM ridicules the statement of Śaṃkara that there is an eternal superimposition uncaused by any condition. This type of view may sound nice in his own sect and may be likened to the brilliant performance of one's own horse in one's own courtyard instead of holding the contest in an open field.

On the Advaita view ignorance itself has to be superimposed; otherwise it cannot be annihilated. Only ignorance's being superimposed can solve the problem. Here MM replies that non-superimposed true facts also can be removed as it is seen that donated things also go away although the things given are not false. The definition of *adhyāsa* is thus refuted.

(EV 61-63) Advaitins contend that the Self is attribute-less, action-less, etc., and so whenever any attribute or action

appears to be present, it must be owing to superimposition. Therefore any sort of awareness, which is an attribute, such as seeing, hearing, etc., must be caused by superimposition of the ego-sense, of the body-complex and mine-ness on anything around. When there are I-ness and mine-ness there is practical activity (*vyavahāra*); when these are absent, there is neither awareness nor activity. Thus with the help of positive and negative concomitance, Advaitins conclude that all positive activity is caused by the superimposed I-ness and my-ness just as all jars, pitchers, etc., are caused by clay.

MM cites the relevant portins from the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtras*, and then starts the refutation of the said theory. The perceptions "I see", "I hear", etc., cannot be accepted as proofs of the superimposition of the Self; on the contrary, such cognitions are true to the Vedic statement that the experiences (*bhoktṛ*) is endowed with self, sense and mind, cf."*ātmendriyamanoyukraṃ bhoktetyāhur manīṣiṇaḥ*", (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1.3.4). Here the word "*yukta*", "connected" precludes the Advaita interpretation of superimposition since in that case "*yukta*" would have been replaced by "*adhyasta*". Again, the concept of *adhyāsa* being unestablished, it cannot be included in the *sādhya*. Thus the said inference of Advaitins suffers from the defect of unestablished *sādhya*. For this reason the reason also remains unestablished, owing to the inclusion of *adhyāsa* through positive and negative concomitance. Thus the *hetu* term cannot be admitted to be present in the *pakṣa*, rendering the inference invalid through the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi*. Again, if all positive activity presupposes superimposition it is so in Yājñavalkya and other wise men attaining Supreme Knowledge. How then can we rely on their instructions? Then enlightenment will be an impossibility.

(EV 63-72) Dvaitādvaitins have sought to prove the impossibility of *adhyāsa*. If this impossibility be owing to unreasonability (*ayuktatva*), that is accepted by the Advaitins since they also maintain that no real superimposition may take

place on the self-luminous, unattached Self. If this impossibility be due to the absence of any instrument of knowledge, Advaitins take exception to it inasmuch as there are the universal perceptions such as "I am ignorant", "I am the performer", "I am a man", etc., If again this impossibility be owing to the lack of the cause of superimposition, the contention is liable to be rejected because ignorance, which is by nature false, is held to be the cause of superimposition.

Now MM refutes these alternatives *seriatim*. First, if superimposition be unreasonable, Advaitins have uselessly spent their time and energy for establishing it just as a child wastes its time and energy by stirring the water. The second alternative is already refuted in EV 61-63, and it will again be repudiated later. According to the Advaitins perceptions such as "I am ignorant", "I see","I hear", etc., refer to the existence of the superimposition inasmuch as the Self has bee determined as devoid of any attribute or action with the help of the six accredited means of ascertaining the import (*tātparya*) of the great Vedāntic propositions, e.g., "Thou art that", "I am Brahman", etc. The Dvaitādvaitavādins , on the other hand, propound just the opposite doctrine of Brahman' being a thinker (*īkṣitṛ*), wisher of being many, creator of the elements such as fire, etc., with the help of the same six means of ascertaining the import of the Veda.

Advaitins hold that Brahman is said to be or exist. Since Brahman is omniscient, He can create the world, and thus be an agent (*kartṛ*) in the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*) of the word. So the meaning of being a non-agent (*akartṛ*) must come from the secondary function of the word (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*).

MM replies to this by showing the untenability of the theory that anything obtained as the primary meaning must be false, and so reality has to be obtained through the implication of a word. In fact, any implied meaning must also be obtained primarily from some other word. The implied meaning of "*gaṅgā*" in the sentence "*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*" is a bank and this is

the primary meaning of the word "bank". In this way any meaning obtained even secondarily from any word is liable to be rejected as false by the Advaitins. Hence the Advaita approach of ascertaining the meaning of a word or a proposition by means of a secondary function is a wild-goose chase. Thus the universal experiences such as "I am ignorant", "I see", "I hear", etc., must not be superimposed; these are correct judgments.

MM rejects now the third alternative of the absence of superimposition owing to the lack of its cause. Advaitins hold that ignorance is the cause of superimposition. But ignorance cannot be accepted because it can neither be defined nor proved nor can it be established in a locus, an object, an operator or a remover.

MM refutes the first definition of ignorance, viz., ignorance is beginningless, positive and removable by knowledge. Ignorance veililng a piece of shell, being originated at a point in time, is not beginningless, and consequently the ignorance covering the shell is also not beginningless. So this definition of ignorance is too narrow. Again, when we superimpose absence of snake on a snake, the ignorance that becomes the material cause (*upādāna*) of an absence (of a snake) must also be an absence. So this ignorance loses an essential characteristic of being a positive entity, and thus the definition is too narrow. Further, we find the definition is also too narrow if we follow the Advaita scholar Vācaspati Miśra according to whom pure consciousness (*śuddhabrahman*) cannot be a content of a mental mode. Ignorance is annihilated only by a mode. Thus the ignorance veiling pure consciousness remains unremoved, and hence the definition becomes too narrow for that reason. An enlightened person (*jīvanmukta*) sees the false world under the influence of ignorance which is not removed. So the said definition of ignorance suffers from the defect of being too narrow

The definition of ignorance is also too wide since in

Advaita doctrine the relation between consciousness and ignorance, being non-self, is removable by knowledge, positive and beginningless.

Since ignorance is of the nature of an awareness caused by a defect, it must have a beginning. So ignorance's being beginningless is an impossibility.

Another defect is shown by MM by maintaining that a beginningless positive entity, viz., ignorance, cannot be annihilated, for the Self, being a beginningless positive entity is never annihilated. Thus the definition of ignorance is rejected as being impossible.

Advaitins resort to anther definition of ignorance as the material cause of error. MM's contention is that this definition is correct when the error is a positive entity like a snake or a piece of silver since a positive entity may require a material cause for its origination. When our error is a negative entity like the absence of snake in a snake, this negative error cannot have any material cause inasmuch as a negative entity is produced only by an instrumental cause. Hence here occurs the defect of the definition being too narrow. Even if we admit the material cause of a negative error, this positive material cause, viz., ignorance, cannot produce a negative error because a positive material cause must produce a positive entity but never a negative one. In the view, as accepted by a section of Advaitins, that Brahman being determined by ignorance is the material cause of the world illusion, the defect lies in the fact that ignorance being an limitation to Brahman cannot be the material cause and renders the definition impossible, and also makes the definition too wide in Brahman.

MM now refutes another definition of ignorance, viz., "something that is capable of being directly annihilated by knowledge is ignorance". This definition, as proposed by the Advaitins, is vitiated owing to the continuance of ignorance in an enlightened person (*jīvaṇmukta*).

Advaitins present another definition of ignorance as "a

beginningless and false material cause". Here MM reminds us of the argument resorted to earlier in rejecting the second definition. In the cases of negative error this definition suffers from the defect of being too narrow because a negative error can have no material cause. Further, ignorance being false must be other than existent, i.e., must be completely imaginary, chimerical. A chimera can neither be a material cause nor beginningless nor a positive entity. Thus this fourth definition is impossible too. Thus ignorance cannot be accepted for want of any definition.

(EV 72-74) MM holds that owing to the lack of any proof also ignorance cannot be accepted. According to the Advaitins the following three perceptions are proofs of a ignorance being a positive entity: (1) I am ignorant, (2) I do not know myself or anybody else, and (3) I do not know the meaning conveyed by you.

With a view to refuting the above contention of the Advaitins MM queries the meaning of "I" (*aham*) in the above perceptual cognitions–Does "I" mean (1) pure knowledge, or (2) Brahman as determined by ignorance, or (3) the individual self? On (1) the defect in that pure knowledge cannot be held to be ignorance since that would involve contradiction, and also because it is opposed to the Advaita view. On (2) there is the defect of begging the question because the concept of ignorance is yet to be established. Mutual dependence also vitiates this second alternative, since the concept of "I" (the self) is dependent on ignorance and the concept of ignorance is dependent on that of "I" (the self). (3) is also not tenable because the superimposed individual self emerging out of the agency of ignorance cannot be the locus of ignorance. MM asserts that in the Dvaitādvaita doctrine there is no such problem because the word "I" in the proposition "I am ignorant" may easily mean the individual self which is not superimposed in that system. Thus ignorance is to be understood as absence of knowledge, and the proposed concept of a positive ignorance

is not established. Moreover, pure knowledge being accepted by the Advaitins as the locus of the positive ignorance this meaning of "I" cannot be the locus. Then in order to maintain the validity of the cognition "I am ignorant" it must be admitted that ignorance is a negative entity, i.e. absence of awareness).

MM argues that in the proposition (3) "I do not know the meaning conveyed by you" it is clear that the absence of knowledge of the meaning is purported to be expressed by such a proposition. Now Advaitins hold that the veiling power of ignorance may be usefully operative on consciousness (*caitanya*) alone since consciousness and consciousness alone is uncovered. To cover a covered entity being useless the so-called veil of jar etc. in the proposition "I do not know the jar" is practically the veil over consciousness determined by the jar. So ignorance always veils consciousness, and the entity (i.e., ignorance) that veils must be a positive entity.

MM animadverts the above argument by maintaining that the individual self-consciousness (*jīvacaitanya*) cannot by itself reveal the objects; it tinges (*uparāga*) the mental modes (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and the objects appearing in the modes are revealed. In this view there is no veil over the individual self-consciousness determined by the inanimate jar, etc.. Hence absence of knowledge is the content of the cognitions "I do not know the meaning conveyed by you" or "I do not know the jar".

(EV 74-77) The inference seeking to establish the positiveness, rather non-negative-ness, of ignorance is not an ordinary one because the Advaitins have nowhere in their inference mentioned explicitly words propounding the positive-ness of ignorance. They have, however, worded the inference in a manner that the acceptance of the inference will necessitate acquiescence to the positive-ness if ignorance. The inference is: (A) A true cognition is prior to something that is different from self, other than its own prior absence, concealer of its own object, removable by it and located in its own locus, because it reveals something unrevealed, as in the case of the

first beam of a candle (ignited) in darkness.[1]

Now, in order to refute the said inference (A), MM argues that in the Advaita doctrine the cognition of pleasure, etc., cannot be the dispeller of ignorance because happiness, etc., are directly revealed by the ever-resplendent witness-consciousness without the mental function of the origination of any mental mode. Thus in the Advaita view pleasure etc. are never veiled by ignorance, and hence the question of the dissipation of the veil of ignorance by the knowledge of pleasure does not arise at all.

If the Advaitins decide to restrict "knowledge" by intending it to mean only modal valid cognitions, they cannot escape from the defect since mediate modal cognitions (*parokṣavṛtti*) do not remove any of the veil of ignorance. To admit mediate modal cognitions as dispellers of ignorance will be a serious mistake inasmuch as the difference of mediate and immediate modal cognitions will, in that case, totally disappear.

MM further argues that a valid perceptual cognition of an inanimate object cannot dispel any ignorance because Advaitins never admit any ignorance in anything other than consciousness.

After refuting the *pakṣa* (of A) now MM shows the inefficacy of the various words making up the *sādhya*. The first term, "other than its own prior-absence", is useless because a true cognition removes ignorance and ignorance only, and so this attempt to exclude its own prior absence is superfluous since a prior absence may be easily excluded by the subsequent term "removable by it".

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[1]Here MM drops two expressions from Prakāśātmayati's inference proposed in *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*, viz., (1) *vivādagocarāpannam* at the beginning of the inference, and (2) *bhavitum arhati* at the close of the long *sādhya*. Although the second one makes no material difference, the first one is essential for avoiding man of the anticipated defects including those put forward by MM.

The term "concealer of its own object" is unavailing because by this term the Advaitins understand the ignorance which veils the object of the subsequent valid cognition. But what type of object will ignorance veil–an unconscious worldly object or consciousness itself? Advaitins themselves hold that unconscious objects are never veiled by ignorance. Again, eternal consciousness, i.e., direct revelation [the witness]being the revealer of ignorance cannot be veiled by it.

By the expression (in (A)) "removable by it" *adṛṣṭa* (i.e., *dharma* and *adharma*) is sought to be eliminated. If the *adṛṣṭa* serving as an impediment (*pratibandhaka*) to the final cognition (*caramavṛtti*) be not destructible by the final cognition, *adṛṣṭa* becomes real and thus non-dualism is lost. And if *adṛṣṭa* is destructible, inference (A) will be defeated.

The fourth term, "located in its own locus", is also inappropriate because ignorance and valid cognition do not have the same locus. Ignorance is located in consciousness only (*cinmātra*) but a valid cognition is located in consciousness determined by the internal organ.

(EV 78-79) The *hetu* term of (A), being the revealer of an unrevealed object, cannot exist in the *pakṣa, viz.,* true cognition, for it (the *pakṣa*) is only revelation (*prakāśa*) and not a revealer (*prakāśaka*). Thus the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi* arises. At the same time another fallacy, called *vyabhicāra*, occurs, since the sense-organs are revealers of unrevealed objects but they are not dissipators of ignorance.

MM further repudiates the reason (of (A)). Inference (A) is (supposed to be) a valid cognition, and thus it is included in the *pakṣa* of inference (A), viz., "true cognition". So it should reveal something unrevealed. (A) is about the positive-ness of ignorance, therefore ignorance is the object of (A). But ignorance is, as it is held earlier, forever revealed by the witness-consciousness. So how can (A) reveal something unrevealed? Accordingly this inference will have to be admitted as revealing something already revealed or non-revealing. In

both cases this inference is futile.

(EV 79) The example in inference (A) is vitiated by MM through shown the uselessness of the word "first" in the expression "the first beam of a candle in darkness", since only the first beam can remove the darkness and the next ones fail to do that. Had the subsequent beams been able to dispel the darkness the word "first" would have been necessary to eliminate them.

MM presents three counter-inferences (*satpratipakṣa*) with a view to refuting (A). MM seeks to establish that the nature of ignorance intended to be proved through this inference is an impossibility. As the beginningless positive entity, viz., the Self, is irremovable, so also ignorance, a beginningless positive entity, must be irremovable. In the second counter-inference the word "positive: is replaced by "non-negative". The contention of the third inference is that a beginningless entity cannot cover anything just as a prior absence cannot do so.

(EV 79-82) Even the Veda cannot be the savior of the theory of the positive-ness of ignorance, because the oft quoted reference to "*nāsad āsin no sad āsit*" etc. is of no avail since in the opinion of Dvaitādvaitins "being" (*sat*) means the the visible elements and "non-being" (*asat*) means the two invisible elements. Again the *mantra* "*tama āsit*" etc. fails to prove the existence of positive ignorance because tamas means *prakṛti* and not ignorance. Similarly "*avidyāyām antare vartamānān*" etc. is unable to establish positive ignorance, because in such expressions "*avidyā*" means action (*karman*).

Advaitins hold that in order to maintain logical consistency ignorance is to be accepted as a positive entity. They argue that for the origination of an illusion a material cause must be admitted. Illusion being false its material cause also will be false, and ignorance is that material cause. The futility of this argument is propounded under EV 73-72.

MM also argues that something that has a material cause

must have an agent who produces the thing with the material. Now if the material of the shell-silver be admitted, the agent-producer will also have to be admitted. God (*īśvara*), being omniscient, knows that the shell-silver never exists and thus He cannot be the agent-producer of it. Again, nobody's experience supports the notion that the individual self produces the shell-silver. Thus owing to the absence of any producer of ignorance the so-called proof of logical consistency (*arthāpatti*) proposed by the Advaitins is rejected.

(EV 82) According to the Advaitins ignorance cannot be proved by any instrument of knowledge, and it is strange that they are presenting proofs such as perception, inference, testimony and logical consistency. By doing so they contradict their own position.

In this way MM refutes the entire issue of the proof of ignorance.

(EV 83-92) According to the Advaitins pure consciousness (*śuddha cinmātra*) is the locus of ignorance. In order to refute the Advaita view MM proposes three alternatives on which ignorance may rest: (1) pure consciousness, (2) the omniscient, and (3) the individual.

(1) is completely repudiated first. Sarvajñātman, a follower of the Vivaraṇa school, establishes that the nature of *jīva* being dependent on ignorance, it is illogical to accept *jīva* as the locus of ignorance. In their opinion ignorance is like a mirror where consciousness is reflected. Consciousness loses its purity when It becomes a prototype (*bimba*) of an image (*pratibimba*) on an limitation (*upādhi*). In fact, pure consciousness, prototype and image are one but they appear as different owing to the limitation on which the reflection appears. Why then is suffering, including the chain of birth and death, experienced only by a *jīva* and not by God? Here the Advaitins reply that the limitation exerts all its influence on the reflection (or image) but never on the prototype. This we always see in the case of a mirror.

MM finds fault with the Advaita contention, holding that pure consciousness loses its purity if ignorance is located in it, because impurity means being the locus of ignorance. One who is the locus of ignorance necessarily becomes ignorant. It is impossible for the Advaitins to accept Brahman as ignorant. Further, if Brahman be the locus of ignorance, ignorance will continue to be cognized even after liberation. Again, in such a view such diametrically opposed concepts as knowledge and ignorance will have to be admitted as co-existent, although the Advaitins consider them as opposed as light and darkness.

Advaitins now try to restore their position by maintaining that superimposition of darkness on the sun is not an absurdity since the owl does this. Dvaitādvaitins agree that such a superimposition requires some superimposer such as the owl. But in the superimposition of ignorance on Brahman there is no such superimposer who can be logically acceptable. *Jīva* being itself dependent on ignorance for being determined by it cannot be the superimposer of ignorance on consciousness. Since none of the other philosophical systems admits this type of ignorance, it becomes necessary for the Advaitins to consider themselves in the position of the owl.

Advaitins assert that there is no inconsistency in ignorance being located in consciousness because in their opinion ignorance is opposed to only the modal cognition (*vṛttijñāna*) but not to pure consciousness or to the witness.

MM inquires: How is it that pure consciousness fails to put and end to ignorance and helps it to be revealed, and this consciousness being determined by mental modes and qualitatively being non-different from pure consciousness destroys ignorance? The position of the Advaitins becomes ridiculous by their accepting the view that sometimes consciousness reveals ignorance and sometimes consciousness destroys ignorance.

Advaitins reply that the sun's rays, which reveal the combustible object, is found to burn when passed through a

magnifying glass, so also consciousness, which reveals ignorance, is quite capable of destroying it when passed through a valid awareness.

MM shows the fallacy in the above argument by citing another illustration. The sunlight (not the sun's rays) reveals the combustible but fails to burn it even when passed through a magnifying glass. This shows that the sun's rays can under no circumstance burn the combustible but fire, and fire only, can do this. This fire has been cause in this case by the glass from the sun's rays. Just so fire always burns, so knowledge also always destroys ignorance. Thus ignorance cannot be located in knowledge or consciousness, i.e., in Brahman.

No another possibility of omniscient Brahman being the locus of ignorance is denied. By holding the view that ignorance rests in the omniscient, the Advaitin becomes a butt of ridicule because "omniscient" means somebody who is not ignorant of anything, who knows everything.

In order to refute the theory of the self's (*jīva*) being the locus of ignorance MM determines the nature of a self by suggesting three alternatives: a self is (1) consciousness *per se* (*cinmātra eva*), (2) consciousness delimited by ignorance (*avidyāvacchinna*), and (3) consciousness reflected on ignorance (*tatra pratibimbita*).

Of these three, (1) was refuted earlier at the time of refuting the tenet of pure consciousness being the locus of ignorance. Alternatives (2) and (3) are vitiated by the defect of mutual dependence. A self is dependent on ignorance whether delimited by ignorance or reflected in ignorance. Again, ignorance is dependent on the self, since resting on it.

(Objection:) Here mutual dependence is not to be considered a defect, just as the mutual dependence of the seed and the sprout is not objected to by any logician.

(Answer:) The seed is dependent on a particular sprout which was in its turn dependent on a previous seed. But this is not the case the individual and ignorance, and thus here the

defect insurmountable.

(EV 92-98) Pure consciousness is, according to the Advaitins, the content of ignorance. Everything other than consciousness, being false and caused by ignorance, cannot be the content of ignorance since the defect of mutual dependence will be unavoidable. Further, a self cannot be the content of ignorance because the self, the limited consciousness, owes its nature to ignorance for being delimited. Thus the same defect of mutual dependence occurs in the alternative of a self's being the content of ignorance.

Advaitins argue that consciousness, and consciousness alone, can be the content of ignorance since ignorance, being of the nature of veil (*āvaraṇa*), can meaningfully operate on something uncovered. Pure consciousness (*cit*), being self-luminous, is apt to be covered or veiled by ignorance; anything other than *cit*, being non-resplendent, cannot be meaningfully veiled.

In order to oppose this stand of the Advaitins MM suggests four possible alternatives, one of which the Advaitins have to accept. MM argues that veiling of consciousness by ignorance may mean (i) destruction of exposed brilliance, (ii) absence of the genesis of unexposed brilliance, (iii) absence of the relation of the existent brilliance with the object, or (iv) the impediment of the effect which is called "knownness". MM refutes these *seriatim*. On the first alternative the Advaitins have to face the defect of total darkness or absolute insensibility. The second alternative is untenable because pure consciousness can never remain in unexposed brilliance. The third alternative is defective owing to the fact that knowledge must always relate to a content. For the Advaitins the fourth alternative is meaningless since in the Advaita tenet knownness is not different from consciousness.

(Objection:) Consciousness may not be veiled from itself for its permanent effulgence, but it may be veiled to something else viz. *jīva*. A candle itself is not covered by the jar but the

candle is covered by the jar from other things outside the jar.

(Answer:) The difference between pure consciousness and a self's consciousness is dependent on the veiling of consciousness by ignorance. Until and unless this concept of veiling by ignorance is satisfactorily explained, the argument advanced by the Advaitins is liabel to be rejected.

(Objection:) It is not that ignorance cannot veil pure consciousness or Brahmàn, because we feel and express that complete bliss is unknown to us, i.e. complete bliss is veiled by ignorance, or in other words Brahman or unveiled consciousness is the content of ignorance.

(Answer:) How can it be? To maintain that complete bliss is unknown to us is to accede to our view that resplendent Brahman is not the content of ignorance, but the unknown or non-resplendent is the content of ignorance.

As has been held earlier (EV61-63 and 78-79), ignorance is not opposed to the witness but it is destroyed by the mental mode (*vṛtti*). Thus it stands that as long as there is absence of modal cognition there is also ignorance. In this concomitance absence of modal cognition is the reason and ignorance is the *sādhya*. Hence from "absence of modal cognitoin" we can easily infer "presence of ignorance". Now the Advaitins are, by their own argument, entrapped in a difficult situation, since in final liberation there being no modal cognition there must be ignorance. Existence of ignorance even in liberation is absolutely absurd.

MM further argues that the experience of ignorance is expressed as "I do not know", which proves that ignorance is ooposed to all sorts of knowledge viz. modal correct awarenesses and pure consciousness. Had only the modal correct awareness been opposed to ignorance, then the expression would have been "I do not cognize correctly" but never "I do not cognize".

MM reasons that the perceptual awareness of a jar dispels ignorance, and that is why we cognize the jar. Now

according to the Advaitins the content of ignorance being consciousness, the perception of a jar will cause the destruction of ignorance of consciousness. With the destruction of the ignorance that covers consciousness this perceiver of only a jar will attain release, liberation.

(Objection:) Perception of a jar does not destroy the ignorance of pure consciousness, but it does annihilate the ignorance of qualified consciousness (*viśiṣṭacaitanya*), though not of pure consciousness. Liberation is attainable only by the dissipation of ignorance of pure consciousness.

(Answer:) It is admitted on all hands that the knowledge of the qualified necessarily causes the knowledge of the unqualified or pure entity. One who knows a person, say Caitra with a stick, must know the person, i.e. Caitra, also. Had it not been so, there might have arisen a doubt as to the existence of Caitra. Similarly to have knowledge of qualified consciousness entails the knowledge of pure or unqualified consciousness. Thus the perception of a jar will be sufficient for the release of a person–a conclusion which the Advaitins cannot accept.

(EV 98-100) MM maintains that owing to the absence of any inducer (*prayojaka*) the concept of ignorance cannot be established by the Advaitins. All the possible alternatives are refuted one after another. Ignorance itself cannot be an inducer because in that case there arises the defect of self-dependence. Further, only something having action can be an inducer; ignorance being devoid of any action fails to be an inducer.

The second alternative, of consciousness only being the inducer, is untenable on various grounds. First, consciousness has no action, and so it cannot be the inducer. If in spite of the absence of any action consciousness can be the inducer , then owing to the eternality of the inducer the occasioned–ignorance–will also be eternal, and it will never be destroyed. As a result release from ignorance, i.e. liberation, will become an impossibility. Again actionless consciousness being the inducer will lost its very nature of being action-less

and attribute-less.

The third alternative, of both ignorance and consciousness being jointly the inducers of ignorance, is also summarily rejected because of the defect of mutual dependence. On this alternative ignorance and consciusnes become the inducers by being dependent on the existence of ignorance; again, the existence of ignorance is dependent on the inducers, viz., ignorance and consciousness.

The fourth alternative may be that ignorance is induced neither by ignorance nor by consciousness, but by something else. MM holds that this is an absurd proposition for the Advaitins because in their theory there is no third entity but these two. The occasion of another ignorance for the consistent exposition of this problem of an inducer will bring in a circular (*cakraka*) series, and if a third ignorance is postulated for the explanation, this will land the Advaitins in infinite regress.

(EV 100-102) The discussion that ensues now is: What is the annihilator of ignorance? Is it pure consciousness, or a perceptual mode (*aparokṣavṛtti*) with consciousness as its object? The first alternative is not acceptable to the Advaitins, for the absence of any opposition between pure consciousness and ignorance. The second alternative also is not immune from defects. The said mode being itself false cannot produce a true result such as liberation or the destruction of ignorance. Both scripture and tradition reject the possibility of a true effect coming from a false cause.

MM does not accept the argument that consciousness is not opposed to ignorance inasmuch as pleasure and pain, etc., never remain shrouded by ignorance. It means that ever-present consciousness always ignorance of pleasure, etc., as a result of which no ignorance can exist as a veil. MM further argues that had it not been so, there would have remained ignorance veiling pleasure, etc..

MM maintains that according to Avaitins the content of ignorance is pure consciousness, and the final kowledge that

destroys the ignorance is the mental mode of consciousness, i.e. consciousness delimited by the mental mode, or in other words "qualified consciousness". The said proposition of the Advaitins stands thus: The ignorance of pure consciousness or unqualified Brahman is annihilated by qualified consciousness. This is, according to MM, an absurdity since the ignorance of a jar is never annihilated by the knowledge of a cloth.

If it at all be accepted that the final mode (*caramajñāna*) is capable of annihilating the ignorance, the problem of the final mode remaining undestroyed becomes insurmountable. In Advaita doctrine only Brahman is true and everything else is false. Thus the final mode is false, and must be destroyed. MM seeks to propound that this final mode will not meet destruction for the absence of any destroyer. Hence this (final mode) will continue to exist even in release--a strangely adverse circumstance for the Advaitins.

(Objection:) With the destruction of the threads the cloth is destroyed. This means that the destruction of the material cause causes the destruction of the effect too. So the destruction of the material cause of the final mode will bring about the destruction of the effect, viz., the final mode. Ignorance being the material cause of all worldly objects the annihilation of ignorance will bring about the destruction of all worldly objects including the final mode.

(Answer:) It is not that the threads are first burnt (or destroyed) and then as a result the cloth is burnt. On the other hand, the threads and the cloth are burnt simultaneously. So the argument of the Advaitins fails miserably.

(Objection:) Let us take another illustration. We know of *kataka*-fruit (Strychnos Potatatorum) which when crushed and put into mud-mixed water cleanses the water i.e. destroys the mud and itself too. As the said fruit destroys mud and itself too without the help of any other agency, similarly the final mode can destroy ignorance and itself too.

(Answer:) It is not a fact that the said fruit destroys mud

and also itself. The fact is that in such cases the mud becomes loose and gets detached from the water particles. Then these dust particles settle as sediments. Similarly the crushed particles of the said fruit also come down at the bottom. Hence the Advaitins' attempt to prove their contention with the help of the above illustration becomes totally futile. Therefore the final mode cannot be accepted as the annihilator of ignorance and itself. thus the final mode will continue to remain even after *mokṣa*–a self–made predicament of the Advaitins.

(EV 102-105) Advaitins hold that release is the termination of ignorance. It may be discussed now whether this termination of ignorance, i.e., release, is of the nature of self or different from self. If the cessation of ignorance (*avidyānivṛtti*) be of the essential nature of a self, then it (cessation) will also be an accomplished (*siddha*) entity like the self. In that case the cessation of ignorance will not remain worthy of being accomplished. Thus all attempts for winning release (*mokṣa*) will be futile. If the cessation of ignorance be different from a self, the Advaitins must spell out the alternative of their choice with apt reasons, whether the cessation of ignorance is true or indescribable or false? If the first, the inconsistency is obvious because in that case the number of true entities will be two, instead of the one admitted by the Advaitins. The cessation cannot be indefinable, since then the cessation of ignorance must be either ignorance or an effect of ignorance. This means that ignorance will remain present even in release. The third alternative is also not acceptable because the cessation will in that case be false. If the cessation of ignorance be false, ignorance becomes true, which the Advaitins cannot admit.

Vimuktātman, the author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, and Ānandbodha, the author of *Nyāyamakaranda*, propound that the termination of ignorance cannot be true for fear of acceptance of a second true concept. It is not absurd because then liberation cannot be achieved. It is not both for they are mutually incompatible. It is not indefinable since then

ignorance will continue even in liberation. Thus it must be of a fifth type..

MM's contention is that such an entity of the fifth type is a strange phenomenon the postulation of which proves the incompatibility of the concept and lack of substantiality in the arguments of the Advaitins.

(EV 105-116) In Advaita it is maintained that mind is a ray-like substance which can go quite along way from its original position inside the body. Through the sense cavity, e.g. the hole of the eye or the ear, this ray-like substance proceeds toward the object which comes before the person or his sense. The sense cavity may be small but that does not hinder one from perceiving the huge objects. River-water may pass through a narrow channel but there is no difficulty in this river-water being spread over a large tract of land. Similarly mind passing through the narrowest channel of the sense-cavity may very well grasp a big mountain or the wide-spread sea. This process of transformation of the mind into the shape of the object which is enfolded totally by the mind's ray-like nature is known as a mental mode or *vṛtti*.

Advaitins preach three different views: (1) all-pervading *jīva*-conscousness determined by ignorance remains uncovered; (2) all-pervading *jīva*-consciousness determined by ignorance remains covered, and (3) *jīva*-consciousness is delimited by the mind. The function of the *vṛtti* in each of the above views has to be ascertained properly. On the first view, owing to the unattached nature (*asaṅgatva*) of the *jīva*-oriented consciousness it has no relation with the objects although these objects are superimposed on the *jīva*-consciousness. Now the function performed by the *vṛtti* is to effect a tint (*uparāga*) or modification of *jīva*-consciousness for the purpose of establishing a relation with the object. On the second view the *vṛtti* rends the veil of ignorance so as to establish the relation of the *jīva*-consciousness with the object. On the third view it is to be noted that the task of revelation of the object must be

performed by Brahman-consciousness since the *jīva*-consciousness is unable to do it because of its limitedness. Now *vṛtti* performs the manifestation of the identity of the *jīva*-consciousness with Brahman-consciousness, and thereby helps the *jīva*-consciousness to have knowledge of the object.

MM holds that only *vṛtti* should be called knowledge, but never pure consciousness. The inconsistency becomes obvious when the Advaitins speak of "*brahmajñāna*". If Brahman or pure consciousness be accepted as knowledge and the final *vṛtti* be of Brahman, then Brahman is one knowledge and the *vṛtti* of it must be another. But here the Advaitin say there is only one single knowledge. Thus the Advaita concept suffers from a defect.

(Objection:) The difference of the modal (*vṛtti*) awareness and consciousness must be admitted, owing to the difference in their very nature, the former being with an object whereas the latter has no object. The knowledge expressed through the proposition "I know the jar" has an object, viz., the jar ;"this jar is revealed" is also an expression of a knowledge attained but here the verb is without an object. This vital difference in the nature of thee two knowledges must not be ignored.

(Answer:) A single action may be expressed by a transitive verb and equally by an intransitive verb, e.g., "*karoti*" is a transitive verb whereas "*yatate*" is an intransitive one although the meaning in both the cases remains the same. There are other instances too.

MM finds fault with the process of the emission of *vṛtti*. How is it that the mind comes out of the body and takes the shape of the object to be cognized? It is sometimes argued by the Advaitins that in order to differentiate an immediate cognition from a mediate one it is held that in an immediate cognition the mind comes out of the body like a ray and takes the shape of the object concerned. This view is not ternable because the tint or modification, as stated earlier, of

consciousness is apt to be determined as the basic fdifference between a mediate and an immediate awareness. MM suggests that the acceptance of the view of the emission of the mind may easily be done away with by holding that the manifest modification of consciousness is responsible for immediate cognition, and the absence of this manifest modification makes the cognition mediate.

The second view as to the utility of *vṛtti* is that it rends the veil of ignorance. In Advaita doctrine only pure consciousness is said to be covered by ignorance. If so, how can this covered consciousness reveal ignorance and its metamorphoses? For this reason this second view is rejected.

By maintaining that *vṛtti* takes the shape of the relevant object the Advaitins commit a mistake inasmuch as in this view the modal cognition will possess a shape. In that case the Advaitins will be subjected to the charges which are hurled against the Buddhists. Further, while cognizing a jar a person also cognizes the various qualities, the universals, the actions, etc., present in the jar. How can the *vṛtti* grasp all these different shapes? Again, in the final mode, viz., *brahmajñāna*, which shape will the mode take? The Advaitins themselves do not admit any shape in Brahman. So the inconsistency is evident.

(EV 116-119) The Advaitins have offered five definitions of falsity (*mithyātva*); all the later scholars have accepted them. MM grapples with all these definitons and the defects by which they are vitiated. Padmapāda, the author of *Pañcapādikā*, has defined falsity as: Something which is devoid of the properties of truth and absurdity is known as false. This definition is too wide since Brahman has no properties, including these two. This nature of Brahman has been made amply clear in the Upaniṣadic expressions "*asthūlam anaṇu...*" (*Bṛhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.8.8) and "*aśabdam asparśam arūpam avyayam*" (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1.3.15).

Sometimes falsity is defined as "something that is the

content of a cancelling cognition (*bādhakajñāna*) is false".On this definition *Brahmajñāna*, being a cognition cancelling the truth of this world, the content of this cognition, viz. Brahman, will be false. This being totally undesirable for the Advaitins they will not accept this definition.

"Whatever is denied to be in its admitted locus at any of the three times is false"–this is the definition proposed by Prakāśātman in his *Vivaraṇa*. When a person makes an error and sees a snake in a piece of rope, this definition of falsity is applicable. The admitted locus of the snake is the piece of rope, and the snake is denied being present in the rope at any of the three times. Therefore the snake is false.

In order to set aside this definition MM presents two alternatives: (1) Does the denial affirm the absence of the snake's being real (*pāramārthika; tāttvika*)? or (2) Is this denial itself false? On the first alternative, the Advaitins have to admit two ultimate entities, viz., Brahman and this absence. Hence for the avoidance of such a predicament they may take up the second alternative, although the consequence will not go in the favor: if this denial, viz., "there is no snake" be false, the proposition comes to this: "there is a snake". For a person perceiving the snake this is hardly any addition to his beliefs, and thus the definition suffers from the defect of proving what is already accepted (*siddhasādhana*).

The definition offered by Citsukhācārya is in esence the same as the one given by the author of the *Vivaraṇa*.

Prakāsātman has given another definition: Whatever is removable by an awareness is false. MM asks: Is the awareness that removes a false entity a remover in the capacity of merely being an awareness, or in the capacity of belonging to a narrower class of awarenesses than the one it removes. The first alternative is rejected because when two consecutive awarenesses occur, the former is removed by the latter. But here the former, though removed by an awareness, is not false, and this undermines the definition. On the second alternative

also there is a defect, since a trace is removed by memory, which belongs to a narrower class.

Ānandabodha proposed the following definition: Anything other than being (*sat*) is false. The word "*sat*" is explained as "known by an instrument of knowledge remaining free from any defect." This definition is too wide since a jar which we perceive is known by an instrument of knowledge, and here no defect has intervened. In Advaita doctrine the world, including this jar, is false; but the definition proposed by Ānandabodha has failed to establish the falsity of this jar.

In this way all the five well-known definitions of falsity are proved to be inaccurate.

(EV 119-120) There is no proof of the falsity admitted by the Advaitins. Perception is not such a proof, because absence in the three times cannot be grasped by perception owing to the fact that past and future times are beyond the realm of perception. Thus falsity cannot be proved by inference since inference operates on the strength of concomitance which requires perception. But perception being impossible, similar is the result as to inference. Vedic testimony also cannot substantiate this type of falsity. The so-called proof, quoted in support of falsity, viz. "Brahman is only one without a second" (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1) should be explained properly. It means that there is nothing which is equal to or more than Brahman; but the said passage does not mean that there is nothing true besides Brahman.

(EV 120-125) Advaitins maintain that ignorance is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) but this very concept is inexplicable. It is the duty of the Advaitins to explain the significance of the word since it is typically their own concept. It may mean any of the following five: (1) the attribute of not being the locus of *sattva* and *asattva*, (2) the attribute of not being the locus of absence of *sattva* and *asattva*; (3) the absence of being of the nature of being or nonbeing; (4) the incapability of being defined as being or nonbeing in a specific

manner, (5) the attribute of not being the object of a *pramāṇa* as being or nonbeing.

(1) and (2) are too wide, applying to chimera and Brahman since these have no attribute including these two attributes (viz., not being the locus of *sattva* and not being the locus of *asattva*). (3) is defective because in Brahman also there is no attribute such as *sattva*, and that is why Brahman is not of the nature of being (*sat*). Similarly, Brahman is not of the nature of non-being (*asat*) either. (4) suffers from the defect of being too wide since Brahman also is incapable of being defined as being in a specific manner. (5) also is not acceptable for the same reason of overextending to include Brahman. And we know that in the Advaita doctrine Brahman is never a content of any valid cognition.

Further, if "*anirvacanīya*" means "different from both being and nonbeing" it cannot be established because the Advaitins refute the existence of difference.

(EV 125-146) MM undertakes a long discussion on the topic of the refutation of the proof of *anirvacanīyatva.* Here he shifts from his avowed principle of refuting the Advaita view; on the contrary he embarks upon the much-debated issue in the philosophical systems, viz. the theory of error (*khyātivāda*). MM first establishes the various theories and then criticizes vehemently their stand, although a major portion of his discussion follows the beaten track and can hardly claim any novelty in the argumentative process. For his discussion of this topic he owes much to Vācaspati Miśra, the author of *Bhāmatī*. Following the lead of this work our summary may start with the refutation of *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of the Advaitins (EV 136).

The *anirvacaniyakhyāti* of the Advaitins does not stand to reason because in their opinion the word means "different from both being and nonbeing. Our universal experience is that a person says after his illusion"It is not silver, it is a shell"and later he muses "for such a period of time the non-existent (*asat*) silver was being perceived", which proves that in an illusion we

perceive the non-existent thing. Thus the nature of the content of an illusion is non-existent, but never *anirvacanīya.*

(Objection:) In fact the illusory silver neither is nor is not, but owing to the fact that it is not existent (*sat*) sometimes it is called "unreal" (*asat*). Hence there is no inconsistency in the expression "This unreal silver was being perceived for such a long time".

(Answer:)If for not being existent the silver can be expressed as "unreal", then on the strength of the same argument this silver should be expressed as existent too since it is not unreal, But nobody has ever made such a statement as "for such a period of time the existent silver was being perceived".

Further, by the scriptural statement "*satyaṃ jñānam*" etc. one may understand *satya* or *sat* Brahman as "not unreal", and thereby the Advaita view of Brahman being existent cannot be established.

MM refutes the Advaita view with other arguments. The Advaitins hold that the *anirvacanīya* shell-silver has ignorance as its material cause and it is destroyed by the correct knowledge of the locus. If it be so, we could have at the time of illusion felt that "the silver is produced" and also after the illusion we could have apprehended that "the silver is destroyed", but this is not our experience.

Again, the material cause of a jar is clay, and so by seeing the jar we feel "the jar is clay". Similarly, ignorance being the material cause of the silver we should have felt "the silver is ignorance". But our experience is otherwise.

Further, if only knowledge be the remover of an illusory object, the Advaitins will be put in serious difficulty. Let us think of a situation in which a person perceives silver in place of a shell and before his illusion is removed by the knowledge of the shell, he leaves the place. Now, will the Advaitins say that the person will go on perceiving the silver? At least, reason demands this, although our experience militates against this.

Hence the Advaita tenet of *anirvacanīya* being removed by knowledge is not tenable.

(EV 147-157) (Objection:) The ego is different from the self, and it is nothing but a superimposition on the Self. Śaṃkarācārya's exposition on the *Brahmasūtras* propounds this eloquently in the very first line. The separate mention of *ātman* after that of *ahaṃkāra* in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7.25 also established the difference. The *Bhagavadgītā* (7.4-5) shows that ego is far apart from self. The following inferences also proves their difference in the following manner:

> *Ahaṃkāra* is not-self, since it does not continue in dreamless sleep, as the crude body does,
> or,
> *Ahaṃkāra* is not-self, since it is an instrument, as is the sense of vision.

(Answer:) In all cases of superimposition the awareness may easily be analyzed into two parts, locus and superimposed. In the cognition "this is silver" we find the trace of the locus, viz., shell, is meant by the word "this", and the word "silver" is a partial representation of the superimposed. But in the so-called superimposition of *ahaṃkāra* there is no such partial representation.

(Objection:) It is not necessary that in all cases of superimposition the cognition will be capable of being analyzed into two parts; on the other hand, there are some accredited instances of such cognitions incapable of being so analyzed. A piece of red-hot iron can burn combustible objects. In the expression "Iron burns" we make a superimposition of fire on iron; here this erroneous cognition is not so analyzable. The same is the case with "I" (*aham*). Strictly speaking, *aham* too can be analyzed, just as "iron burns" is analyzable. Owing to the superimposition of awareness on the ego we can say "I feel". Here the ego is non-self, but there is the feeling, and the awareness of it. For avoidance of the contradiction of awareness residing in the non-self, superimposition has to be

admitted. Here feeling (*dṛk*) and non-self ego (*dṛśye aham*) are the two parts in such an expression of illusion. In "iron burns" also, we know, there are two parts–non-burning iron and the action of burning. On the basis of the daily experience of the superimposition of an object, viz. fire, on iron, we Advaitins show the superiposition of awareness (feeling) on the non-self ego, just to avoid the contradiction in burning by iron. The former, as it has been said earlier, is *arthādhyāsa* whereas the latter is *jñānādhyāsa*.

(Answer:) The illustration "iron burns" is itself defective because it is not a true sentence, since iron never burns: fire and fire only can burn. Thus there is no superimposition in the sentence "iron burns". Similarly there is no superimposition of awareness in the sentence "I feel". Thus the so-called analysis of this awareness into two parts is untenable.

(Objection:) Why should the opponents rejected the universal experience "iron burns"? It is a valid cognition, and a valid experience too.

(Answer:) Let us accept that "iron burns" is a true awareness, but we need not for this purpose accept any superimposition as sought by the Advaitins. The sentence may be explained by resorting to implication. Here "iron" means "iron with excessive heat" as in the sentence "a dagger comes" we understand" a person with a dagger" by the simple word"dagger". Hence in "iron burns" there is no superimposition; similarly in "I feel" also no superimposition needs to be admitted.

The testimony of the Vedas also does not militate against the identity of ego and self. The so-called separate mention of these two in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7.25.1-2 fails to prove their difference, since the word "*ahaṃkāra*" in *Chāndogypaniṣad* 7.26.1 does not mean the conscious thinking subject but merely arrogance or pride. Similarly the *śloka* of *(Bhagavad)Gītā* 7.4-5 also has to be understood accordingly. Thus the contention of the Advaitins falls through. MM further points out that the

Advaitins have failed to notice the difference between "*asmad*", meaning self, and "*ahaṃkāra*", meaning pride [in the passage in the *Chāndogya*]."*Aham*" in the *śruti* and *smṛti* referred to by the Advaitins is expressive of non-self, i.e., *ahaṃkāra*, and so its difference from self is admitted by the Dvaitādvaitavādins without any hesitation.

The inference drawn by the Advaitins in order to prove that the ego is not the self is fallacious because the *hetu* [property] is not present in the *pakṣa*. MM shows that *ahaṃkāra* is present even in dreamless sleep inasmuch as we recollect immediately after such dreamless sleep that "I knew nothing". This recollection (*smṛti*) proves that there was experience during sleep, otherwise there could not have appeared such a recollection. Hence the said inference is vititated by the fallacy called *svarūpāsiddhatva*.

Vāmadeva, a liberated self, expresses his experience as "*aham*", and this is a conclusive proof of the Vedas that the self is comprehended by "*aham*". MM quotes ten such *ślokas* of the *Bhagavadgītā* where the self is understood by "*aham*".

(EV 157-166) Normally it is felt that the self is the agent of actions, but the Advaitins hold that this agency is not of a self but of mind, and this agency of mind is superimposed on the the self. In fact, an attibuteless and actionless self can have no agency, and this is supported by the the Upaniṣadic expression "*dhyāyatīva lelāyatīva*: (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.2.7) which means "the self appears to meditate and appears to move".

MM argues against this contention. If the attribute of mind be superimposed on the self we should have both types of cognition on different occasions as "the self is the agent" and "the mind is the agent". This is established by the accredited illustration of the Advaitins. When owing to the close contact of a red flower and a mirror we superimpose the redness of the flower on the mirror, the original nature of the flower is not lost sight of. And that is why sometimes we cognize a red mirror, and sometimes again the red flower too. Here in respect of the

superimposition of agency on the self this unique feature of being known in both ways being absent, MM refutes to accept such a proposition of the Advaitins.

MM dialectically inquires whether the so-called superimposition of agency on the self is conditioned by an limitation or on a self not so conditioned. "The mirror is red' is an instance of the former and "this is silver" is an instance of the latter. But the latter is not tenable because in this type of superimposition the error is removed once for all by just a single cognition of the locus. One who knows for certain that the object lying on the sea-shore is only a shell is never subjected to the error that it is silver. Unfortunately a person knowing well and being convinced that the self is not an agent commits the same error time and again. Thus the so-called superimposition of agency is not the second kind of superimposition. The first kind also is liable to be rejected for reasons detailed in the preceding paragraph.

The Upaniṣadic expression "*dhyāyatīva*", etc., does not mean what the Advaitin takes it to mean. The word "*iva*", meaning "as if, appearing" does not establish that a self does not meditate, but it conveys something else. The said expression is to be construed with the individual self, and the meaning comes to this: the individual self does not meditate independently, i.e., the individual is dependent on the supreme self (God, *īśvara*) for every action including meditation, movement etc. The word "*iva*" signifies the dependence of the individual self on God.

(EV 166-176) Advaitins admit mutual superimposition between the body and the self, sense-organ and self, etc. But this is totally rejected by MM owing to the absence of any proof.

(Objection:) We Advaitins hold that immediate awarenesses such as "I am a Brahmin", "I am deaf", "I am blind", etc., directly prove the superimposition between the self and the body, the self and the ear, the self and the eye, etc. respectively,

since only the body may be a Brahmin, never the self, the ear may be deaf but not the self, the eyes may be blind but not the self. Still, to refer to a self as a Brahmin, as deaf or blind clearly shows a superimposition of the identity between self and not-self, viz., body, ear and eyes.

In the part of the Veda dealing with the rituals there are injunctions such as "A Brahmin should perform sacrifices" etc., and in the other part, relating to knowledge, also there are other injunctions such as "a Brahman should develop quietude", etc.. Since a self cannot be a Brahmin, the attribute of being a Brahmin relating to the body, a superimposition of the identity between body and self is established by the Veda also.

Presumption also demands the postulation of mutual superimposition between body and self. During sound sleep there is no feeling of oneself's being the agent but this is present in the awakened state. There being the absence of superimposition of the identity between body and self during sound sleep, it is a logical necessity to admit the superimposition of the identity of body and self during the awakened state.

(Answer:) The so-called immediate awareness of the superimposition of the identity between self and not-self is totally unacceptable because the Advaitins may be paid back in their own coin inasmuch as they had denied that the "I" (*aham*) is identical with the self. It is strange that they have now cited an example where "*aham*" is to be understood as self. In the examples "I am deaf" or "I am blind", how can deafness or blindness be predicated of the self, since "I" (*aham*) is not-self?

Further, if perceptual cognitions such as "I am black' or "I am deaf", etc., could have established the identity of self and not-self, in that case all inferences intended to prove the difference of body from self would have been fallacious just as an inference of fire being cold is defective, going against the perceptual awareness of fire being hot.

Again, a person knowing the difference between a snake

and a stick cannot superimpose both of them on a piece of rope. Similarly, each and every person being aware of the difference between the body and the sense-organs cannot superimpose them on his self. Unfortunately the Advaitins have presented such a strange proposition.

According to Advaitins all difference, including the one between the self and the not-self, is superimposed. How then can the identity of self and not-self also be superimposed on the same locus? MM also argues that the so-called perception of the superimposition of the identity of body and self is contrary to our experience because all of us are always feeling the difference of our body from our self expressed through the proposition "I have a body", which proves that body and self are different.

MM shows that the Vedic expression "A Brahmin should perform sacrifices" does not propound that a Brahmin is a "self with the superimposition of identity with a body" since in the event of such a meaning being accepted, in similar expressinos such as "a Brahmin should not be killed" the homicide of a Brahmin in sound sleep or enlightenment will be permissible, and therefore not sinful, inasmuch as in such cases there remains no superimposition of the identity of self with body.

(EV 176-177) MM concludes that in the preceding pages he has been able to discard the theory of superimposition with all its facets. All the four bonds of connection (*anubandha*) have been refuted by him, and hence the *śāstra* as propounded by the Advaitins cannot be started at all. Then with the help of two verses MM pays obeisance to the line of heritage of his Vedāntic sect, and prays for the blessings of the human incarnation-Nimbārkācārya–of Bhagavat. Here ends the prolonged introduction of the work intended to animadvert the well-known *adhyāsabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṃkarācārya.

(EV 178-181) Before explaining the first *sūtra* of Śārīrakamīmāṃsā, i.e., the *Brahmasūtras*, MM explains the meaning of the said appellation of the work. "*Śārīra*" means

belonging to the body, i.e., the individual self, "*ka*" means self of the nature of bliss. Thus "*sārīraka*" signifies Supreme Brahman or Puruṣottama. He gives another explanation of the word. MM has made such a long introduction covering almost all the aspects, so that any detailed discussion on the individual *sūtras* becomes unnecessary and that is why he decided to dwell upon the salient points, in brief, of all the four chapters, the first of which is entitle "*samanvaya*" as being stated just now.

In the first *sūtra* the word "*atha*" means "after". In reply to the query"after what?" MM says: after the desire for liberation; but at the same time some other requisites such as *śraddhā* (respectful belief), *gurūpasadana* (approaching the perceptor), etc. are to be included. The word "*ataḥ*" means "therefore"; since all results (of the deeds of this world and those of the other world) are transient, all judicious persons, therefore (*ataḥ*), desire the knowledge of Brahman. The testimony of the Vedas and the *smṛtis* as also the derivation of the word "*brahman*" propound that the word means Lord Vāsudeva Puruṣottama. The compound "*brahmajijñāsā*" is to be expounded as "*brahmaṇaḥ jijñāsā*", the sixth (genitive) case-ending having the sense of the accusative.

(EV 181-186) MM shows that Advaitins can in no way define Braman. In their system there are two types of definition: *svarūpalakṣaṇa* and *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*. The former occurs when the nature of a substance is considered to be the definition, e.g., "*satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma*" is deemed to be the definition of Brahman. The illustration of the second type of definiton is: something having smell is earth. This second definition is nothing but an easy device for differentiating earth from non-earth. In the moment of creation the earth remains free from smell. So this definition cannot be held to be a *svarūpalakṣaṇa*. Similarly, being the creator etc. of the world cannot be a *svarrūpalakṣaṇa* of Brahman inasmuch as the process of creation, etc., is not always undertaken by Brahman.

Hence it is a *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*.

(EV 186-190) In Advaita doctrine Brahman is held to be the cause of the world. But it is very difficult to establish this view. MM inquires of the Advaitins about which alternative is their choice out of the following three: (i) pure Brahman is the cause, or (ii)determined (*upahita*) Brahman is the cause, or (iii) the Self superimposed on [by?] ignorance is the cause. The first alternative is vitiated because pure Brahman being devoid of all attributes and specifications cannot think or ponder (*īkṣaṇa*) and thus cannot create the world. On the second alternative Brahman is to be accepted as te prototype and the self as the image, the limitation being ignorance or the individual mind of a self. MM first summarily rejects the theory of reflection owing to the lack of form of both the limitation, viz. ignorance, and the prototype, viz., Brahman. Next, the prototype never remains in the image; for example, the original face is never present in the image inside the mirror. Thus Brahman, the prototype, cannot remain in the image, viz., *jīva*. This is opposed to the *śruti* because in the whole of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 3.7 Brahman is propounded as an entity remaining in and also controlling the entire world including the individual self. The third alternative also does not deserve special attention owing to the fact that superimposition itself is refuted lock, stock and barrel in EV 41-63.

(EV190-240) In the *sūtra* 1.13 it is propounded that Brahman is to be known through the scriptures, mainly the Vedas. MM dwells upon the epistemological standpoint of his Vedāntic system. First he enumerates the eight *pramāṇas* as admitted by the various philosophical systems.

(EV 191) MM divides perception into external and internal. He shows his particular contribution in the discussion of internal perception, which is caused by mind or the internal organ. This internal perception is subdivided into ordinary and extraordinary. Perception of internal pleasure or pain is ordinary, but that of the individual self or of *paramātman* is

extraordinary. This extraordinary internal perception is further subdivided into two groups as (1) perception of the self caused by the meditation on the meaning conveyed by a word, and (2) perception of the identity of the self and Brahman caused by the meaning conveyed by a sentence.

(EV 191-192) Here MM propounds that knowledge is an attribute of *jīva* and that this knowledge is beginningless, endless and all-pervading. It is only during the period of bondage that the knowledge of a self becomes shrunken, and that is why it appears to be limited also. The light of a candle is by nature spread out from its source to an unlimited distance; but that light of the candle becomes shrunken and limited whenever it is put in a jar. Similarly the unlimited extension of the knowledge of a *jīva* shrinks owing to the limitations caused by the external and internal senses.

MM summarizes his discussion on perception by delineating the process of release through perception which is attained by a devoted disciple approaching the preceptor and then hearing from his mouth the Vedāntic doctrines, subsequently reasoning on them, and finally meditating on the Supreme Entity.

In EV 193-203 MM engages himself in inference. Almost all the philosophical systems have followed the Nyāya system as regards the principles and modes of inferential arguments, and MM is not an exception to that. A special feature of MM's contention is that a pervasion may be determined in two ways, viz., (i) through perception, etc., and (ii) through scripture only. In order to illustrate the first MM provides ten inferences. For the second he presents 33 inferences of which 24 are demonstrated for the establishment and support of his own view, and nine are purported to refute the views of the opponents.

The treatment of testimony is also commonplace but one, or at best two, points deserve special mention. Besides the eight accredited means for determining the meaning of a word

MM also accepts the speaker's intention (*tātparya*) as an additional means. But there being no speaker of the Veda the "intention" is to be determined by the six ways of understanding import, viz. the identity of the beginning and the end, repetition, novelty, result, laudatory or derogatory remarks and reason.

MM tries his best to prove the validity of the Pāñcarātra school. Bādarāyaṇa himself has said in the *Mahābhārata* that in order to understand the full import of the Veda the supporting works are to be consulted for the avoidance of misunderstanding of the text which is very difficult for a dilettant. He also holds that the word "*śāstra*" means *śruti* and the other texts such as *smṛti, Mahābhārata, Pāñcarātra, Vālmīkirāmāyaṇa,* etc., which are dependent on *śruti*. By citing a *śloka* of the *Mahābhārata* MM shows that in the Mokṣadharma portion Yudhiṣṭhara poses a question as to the deity who may be worshiped for the accomplishment of the ultimate result to be achieved by people of all the four stages of life. The reply thereto shows that the Pāñcarātra is a great Upaniṣad, being endowed with all the four Vedas and related to the conclusions of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system. Without going into further detail it may easily be upheld that MM succeeds in removing all charges against the Pañcarātra system.

From his discussion up to EV 223 it appears that he refrains from offering resistance to the admission of the first six instruments of knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison, testimony, implication and non-perception. After this he begins (EV223) a discussion on intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) and extrinsic validity (*parataḥprāmāṇya*) of the instruments of knowledge. Then (EV 225) resumes the discussion on the two other *pramāṇas* admitted by the Paurāṇikas–*sambhava* and *aitihya*. He does not approve of these two instruments but merely refers to them. Now comes MM's conclusion as to the number of instruments of cognition (EV 226). MM accepts only three, viz., perception, inference

and testimony, the other five being included in them. In his opinion non-perception and tradition (*aitihya*) are included in perception, but the other three, viz., comparison, implication and inclusion (*sambhava*) are to be classed under inference.

Here (EV 226) ensues the discussion why Brahman cannot be ascertained by perception because Brahman is incapable of being grasped by the senses. In spite of the contact of all-pervading Brahman with the senses they fail to grasp it owing to their inherent capability. A person drinking milk can have the taste of it but not the color owing to the tongue's incapacity to grasp it. It is only the incapability of the senses that Brahman cannot be comprehended by them. Sunlight is present everywhere. It enlightens the glow-worm, but the glow-worm fails to enlighten the sun because of its inherent incapacity. Similarly all the senses are enlightened by Brahman but they cannot enlighten it.

In EV 227-228 MM shows that Brahman is incapable of being proved by inference. In support of this statement he quotes several lines from *śruti* and *smṛti*, and even *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.11. Followers of the Nyāya system often advance an argument, viz.," Whatever is an effect is made by some creator. The five elements are effects, therefore the five elements are made by some creator." According to the Nyāya system this supreme creator of five elements is none else but Brahman. MM holds that such an inference can establish the existence of a creator, and this much is accepted by him; but he refuses to accept that this creator, as established by the inference, will be free from any blemish, will be omniscient and omnipotent, and that this creator will be endowed with endless and unthinkable excellent good qualities. The concomitance of this inference is between an effect and a creator, and only this much is established by our experience, but never between an effect and an omnipotent and omniscient creator.

In EV 229 MM refutes the suggestion that comparison (*upamāna*) may be an efficient cause for the proof of Brahman.

There is nothing in this universe which may be likened to Brahman, and thus comparison can be of no help. Dissimilarity (*vaisādṛśya*) is also sometimes accepted as an instrument of cognition. By a narration of a horse's dissimilarity from the cow that he knows a man may understand a horse at the time of his first experience of it. Similarly, a teacher may make the student understand Brahman by explaining Brahman's dissimilarity from all the substances of the world. This view of the opponents is discarded by MM by holding that in order to understand the dissimilarity the comprehender has to know the items between which dissimilarity is claimed. Further, as in similarity so in dissimilarity the knowledge acquired must be something indeterminate and non-specific. This sort of knowledge is not honored as a valid cognition (*pramā*).

Presumption, being included in inference, and inference being incapable of grasping Brahman, it goes without saying that presumption is not at all a dependable instrument for understanding Brahman. (EV 230)

Non-perception cannot be accepted as an instrument for understanding Brahman because the said instrument is requisitioned only for the grasp of absence(s). Brahman being all-pervading can in no way be comprehended by this means.

Thus, MM concludes, testimony and testimony alone is required for the comprehension of Brahman. This is propounded by the author of the *Brahmasūtra* in his third *sūtra*, viz. "*śāstrayonitvāt*" (1.13) which means that scripture is the cause or instrument of knowledge of Brahman. This is the nature of Brahman which signifies that Brahman is grasped by *śāstra* and by no other means.

During this prolonged disquisition from EV 190 to 240 several issues have been raised by MM. Some of them are common to all the philosophical systems. Whereas in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system there is a special stress on epistemology, the Vedānta systems generally consider epistemology to be subservient to metaphysics, and thus most

of the Vedāntic works deal with metaphysics. But on appropriate occasions they divert and make a balanced treatment of epistemology. Under this *sūtra* MM undertakes a fairly lengthy discussion on *pramāṇas*.

(EV240-249) According t the Mīmāṃsā system only the unaccomplished (*sādhya*) can be taught in the Veda. Thus Brahman, the accomplished eternal entity, cannot be taught there. In order to maintain the validity of that portion of the Veda seeking to propound Brahman, e.g. expressions such as "*sad eva somyedam agra āsīt*" etc., the Vedāntins must explain them in accord (*ekavākya*) with either of the two types of Vedic propositions, viz., injunctions (*vidhi*) and prohibitions (*niṣedha*). As the three other types of Vedic propositions, viz. eulogies or denouncements (*arthavāda*), *mantras* and nomenclature (*nāmadheya*) are explained in accord with either injunctions or prohibitions, so also the Vedāntic doctrines teaching the accomplished Brahman are to be explained accordingly. The Mīimāṃsakas suggest that the propositions speaking of the individual self (*jīva=tvam*) should be identified with the eulogy of the sacrificer, and those propounding the Supreme Deity (*tat*) should be understood in terms of the deity of the sacrifice. This argument is expressed in the following manner: Vedāntic propositions are not intended to signify Brahman, since they teach the eulogy of the sacrificer or the deity of the relevant sacrifices, like the expressions of other eulogies.

In reply to the above MM refers to *Brahmasūtra* 1.14 "*tat tu samanvayāt.*". The word "*tu*", meaning "but", indicates a different view which means that these Vedāntic passages do speak of Brahman. This sense is further strengthened by the word "*tat*" which literally means "that", i.e. Brahman taught only in Vedāntic sentences. Now the reason is adduced by the word "*samanvayāt*" whichmeans that all the Vedāntic statements finally converge on and culminate in Brahman which alone is the material and efficient cause of the world,

which is the origin of the *śāstra*, which is the controller of the self, *prakṛti* etc., which is adored by all the deities, which is free from all blemishes, which is endowed with all excellent qualities and which is the ultimate end of the liberated selves.

MM suggests explaining the above *sūtra* in another way. The Being of the above nature is Brahman alone, since through the Vedāntic sentences Brahman alone is primarily meant. Here "*samanvaya*" is to be understood as *sam anvaya* or primary meaning. The prefix *sam* means *samyak*, full or primary.

The pleas of the opponents that all Vedic propositions are related to either an injunction or a prohibition is liable to be rejected on the ground that all actions, as enjoined, virtually culminate in the desire for learning or knowing Brahman, and thus instead of all Vedāntic principles being converged on and culminating in injunctions or actions, all injunctions or actions become ultimately fruitful by being an essential step in understanding Brahman. It is needless to state that without the desire for knowledge no one feels the need for going through the process of hearing, considering etc., for the realization of Brahman. Without going into further details we may sum up the arguments of MM with a few inferences which tersely and curtly contain all aspects of the discussions. The inferences are

(i) The Veda does not signify action (*karman*), since its function ends with the generation of the desire (for knowledge), as the function of the senses ends with the production of the awareness of shape, etc.. (EV 245-246)

(ii) An action is dependent on consciousness, since it is unconscious and produced, like the jar etc. are. (EV 249)

(iii) Brahman is not subservient to action, since it is independent, of the nature of the universe, and controller of all. Whatever is subservient to action is not such, as the sacrificial cake, viz., *puroḍāśa*. (EV 249)

(iv) Action is subservient to something else, since it unconscious, meant for something else (its result), and an effect, as the sacrificial cake is. (EV 249)

(EV 250-270) The entire Veda propounds Brahman. Advaitins establish with arguments that Brahman is devoid of any part and that it is one integrated whole (*akhaṇḍa*) A sentence normally consists of two or more words conveying separate meanings, and there is also a relation between the individual words. The Vedas, rather a Vedic sentence, makes us understand Brahman. The sentences being formed of individual words conveying different meanings, the cumulative meaning of a sentence cannot be one integrated whole, and thus through such ordinary sentences we can never expect one integrated Brahman to be comprehended.

Here Advaitins argue that there are some sentences which can convey single integrated substances. Sometimes some individual words (of a sentence) convey the meaning of a word, as in our everyday life the nature of the moon is conveyed by the words "whatever (in the evening sky) is of special brilliance is the moon". Here through the entire sentence only the meaning of the word "moon" is conveyed, and nothing else. In the Vedic usage is is the sentence "whatever is truth, knowledge and bliss is that (Brahman)" which is referred to as the instance of the meaning of a word being conveyed by a group of words. Again, sometimes the meaning of a whole sentence conveyed culminates in identity of meaning, although apparently the sentence signifies two or more meanings. "It is that Devadatta" is the expression of a person who understands the identity of Devadatta seen long ago and the Devadatta present before him, although quite a lot of physical changes have been undergone in such a manner that at first sight recognition is impossible. Here the meaning of the sentence virtually comes to one single unit, viz., identity. In Vedic usage a similar reference may be made to "thou art that" which ultimately conveys the identity of the individual (thou) with the Supreme Being (that) through the words of the sentence "thou art that". Thus there are four types of integrated meaning, viz., (i) integrated meaning residing in a word of non-Vedic usage,

(ii) integrate meaning residing in a word of Vedic usage, (iii) integrated meaning residing in a sentence of non-Vedic usage, (iv) integrated meaning residing in a sentence of Vedic usage".

Advaitins hold that their claim of reality being one integrated whole is substantiated by the six means of determining the import of a topic. MM shows this in detail with the help of the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*.. Owing to the secondary function (*lakṣaṇā*) of words these Vedic sentences signify one integrated whole, viz. Brahman. Here Advaitins have admitted the implication of sentences, and thus these sentences are explained to have as their import one integrated Brahman. Although normally words are understood in their implied meanings, it is on several occasions found that a whole sentence is comprehended in the implied meaning, e.g., the sentence "*visaṃ bhuṅkṣva*" means "do not eat the meal of your enemy-family". Again the series of *arthavādavākyas* is understood to have a different import just to come into agreement with the relevant injunctions. Advaitins further maintain that all definitions convey one integrated meaning, and this integrated meaning of a sentence is to be accepted by the scholars of all the system

MM rejects outright the possibility of an integrated meaning of a whole sentence. Advaitins seek to establish this doctrine on the strength of the illustration of the sentence "whatever is of special brilliance is the moon". MM undercuts their stand by showing that the said sentence is a composite one made up of various parts: specialty, the locus of this specialty, brilliance, the relation of this attribute to the object, and the moon. MM further contends that construction-free (*nirvikalpa*) valid cognition is an impossibility which is accepted by the Nyāya and even by the Advaita system. The Advaitin's attempt to prove the capability of the sentence "*satyaṃ jñānam*", etc., to convey an integrated meaning is sure to be baffled because the *sādhya* itself is totally nonexistent.

In opposition to the inference presented by the Advaitins

MM offers the inference "The valid cognition caused by the Vedāntic sentences is attributive, since they are caused by discussion and are also removers of doubt etc., as the knowledge originated by the section of the Veda describing various deeds".

(EV 270-283) Advaitins are the common opponents of the followers of Madhva, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. Thus MM has, to a large extent, utilized the arguments putforward by those sects. Advaitins refute difference, but the above-named philosophers accept difference. The primary contention of the Mādhvas in this context is to show the difference between *jīva* and Brahman. Whereas the Advaitins explain the sentence "*tat tvam asi*" as the identity of *jīva* and Brahman, Mādhvas intepret it as a proof of the difference between *jīva* and Brahman. Mādhvas argue that without accepting the implied meaning of both the word "*tat*" and "*tvam*" it will be quite logical if we admit the implied meaning in the suffix, viz. *su,* and understand any of the meanings of the third to the seventh case-endings. In case such meanings are accepted the word "that" will mean "by that", "for that", "from that", "of that" and "in that" respectively. Then the sentence-meanings will be (i) "you exist by that", (ii) "you exist for that", etc.. All these expressions doubtless prove that *jīva* differs from Brahman. Besides, In such expositions there is no grammatical difficulty since in Vedic expressions such irregularity is tolerated. Here Pāṇini's rule 7.12.39 is requisitioned.

From continued pronunciation of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.7 we may separate the words as *sa ātmā atattvamasi* in place of the normal separation as *sa ātmā tattvamasi.* In such separation the meaning of the sentence becomes just the opposite, viz., "that is self; thou art not that".. This meaning is whole-heartedly welcomed by the Mādhvas. (EV 271). In keeping with the Mādhvas MM quotes several lines from the Veda which propound the differences between *jīva* and Brahman, most prominent of them being "*dvā suparṇā*"

(*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.1), *jñājñau* (*Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* 1.9), etc. The followers and adversaries of difference try their best to show that the Upaniṣads establish their own views. The acceptance of this absolute authority of the Upaniṣads deserves special mention, and this textual wrangling is quite interesting too.

In the Mādhva system Brahman is different from *jīva* but Brahman is not admitted to be both the efficient and material cause of this world. Brahman, in their opinion, is only the efficient cause but never the material one. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* propounds that the knowledge of Brahman necessitates the knowledge of the world. This is possible only if Brahman is admitted to be the material cause of the world. Further, the effect can dissolve only in the material cause. The entire world being dissolved in Brahman proves that Brahman is the material cause of the world. Hence it is taught that Brahman, who is exemplified by both conscious and non-conscious principles, opposed to all evil, endowed with all excellent qualities, and who is called Puruṣottama, is the ultimate import of the Vedānta. This is the view of the Rāmānujīyas.

(EV 283-290) Advaitins stand against this view of the Rāmānujīyas because Brahman, as maintained in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1, is one without a second, and accordingly it cannot be qualified by conscious and non-conscious principles or entities.

To this the followers of Rāmānuja say that this sort of being–having no part, not having beyond it the existence of any similar of dissimilar entity–cannot function since any sort of funciton presupposes at least an object, an action, a method, a result, etc.. The answer of the Advaitins is that in spite of the fact of Brahman being alone it can function for the acceptance of *māyā* which itself is a power.

The followers of Rāmānuja argue that in case Brahman is different from *māyā* Brahman becomes subjected to that difference. This cannot be accepted by the Advaitin. Again, if

Brahman be identical with *māyā* there arises no question of Brahman accepting *māyā*.

MM refers, on behalf of the followers of Rāmānuja, to some other popular arguments. If everything of this world becomes false, the teacher, the teaching and the taught etc. will be false. Even the instruction in the *Gītā* by Bhagavat would be false.

By quoting some lines form the Upaniṣad followers of the Rāmānujīya sect prove that in sound sleep the individual is embraced by the omniscient, and loses all consciousness of external and internal phenomena (cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.3.21). It is never the intention of scripture that this individual self becomes omniscient in sound sleep and becomes embraced by himself. Further, in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.1 it is never intended that this individual self become dissolved in the supreme Self. Thus the Vedāntas, i.e. the Upaniṣads, prove that all conscious and non-conscious entities are attributes of supreme Brahman. The individual self (*cit*) is different from Brahman; so also is the non-conscious world (*acit*). Hence one single Brahman, qualified by consciousness and the inert, is the ultimate reality. This Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. This, in short, is the view subscribed to by the followers of the Rāmānuja system.

(EV 289-292) MM refutes the above view of the Rāmānuja sect of the Vedānta. At the very outset he offers an excellent argument against the acceptance of Brahman being qualified by two entities, viz. consciousness and the inert. This Rāmānujīya sect accepts these two adjectival qualifications of Brahman. MM shows the defect in such acceptance in the following manner. By the word "Rāma" we may understand all of the three persons, viz. Raghunātha, the son of Daśaratha, Parasurāma, the son of Bhṛgu, and Balarāma. But if we really mean Raghunātha we are to qualify Rāma by an adjectival expression "*dāśarathi*" so that the other two Rāmas are eliminated. In this function of differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*) the

word "*dāśarathi*" is the differentiator. Rāma is the differentiated (*vyāvṛtta*) and Bhārgava and Balarāma are the differentiables (*vyāvartya*). In order to eliminate these differentiables the adjectival expression or the qualification "*dāśarathi*" is resorted to. But in the present context the so-called adjectival expressions '*cit*' and '*acit*' are mistakenly understood to be so, because in this case there is no differentiable by the elimination of which the function of differentiation may be considered fruitful. In accordance with the Rāmānuja sect there are only three fundamental entities, viz., *cit, acit* and Brahman. If both conciousness and the inert be the differentiators and Brahman be the differentiated, where is the differentiable? For the elimination of which differentiable should we accept the differentiators? This is a big lacuna in the chief tenet of the Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins.

Further, if Brahman be endowed with all conscious and non-conscious entities, it will be qualified by the wicked persons committing hundreds of ignominious sins. Then the condition of Brahman is really pathetic. Advaitins consider the attributes of Brahman as false, and thus there will be an end to these at a later date. But this school of Rāmānuja admits all these attributes of Brahman being continued during its existence. So there is never any relief from these sins. For these reasons the said view of the Rāmānuja sect should be totally forsaken.

(EV 292-310) By refuting the views of Advaitins, Mādhvas and Rāmānuja MM explains the stand of his own sect. He shows that ther are several passages of scripture and many *sūtras* of Vyāsa which are primarily expressive of the difference between *jīva* and Brahman, there are others which signify identity, and there are still others which in general negate or denounce the difference. Examples are provided.

The reasonable synthesis of these conflicting views will be to accept that the existence (*sthiti*) and activity (*pravṛtti*) of all the individual *jīvas* are dependent on Brahman. Again,

Brahman is wider than *jīva*, who is narrower (*vyāpya*). Further, Brahman is the locus in which *jīva* is located. All conscious and non-conscious entities owe their existence to Brahman. This is the contention of the word "*aitādātmya*" which comes from the word "*etadātma*" meaning "Brahman (*etad*) is the nature (*ātman*) of which, i.e., of all conscious and non-conscious entities". Brahman is free, independent and controller of all, and everything else is bound, dependent and controlled by it. The "everything else" is divided into two groups, viz. *kuṭastha* and *vikārin*. The living being which has no real birth and death and is hence permanent is *kūṭastha*, whereas non-conscious entities being subjected to various metamorphoses are known as *vikārin*. These individual non-living entities are not permanent but their permanence has to be accepted as members of a series. All the text of the Upaniṣads and *smṛti* may be consistently explained on this view. There is difference between Brahman and the rest; there is non-difference for the supreme authority and controlling power of Brahman which contains everything else in its fold. Thus the reality is difference-cum-non-difference (*bhedābheda*) between Brahman and the rest.

It is to be noted that this Brahman is none else than Śrikṛṣṇa who is referred to in the scriptures by various names.

The doctrine of difference-cum-non-difference is subscribed to by Bhagavad Bhāskara and his followers as well as the Nimbārka sect. There is a fundamental difference between these two views. According to the Nimbārka sect the difference between *jīva* and Brahman is intrinsic or natural (*svābhāvika*) whereas in Bhāṣkara this difference is limitationive (*aupādhika*). Now MM shows the defects of Bhāskara's view, and then establishes his own philosophical doctrine. It is to be ascertained whether Bhāskara admits the existence of a *jīva* in liberation. Liberation is a state when all limitations disappear. If at that time the existence of *jīva* is admitted, it is proved up to the hilt that the existence of a self

is not limitationive but intrinsic. If, on the other hand, Bhāskara denies the existence of a self in liberation, he has to accept that liberation of an individual is tantamount to his destruction. In that case Bhāskara will, to a great extent, lean towards the *māyāvādins*, the difference being that they go even to the extent of the destruction of God, but Bhāskara does not.

The so-called incompatibility of difference and non-difference is overcome by MM through having recourse to the *sūtra* "*ubhayavyapadeśāt tvahikuṇḍalavat*" (*Brahmasūtra* 3.2.27), where we may easily trace the difference between the creeping snake (*sarpa*) and the coiling snake (*kuṇḍalin*). At the same time we may understand that *sarpa* and *kuṇḍalin* are two different positions of one non-different snake. Similarly the relation between Brahman and the non-conscious world is to be comprehended.

At the close of the first chapter MM refers to the *sūtras* regarding the origin of the world. In line with the Advaitins here he establishes that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world.

(EV 311-320) The second chapter of the *Brahmasūtras* deals mainly with the refutation of the views of other sects and systems of Indian philosophy. Thus in the exposition of this chapter there is quite a lot of unanimity among the Vedāntic sects insofar as the *sūtras* relate to the animadversion of non-Vedāntic systems. MM has followed the Advaitins, especially Śaṃkarācārya, even in some details.

Although the Yoga system is closely similar to the Sāṃkhya, Bādarāyaṇa makes a distinction owing to some special traits of the Yoga, viz., the eight-fold yogic methods leading to the realization of the supreme entity Śrīpuruṣottama. For this people may be misled that the Yoga system is a step toward Vedāntic ideals. But the fact is otherwise because in this system also *prakṛti* is considered to be the material cause of the world. This principle goes directly against the Vedānta, and that is why Bādarāyaṇa has to make a special effort to refute this

system seemingly dissimilar to the Sāṃkhya system.

(EV 320-349) Now MM beings to criticize the Advaitin's theory of falsity or *anirvacanīyavāda*. Thus discussion was undertaken earlier by MM in EV 119-146. Besides the unavoidable repetitions here he adds some new points. Advaitins have stressed the point that knowledge can remove or annihilate only ignorance and nothing else. The rope-snake destroyed by the knowledge of the piece of rope proves that the so-called serpent was false. Similarly, the world being annihilated by the knowledge of Brahman must be false. MM takes serious exception to this position of the Advaitins, showing that knowledge can destroy even true entities. MM shows that the knowledge of a jar destroys the prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) of the jar which is not false. The awareness of a cloth is destroyed by a subsequent awareness such as of a jar. The trace of an awareness is killed by a recognition. Attachment is put to an end by the comprehension of the inherent defects of the objects for which attachment grew. Again a visit to a religious place such as the bridge at Rāmeśvara, traditionally believed to be built by Rāmacandra for killing the injustice incarnate Rāvaṇa, destroys such a serious sin as the murder of a Brahmin.

Advaitins accept beginningless superimposition as of non-self but this beginningless superimposition cannot be established by our experience since all instances cited without exception have a beginning. Nor can the Advaitins succeed in citing any evidence from the Veda in this regard. Thus the Advaita tenet suffers from a defect. Still they harp on the same string most unreasaonably.

Advaitins admit that the poison of a snake is annihilated by meditation on Garuḍa. If so, where lies the inconsistency in accepting of the doctrine that after the comprehension of the implications of the Vedānta *mahāvākyas* an inquisitive student will realize Brahman through meditation on it which will put an end to this true world?

In Advaita the remnant of ignorance (*ajñānaleśa*), trace of ignorance (*ajñānasaṃskāra*), *prārabdhakarman* etc. are also false. But during the period of the continuance of the body of a liberated person (*jīvanmukta*) these entities do not disappear, i.e. they are not annihilated by knowledge although they are false. Hence it does not follow that whatever is false is to be removed by knowledge. But the necessary relation or concomitance that exists is: Whatever is opposed to knowledge is to be removed by knowledge. MM observes that it is the grace of Bhagavat which is the real cause of the destruction of bondage, and in no other way can this bondage be removed.

The falsity of the world is established by the Advaitins with the help of the inference in which any of these three may be selected as the reason–the attribute of being cognized (*dṛśyatva*), the attribute of being non-conscious (*jaḍatva*), and the attribute of being limited (*paricchinnatva*). By his typically dialectical method MM refutes all of them.

(EV 349-369) Followers of the Vaiśeṣika system propound that the effect is entirely new, and it was not present in the cause. While summarizing the arguments proposed by the Vaiśeṣikas MM is precise. For his rebuttal of the stand of the Vaiśeṣikas he is definitely indebted to the earlier authors of the various systems.

MM has been very particular in establishing that Brahman is both material cause and efficient cause. The opponents are ready to accept Brahman as the efficient cause but they object to the proposition that Brahman is the material cause as well. MM shows that the suffix *-tasil* being added in place of the fifth case-ending proves that Brahman is the material cause also. This view is corroborate by the scripture *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante,* by the *smṛti yataḥ sarvāni bhūtāni,* by the *Brahmasūtra janmādyasya yataḥ*. Leaving aside the stock-in-trade illustration of the cobweb in favor of the doctrine of Brahman being both material and instrumental causes, here MM has cited a few cases where the Vaiśeṣika is

compelled to accept such a situation of one cause being both material and instrumental at the same time. God being all-pervading, the contact of a jar and God has to be accepted. This contact is an effect and requires both a material cause and an instrumental cause. The Vaiśeṣika has to admit that here God alone will be the material cause and the instrumental cause. Similarly awareness of the self has as its material cause the self alone, and this self is also the instrumental cause. Thus the difference of the material cause and the instrumental cause is not a necessity, and accordingly the Dvaitādvatita view is not vitiated at all owing to the non-difference of the material and instrumental causes of the entire world.

Relevantly here MM explains the significance of the Upaniṣadic expression *ekam evādvitīyam* in a manner which suits the requirements of his doctrine. Advaitins are against all sorts of differences, and so they explain these three terms for the elimination of three types of difference, viz. (1) similar or of the same class (*sajātīya*), (2) intrinsic of inside difference remaining among the parts and the whole (*svagata*), and (3) dissimilar or belonging to a different class (*vijātīya*) respectively. MM explains that "*eka*" means predominance for excellence (*utkarṣarūpaprādhānya*). In fact Brahman is predominant in all respects. The word "*eva*" means "the absence of anything better" (*svātiśayavastuśūnya*). In fact Brahman exists *par excellence*. The word "*advitīya*" means the negation of anything of equal merit (*samānaniṣedha*). In fact Brahman is unparalleled.

As propounded at the close of the first chapter (*vide* EV 299-310) the relation between the world and Brahman , as also between *jīva* and Brahman, is both difference and non-difference. Thus the cause-effect relation also is one of difference-cum-non-difference. To put it technically we should sum up: The effect being of the nature of the cause, the effect is existent (*sat*); again, the effect being nothing completely new, it is neither non-existent nor logically indeterminable

(*anirvacanīya*).

(EV 369-374) Here MM has refuted the Vaiśeṣika tenet almost in the words of Śaṃkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. In his arguments MM lays special stress on the refutation of inherence (*samavāya*). This portion contains nothing remarkable which need draw our serious attention.

(EV374-375) The Pāśupata view is criticized here. MM shows the various sections among the followers of this doctrine. He denounces some queer propositions of this religio-philosophical sect. Some acts of this sect are definitely derogatory to Vedic princriples; some others, however, are sanctioned by the Veda. This inconsistency is so marked that consistent philosopher cannot be satisfied with it.

(EV 376-378) In the last topic of *Brahmasūtra* I1.2, consisting of four *sūtras*, MM differs widely from the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣyas* of the other systems, even from the predecessors of his own system. Śaṃkarācārya refutes here the Bhāgavata or Pāñcarātra doctrine, whereas in the *Nimbārkabhāṣya* and the *Vedāntakaustubha* of Śrīnivāsācārya the *śaktivāda* is refuted in these *sūtras*. MM elects to establish the Pāñcarātra view by thwarting the arguments advanced by Śaṃkarācārya. This endeavor of MM has, perhaps, been prompted by his excessive predilection for and devotion to this Pāñcarātra system. By doing so he has been a bit inconsistent too since this quarter of the *Brahmasūtras* is meant to criticize other systems and not to establish any.

However, MM seeks to steer clear of all the charges leveled against the Bhāgavata system by Śaṃkarācārya. MM holds that Vāsudeva is one but he has three other manifestations (*vyūha*) which are in essence non-different from him. The three, viz. Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, are the assumptions of new form by one who does really produce them. The scripture, viz., *ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyante*, means this. Earlier also (EV 210) MM has not missed the opportunity to show his liking for the Pāñcarātra syatem.

(EV 379–400) MM takes special care in pulverizing the arguments of other systems as to their view on self. Like all other theistic systems he also enumerates the prevalent doctrines on self and goes on refuting each of them excepting the one subscribed to by him. Many of the arguments smack of a mere repetitive survey of arguments proposed by earlier teachers of the various schools. He defines self as the locus of the attribute of being knower, of the nature of knowledge and being different from all non-conscious entities such as body, senses, mind, intellect, vital organs etc. Here *jīva* is defined by a noun with three adjectives. The first adjective, 'body, senses, etc.' (*dehendriya*), is given to exclude the various non-Vedic systems and sub-systems in which a self is considered to be a non-conscious entity. The second adjective, 'nature of knowledge' (*jñānasvarūpa*), is inserted to show the difference from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The third adjective ("being of the nature of a knower") is used for the refutation of the view of the votaries of *māyāvāda* where Self is considered to be of the nature of consciousness but not conscious.

The above definition of self applies to both a self and God. For the exclusion of God MM adds one more attribute that *jīva* is, under all circumstances and in each and every awareness and action, dependent on Bhagavat.

MM further establishes that a self is of the size of an atom because in that case it can leave this body and reach the various stages as prescribed in the Upaniṣads and other scriptures.

(EV 400-414) Some minor topics have been discussed here. Space is held to be the effect of Brahman, the material cause. Only by knowing the material cause is a person in a position to know all the effects. The Vedāntic proposition is that by knowing Brahman a man knows all, and *ākāśa* cannot be an exception to that. If it were, i.e., if *ākāśa* were not the effect of Brahman, there would remain no chance of knowing it by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus in order to accept the veracity of

the said proposition we must admit that Brahman is the material cause of *ākāśa* too.

In the next topic MM propounds that the vital breaths (*prāṇa*) also have a beginning. The birth of the vital breaths is mentioned in various Vedic texts including *Praśnopaniṣad* 6.4.

The next topic deals with the number of sense-organs. After some discussion the following conclusion is reached: the sense-organs (*jñānendriya*) are five, the action-organs (*karmendriya*) are five, and the internal organ, viz., the mind, is one. Thus in all there are eleven organs. The various functions of a mind are sometimes given various names and are counted separately. Thus counting four functions of mind the total number of organs will be fourteen. But this lack of uniformity about the number is not a all irreconcilable. The senses and the vital organs are all atomic in quantity, and hence these are not visible at the time of their departure from this gross body. Owing to the elasticity of a mind it can have contact with the whole body and thus tactual perception from head to toe becomes possible.

(EV 415-448) The third chapter of the *Brahmasūtras* is devoted to the means of liberation. MM holds that his predecessors have said quite a lot in this regard; only a brief survey of those instructions is made by him. For release from bondage the primary condition is to have a favorable glance from Mukunda at the time of a person's birth. Such a favored person becomes a pursuer of release, and gets a second birth capable of attaining release. Then the person tries to get it according to his mental ability. The various states towards the goal are as follows: performance of unattached deeds dedicated to Bhagavat; attainment of His favor; purification of the mind,; renunciation of all worldly objects; inquiry for Him; to undergo the stages of *śravaṇa* and constant reflection; meditation of the highest order; perfect devotion (*parābhakti*) which is also called *dhruvā smṛti*. Then owing to His favor comes the realization of Bhagavat and finally *mokṣa* or release.

Now MM explains *karmayoga*, i.e. compulsory duties and the occasional duties (*nitya* and *naimittika*) which are to be performed. Deeds prompted by desire and the prohibited deeds are to be forsaken. although many of the scholars sanction the fourth order, *sannyāsa*, for the three highest castes, MM argues that only Brahmins can have recourse to the fourth order.

MM further holds that the performance of deeds leads to release only through the medium of either knowledge or devotion. But deeds can never directly produce release.

All the scriptural injunctions for the attainment of knowledge are meant for persons who undergo the rigors of *varṇa* and *āśrama* by controlling the indomitable senses. But the question is whether the outcastes are unfit for the attainment of knowledge and Bhagavat. MM repeats that such persons have to go through certain processes as control of external and internal senses, chanting of *mantras* (*japa*), penance and the visiting of holyplaces (*tīrthayātra*). Baring a few who have not even developed compunction for their misdeeds, all persons going outside the fold of the main-stream may easily veer back by worshiping Bhagavat with utmost devotion and sincerity or purpose. In the *Bhagavadgītā* 9.10-31 Bhagavat Himself has assured the vilest person of safety, peace and also recognition as honest provided he starts a life of unflinching devotion to Him.

For *darśana* (revelation) *śruti* has prescribed the three means, viz., *śravaṇa,* constant reflection and intense meditation. Advaita scholars accept *śravaṇa* as the principal means and the two others are considered to be subsidiary means. MM rejects this view on the strength of the Vedāntic expression *nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyaḥ* (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 1.2.23) which expressly shows that one cannot attain the Self through instructions.

The Vivaraṇa school of Advaita Vedānta holds that realization comes from the understanding of Vedāntic expressions such as *tattvamasi*. MM, however, subscribes to the

contrary and holds that only through the mind can realization appear. In support of his view MM cites *manasaivānudraṣṭavyam* (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.19).

Although in the Vedānta *jīva* is said to reside during deep sleep in the *nādīs*, in Purītat and in Brahman (cf. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.6.3, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 2.1.19 and *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.8.1 respectively, MM maintains that the real residence of *jīva* during deep sleep is Brahman being surrounded by the other two.

(EV 449-480) At the beginning of the fourth Chapter the nature of release (*mokṣa*) is discussed. MM discards the Nyāya view about release. He contends that release cannot be accepted as the destruction of frustrations (*duḥkhanivṛtti*). A discerning person will try to attain release, i.e., to get rid of all sorts of miseries by destroying them–past, present and future. Here MM argues that past sorrows are already over, and now no attempt for that will be necessary. It is true that present sorrows are required to be annihilated. But in order to achieve that end a follower of the Nyāya system need not necessarily seek the knowledge of reality, since with the origination of any other special attribute of an all-pervading being the previous one (here, the existing sorrow) will automatically disappear. This is the technicality of the Nyāya system. Hence the most difficult and arduous task of the annihilation of present sorrow for the attainment of reality is meaningless for a follower of this system. It is also not possible to destroy future sorrows because only something present may be destroyed. Thus the destruction of miseries is beyond the capacity of human efforts.

By refuting other views of the various philosophical systems MM establishes his own doctrine as to the nature of *jīva*'s release as a state of knowledge remaining endowed with the quality of being freed from any sin.

MM is of the opinion that the realization of Brahman destroys all types, classes and subclasses of the deeds performed by a person whether in this birth or in any previous

births. Thus an enlightened person can have no body, and the so-called concept of liberation while living is totally untenable.

Advaitins maintain that with the attainment of realization the subtle body of the liberated person does go out of the gross body but it becomes dissolved there. But MM objects to this view and observes that the subtle body of this free man moves out through the *suṣumnānāḍī* and passes through the prescribed path beginning with light *(arcis)* and finally reaches *brahmaloka.*

15 PURUṢOTTAMAPRASĀDA VAIṢṆAVA I (1684)

VPSVK III, p. 171: (He) "is said to have been born in the city of Jagādharī in Kurukṣetra in the Vikrama era 1680, i.e., 1623 A. D.. He was the only son of Nārāyaṇaprasāda, a Gauḍīya Brahmin, who was a follower of the creed lf Svabhūdeva of the sect of Nimbārka. Being an only child Puruṣottamaprasāda was spoilt by his father, and spent his time in idle pastimes, instead of in study, till he was nine years of age. thereupon his father took him to his preceptor, Dharmadeva, and left him in his care. Dharmadeva initiated and instructed him with great care and taught him the holy *mantra* of the Lord Hayagrīva (=horse-necked). Within a year, so the tradition goes, the Lord, being pleased with the boy, appeared to him in a dream and asked him to ask for a boon. The boy prayed that he might soon be well-versed in all the Vedas and thereby fulfil his heart's desire of his father and teacher. He was granted the boon. He sent the information to his father who wanted him to stay on with his preceptor and continue his studies. He engaged himself in studies with whole-hearted devotion and learned everything within three years. At the age of thirteen he returned home, and
is said to have defeated all the heretics and preached the Vaiṣṇava religion all around."

15.1 PURUṢOTTAMAPRASĀDA (VAIṢṆAVA) I, *Śrutyantasuradruma* on Nimbārka's *Saviśeṣanirviśeṣaśīkṛṣṇastavarāja*

The work has been edited at least twice. Our "E" is the edition by Ratna Gopala Bhatta in Benares Sanskrit Series 135, Banaras 1907. The summary of a section is provided by Rotna Bose in VPSVK 3, pp. 175-177.

Summarized by Roma Bose

(E18ff.) "There is neither any *lakṣaṇa* or definition, nor any *pramāṇa* or proof, of *anirvacanīyatva.* It cannot be said that the *anirvacanīya* is what is different from being (*sat*) or the existent, for a hare's horn, e.g., is different from *sat,* but is taken to be not *anirvacanīya,* but completely imaginary. It cannot be said that it is what is different from the *asat* or the non-existent, because Brahman is different from the non-existent, yet He is not taken to be *anirvacanīya.* It cannot be said that it is what is fferent from both being and nonbeing, for a thing must either be or not be. It cannot be said that the *anirvacanīya* is what is not the locus of either existence or non-existence, for in that case Brahman, who is not the locus of any quality, must be taken to be *anirvcanīya.* It cannot be said that the *anirvacanīya* is what cannot be depicted, for whatever cannot be depicted must be simply non-existent; also Brahman, who, according to the Advaitins cannot be depicted, must be *anirvacvanīya.* It cannot be said that it is what is different from the existent, different from the nonexistent and different from both the existent and the non-existent, for as shown above, the existent and the non-existent being mutually opposed cannot be denied simultaneously. For the same reason, it cannot be said that the *anirvacanīya* is what is devoid of existence, devoid of non-existence, and devoid of both existence and non-existence.

"Also, what is meant by the terms 'existence' and 'non-existence' here? Firstly, it cannot be said that existence means

a class and non-existence the absence of that, for in that case Brahman who has no class becomes *anirvacanīya,* i.e. unreal, while the world which has a class becomes real. Secondly, it cannot be said that existence is what leads to successful practical reaction, while non-existence is what does not, for the very same reason, seeing that Brahman does not lead to any practical reaction, not being the basis of action at all, while the world does so. Thirdly, it cannot be said that existence is what is incapable of being negated, while non-existence is what is so capable, for according to the Advaitins, the *anirvacnīya* is capable of being negated, yet it is not the same as the non-existent. Fourthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is established by the sources of knowledge, while non-existence is what is not so established, for the *anirvacnīya* cannot be established by any source of knowledge, yet it is not non-existent. The pure Brahman too is not capable of being established by any source of knowledge, yet He is sat. Fifthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is outside all sources of knowledge, for then the existent can have no specific marks of its own, like the sky-flower. Sixthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is free from nothingness, i.e. what is not a non-entity, for then the *anirvacanīya*, which is not a mere non-entity, like the sky-flower, according to the Advaitins, must be existent. Seventhly, it cannot be said that existence is what is free from Brahmanhood, i.e. what is not Brahman, for then the world must be existent. Eighthly, it cannot be said that existence is what exists at all times and in all places, while non-existence is what does not. Now we accept this definition, but the Advaita theory itself contradicts it, for according to it the world, etc., which are capable of being depicted (i.e. are *nirvacanīya*) must be existent.

"Thus, as it is not clear what exactly is meant by the terms 'existence' and 'non-existence' here, it cannot be said that the *anirvacanīya* is what is devoid of existence and non-existence and different from both of these two.

"Further, does the *anirvacanīya* exist (i.e. *asti*) or not (i.e., *nāsti*), or is it altogether false (i.e., *asat*). It cannot be said to exist, for whatever exists must have some mark by which it can be distinguished from others and depicted, e.g. when we say 'the pot exists', the very existence of the pot means that it is something which is capable of being depicted by some mark or other. But the *anirvacanīya* cannot be depicted and hence cannot be distinguished from anything else and therefore cannot be known, as all knowledge implies assimilation and discrimination. But if the *anirvacanīya* cannot be known, it cannot be *denied* too, for just as knowledge (or affirmation) must be of a *definite* thing so denial too must be so. In fact, nothing at all can possibly be said of the *anirvacanīya*, as it is absolutely indefinite, indeterminable and indescribable. It can neither be affirmed nor denied.

"Thus, we conclude that no definition of the *anirvacanīya* is ever possible.

"It has also no *pramāṇa* or proof. It is not a content of direct perception, as alleged by the Advaitins, for when we mistake a shell for silver what we see for the time being is not any *anirvacanīya* silver but the *real* silver-elements in shell. Thus the *anirvacanīya* is outside the sphere of all *pramāṇas*."

15.2 PURUṢOTTAMAPRASĀDA VAIṢṆAVA, *Vedāntakārikāvalī*

Edited in Chowkhamba Saskrit Series 39, 1913.

16 VANAMĀLI MIŚRA (1700)

Surendranath Dasgupta ways he is "a native of Tryaga, a village within two miles of Brindavan (HIP 3, p. 440).

16.1 VANAMĀLI MIŚRA, *Vedāntasiddhāntasaṃgraha* or *Śrutisiddhāntasaṃgraha*, with autocommentary

The work is briefly summarized in HIP III, pp. 440-444. Our summary below was prepared specifically for this Volume. "E" references are to the publication by the Secretary, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares 1913. It is also edited by Bālācārya Khuperakara and published from Kolhapur in 1968.

Summarized by Ahi Bhusan Bhattacharya

CHAPTER ONE

(E1-6) At the outset the author seeks the protection of Lord Viṣṇu and invokes His grace for the safe completion of the treatise. The author enumerates, thereafter, the qualities that make a man deserving of the acquisition of the knowledge imparted here. One should be controlled in mind, devoted to Mādhava (Viṣṇu),[1] indifferent to mundane or spiritual pleasures, devoted to the spiritual preceptor, and inquisitive about the supreme truth. The preceptor also should likewise be endowed with the restraint of passion, be versed in the Vedas and able to remove the doubts entertained by his pupils. He should also be dedicated to the service of others, compassionate, competent and detached.

(E7-21) In reply to the inquiry posed by the pupil regarding happiness and misery, the teacher discourses that attachment to pleasures of the sense, craving for wealth, affection for the body, house and such objects engendered by the feeling of egoism are the sources of sorrow and miseries. Aversion to all pleasures of life, indifference to riches, absence

[1]Words like Hari, Mādhava, Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa etc. (used in this summary) refer to one and the same entity–the supreme Lord (also called supreme Spirit, supreme Master, etc.. Since all these words have been used by the author, they have been used in the summary also.

of the feeling of 'I' and "mine" in respect of temporal objects and non-attachment to the perishable body constitute the origin of happiness. In short, vice and virtue respectively are the causes of misery and happiness.

The execution of deed prohibited by the Vedas and non-observance of the duties enjoined by them or doing what is contrary to the prescribed rites is vice.

The opposite of this course of action pleases the Lord Hari and constitutes what is virtue. Catering to the pleasure of Lord Hari is the highest virtue while its abandonment is the bases of vices. The germ of both virtue and vice is the stimulating force of Lord Hari, the force which overwhelms beings and is separate in separate individuals. The error committed in supposing an object what is is really not leads to the course the worldly beings follow. All the sufferings of men are due to ignorance about the true nature of things.

The self-conceit created by ignorance is the root cause of the mundane sorrows of all beings. Those who are liberated while still living and are not even slightly affected by the spiritual ignorance are not susceptible to these worldly miseries.

(E22-46) All beings, good, bad or indifferent, have to experience the result of their actions and have to undergo a perpetual course of entering into wombs and taking birth again and again. Eternal ignorance, further augmented by aversion to Viṣṇu, engenders the feelings "I" and "mine" in respect of the body and belongings.

He who performs all actions without making them over to Viṣṇu, does of course go up to the higher regions and enjoy the results of his actions, but the pleasure enjoyed thereby is only nominal, whereas the miseries attendant on it are colossal in magnitude. After having experienced the apparent joys in the high regions, he has to enter in the form of semen grown out of the food consumed by a father into a womb. There he recalls the miseries of previous births, trembling at the thought of his past misdeeds. Helpless and feeble, he cannot serve the Lord

Govinda (Viṣṇu) though he constantly retains Him in memory. In this condition, he is ejected perforce out of the womb. Remaining unconscious for an hour, he regains his senses and recollects the deeds performed by him in various previous births. The stupid fellow, inherently wicked, still regaining the feeling of "I" and "mine" through the illusion cast upon him by Lord Hari, and destined to suffer the consequences of his own deeds, cries out.

(E47-63) He has thereafter to suffer from various ailments during childhood and miseries born of foolish pastimes and exertions and acquiring learning in his boyhood days. Again he has to suffer from the foibles of lust, infatuation, greed, fear and such others as also from afflictions generated by anger, malice and kinsmen in his youth, and in his old age from infirmity, tremor over the entire body, and from being forsaken by friends and relatives. He ekes out a dog-like living, but though choked in the throat by phlegm, he is nevertheless reluctant to shuffle off the mortal coil. At the end of the span of life granted to him, the frightful messengers of Yama, the God of Death, come there.. He is then tied down and brought to Lord Yama before whom he confesses his guilt out of fear. He is thereafter carried to the spot of his confinement and has to go through terrible torments ordained for him as a sequel to his past misdeeds. After his sufferings are over he is reborn as a tree, an insect, etc., in successive births, and ultimately as a human being of the lowest rank. If he observes the religious rites prescribed for the rank, he is elevated to the class of a *śūdra*, then a *vaiśya*, a *kṣatriya*, and ultimately to the status of a *brāhmaṇa* in successive births. From the status of a Brahmin again he is elevated to the rank of a sage and thereafter to that of a divine being. A deliberate sinner shall likewise have to descend successively to births in lower ranks and species.

CHAPTER TWO

(E1-22) In reply to the pupil's inquiry about the means

for the cessation of pain and for gaining happiness, the teacher announces that pain ceases at the removal of ignorance and perfect happiness may be won only by the grace of the Lord. The procedure necessary for winning the grace of the Lord is elaborated thus: By virtue of adhering to the belief that it is God himself who gets all deeds performed and that the action does not pertain to him (who is but an agent) a man residing in the Bhārata country gains purification of heart. When a man experiences suffering or gains a satiety of enjoyment in worldly pursuits, he refrains from following that course any more. This inhibition, termed *vairāgya*, is an excellent means to the attainment of bliss. Apathy to worldly objects and pleasing Hari by the performance of pious deeds are the two instruments for gaining renunciation and are the primary means for attaining liberation. This kind of disinterested feeling for mundane objects coupled with single devotion to Lord Hari can be gained by following the three means, viz., (1) harkening to discourse on the Lord, (2) pondering, and (3) meditation. When the heart is purified by pursuing the nine-fold path of devotion, hearing (*śrvaṇa*), etc., the Lord is pleased and revealing Himself to the devotee, frees him from worldly bondage. The unmanifest Lord becomes visibly perceptible to the devotee just as the subtle notes of music appear in perceivable forms before the practitioners of music. Fulsome ecstacy can be experienced through the grace of the Lord and the dissolution of spiritual ignorance. This condition is termed "liberation". The presence of the Lord can be be perceived through the practice of hearing, ponderng etc. according to one's own attainments.

(E24-40) Since the attributes of the Lord Hari are not known in their entirety even by Hari himself, they can only be partially comprehended by His devotees. It is not through the acquisition of knowledge or through studies that the Lord may be attained. He may only be attained by those whom He chooses at His will. Diverse forms of propitiation win divers forms of His grace. Having been fully content with the

communion with Hari through constant meditation, the liberated devotees assume appearance at will and sport with Him in fullest joy. Just as the rivers, seasons and lakes are said to be full though there is a great disparity in the quantity of water among them, similarly the Supreme Lord and worldly creatures are said to be enjoying full joy according to their respective measures, despite great disparities. The sports in which they indulge are due to the excess of joy and not for anything other than joy. Just as a pitcher full of water would not contain any more water, so there is no craving for any other joy for those whose minds are already full of joy.

(E41-60) Among those who follow the exercises mentioned earlier some are liberated while others exist in this world and some other in different ethereal regions in accordance with their attainments and abilities. The perception of the existence of the Lord Hari in one's own heart leads one to salvation. Those who proceed to the upper regions by the path called *acirādi* (beginning with flame) as described in *Bhagavadgītā* 8.24 achieve the highest station and never return to the earthly plane, but those who go by the path called *dhūmamārga* (the path of smoke) as described in *Bhagavadgītā* 8.25 have to return recurringly. They go to the region of Indra, then to Maha, Jana, Tapas and Satya succesively and become enlightened. Though the Lord is competent to grant liberation to his devotee through His grace, yet He may not grant one absolute liberation without circumscribing it by one's deeds. Those devotees who are emancipated by annihilating all ignorance and delusion do abide in their natural condition which is termed liberation. These liberated ones gain communion with the Lord in four ways according to the degree of their fitness and achievements. Some gain vicinity to the Lord, some others gain similarity of form with the Lord, a third category win residence in the same abode with the Lord, while the fourth class attain *sāyujya* (union, *saṃśleṣa*) with him. Constant union is not identity.

(E61-71) Even as the birds lying in trees or the animals residing in forests are but different entities, likewise the liberated beings merged in the Lord Hari have still their separate existences. Devotees having communion with Āditya (the sungod) may come out from Āditya and enter into the body of Aniruddha, the controller of egotism, therefrom into Pradyumna, the restrainer of mind, and released from Pradyumna they enter Saṅkarṣaṇa (all of these are but different forms of the self-same Lord Nārāyaṇa) and ultimately into Lord Vāsudeva. They sport in that conditoin like fish in water and just as the fish do not merge in water, similarly do they also maintain their separatre identity though in communion with God. Stimulated by ecstacy they sport at will and also come out of the body of Hari when they please. They are not created when creations takes place nor do they perish at the time of dissolution. Secure in the spacious womb of the Lord Hari, they sport, free from anxiety.

Those who have correctly known Viṣṇu, the eternal One, the author of creation as well as of dissolution, the Supreme Spirit, the unborn and unmanifest Lord, get purified by their devotion, by contentment on account of their acquisition of the highest knowledge and by their absence of desire.

(E72-95) Knowing Hari as placed in their hearts, these imperishable persons attain the supreme station and do never return. The characteristics of those who become liberated in this very world resemble those of the inhabitants of the *Śvetadvīpa* ("White Island") who are devoted to Nārāyaṇa, possessed of the vigor of the moon, and bereft of the sense-organs. They do not have any diet, and are exempt from discharges of the seminal fluid. They live in seclusion and are possessed of wisdom and devotion to the highest Lord, Nārāyaṇa, who delights them and also is delighted in their company. Among them, none is superior or inferior to any other, but all are of equal standard. They stand with folded hands in a merry mood, uttering words in obeisance in front of

the Lord. They propitiate the Lord Hari with perpetual joy, but not hankering after the fulfilment of any unfulfilled craving, as their joys are full to the brim. Since they are recipient of the highest bliss, they feel no misery. The joy experience by these liberated ones is distinct from the mundane pleasures enjoyed by human beings. They go beyond nature and get united with the primordial self, Nārāyaṇa, who is higher than nature and indifferent to pleasure and pain. Since they are shorn of ignorance, have no sense-organs and are free from desire, they are immune from all afflictions. Nor do they have any other afflictions born of malice or envy. They are possessed of all joy to the fullest extent. After having reached the Supreme Lord, the high-souled liberated ones do not have to be born again. Those who have to go through the consequences of their deeds are compelled to take rebirth. Having undergone the results of their past actions, they wear out their past deeds and are thereafter entitled to go back to the Lord.

Even at the complete annihilation of ignorance and the acquisition of divine birth, one may not attain the highest bliss, but has to go through the consequences of one's past actions and suffer a delay in the process. This is the state known as liberation while living. Supreme liberation comes into existence when one's past deeds are worn out by going through their consequences. The result of the accumulated as well as the presently perfomred deeds are all destroyed by the very perception of the Lord Hari and thereafter the devout is not further involved in any action. According to the view of the followers of the doctrine of *māyā* "being liberated in the state of living' (*jīvamukti*) is impossible.

(E96-105) The aspiration of mankind is to be happy, but not to get identified with happiness. Otherwise the destruction of the individual self according to the Buddhists, and the destruction of happiness according to the logicians [Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas], should have been the ultimate desire of mankind. In a state of seep slumber and also in that of profound trance

(*samādhi*), the ecstacy experienced is but partial, and not full as in the state of liberation.

According to the Jains liberation is attained by enjoying the results of some actions, and by uprooting some actions through knowledge, in accordance with the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī*. Thereafter the self soars higher and higher in the sky like a bird released from the cage.

This view is untenable inasmuch as merely soaring high up is not tantamount to liberation. Otherwise hawks and vultures also can claim to gain liberation. The changeable self imprisoned in the mortal frame cannot gain the state of freedom from joy or sorrow by merely shuffling off the mortal coil.

(E106-150) The theory propounded by the Buddhists is also untenable. It was designed to bewilder the foolish devils. There are four type of Buddhist theories. The first claims that the world is but an evolution of emptiness. The second avers that knowledge is the sole object that exists. The third is of the view that external objects exist but are not perceptible and can be known only through inference. The fourth thinks that external objects are existent and are also perceptible.

The first of these four views is that the state of emptiness, which is bereft of pleasure and pain, etc., is liberation. This is also the view of the followers of Vedānta who deem the world to be only an illusion. The emptiness which is defiled (*dūṣita*) by ignorance is termed *saṃsṛṣṭi* (the transitory world) by the adherents of the *śūnyavāda*. This theory cannot be entertained. Some again hold that emptiness is manifold, being separate in various beings. They also equate emptiness with Brahman, the Supreme Spirit. This is unacceptable. Having refuted the doctrine of *śūnya*, the author proceeds to prove that the *vijñāna* theory of the Buddhists, as well as the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika doctrines relating to the nature of liberation, are faulty.

Hereafter the author contends with the fallacious

doctrines of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems of philosophy. These systems maintain that the absence of pleasure and sorrow, knowledge, desire and effort are associated with the attainment of *mokṣa*. This doctrine is inadmissible as it is contrary to the teaching of the Vedas which declare that in a state of liberation the feeling of extreme joy and bliss still persists. Moreover if the ultimate result acheived is the destruction of mundane as well as spiritual pleasures, no one on earth would strive for the goal. Liberation is not constituted by the state of absolute emptiness; the general a spiration of beings is to gain pleasure combined with the absence of misery. That the liberated ones have no body means that they are bereft of their corporal identity. The view that the annihilation of the self is liberation is untenable since the self is said to possess destructible attributes.

(E151-164) The Supreme Spirit cannot be seen or touched. It is the knower of the entire cosmos and is imperceptible and incomprehensible. Efforts should be made, however, to comprehend Hari. It is for the acquisition of knowledge about Him that the study of the Vedas and other scriptures are presribed. There is no contradiction in the same self acting as the agent and the object. Every living being knows itself as its individual self and would not strive for gaining liberation if that involved the total destruction of one's own self. Mere absence of sorrow cannot be equated with liberation. Perpetual bliss is indeed the *sine qua non* of liberation as propounded in the scriptures. The liberated person gets released from all miseries, and, concentrating the mind on the attributeless (*nirguṇa*)Supreme Spirit, dwells in perpetual bliss. Indeed, there is no divinity similar to Viṣṇu, no bliss resembling *mokṣa*, no test superior to the Vedas, and no syllable as comprehensive as the sacred "*om*".

CHAPTER THREE

(E1-11) The self (*jīva*)is distinct from the gross or subtle

body wrongly comprehended in the concept of self. It is the experiencer of joys and sorrows. It experiences the delights of mundane existence in different states of its life, as a human or non-human being in all its births. On its birth as an infant, it strives to suck the mother's breas, even as the animals do. This action on its part is due to a process of inference which is dependent on the memory of the experiences of a previous birth.

Just as the self-same single thread is woven through any gems (to make a garland), similarly does the same self permeate through the various individual bodies and appear to be different in different individuals. In a state of slumber or swoon the vital process remains active though consciousness (*caitanya*) is absent. The phenomenon proves that the vital principle is distinct from the individual self. The sense-organs are only instruments of perception but it is the self which really perceives even without the assistance of the sense-organs. It is evident that the self and the sense-organs are distinctly different entities. The sense-organs are instruments and not the performers of actions.

(E12-33) *Avyakta*, the unmanifest *prakṛti*, is subtler than the principle of intellect while *amṛtā* (i.e., the self) is subtler than *avyakta*. There is nothing else which is higher than the self. The notions of "I" and "mine" should be related to the self and not to the gross body. Similarly, the feeling that one is of fair complexion, is lean or is a Brahmin by caste should be related to one's self and not to one's body . It is the self which is the real performer of all deeds, and is the experiencer of the results thereof. The self is not absolutely independent in its actions. Had it been independent, all its endeavors would have been crowned with success. But this universal triumph of the individual self is not noticeable anywhere in the world.

Therefore a man should never consider himself to be the independent, actual doer of any deed. If he exerts himself towards the performance of any action free from mundane

attachment, dedicating the action to Hari, the Supreme Lord, he will not be involved in any sin. The individual self is not solely the performer of any action, but it becomes to be the performer jointly with five others, namely the corporeal body, the individual being, the different instruments of action, the various activities of the vital organs, and providence (*daiva*). All actions of man emanate from the joint activities of these five agencies.

(E34-47) The individual self is different in different individual bodies according to the distinctive and peculiar experiences they have to undergo severally.

Acquisition of knowledge stored in the past is conducive to the attainment of liberation. By acquiring the highest knowledge the seers (*ṛṣi*) as well as ordinary persons get freed from the three innate qualities (of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*) and gain similarity with God, the primordial self.

The magnitude of the ever-cheerful self is as small and minute as an atom. Though small and stationed in one spot, its qualities spread over the whole body . As the light of lamp set up in a corner of a room extends over the whole room or as the coolness of a drop of sandal-paste on an extremity of the body pervades over the entire body, so do the properties of the self permeate themselves in an extensive manner. The self is imperceptibly linked with the destiny of the sentient being just as the sprout is indivisibly related to the tree grown out of it in the distant future. Every sentient being shall have to go through the results consequent on the deeds executed by him. The atomic self lends the ability to the mighty *yogins* to control the rush of adverse experience by the inhibition of ignorance. This potency in the *yogins*, though always enveloped by ignorance, is contained only by the grace bestowed by the Lord Viṣṇu upon them.

(E48-56) The miseries and joys experienced by the mind which resides in the body are supposed wrongly to be experienced by the self. This feeling is caused by ignorance. In the particular discipline of metaphysics followed by the author,

the self is not the seat or place where miseries etc. are felt. The self is the experiencer of what crops up, just as a landlord enjoys the benefits of the crops which are yielded by his land. Having been endowed with the corporeal body, vital airs and sense-organs, one enjoys the object of these organs as well as suffering the consequences of one's actions when awake. In the state of dream, the self perceives certain unreal objects as also some real ones. This perception is of a valid nature. In the state of slumber the self becomes inactive and enjoys transcendental pleasure in communion with the undecaying Lord. The joy is then so intense that neither any internal nor any external experience would be able to make any impression on it. In a state of swoon, however, when any association with the Lord Hari is absent, the experience of happiness is entirely ruled out. In the state of concentration called *samprajñāta* when the mind and other senses remain intact the self fully experiences the traces. In the concentration called *asamprajñāta*, when there is a complete annulment of the mind and the senses, perception dawns upon the devotee by the grace of Hari, and the mind is inhibited by dint of yogic exercise, the *yogin* sees himself by his own self. He then gets gratified at heart. Intense and infinite pleasure is beyond the cognizance of the senses and attainable only by the intellect. Men do crave for pleasure; they do not merely crave for exemption from sorrow or pain. No other gain is superior to the acquisition of this profound joy. In mundane existence the gross body and the sense-organs are the instruments for the enjoyment of pleasures, but at the final dissolution of the universe beings are bereft of any joy or pleasure.

CHAPTER FOUR

(E1-21) The Lord creates the existing world by way of sport; He is competent to accomplish anything only through his will. The paramount Lord did stir up *prakṛti* as well as *puruṣa* by entering into them at the time of creation. The duration of

a day of Viṣṇu covers a period of two *parārdhas* and another two *parārdhas* comprise a night of His. Though the time of his primordial Self may not be measured by days and nights, yet it is reckoned as such. It is He who produced Brahmā, the creator of the universe. Assuming the form of Brahmā and resorting to the quality of *rajas* (passion), the eternal Lord Nārāyaṇa improvises the creation, preservation and dissolution of the world. Thereafter, the Lord adopts the *sāttvika* (virtuous) quality in the form of Viṣṇu and nurtures creation. Then He takes up the *tāmasa* (malignant) attitude in the form of Rudra and annhilates the created universe at the time of final destruction.

Intellect, mind, air, fire, water, space, the earth and the fourfold beings are all located in Kṛṣṇa, who is the originator as well as the destroyer of all the four kinds of living beings. He is invisible to the common eye; He cannot be touched or smelt by the ordinary sense-organs. He is not involved either with the quality of *sattva* or with *rajas* or *tamas*, and is all-pervading, the witness and the self of the universe.

(27-41) The Lord is actionless and is perceptible only through knowledge. The sages achieve liberation by winning access to Him. He is known as Vāsudeva, the universal and eternal primordial Self. He is the veritable mind of all beings and it is His offspring Pradyumna who is the doer, the deed and the cause of all actions. He is Aniruddha, the almighty one, manifest in all activities. He is the Lord Vāsudeva, the supreme Self, devoid of all properties. He being the cause of all is also to be known as Saṅkarṣaṇa; from Saṅkarṣaṇa is produced Pradyumna the mind-born deity whose offering is Aniruddha. From the wrathful forehead of Viṣṇu sprang the terrible Lord Rudra, while Brahmā who was earlier created by the Lord (Viṣṇu) propitiated the latter through the performance of a sacrifice. By the fourth form of the paramount Lord, known as Saṅkarṣaṇa, was created the rest of the undecaying objects. Saṅkarṣaṇa created Pradyumna who again gave birth to

Aniruddha. From Aniruddha's navel came out Brahmā as a grace granted by the great Lord. These two divinities, Brahmā and Rudra, were thus born of the grace and wrath respectively of Nārāyaṇa.

(E44-66) Man is invested with one of the three natural propensities at the time of birth, namely virtuousness (*sattva*), passionateness (*rajas*)and glominess (*tamas*).One who has acquired a true conception of the Lord Nārāyaṇa is really virtuous. Kṛṣṇa cannot be perceived even by Brahmā or any other divinity or anyone else whether possessed of or devoid of qualities, except through the eyes of wisdom. The wise ones cherish the ambition of becoming similar to that paramount overlord. The consequences of action do not stick to Him. He is spoken of and eulogized in the four Vedas and other scriptures. In the Vedas, etc., The great Lord Hari is everywhere eulogized. He pays homage to Rudra who is the embodiment of His own self, by way of educating the people to emulate His example. Since the Lord Nārāyaṇa himself has enjoined upon all to propitiate the Lord Rudra, He therefore made it a point to worship the latter so that the world should follow the example set by Him.

(E67-81) By virtue of propitiating Viṣṇu through the muttering of the thousand names of the glorious god (Viṣṇu), the Master of the universet, a man is raised from strength to strength. The scriptures, arts and sciences owe their origin to Him. All knowledge, traditional laws and the Vedic truths emanate from Him. One who can conceive Him as the experiencer of the results of sacrifices and penance, as the paramount master of all the regions and the sole benefactor of all beings, does indeed gain the highest peace and absolute tranquility of mind. Scripture like the Vedas and Āraṇyakas, the systems of philosophy like Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata, are all different branches of knowldge. There is, however, another system of scriptures, known as Pāñcarātra, which is distinct from the afore-mentioned sources of knowledge. This branch is

distinctly superior to the other ones inasmuch as its propounder is Nārāyaṇa Himself. Those who have acquired a profound knowledge of the Pāñcarātra discipline and observe its tenets in due order with single devotion, do enter into the body of Vāsudeva. This great Upaniṣad (viz. the Pāñcarātra) embodies the quintessence of the Vedas and the philosophical systems of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta do actually echo the teaching of the Pañcarātra philosophy. Even Manu himself, the pre-eminent lawmaker, formulated his laws on the basis of this Pāñcarātra's injunctions which are based on the four Vedas.

(E82-94) At the commencement of each creation Viṣṇu creates Brahmā as well as Śiva. But there is no reference to the birth of Viṣṇu anywhere in the context of creation in any of the *Purāṇas* or the *Mahābhārata*. The superiority of the Pāñcarātra doctrine is universally admitted on account of its being formulated by Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself, and for speaking also about His glory. It is with the object of educating the masses that the Lord Viṣṇu initiates the worship of Rudra and others who are but His own creation, just as He incarnates Himself and performs deeds in order to educate the people.

The origin of objects other than Hari is of three kinds. The inanimate objects like the intellect gain existence in their own form; beings in bondage gain bodily existence, and words gain life through an orderly placing (of letters). The origin of all of these is dependent on other external factors. But the liberated ones gain their form only through the will of the Lord. The origin of all material objects is due to external forces, and their destruction also happens at the will of the undecaying Lord. But the liberated sages, to whom fullest ecstacy has dawned, know no destruction and can at their will abjure their sporting activities at anytime and enter into the womb of the Lord Bhagavat.

CHAPTER FIVE

(E1-10) Though substantially identical, the individual

self and the supreme Spirit have apparently distinct characteristics. The individual self is different from both the gross and the subtle body and is the experiences of joy and miseries. The individual self feels itself to be the self-same entity in spite of corporal change.

At the time of creation the Supreme Lord Hari enters into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and stirs both. Thereafter the Lord creates the [Sāṃkhya] categories beginning with the intellect and controls many others by entering into them in various forms. Having entered into the various principles, He brings them together and produces the cosmos, right from the Lord Brahmā to even a blade of grass, as well as all living beings. Though fundamentally He is one and indivisible, He appears to lend Himself to all and is manifested in a plurality of forms. Though fundamentally single and the sole supreme One, the Lord wished to multiply for the accomplishment of His purposes. He made Himself manifest through various incarnations. *Prakṛti* is under His control.

(E11-41) The Supreme Spirit is not only the material cause of creation but also the instrumental cause. The multitude of living beings exist in the world upon the states as ordained by the Lord and thereafter undergo destruction during the day and night of the Lord corresponding respectively to the creation and destruction of the world. The Lord incarnates Himself as perceptible living beings when occasion demands it. He does not evolve Himself through the intellect as assumed in the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy. It is wrong to think that the Lord is inexpressible by words, since the Vedas declare that Brahman is *vācya* and since in *Brahmasūtras* 1.15 (*ikṣaternāśabdam*) the inexpressibility of Brahman has been refuted.

The Lord is to be understood as one full of food, replete with vital energy, full of spirit, as well as possessed of knowledge. All these four features are synthesized in the word "Brahman". In addition, He is also full of joy. In reality the word

"Hari" is of comprehensive meaning, and embraces all substances, objects, persons and principles.

(E42-60) There are five sheaths of the self. The first is composed of the material body fed by food, the second is composed of the five vital airs, the third is formed of the mind, the fourth embodies knowledge, and the fifth is full of the quintessence of joy. Lord Hari also combines in Himself all the five. Aniruddha, Pradyumna Saṅkarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva and Nārāyaṇa apear to be separate entities but are really the self-same Lord whose properties are inconceivable. Different appellations are given to different divinities, but all these names actually denote the Lord Viṣṇu. Scholars delving deep into the Vedic scriptures deem the Lord as the Supreme Spirit pervading all. Hari is, therefore, to be comprehended as an entity separate from all beings, yet abiding in all, the undivided self dwelling in the hearts of all beings. The Lord Viṣnu is to be meditated on as dwelling in the sun and other natural phenomena and controlling them, though He has no organs. The fact that the Vedas consider Viṣṇu as possessed of the greatest significance proves the they contain the highest knowledge. He is the eternal and infinite one into whom the entire world enters and resides, like gems woven into a string. All the elements inclusive of intellect, mind, air, fire and water as also the four classes of beings (viz., viviparous, sweat-born, oviparous and plant-born), owe their existence to the Lord Kṛṣṇa.

(E61-98) The various names ascribed to different divinities do but signify the self-same Viṣṇu. He abides in the inner hearts of all beings. Though He controls Rudra and the other deities, He is nevertheless connoted by the word "Rudra" and such others which have ben endowed with traditional meanings. Just as the victory achieved by soldiers is ascribed to the king, so do words carry an implied meaning through the direct ones.

The scriptural saying that the entire perceptible world is Brahman means that the latter pervades the world in its

entirety, and not that it is as gross as the mundane world. The identity between the individual self and the primordial one spoken of (by the Vedānta school of thought) is of the nature of the subservience of the individual self or the Supreme Lord or of His being the support of the former, and not of an actual and integral identity. He, however, chooses to take the assistance of beings by way of sport to get His will done. In the matter of creating beings, however, He takes into account the deeds performed by the beings in their previous lives. He creates the beings without having any need or purpose beyond the creation. Or it may be due to His kindness that He created beings in order to bestow on them worldly enjoyments and ultimate deliverance. He is of inconceivable abilities and is possessed of supreme faculties. Though He assumes different forms and incarnations, He is the self-same entity. Though the demons do always malign Him and perpetuate diabolical designs against Him, He nevertheless looks upon them with perfect equanimity.

(E99-147) Brahmā, Rudra and others also are not the Supreme Lord, since in the final dissolution they merge in Lord Nārāyaṇa and lose their separate existence. Though endowed with no particular form or figure, the Lord Hari performs all deeds or enters into any place, and is possessed of an eternal body not produced by prakṛti. He manifested Himself in His vast all-pervading shape to Arjuna and others. He, the Lord Kṛṣṇa, is frequently referred to in the Vedas by the appellation "Brahman". He is bereft of all qualities, and is the bestower of weal to all. In the Pāñcarātra text which deals with the five categories of knowledge, Kṛṣṇa is eulogized as the *summum bonum* and his region, Vaikuṇṭha, as the loftiest region and most venerable place. He needs nothing and craves for nothing, but is kindly disposed to all beings.

People versed in the Vedas know Him as Viṣṇu, the eternal one, the originator, preserver and destroyer of the universe, the unborn and unmanifest Lord. Those devotees who

succeed in conceiving the Lord Hari as dwelling in their own selves attain the highest position of communion with the Lord, and have never to return. It is Kṛṣṇa, the sole and most excellent Lord, who created the four *varṇas*--Brahmin, etc.--from different parts of His body. He created Brahmā, the superintendent of all beings, possessed of unlimited splendor and proficient in the Vedas. He also created Rudra, the head of the goblins and other creatures.

(E148-174) It is propounded in the Vedas that a sudden excess of joy was aroused in the mind of the Supreme Lord and He created the world. The Vedic texts which assert the agency and omniscience of the Lord would prove to be invalid if the world were unreal. The Vedas are admitted as infallible statements. The Vedas cannot be interpreted to mean that the agency and omniscience of the Lord are unreal (*mṛṣā*), for such an interpretation if far-fetched. The first Chapter of the *Brahmasūtras* showing coherence of the Vedic statements would be futile if *nirguṇa* Brahman is accepted as the sole purport of the Vedas. In the Vedic statement "Brahman is endowed with qualities", the qualities are of a kind which is not produced by *prakṛti*. Similarly in the Vedic statement "Brahman is devoid of qualities", the qualities are the sorts that are produced by *prakṛti*.

The acquisition of knowledge about Hari leads one to liberation. He is the supreme Self, the eternal Lord, free from all blemishes, Nārāyaṇa residing in the hearts of all. The epithet "*nirguṇa*" simply shows that the Lord does not possess all qualities but some particular qualities only.

CHAPTER SIX

(E1-9) The rich and gorgeous dwellings, furniture, decorations, etc., of various deities are perishable and similar to hells in contrast with those of Hari, the supreme Lord. The region of Hari is eternal and imperishable, free from pain, miseries and grief. It is not vulnerable to the onslaught of time.

On reaching there, the individual self does not regret at all. The selves who reach the regions of other divinities have to return, whereas those who attain that of Hari do never return to worldly existence.

(E10-52) The mundane riches and pleasures are transient and the wise should never hanker after these but should abjure them and crave for the realization of the supreme Spirit with a dedicated mind. The Lord should be sought inside one's own self by exterminating the wrong and foolish notions of the mind. Mādhava, the paramount Lord, gets pleased when worshiped as the supreme Master. The silly atheist who projects himself as the supreme Being also deserves condemnation. Those who aspire to the final beatitude should meditate on the inconceivable Hari, being rightly equipped with proper knowledge and joy. The individual being who deems himself as an entity separate from Hari, the Director, earns the grace of the Lord and wins immortality thereby. When the individual being witnesses that the liberated sages themselves adore the Highest Lord with deep devotion, he will also imbibe the feeling of veneration for Him. When he perceives the radiant Master, he shakes off his virtues and views and gains similarity with the Lord Hari, the veritable supreme Master of beings, the sustainer of the universe. He is spoken of as the sole arbiter, free from the three qualities and vulgar properties. Scholars should aspire to realize Him. The infallible and infinite knowledge lyinig hidden in a deep cavern (*guhā*, intellect) may be acquired by the liberated none in company with the supreme Being Brahmā (the creator) with whom the former also gets all desires fulfilled. The individual being is the receiver whereas the paramount Lord is the object of realization. In this way are the two distinguishable.

The Lord pervades all. It is Viṣṇu, the bestower of deliverance from mortal existence; He is the sole object of contemplation. The individual being feels himself clearly as a different entity from the supreme Lord. If the two were

identical, no being would execute any harmful deed against its own self. The Vedic view that the Lord is eternally faultless would be invalid if it is held that there is no difference between Him and the ignorant individual selves. Moreover an ignorant individual self will to to hell if he, by following the doctrtine of non-difference, considers the Lord as possessing faults on account of his (the individual self's) possessing faults.

(E53-72) It has been stated in the Vedas that the supreme Master and the individual being are like two separate birds sitting on the same tree, one eating the fruits while the other, which has tasted all enjoyment to satiety, refrains from any further enjoyment, yet remains calm and resplendent. When liberated, the self of an individual being issues out of the gross and subtle body, attains the supreme Lord Hari, and enjoys the highest bliss in its own form as distinct from that of the supreme Master.

The theory advocated by the Buddhists, that the self is annihilated in the state of liberation, is not acceptable. The adherents of the Vedic doctrine do not admit that liberation is of two types, remote (*apara*) and proximate (*para*). It is a futile exercise to insist on the identity of the individual self with the paramount Master. The doctrine of emptiness propounded by the Buddhists is wholly untenable. It holds that emptiness is incomprehensible just as the Vedāntins who believe in the doctrine of *māyā* and hold that Brahman is incomprehensible. The only difference between the two schools is that the Buddhists are atheists whereas the adherent of the *māyā* doctrine are believers in the scriptural sayings. The Buddhists hold that the *śūnya*, enveloped by ignorance, is a sentient being and like a sentient being it has an individual as well as plural nature. The same doctrine is adumbrated by the Vedāntins, the *māyāvādins*. While the Buddhists are heretics the *māyā* school of philosophy acknowledges the authority of the scriptures. The *śunya* theory as well as the *māyā* theory are heterodox doctrines repudiated by scholars. Emptiness cannot be proved

either by direct perception or by inference.

(E73-78) The Sāṃkhya theory also is untenable since *prakṛti*, the source of the material world, is actually inactive, and therefore a sentient being has to be recognized as the performer in respect of the creation of the universe. The individual being is not fully independent in performing actions; it is the supreme Master who gets all deeds performed through the agency of the individual beings. The creation, preservation as well as annihilation of the world are all designed and executed by the Lord, who is exempt from pain and the consequences of all deeds. Though He is the performer of all actions He is not even slightly involved by them.

(E79-85) It is He who, of his own accord, entered into *prakṛti* as well as into *puruṣa* and stimulated them both at the time of creation. The atoms and molecules are not therefore the instrumental cause of the creation of the universe, as is propounded by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought. Nor are the Śaiva or Śākta doctrines tenable. Vāsudeva the almighty One is the highest power and none else is to be adored as such. The theory of the Cārvāka philosophy similarly does not stand to reason. The adherents of this system believe that perception through the senses only is the proof of the existence of any object. If that is so, how could the existence of fire be proved except by inference from the existence of smoke?

(E86-100) The Jaina theory that the self is of the same dimension as the body also lacks reason, since the self residing in an elephant would not be accommodated in the body of an ant (in the next birth, for example). If however it is argued that the self would expand and contract according to the size of the bodies, the presence of the body even in the state of liberation would be implied. The author refutes the Jaina doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī* saying that seven opposite assertions cannot be applied to one and the same entity at the same time.

The individual selves, though different in themselves, go back to the primordial Self and attain similarity with Him and

merge in It. The connotation of the term "Brahman" is greatness (*bṛhattva*), and there are practically two Brahmans, one in individual beings and the other in the supreme Spirit. When the individual self merges in the supreme Self, the size of the latter does not increase, even as the waters of the ocean do not increase with the addition of the water carried by rivers into it.

(E101-128) It is cumbrous to assume implied meaning in both the words "*tat*" and "*tvam*" in the dictum "*tat tvam asi*" in order to show identity between them. There is parsimony in taking "*tat*" in various case-endings, i.e., thus meaning "by, from, of, in Him (thou art)". It is to be noted further that "*tat*" in "*tat tvam asi*" relates to "*aitadātmyam*" (a neuter word). Thus the dictum would mean "you are related to this self, i.e., the Lord". This relation is of various kinds, namely the relation of master-servant and the like. The passage "*sa ātmā tattvam asi*" may also be analyzed as "*sa ātmā atattvam asi*" (the word "*atat*" meaning "similar to that", i.e., the *jīva* is similar to the Lord as both possess *jñāna, ānanda,* etc..

The individual self and the Lord cannot be identical since identical entities cannot be said to attain each other. The individual self which is said to attain the supreme Self in the state of dreamless sleep is an entity quite distinct from the latter. The individual selves do not feel, wrapped up in ignorance as they be, that the Lord Viṣṇu resides in them. The supreme Lord Hari is independent while living beings are subservient to Him. In every living creature does the Lord exist but imperceptibly. The individual self merged in the supreme Lord cannot be distinguished as such, but its existence can be inferred.

(E129-153) The nature and properties of the Lord are not comprehensible by living beings enveloped in ignorance. It is only through the instruction of the proper teacher that the knowledge can be revealed to them. He who thinks himself to be the supreme Lord is in reality a knave who usurps the glory of the Lord and therefore deserves punishment. He who adores

any deity other than Nārāyaṇa is indeed a deluded person. The individual being, when liberated, gains similarity to the supreme Spirit, but not complete merger. The individual selves of beings bear a likeness to the supreme Lord, but not sameness.

(E154-180) The incarnations of the Lord assumed for the chastisement of evil forces are not really different from Him. If by the grace of the Lord the wrong notion that the individual self and the supreme Spirit are absolutely separate entities is removed, none would consider the two as really separate. The individual self is not merely similar to the supreme Self, but also a part of it, a reflection which is similar yet separate. The analogy of the reflection of the sky falling on water is wrong, since it is not the sky but the stars and constellations whose reflection is found in the water. Ignorance is the root cause of all misconceptions about the relation of the individual selves with the primordial One. It cannot be said that the difference between the Lord and the selves is illusory (*māyika*) for the Lord cannot be regarded as creating illusions like a juggler. That the world is unreal and destitute of any Master is a pervese and untenable tenet conceived by the Buddhists to lead people astray.

(E186-219) The Buddhists say that the state of *śūnya* is the state of liberation. In like manner do the Vedāntins, the adherents of the theory of *māyā*, advocate that the attainment of Brahman is really the attainment of liberation. Both these two views are erroneous and imaginary. According to both the systems, the experience of joy is absent in the state of liberation. The universe is presided over by *śūnya* according to the Buddhists, by Brahman according to the adherents of the doctrine of *māyā*. Both these theories are based on unreality and are but figments of ingenious imagination. Both hold that in the state of liberation the experience of joy is absent. But it is not so.

The world is real, true, just as Brahman is real, true.

The creator is real and the entire community of beings is real. Before creation, however, originally Brahman, the supreme Spirit, was the sole entity. When the animate beings gain liberation, they give up their external sports and enter into the womb of Hari, the primordial Self, merge into Him and indulge in sports therein. The vast body of the Supreme Lord does not suffer from any diminution of His size to the extent that the parts of His being reside separately inside different individual beings.

(E220-247) The statement that Brahman, the supreme Spirit, is a single entity without a second, connotes that no second entity in the form of an assistant is required by Brahman, and not that there is absolute absence of a second entity. Pure monism, therefore, is not an acceptable doctrine. The visible world does truly exist, and is not an illusion.

Since the omniscient Lord does not see or consider His incarnations as separate entities, there is no duality. But there actually exists a distinction between the omniscient almighty primordial Self and the ignorant and weak individual being. Hence, perfect and unqualified monism cannot be accepted as valid. The true universe is characterized by life; the supreme Master is superior to it. The word "truth" connotes Hari who controls beings in their bondage and liberation. When Hari is synonymous with truth, the universe created by Him cannot be untrue or illusory.

CHAPTER SEVEN

(E1-13) The beginning and end of the beings really related to the self. The attachment ascribed of beings to their kith and kin is the attachment of the individual self and not of the worldly bodies to their relations. Just as the bell and its sound are inseparably concomitant, yet maintain separate identity, similarly are the worldly being and the supreme Lord inseparably related, yet have separate identity. The Lord distributes Himself among each and every worldly being. The

entire material world, all living beings and deities, have issued out of the body of the Lord just as the cobwebs issue out of the spider's body.

(E14-30) It is sheer folly to think of the body as identical with the self and to consider one's bodily charactetistics as pertaining to the self. Both the individual being and the supreme Spirit cannot have the same absolute power. The individual being is but a creation of almighty God and naturally cannot have the same properties as the creator possesses. The contention that the distinction sought to be established between the individual being and the Lord is born of perceptual illusion is also untenable. That the individual being has no absolute power is a clearly perceptible fact. Nor does a liberated being acquire the power of creating the world.

The self does not slumber concurrently with the body which sleeps and remains bereft of cognition for the duration of sleep. The supreme Self is verily the almighty One, the performer of all actions. If the living being be an independent doer of deeds even in a state of slumber and dream, how can it conjure up fierce and harmful creatures or the severance of his own head?

If the living being possesses absolute power in his dream, it would surely conjure up pleasurable objects even in dream. If it be contended that the dreams are conjured up without any doer or performer, the proposition is unacceptable, since no object can be produced without any cause. The illusion of silver created by a conch-shell is not a reality, and as such the silver is not really produced, while all objects need a material cause and an agent for their production. Nor are all dreams unavailing since some incantations delivered in dream prove efficacious.

(E31-42) Just as an insect gets transformed into a bee by constantly thinking about the latter, similarly is one converted and entirely merged into the supreme Spirit by constantly meditating upon the latter. Likewise did many deities, sages

and human beings get transformed into Brahman by constantly contemplating on the latter. The sage Vāmadeva declared that he had, in like manner, been transferred into the Sun-God and into Manu. The words "Sun-God", "Manu" here connote the same Almighty overlord of all beings.

Thus, he who feels himself as Brahman itself against the highest bliss. The divinities do not debar his way towards attaining the highest weal since he does not crave for gain in the position of a deity. He has won the fullest bliss and the gods consider him as belonging to their own class. The deeds executed by a man devoid of the knowledge about Brahman with a view of fulfilling his desires produce transitory results while those done by one versed in the knowledge of Brahman with no desire produce imperishable result.

(E43-65) The primordial Self is the source of knowledge as also of pleasure of the living beings even in their dreams. He is unattached to and unaffected by any object. He is the absolute Power and needs to be known and thought by the liberated ones. He is Viṣṇu, replete with the fullest attributes, and perpetually full of joy. Having perceived or heard of Him, the desire to see or hear any other one fades away. He abides everywhere and is the self of all selves. The entire cosmos is enveloped by Him. That the supreme Lord and the individual being are two distinctly separate entities is clearly borne out by the fact that the two are related as container and contained. The Lord abides in all beings and all beings reside in Him. By the acquisition of the true conception of the supreme Spirit, one gains freedom from ignorance and grief, wins ecstatic joy and ultimately attains union with the supreme Lord. He who can thoroughly comprehend the true nature of Brahman gets all his desirers fulfilled. Knowledge about that supreme Master, who is connoted by various appellations, graciously grants the devotees all the objects of human pursuit. It is by His grace only that He may be attained. The duality of the Lord is clearly established by the different forms He assumes and also by His

being the experiencer of the articles offered by His devotees, the individual beings.

(E60-77) Worldly beings have to experience the consequences of their actions. The liberated ones have not to do so. Through the acquisition of knowledge one can attain the highest station of the Lord Viṣṇu. He, the unmanifest Lord, beyond the range of *prakṛti*, lies hidden in the hearts of all beings. Just as fire and water lie inside the corporal bodies of living beings and yet have separate existence out of these bodies, similarly does the supreme Lord, on account of His overlordship and all-pervasiveness, abide inside living beings as also outside. He is possessed of inconceivable and immeasurable potency. He who considers the Lord as confined to a certain measure does not really comprehend HIm, whereas he who knows Him as beyond all confines does indeed know Him perfectly.

17. ANANTARĀMA (1700?)

Roma Bose (VPSVK Vol. 3, p. 178): "Anantarāma was one of the later followers of Nimbārka. He was the son of Nārāyaṇaprasāda, a Gauḍa Brāhmaṇa and was born in the village of Jagādharī in the Punjab in the 17th century.A.D. He was a disciple of Dharmadāsa. According to this view he must have been a brother of Puruṣottamaparasāda Vaiṣṇava II."

"He composed a number of treatises, developing the Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka and subjecting the Advaita view to a thorough criticism.

17.1 .ANANTARĀMA, *Tattvasiddhāntabindu*

Edited by Chabilal Gosvami, Vrndavana 1913. It has 25 verses, according to Bose (ibid., p. 179).

17.2 ANANTARĀMA, *Vedāntaratnamāḷā*

Edited by Ramaprasada Sarma, Vrndavana 1916. Bose,

ibid. says it is "a fairly elaborate treatise in verse, dealing with the three categories and their relation.

17.3 ANANTARĀMA, *Vedāntatattvabodha* on Nimbārka's *Daśāślokī*

Edited by Ratnal Gopala Bhatta in Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 23, 1908.

17.4 ANANTARĀMA, *Śrutisiddhāntaratnamālā*

"Mentioned in the Preface to *Vedāntaratnamālā*", says Bose, ibid. p. 179.

17.5 ANANTARĀMA, *Vedāntasārapadyamālā*

"Twenty-five verses", says Bose, ibid., p. 179. It seems to have been edited; cf. IO Ptd. Books 1938, p. 114.

18 HARIVYĀSA DEVA (1755)

Ms. Bose (VPSVK 3, pp. 133, identifies him as "the immediate disciple of Śrībhaṭṭa and thirty-first after Nimbārka. Nothing is known about his life or date...He wrote a commentary, styled *Premabhaktivivardhinī* on Sadānanda-bhaṭṭa's *Śrīnimbārkaśatanāmastotram...*" She also mentions some other works.

18.1 HARIVYĀSA DEVA or MUNI, *Siddhāntakusumāñjali* on Nimbārka's *Daśaślokī*

Edited by Vāsudeva Śarman, Bombay 1925

18.2 HARIVYĀSA DEVA, *Arthapañcaka*

Ms. Bose (VPSVK 3, p. 133) cites Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency (Bhandarkar) p. 76, and Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency (Kathavate), p. 29, where the name given is *Tattvārthapañcaka.*"

19 PURUṢOTTAMAPRASĀDA VAIṢṆAVA II (1785)

"Nothing unfortunately is known of his life and date . His work supplies evidence of his great scholarship." (VPSVK, Volume 3, p. 140)

"Reputed to be Svabhūdevācārya, the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva, and thirty-second after Nimbārka. This seems to be supported by one of the opening verses of his work, where he says that he is making a collection of all scriptural truths in that work by means of the knowledge which he has gained through the grace of Harivyāsadeva. This suggests that he was the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva and directly instructed by him."

19.1 PURUṢOTTAMAPRASĀDA VAIṢṆAVA II, *Śrutyantakalpavalī* on Nimbārka's *Saviśeṣanirviśeṣaśrīkṛṣṇastavarāja*

This work has been edited at least twice, once by Ratna Gopala Bhatta (Benares Sanskrit Series 32, 1908) and again by Gopala Sastri Nene in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 65, 1927, pages of which are referred to below as "E".. The summary below we find in VPSVK, Volume Three, pp. 141-173, pages of which referred to as "S". As Ms. Bose notes (p. 141), the author "often refers us back to Puruṣottama, Devācārya and Sundarabhaṭṭa." In what follows, we distinguish Puruṣottama, the author of the *Daśaślokī-Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā,* from Puruṣottamaprasada, the author now being reviewed.

Ms. Bose indicates that this later Puruṣottamaprasāda agrees in sizable measure with the earlier Puruṣottama.

The headings for sections of this summary are provided by Ms. Bose. Since we have omitted those sections where it is indicated that "this Puruṣottama follows [the other] Puruṣottama exactly", there are some gaps in the headings.

Summarized by Roma Chaudhuri Bose

(a) Brahman

(S141) "The Highest Reality–Brahman, Kṛṣṇa and Hari–is an abode of all auspicious qualities and free from all inauspicious and material ones (E13-14). The attributes and powers of the Lord are natural–parts and parcels of His very nature, and their denial, therefore, amounts to a denial of the very nature of the Lord. Qualities and powers may be of two kinds, natural and adventitious, e.g., the natural qualities of fire and water are heat and cold respectively, while their adventitious qualities are smoke and foam respectively. Now, we can say that fire is without smoke, or that water is without foam, but we can never say that fire is not hot, or water is not cold. The same is the case here (E15).

"As for the rest of the characteristics of the Lord, Puruṣottama[prasāda] follows others exactly. He points out, exactly like Puruṣottama and others, that the Lord embodies Himself as various incarnations, yet Himself remains full. (E4). The birth, work, quality, form and youth of the Lord are non-earthly. His birth means His voluntary appearance on earth as the various incarnations throughout the various ages, viz., as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Nṛsiṃha, etc.. His works consist in His creation, maintenance and destruction of the Universe, the protection of the good and the annihilation of the bad–the killing of Rāvaṇa, Śiśupāla, etc., the playful devices in Vṛndāvana, the stealing of cream, etc.. His qualities are knowledge, etc. on the one hand and affection, etc. on the other. his forms are the various forms assumed by Him and His youth is His beauty, grace and charm (E34).

(b) Consciousness and the Inert

"There is no special section regarding the nature, etc., of the self and the universe in *Śrutyantakalpavallī*. The main topic being the Lord–the self and the universe are discussed here and there only in connection with the discussions of the Lord's nature, qualities, etc.. He brings out no new point here, but

exactly follows Puruṣottama.

(c)The *sādhanas*

(S142) "He points out that the manifestation of the Lord's grace is of two kinds, viz., *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika*. The first is the grace which descends on those who pray to the Lord for the sake of attaining relief from pain, etc.. It is due to particular *sādhanas* resorted to by particular devotees wishing for particular ends, e.g. the manifestation of the Lord's grace to Draupadī, Dhruva, etc.. The second kind of manifestation happens in the case of those devotees who do not pray to the Lord for any particular end. It is due to the will of the Lord, as in the case of Prahlāda, Uḍḍhava and the rest. Hence it is that although a great many people see the Lord when he descends on earth as an incarnation, yet all of them do not become free, since they are not favored by Him (E38).

(d) Criticism of rival theories regarding Brahman

(A) Criticism of *Nirviśeṣavāda*

"Brahman cannot be pure distinction-less [*nirviśeṣa*] knowledge, for there are numerous passages in scripture which designate Brahman as possessed of attributes. It cannot be said that the texts which designate Him as [having] attributes are of a greater force than those which do not, for then we have to admit that the text 'non-existence alone was in the beginning' (*Taittirīyopaniṣad* 2..7) is of a greater force than the text 'existence along was in the beginning' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1). Moreover, the *nirguṇa*-texts don't conduce to salvation, e.g., the text 'when the seer sees the Golden Person' etc.' (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 3.1.3) shows that the *saguṇa*-texts lead to salvation. The text '*sākṣī ceta kevala nirguṇa*' (*Śvetāśvatar-opaniṣad* 6.11) does not deny any and every quality to the Lord, but particular qualities only, viz. material and earthly qualities. If it be objected that the above text denies all qualities in general and not particular qualities only, then we point out that

general statements are often modified by particular statements, e.g., the general statement 'one should sacrifice animals' really means 'one should sacrifice goats'. So is the case here. And, if the text does really deny any and every quality to the Lord, then how are you to explain the locus; of the *quality* of knowledge and according to the Advaitins, Brahman is not so (E53-54).

"Also, why should scripture first ascribe virtuous qualities to Brahman with great care, and then deny any and every quality to Him, thereby contradicting itself and behaving like a mad man? Further, if Brahman be absolutely free from distinctions, He cannot be the content of Vedāntic discussions even, and this being so, scripture becomes meaningless (E54).

"Also, if the qualities of the not-self are to be falsely superimposed on the self, then the latter must of necessity be possessed of some qualities which leads it to be mistaken for the non-self, and some again which leads it to b e recognized in its real character (E55.

(S144) "Finally, what is the proof of such a Brahman, devoid of all distinctions? Neither perception, nor inference, nor even word which expresses a quality or an action or a universal. So we conclude that Brahman cannot be devoid of distinctions (E55).

(B) Criticism of *Adhyāsavāda*

"The view that ignorance (*ajñāna)*[1] is illusorily superimposed on Brahman is absolutely untenable, for the very existence of ignorance is untenable.

"Thus, first, what is the locus (*āśraya*)[2] of ignorance

[1]Though Ms. Bose appears to prefer to give the Sanskrit term *ajñāṇa* where it occurs, we have replaced these occurrences with our reguiar translation "ignorance".

[2]Ms. Bose's translation of *āśraya* is substratum, for which we substitute our standard translation of the term, viz., locus. .

–pure consciousness, i.e. Brahman; the omniscient, i.e., *īśvara*; or the individual self? It cannot be said that pure consciousness is the locus of ignorance, because just as light and darkness cannot co-exist, so knowledge and ignorance, being mutually exclusive, cannot co-exist. Ignorance is that which is put to an end by knowledge, but if the two may co-exist, then it cannot be said that knowledge contradicts ignorance and this amounts to a denial of the very nature of knowledge. The difficulty is not removed if it be pointed out that ignorance, though not contradicted by pure knowledge, is negatived by *vṛttijñāna* or knowledge of particular objects,–for according to the Advaitins *vṛttijñāna*, because of being due to the *antaḥkaraṇa* or the internal organ, is not real knowledge but only metaphroically so, and what is *aupacārika* can never accomplish what an actual entity does. E.g., if we say 'the sacrificial post is the sun', then evidently the sacrifical post, the metaphorical sun, can never remove darkness as the real sun can do. Also, if knowledge be not opposed to ignorance then it must cease to be knowledge and be non-sentient like pots, etc.. The fact is that knowledge and ignorance are mutually opposed and hence the latter can never inhere in the former (S144; E111).

"It may be urged here that just as the owl is in complete darkness in spite of the sun's bright rays all around, there being no opposition between the sunlight which is real and the darkness experienced by the owl, which is unreal, so there is no opposition between the real knowledge and the unreal ignorance so that the one may be the locus of the other. To this we reply: Although the sunlight is not opposed to unreal darkness, yet there is *real* darkness too besides this unreal darkness and it is opposed to this real darkness. Hence although the sunlight may be the locus of one kind of darkness, viz. unreal darkness, yet it is actually opposed to real darkness, and so its being the locus of unreal darkness does not contradict its real nature as opposed to darkness. But in the case in hand there is no other real ignorance opposed to knowledge and

hence if knowledge be not opposed to this ignorance we have to say that knowledge is not opposed to ignorance at all. Further, the Advaitins cannot say that ignorance is unreal, for in that case the individual self, which is really of the form of bliss, must be said to be subject to unreal miseries only, while the fact is that pains, miseries, etc., of the self are very real, so long as its bondage continues. Further, perceptions like 'I am ignorant'–which prove the existence of real ignorance–must be regarded as false on this view. If it be urged that no harm is done if the perception 'I am ignorant' be taken as false since this perception, like other perceptions 'I am fat', etc., is after all nothing but a false perception, brought about by the false superimposition of the body on the self or of the *ahaṃkāra* on...consciousness, the locus of ignorance–then we point out that the very allegation of the falsity of the perception 'I am ignorant' presupposes consciousness as the locus of ignorance–the point we are disputing about. Also the perception 'I am ignorant' cannot be false, being not due to *doṣas* (as any illusory perception is) (E112).

"Finally, is the ignorance of the pure consciousness natural or due to limiting limitations? If the former, then like other natural qualities of bliss, etc. it can never be negated. If the latter, then what is the limiting limitation here? If ignorance be such an limitation, then there will arise a logical fallacy, since ignorance cannot itself be its own limitation. If, again, something else be the limiting limitation, then there will arise another logical fallacy or arguing in a circle, for this something else is due to ignorance (all duality being due to ignorance) and ignorance itself is due to that something else (which is its limiting limitation) (S145; E114).

"Hence, the view that pure consciousness is the locus of ignorance cannot be maintained in any way.

"The omniscient [God] *īśvara* too cannot be the locus of ignorance. To say that the omniscient is the locus of ignorance is just as absurd as to say that the sun is the locus of darkness.

It may be argued that omniscience itself is due to ignorance, whether it means being a knower (*pramātṛtva*), since the self is never a knower but pure knowledge; or it means knowing one's essential nature (*svarūpajñapti*), since the real nature of the self which is absolutely unassociated can become an object of knowledge only through ignorance. In answer, we point out that to say that the Omniscient Being is a product of ignorance is to talk like a man without sense, since only one who is devoid of all ignorance can ever be an Omniscient Being. Also, the qualities of being a knower and self-knowledge are never based on ignorance. To say that the self is unassociated simply means that it is not touched by any faults and not that it is never a content of knowledge (E144; S146).

"If it be said that even if there can be no connection of *īśvara* with ignorance, yet there may very well be connection between *īśvara* and *māyā*, the latter being the *līlopakaraṇa* or an implement of sport of the former,–then we ask: What exactly is meant by the term '*māyā*' here? Does it mean a particular kind of ignorance, or a particular kind of power belonging to gods and the rest of creating fire, water and other actual entities without the aid of external implements, or the power of a magician to show non-existing objects? Not the first, because as ignorance in general is not possible in *īśvara*–as shown above–no particular kind of ignorance can be possible in Him, and ignorance is never seen to be an implement of sport. Nor the second, for that goes against the Advaita view and supports ours. Nor the third, because there being no selves to be deluded no deluding is possible. Further, if this power be true, then there will be no non-dualism; if imagined by the self, then it will cease to delude it; if imagined by *īśvara*, then *īśvara* will be subject to ignorance.

"Finally, the self cannot be the locus of ignorance, because it itself is due to ignorance.

"Hence, ignorance has no locus (E114); S146).

"Secondly, there is no content of ignorance. It may be

said that pure consciousness alone can be the content of ignorance, since everything else is itself due to ignorance and is non-sentient and as such non-manifest, so that it cannot again be veiled by ignorance, i.e., be its object. Here we ask: What exactly is meant by this veiling of the pure consciousness? Does it mean the disappearance or *lopa* of the self-manifest nature of Brahman, or its non-origin or *anutpatti*? Neither–because what is every-existent can never have *lopa* or *anutpatti*. Also, if there be no manifestation of Brahman, there can be no manifestation of anything else. It cannot be said that this veiling of Brahman means that Brahman, though having manifestation, is not connected with any object, for (according to the Advaitins) pure consciousness does not refer to any object. It cannot be said that this veiling of Brahman means any hindrance to the act of manifestation, because (according to the Advaitins) there is nothing besides pure consciousness, so that there can be no obstacle. It cannot be said that the veiling of Brahman means having such perception as 'Brahman is not', 'Brahman does not manifest Himself', because whether such perceptions be recognitions or mere affirmations, in either case such percepts are the *result* of the veiling of Brahman and cannot, therefore, be the *cause* of the veiling of Brahman. On this view, since there is no perception, etc., during deep sleep, there must be absence of veiling during that period.

"It cannot be said that the veiling of Brahman means the absence of such perceptions [as] 'Brahman is', 'Brahman manifests itself', etc., for if such perceptions be recognitions, then at present the individual self has the recognition of its own nature and therefore the recognition of Brahman (the self being identical with Brahman), and as such there can be no veiling of Brahman during the state of mundane existence. On the other hand, there is no recognition of Brahman during the state of liberation (the self being not a perceiver during liberation according ot the Advaitins), and no withdrawal of the veil. If, again, such perceptions be simple affirmations, then again, the

freed self not being a perceiver, Brahman must continue to be veiled during liberation as well.

"It cannot be said that the veiling of Brahman means such perceptions as 'Brahman exists' and absence of such perceptions as 'Brahman does not exist', for these perceptions themselves are the result of the veiling of Brahman (since according to the Advaitins the self is not really a perceiver, but appears to be so through illusory superimposition). It cannot be said that the manifestation of (S147) Brahman is real, while His non-manifestation is non-real, being brought about by ignorance which is *mithyā* and hence both manifestation and non-manifestation of Brahman are possible, there being no opposition between the true manifestation and the false non-manifestation,–for exactly the two are opposed, or the one (viz., manifestation) cannot negate the other (viz. non-manifestation.)

It cannot be said also that the self-manifested Being is one who, though not knowable, is yet perceived to be free from all contradictions, and that the veiling of this self-manifested being means the prior absence of that freedom from contradiction–for Brahman is free from all contradictions right from the very beginning and cannot therefore become so *after* the removal of any veil or ignorance. Also, during the state of mundane existence there is only *prāgabhāva* of this manifestation or perception of Brahman as free from all contradictions, but during the state of liberation there is an absolute destruction of it, since the freed self is never a perceiver according to the Advaitins. But is it not absolutely absurd to say that there is no non-veiling of Brahman during liberation even? Also, the pot, inside which a lamp has been put, does not really destroy the light of the lamp, but simply covers it up *from someone else*. Similarly, the Advaita doctrine is that ignorance does not *really* destroy the manifestation of Brahman but simply veils it for the time being. But to veil it means to veil it from someone else, and who is that someone

from whom ignorance veils Brahman? It cannot be the individual self, for it itself is due to the veiling of Brahman by ignorance.

"Thus we conclude that the notion of the veiling of Brahman by ignorance cannot be logically defined and hence that pure consciousness cannot be the content of ignorance (E116-118).

"Nor can the self's distinction from the body, etc., the self-s not being an experiencer, etc., and non-distinction of Brahman, absence of a second, or the self which is one without a second, be the content of ignorance–for if these be merely of the nature of the self, then, as shown above, they can never be the contents of ignorance; if they be different from the self, then there will be no non-dualism, as held by the Advaitins; and if they be due to ignorance then there will arise the logical fallacy of mutual dependence. It cannot be said that although they are identical with the self, the self-manifested, yet they (S 148) can remain veiled due to their imaginary difference from it–for as shown above, this imaginary difference itself is not possible without the prior veiling of Brahman (E118).

"Hence we conclude that ignorance has no content.

"Thirdly, it cannot be said that ignorance is something imagined, for there is no one to imagine it. Thus, Brahman cannot be the imaginer here, because Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is inactive and therefore cannot do anything. Further, in that case, Brahman, the imaginer, being permanent, the imagination itself must be so, i.e., ignorance must be permanent, so that no liberation would ever be possible. Nor can ignorance itself be the imaginer here, for one cannot imagine one's own self. Further, ignorance too is inactive like Brahman and therefore cannot be an imaginer. Nor can Brahman and ignorance together be the imaginer here, because that will lead to the logical fallacy of mutual dependence. Nor can someone else be the imaginer here, for there is nothing else, according to the Advaitin, besides these two. And, if the existence of another ignorance be admitted as the imaginer of ignorance, then that ignorance will need another ignorance as its imaginer, and that another and so on to infinity. Thus, there can be no imagination of ignorance and hence no existence of ignorance (E55-56).

"Fourthly, ignorance cannot be said to be [false] *mithyā*, for no logical definition of falsehood is possible. It cannot be said that the false is what is separated from the real or the *sat*–for an actual entity itself is separated from a different actual entity and must become false on this definition. It cannot be said that the false is what is not the locus of the quality of existence or *sattva*–for then Brahman who according to the Advaitins is not the locus of any quality must become false. It cannot be said that false is what is not the content of any instrument of any *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge, for the false silver is an content of knowledge, viz., 'This is a shell and *not* silver'. It cannot be said that the false is what is never the direct content of any positive knowledge (and not of the negative roundabout knowledge as quoted above)–for the world, which is false according to Advaitins, is the content of positive knowledge. It cannot be said [that] the false is what is without existence, for what is without existence can never be perceived, as the false world is. It cannot be said that the false is what is a content of error, for Brahman, as the locus of error, is the content of error. It cannot be said that the false is what is the (S149) content of that knowledge which corrects an illusion (*bādhakajñāna*), viz. 'This is not a shell and not silver"–for Brahman is the content of such knowledge. It cannot be said that the false is what is capable of being negated by knowledge,–for a prior piece of knowledge may very well be set aside by a later piece of knowledge, but that does not mean that the former is false. It cannot be said that the false is what is absolutely absent from the locus to which it is (falsely) attributed–for the absolute absence of an attributed, i.e., unreal, connection is different from that of a non-attributed,

i.e., real one. Finally, it cannot be said that the false is ignorance or an effect of ignorance, for the distinction between Brahman and the individual self, for example, is false, according to the Advaitins, yet is not an effect of ignorance, being beginningless or *anādi*.

"Hence we conclude that no definition of falsity is possible.

"Also, what is the proof of falsity? Not perception, for one can perceive only what is present and near at hand and not what is negated in the past, present and future (as ignorance is according to the Advaitins). Nor inference, because inference is based on perception; nor finally scripture, because none would admit that scripture is concerned with establishing ignorance (E563).

"Thus, there is neither any definition nor any proof of falseity. Hence, ignorance cannot be said to be false.

"Fifthly, what exactly is meant by the term 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*)? What is the meaning of the prefix '*nañ*' here? There are six possible meanings of the prefix '*nañ*', viz. *tatsādṛśya* or similarity; *tadabhāva* or absence; *tadanyatva* or otherness; *tadalpatā* or littleness; *apraśāstya* or worthlessness; and *virodha* or contradiction. Now, it cannot be said that ignorance is what is similar to knowledge. Two things are said to be similar when, though different, they possess many similar qualities, e.g., '*abrāhmaṇa kṣatriya*' means a *ksatrīya* who is similar to a Brāhmaṇa in many qualities. But ignorance does not possess any quality or property of knowledge. It cannot be said that ignorance is the absence of knowledge, for if ignorance is something non-existent then , evidently, it cannot be cause. It cannot be said that ignorance is other than knowledge, for that implies difference, just as the expression '*abrāhmaṇa śūdra*' implies a *śūdra* who is different from a Brāhmaṇa, and in that case there will be two realities--knowledge and ignorance, and no [Advaita or] non-dualism. It cannot be said the ignorance is little knowledge, for (S150) then it will fall under the category

of knowledge, a little knowledge being knowledge all the same, just as the word '*anudarī kaṇyā*' means a girl who has a belly though a small one. It is cannot be said that ignorance means worthless knowledge, for then too it will fall under the category of knowledge, just as the word '*apaṇḍita*' means one who is a *paṇḍita*, though not a good one. Finally, it cannot be said that ignorance is opposed to knowledge, for just as the word '*asura*' means one who is opposed to the *sura*s (or gods), so here too knowledge and ignorance must be on a par with each other and co-exist--which is not admitted.

"Thus we conclude that no epistemological meaning of the term '*ajñāna*' is possible (E4-5).

"Thus we find that no locus, object, imaginer and etymological meaning of 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*) are possible. Hence the very existence of ignorance is not tenable.

"And if there can be no ignorance, there can be no *adhyāsa* or superimposition of ignorance on Brahman (E563).

"Further, is that on which ignorance is superimposed (i.e., the [locus] *adhiṣṭhāna*) of the nature of knowledge and opposed to ignorance and not opposed to it? It cannot be opposed to ignorance, for there can be no mutual superimposition between two opposed things, e.g., silver is falsely superimposed on a shell, to which it is similar, and not on a rope to which it is opposed. It also cannot be non-opposed to ignorance, for then there can evidently be no cessation of ignorance. Also to say that knowledge is not opposed to ignorance is, as pointed out above, simply ridiculous. It cannot be said that although knowing one's essential nature, self-knowledge, is not opposed to ignorance, yet *pramāṇajanyajñāna*, i.e. *vṛttijñāna* of knowledge gained through perception, etc., is opposed to ignorance and negates it, for then knowledge and ignorance will come to be concerned with different objects. Thus, what is the content of this *vṛttijñāna*? Is it pure Brahman or qualified Brahman? Not the first, for the Advaitins do not admit that Brahman is ever the

content of a *vṛttijñāna*. Nor the second, for then, as pointed out above, knowledge and ignorance will be concerned with different objects, and therefore the former will not be able to negate the latter. Thus the ignorance regarding a pillar cannot be removed by knowledge regarding a pot, (S151) but only by knowledge regarding the pillar. Similarly, the knowledge regarding qualified Brahman cannot negate the ignorance regarding pure Brahman. Thus we conclude that Brahman cannot be the locus of superimposition.

"Further, Brahman being absolutely devoid of qualities and distinctions cannot be the locus of superimposition, for such a locus, as shown above, must have certain qualities which leads, on the one hand, to the superimposition and on the other negates it, and Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is absolutely devoid of qualities.

"Further, is the nature of pure Brahman veiled by ignorance or not? Not the first, for then Brahman cannot be the locus; nor the second, for then there being the manifestation of the very nature of Brahman, there can be no superimposition.

"Thus we conclude that Brahman cannot be the locus of superimposition. And hence there can be no locus of superimposition at all, because, according to the Advaitins, there is nothing besides Brahman. Hence, there being no locus of superimposition, superimposition itself is not possible.

"Finally, there is ono one who can superimpose or falsely attribute ignorance on Brahman. Attribution always implies one who attributes, but neither Brahman, nor ignorance, nor someone else can do so. Hence there being no one to effect the superimposition, superimposition itself is not possible (S152).

"Thus, we find that there can be no superimposition of ignorance on Brahman, because the very existence of ignorance, which is superimposed, is not possible, because no locus of the superimposition is possible, and because no effector of the superimposition is possible." (E57-58).

(C) Criticism of the Advaita view that Brahman is the *Upādānakāraṇa* of the world

Our view is of course that Brahman is both the material and *nimitta,* efficient cause of the world. But consistently with their views, the Advaitins cannot hold that Brahman is the material cause of the world–for what exactly do they mean when they call Brahman the material cause? It may be said that just as two threads, twisted together, are the cause of a rope, so Brahman is the material cause of the world as qualified by *māyā* or as possessed of the power of *māyā*, or as the locus of *māyā*. On the first view, just as two threads are the cause of the rope, so Brahman and *māyā* together are the material cause of the world, while Brahman Himself, not associated with *māyā*, is changeless. On the second view, Brahman is the cause through the contamination of *māyā*, while Brahman, not so contaminated, is changeless. On the third view, just as the fibre is the material cause of a piece of cloth through the thread, so Brahman is the material cause of the world through *māyā*, while Brahman without *māyā* is changeless.

"To this we reply: The first view is untenable, for just as both the threads have to undergo transformation in order to produce the rope, so both Brahman and *māyā* must be transformed into the form of the world, so that Brahman cannot be said to be changeless. Also, if Brahman, the real, be the material cause f the world, the world too must be real, just as a piece of cloth, made of white and not-white threads, is white. It cannot be said that the world may be argued to be real only if the material cause is *solely* real, and not a mixture of the real (Brahman) and the unreal (*māyā*)–for in that case, the world which is *anirvacanīya*, according to the Advaitins, must have a solely *anirvacanīya* cause, but there is no such thing as an *anirvacanīya* material cause.

"The second view is also untenable. If Brahman be the cause, when in contact with *māyā*, then He must be like clay, etc., which (S153) which are also causes. Also, if it be held that

Brahman, as contaminated by *māyā*, undergoes a real transformation, then evidently the world cannot be said to be an illusory transformation. If it be said that the world is a real transformation of Brahman, contaminated by *māyā*, while it is an illusory transformation of the pure Brahman, then we point out that in that case there must be attributed changes in the pure Brahman, and what is really changeless can have no attributed changes even.

"The third view also is untenable. We find that the fibre is the material cause of the thread and the thread again is the material cause of the cloth, and in this way also the fibre is the material cause of the cloth through the thread. But this does not evidently hold good in the case of Brahman and *māyā*, for Brahman is not the material cause of *māyā*, as the fibre is of the thread, so that it cannot be said that Brahman is the material cause of the world through *māyā*. It cannot be said that Brahman is the material cause of *māyā* in the sense of being the locus of the cosmic illusion, for that Brahman cannot be such a locus has already been shown, and further it is not possible to define a material cause as being the locus of error, for clay, etc., which are material causes, are not so, while shell, etc., which are so, are not material causes.

"The same arguments go to refute the view that '*vivarta*' means assuming another unreal form, *pariṇāma* means assuming another real form, while *upādānatva* (or being the material cause) means assuming another form (real or unreal) and hence Brahman can be the material cause in the sense of having illusory transformation, while ignorance too is the material cause as having real transformation. The Advaitins themselves hold that what is false must have a false material cause, for it the cause be real the effect must also be so, and hence the Advaitins themselves deny that the real can have any unreal form, since this would imply the discarding of the very nature of the real. Hence the conclusion cannot but be that the real Brahman can have no *vivarta* or unreal form. Also, if

Brahman were to assume an unreal form, then Brahman, as pointed out may times before, must possess certain qualities which lead Him to assume (i.e be mistaken as) that particular unreal form, instead of any other. But Brahman has no qualities according to the Advaitins. Hence the world cannot be an illusory transformation of Brahman. Nor is the world a real (S154) transformation of ignorance. *Pariṇāma* means a real transformation into an actual entity, as the transformation of a lump of clay into a pot. But an unreal object (which the world is according to the Advaitins) does not imply any transformation, e.g., an illusory silver does not (E58-59).

"Thus we find that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world on the Advaita doctrine. The Advaitins cannot get out of the difficulty by pointing out that *māyā* is the material cause, *īśvara* is the effecient cause and Brahman is the locus, because according to the Advaitins also, the material cause and the efficient cause of the world are identical (E60). Here our author follows Keśavakāśmīrin.

(D) Criticism of the Advaita doctrine of *Īśvara*

"It cannot be said that *īśvara* is Brahman limited by *māyā*, for then *īśvara*, being subject to ignorance and illusion, cannot be said to be omniscient. To say that one who was associated with *māyā* is omniscient is as absurd as to say that the blind is lotus-eyed (E60).

"Also, according to the Advaitins, *īśvara* or *māyā*-limited consciousness is the creator of the world and not Brahman or pure consciousness. Now, in what exactly does *īśvara's* creatorship consist? Is *īśvara* a creator in the sense of being a locus, like a shell; or in the sense of being the perceiver of the false imposition like a mistaken person; or in the sense of being a deluder, like a magician; or in the sense of acting with a definite intention to produce a definite effect by means of perceivable implements like a potter? Not the first, for evidently creatorship does not mean passively being a locus only, but the

creator must essentially be active. Scripture bears testimony to the fact that the creator of names and forms resolves to be many; but can one resolve to be something false? Hence, why should *īśvara* voluntarily wish to be something false? Hence not the second, for why should *īśvara* voluntarily wish to see an illusion? A person under an illusion does not *voluntarily* see the illusory object, because for the time being he is perfectly certain that what he is perceiving is true. Not the third, since there being at that time no individual self to be deluded, *īśvara* cannot be a deluder. Also, scripture tells us, as pointed out above, that the creator, prior to creating the world, formed the resolve: 'Let me evolve (i.e. *create*) names and forms' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.3.2), but a magician never resolves (S155) 'let me create' but only that 'let me *show* kings, etc.'. Nor, finally, the fourth, for in that case the world cannot be false. A potter never creates an imaginary pot, but always a real one. An imaginary object can never be created, whether by a non-mistaken person or by a mistaken [one] (E60-61).

"Thus, we conclude that the Advaita view of *īśvara* is absolutely untenable.

(E) Criticism of the Advaita interpretation of the text *'Ekamevādvitīyam'*

"In the celebrated text '*ekamevādvitīyam*' (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1) the word '*eka*' (=one) means that the Lord is absolutely independent, while the term '*advitīya*' (=without a second) means that the Lord has nothing equal to or superior to Himself, i.e., whatever there is besides the Lord is absolutely dependent on the Lord. Thus, even the qualities and powers etc. of the Lord are not independent, but depend on the Lord, Who is their very essence.

"Or, an alternative explanation may be offered, viz., the term '*eka*' denies that sentient beings (i.e., the selves) are independent; the term '*advitīya*' denies that non-sentient objects (i.e., the world, etc.,) are independent; while the term '*eva*'

denies that the own qualities of the Lord are independent. Thus, the text means that consciousness, the inert and the *svagatadharmas* of the Lord, being of the essence of the Lord, are non-distinct from Him. In this sense alone the Lord is one and without a second.

"According to the Advaitins, however, the above text denies three kinds of differences to Brahman,viz., *sajātīya* or difference from the sentient; *vijātīya* or difference from the non-sentient; and *svagata* or difference from His own qualities and powers. But this view is absolutely untenable. Here the term '*eva*' does not imply any discrimination from something else, e.g., the expression '*śaṅkhaṃ pāṇḍu eva*" means that the conch-shell is white and does not deny the connection of the conch-shell with anything else. Similarly the expression '*pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ*' means that Pārtha is a warrior with bow in hand, but does not deny his connection with something else. Hence, the expression '*ekam eva advitīyam* (S156) means simply that being is one (*eka*) and without a second (*advitīya*), and not that being has no connection with anything else. Further, if the term '*advitīya*' implies the absence of a second, then the term '*eka*' becomes a mere superficiality. Hence it cannot be said that the term '*agre*' implies time and the term '*dvitīya*' implies an object, as according to the Advaitins nothing besides Brahman ever exists in the present, never did so in the past and will never do so in the future. That is, if Brahman be *always* without a second, then there is no sense in saying that He was so in the beginning. Further, if the term '*advitīya*' does not deny the absence of a second, then there will be no non-dualism (for then, there will be at last two realities–Brahman and this absence of a second), and if it does not, then too, there will be no non-dualism.

"Further, what exactly is meant by the term '*sat*' in the above text? It cannot mean the pure Brahman, for according to the Advaitins the pure Brahman cannot be expressed by any word or sentence. It cannot mean Brahman with the limiting

limitation of *māyā*, for then the Advaitins themselves have to admit differences, i.e. if *māyā* be different from Brahman whom it limts, then there can be no non-dualism; if non-different, then Brahman Himself will become of the form of ignorance. Finally, it cannot mean the locus of the superimposition of ignorance, for, as shown above, Brahman cannot be the locus of ignorance (E17-18).

(E) Criticism of rival theories regarding the *jīva*

(A) Criticism of *Pratibimbavāda*

"It cannot be said that the individual self is a reflection of Brahman on ignorance, for, in the first place, the very existence of ignorance is not possible, no definition and proof of ignorance being possible. Thus, it cannot be said that ignorance is that which is without beginning and a positive entity, yet is negate by knowledge, for the ignorance regarding the illusory silver is by no means without a beginning, so that the above definition is too narrow. Again ignorance cannot be a positive entity, for if ignorance, a positive entity, were to give rise to an illusion which is not a positive entity, then we have to admit that a false something may arise from a real something. But this cannot be, for the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. Yet if the (S157) illusion be not due to ignorance, it cannot be put to an end by knowledge. Also, according to the Advaitins themselves, ignorance is different from both existence and non-existence, so how can they hold again that it is a positive entity? Again, ignorance cannot be always negated by knowledge, e.g., ignorance persists in the *jīvanmuktas* in spite of their knowledge; also in spite of knowing perfectly well that the trees on the banks of a river are standing upright,; we cannot help seeing them upside down on the surface of the river. Further, if ignorance be negated by knowledge, then it cannot be without a beginning, for that which is simply due to the false imagination of one thing as another, that which is due to some or other defects, and that which has no existence

beyond perception, can never be beginningless, e.g. the illusory silver which is due to the false imaginaiton by a man of a shell as silver to [due] to some defects of eyesight, want of proper light, etc. and persists so long as the error persists, is not beginningless. Further, if ignorance be a positive entity, then it cannot be negated by knowledge. Thus, the first part of the above definition of ignorance (viz., that it is beginnigless and a positive entity) comes into conflict with the last part (viz., that it is negated by knowledge.)

It may be said that the specific [pervasion] *vyāpti* viz., 'ignorance is negated by knowledge' is of a greater force than the general pervasion 'what is beginningless and a positive entity is not negated by knowledge' and ignorance (according to us) is different not only from existence but also from non-existence, so that although being different from non-existence it cannot be negated, as the self cannot be, yet being different from existence, it can nevertheless be negated like prior absence. To this we reply that in that case, i.e., if a specific pervasion be taken to be of a greater force than a general pervasion, we may very well infer any and every thing, e.g., we may very well hold that the specific pervasion "whatever is a hill is without fire' contradicts the general pervasion 'whatever smokes is on fire'. Further, a specific pervasion regarding ignorance, as held by the Advaitins, is not possible, since pervasion is a *general* statement regarding a *class* of things, but ignorance, as held by the Advaitins, i.e., ignorance which is beginningless, a positive entity and negated by knowledge, is without any parallel, as other kinds of ignorance, viz., the ignorance regarding a shell, are neither beginningless nor positive entities, and hence ignorance as held by the Advaitins, being the only one of its kind, cannot be the subject of any pervasion. Further, if it be said that what is different from existence (S158) may be negated, then we have to say that [absolute absence too, which is different from existence, may be negated. Thus we find that the definition of ignorance as

that which is beginningless, a positive entity and negated by knowledge, is not tenable (E61-62).

"Ignorance cannot be defined also as the material cause of error for, as shown above, illusion being not a positive entity cannot have ignorance , a positive entity, as its material cause. If again an illusion be taken to be a positive entity (for the sake of argument), still then it cannot have ignorance, which is different from existence, for its material cause, since the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. An illusion is the *awareness* of an object. Now, according to us, both the content of en error and the erroneous awareness are real,[1] and hence they can have a material cause. Of course, ignorance is not their material cause, but the illusory object, viz., 'silver', has real ingredients as its material cause, while the illusory awareness, viz., 'This is a piece of silver', has the mind as its material cause. But according to the Advaitins neither the illusory object nor the illusory awareness is real, so how can they have material cause? Hence, it cannot be said that ignorance is the material cause of illusion.

"Also, ignorance cannot be a material cause, because it is not an existent something, according to the Advaitins. Otherwise we have to admit that prior absence too can; be a

[1]This is the doctrine of *satkhyāti*, viz. that all percepts are true, even the so-called illusory ones. Thus the doctrine is that because of the original process of *pañcīkaraṇa*,, everything contains the element and ingredient of everything else. A shell, e.g., contains come subtle and ordinarily imperceptible elements of silver, and when owing to some defects in the eyesight, want of proper light, distance, etc., we perceive the silver - element only in the shell, we mistake the shell for the silver, although the silver we are perceiving is *real* silver contained in the shell. This is the so-called false perception of silver in placè of shell and it is called *false*, because it fails to lead to *successful* practical reaction as a *real* silver does; e.g. when we stoop to pick it up under the impression that it is a piece of silver, we find that it is not so and cannot be sold as such. Thus, the distinction between *true* and *false* perception is really a question of practical utility (*arthakriyā*). [Roma Candra Bose]

material cause. Hence if ignorance were to be a material cause, it must be an existent something. Further, the effect appears to be of the nature of the cause–an earthen pot looks like clay, but neither (S159) the illusory silver nor its awareness appears to ignorance--the illusory silver appears to be real silver and the illusory awareness as knowledge for the time being. Finally, the definition of ignorance as the material cause of error is both too narrow, because the ignorance of the *jīvanmuktas* is not the material cause of error, they, according to the Advaitins, being not subject to any more error, though leading an earthly existence; and too wide, because clay etcd. which are material causes are not ignorance (E62-63)...

"Thus, no definition of ignorance is possible.

"Nor is there any proof (*pramāṇa*) of ignorance.

[Objection:] "The existence of ignorance is proved directly through such perceptions as 'I am ignorant', 'I do not know others', etc.. Its existence is proved by inference as well. The fact is that knowledge of a particular object is preceded by something which is other than the prior absence of knowledge, which previously veiled the object of knowledge, which is now negated by knowledge and which previously inhered in knowledge itself, and this something is ignorance; e.g., when a lamp is lit in a dark room, the lamp does three things–it puts its own prior absence to an end; puts darkness to an end; and manifests objects. Now, this darkness is other than the prior absence of light, previously veiled the objects of the light, is put to an end by the light, yet was previously inhering in the lamp. The same is the case here. Hence the following inference proves the existence of ignorance:

> Whatever, coming into existent, manifests objects previously non-manifest, is preceded by something which [is] other than its own prior absence, which previously veiled its objects, which is now negated by and which previously inhered in it, like a lamp lighted in a dark room.

Knowledge does so.

Therefore, knowledge is preceded by something which is other than its own prior absence, etc., i.e. by ignorance.

[Objection continued:] The existence of ignorance is proved by scripture as well–cf. texts such as "Then there were neither non-being nor being" (*Ṛgveda* 10.129.1), etc.. (E63; S160).

[Answer:]"Perceptions like 'I am ignorant' etc. do not establish ignorance, for according to the Advaitins, the 'I' is not the locus of ignorance, which is a positive entity. such perceptions prove simply the absence of knowledge and not any ignorance which is a positive entity. Also, what does the 'I' stand for in the expression 'I am ignorant'? It cannot mean the pure Brahman, for the Advaitins do not admit that; nor can it mean the *ahaṃkāra*, which is non-sentient; nor something else, because there is nothing else besides Brahman according to the Advaitins.

"The [objector's inference] above also is not correct, because it cannot be said that knowledge always negates ignorance; e.g., the knowledge of happiness, etc., does not negate ignorance, being of the form of a witness. Further, the adjective 'other than its own prior absence' [in the objector's inference above] is futile, since prior absence being that which is put to an end by the object in question, viz. knowledge, it is expressed by the adjective 'negated by it'.

"Finally, the above text [from the *Ṛgveda*] does not prove the existence of ignorance, but it refers simply to *prakṛti*. The term 'non-being- refers to the subtle intellect, etc., while the term 'being' refers to the gross elements, while the term 'darkness', *tamas*, refers to the primal *prakṛti*, the sense of the text being that in the beginning there were neither subtle elements nor gross elements, but only *prakṛti*, the primal cause.

"Thus, there is no proof of ignorance (E63).

"Further, there can be no apprehension of ignorance.

Thus, is ignorance perceived by the pure consciousness or by consciousness arising through one or another of the instruments of knowledge? Not the first, for if ignorance be perceived by the pure consciousness, then such a perception must be real and everlasting and continue in liberation too. Nor the second, for then ignorance will be sometimes perceived and sometimes not. Also, ignorance cannot be grasped through any instrument of knowledge, as just shown above, and hence it cannot be said [that] the apprehension of ignorance is due to some instrument of knowledge. Further, according to the Advaitins, the knowledge arising from the ordinary sources of knowledge is itself due to ignorance [and thus not knowledge] and hence this will lead to arguing in a circle. thus, there can be no apprehension of ignorance.

"We conclude, therefore, that there can be no definition, proof and apprehension of ignorance; hence the very existence of ignorance is impossible (S161).

"And if there can be no ignorance, then evidently the individual self can[not!] be a reflection of Brahman on ignorance...

"According to the Advaitins, the limiting limitation (*upādhi*) pertains to the reflection and not to the object reflected, and that is why the individual self is subject to mundane existence and not Brahman. But what does that precisely imply? It cannot imply that the qualities of the *upādhi* pertain to the reflection, [that] just as dirt on the mirror, the *upādhi*, makes the image of the face look dirty too–for agency, etc., do not pertain to ignorance, the limiting limitation, yet the individual self, the reflection, is an agent, etc.. It cannot be said also that the *upādhi* pertains to the reflection in the sense that the functions of the former pertain to the latter, for the functions of the *upādhi*, such as distinguishing, etc., (i.e. ignorance distinguishes the self from Brahman) pertain to the sky , which is an object reflected. Also, if the *upādhi* pertains to the reflection alone, then omniscience etc., which pertain to

Brahman, cannot be said to be due to *upādhi*, as held by the Advaitins. It cannot be said also that the *upādhi* pertains to the reflection in the sense that the qualities inhering in the functions of the upādhi pertain to the reflection, or that the *upādhi* veils its own object from the reflection, for such is never seen in the case of a mirror and a pot. Thus, we find that the *upādhi* cannot pertain to the reflection (E113).

"We conclude, therefore, that the *pratibimbavāda* is absolutely untenable because the very existence of ignorance is not possible; because Brahman cannot be the object reflectd; because ignorance cannot be the *upādhi*; and because the *upādhi* cannot pertain to the reflection. (S162)

(B) Criticism of *Adhyaṣavāda*

"The theory that the course of mundane existence is due to the illusory superimposition of the body, etc., on the self is not tenable, for the fact is that it is really due to the want of discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, between the self and the not-self. In fact, the superimposition of the body, the sense-organs, etc., on the self–which is directly opposed to them–is quite impossible. It cannot be said that the perception 'I am Brahman' falsely attributes the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* to the self, for according to the Advaitins the 'I', the *aham*–is not the self, the *ātman*, but is not-self, so what fault can the Advaitins possibly find with this identity between two things both of which are not selves? The fact is that the identity between the body and the self is established by direct perception, and cannot be dismissed summarily as false. Of course, to say that the body and the self are identified is not to say that they are one and the same; they are different, yet are identified in all practical experiences, just as heat and iron, though different, are identified in a red-hot iron ball.

"The Advaita view is full of contradictions from the very beginning to the end. Thus, according to the Advaitins, the *identification* of the body and the self is due to illusory

superimposition, but in the same breath they declare that the *differentiation* between the body and the self also is due to illusory superimposition–there being the self alone in reality. But how can possibly the difference and the non-difference between the body and the self be both falsely superimposed? The unreal (*mithyā*) is absolutely different from the real (*satya*) and difference is absolutely different from non-difference. Hence if the difference between the body and the self be *mithyā*, the non-difference between them must of necessity be *satya*. It cannot be said that as the body itself is due to superimposition there is neither difference nor non-difference between the body and the self–for the illusory silver, though due to superimposition, is yet *different* from the shell.

"The perception 'I am embodied (*dehin*)" is just like the perception 'I am a *gehin*'; i.e., just as the latter means 'I *have* a house' and never 'I *am* a house', so exactly the former means 'I *have* a body' and never 'I *am* a body'. So how can it be said that the latter perception implies an *identity* between the body and the self? In fact, our perceptions are always to the effect '*my* house', '*my* eyes', '*my* (S163) hands', etc: so that there is always a difference between the 'I', the self, the possessor and the body, etc. the things possessed. Thus the perception 'I am a *brāhmaṇa*', 'I am a man' are true perceptions. The word '*brāhmana*' means a conscious *individual self endowed with a particular body*, and not a *mere* body. If the word '*brāhmaṇa*' were to mean a body only, then such injunctions as 'a *brāhmaṇa* should perform a sacrifice' become absurd, for a body, a non-sentient object, can never possibly perform a sacrifice etc. In the very same manner, perceptions like 'I am blind', etc. are true perceptions for the blind is a conscious individual self devoid of eyesight and so on. The perceptions 'I am thin', 'I am black', etc. are secondary ones like the perceptions 'My son being thin, I am thin as well', 'I, besmeared with mud, am black', etc., but there is no illusory identity (superimposition) here, since 'I' am clearly conscious of my

distinction from son and from the mud here. Moreover perceptions like '(The same) I whom made obeisance to my father in my childhood am now playing with my grandchildren in my old age', 'I, who was a tiger in a dream, am now a man', etc. clearly prove that we *distinguish* between our *body* and our *self,* and that we realize very well that the body may change and assume different forms, but the self remains unchanged in the midst of all changes. So, the Advaitins cannot say that we mistakenly identify the body and the self. Hence we conclude that there is no such thing as superimposition and that the individual selves are not due to superimposition but to the beginningless *karmans* (E69-71).

Further, the Advaita view that the 'I' is not the self, because it does not persist under all states, viz. during deep sleep and release–is not at all tenable, for the 'I' does not persist during these states. That the 'I' persists during the state of deep sleep is clear from the perception 'So long I slept happily', etc.. Also, according to the Advaitins themselves, the *ahaṃkāra* is the vital-breath through the power of action, and mind through its power of understanding. Now which is the funciton of the vital breath? It may be said that if the *ahaṃkāra* and the vital breath be different, then there is no harm if the former disappears during deep sleep; if they be non-different, then (S164) we hold that the portion of the *ahaṃkāra* which, devoid of the vital breath, disappears, while the vital breath portion persists, to this we reply: This cannot be so, for if the vital breath only persists in deep sleep, then we cannot have perceptions to the effect 'I slept happily'; as the [breath] *prāṇa* never constitutes the 'I'. Thus, we conclude that the 'I persists during deep sleep (E100-102).

"The 'I' persists during release as well. We do not deny that the Lord is ever-free, but what we insist on is that the Lord is a knower, an 'I'. So the 'I' persists always. This may be established by inferences as well, thus:

the 'I' persists in liberation, being the performer of the

sādhanās which lead to liberation, like consciousness. "Further, the Advaita view that the 'I' is non-sentient, i.e., the internal organ and not the self, is not tenable, for in that case perceptions like 'my mind' would mean 'my mind's mind'–which is absurd; and also we should not have, in that case, felt an difference between the 'I'–ourselves and our minds, which we undoubtedly do, e.g. the 'I' persists even in the absence of the mind (attention). We never *feel* that the 'I' is non-sentient, and if it be said to be *imagined,* then the self too may very well be imagined to be non-sentient, as we can, of course, imagine any and every thing to be any and every thing. So we conclude that the 'I' is not non-sentient (E103-104).

(C)Criticism of *ekajīvavāda*

There is absolutely no proof that there is only one self. On the contrary, this view leads to absurd results. Thus, if there be only one self, then there could not, evidently, be any preceptor-disciple relation and the scriptures would become meaningless. If the preceptor be possessed of the knowledge of non-dualism, then he cannot teach the disciple who is different from him, and if he be not possessed of the knowledge of non-dualism, then he is nothing but an impostor and a cheat (S165).

(F) Criticism of rival theories regarding the world

(A) Criticism of *māyāvāda*

"The Advaitins argue that the world is false or *mithyā* as established by the following inference:

The world is false, because it is capable of being perceived (*dṛśyatvāt*),
because it is non-sentient (*jaḍatvāt*) and because it is limited (*paricchinnatvāt*),
like the shell-silver.

To this we reply that the above inference is not correct, because the *prakṣa*, the *sādhya*, the *hetu* or reason, and the

example (*udāharaṇa*) are all untenable.

The *pakṣa* is 'the world' here. Now, is the world established by one or another of the sources of knowledge or not? Not the first, because what is so established cannot be negated. If it be said that the universe, though perceived, can yet be negated, since it is not the locus of existence, then we point out in reply that in that case the pure Brahman too, not being the locus of existence, must be false. The second alternative also is not possible, for in that case, the world must become completely imaginary, absolutely unreal like the sky-flower, which too cannot be established by any source of knowledge.

"The *sādhya*, viz., 'falsity' (*mithyātva*) too cannot be established. If this falsity be real, then Brahman cannot be said to be the sole reality; if it be unreal, then the world must be true.

"The three reasons quoted also are untenable., Thus the first reason, *dṛśyatva* does not prove the case. It cannot be said the world is false, because it is perceived, for then Brahman too, being directly intuited by the knowers, must be false. It cannot be said that Brahman so intuited is not pure Brahman but *māyā*-limited Brahman who is, of course, false–for unless the knower perceives the pure Brahman, his ignorance regarding pure Brahman cannot be put to an end, and the pure Brahman, being in that case outside all sources of knowledge, must be non-established like the sky-flower, which too is outside all sources of knowledge. Also, texts which distinctly declare Brahman to be a content of direct realization will come to be contradicted. Also, if Brahman who is to be inquired after be only *māyā*-llimited Brahman and not pure Brahman, then (S166) evidently the very inquiry becomes value-less and the scriptures concerned with sun an inquiry become useless. Further, no attributes can either be attributed or denied to something which is unknown, as that this very denial of *dṛśyatva* to the Supreme Brahman implies that the Supreme

Brahman is known.

"The second reason, *jaḍatva*, also does not prove the case. Now what is *jaḍatvà*? It cannot be said that the non-sentient is what is not a knower, for the 'I', which according to the Advaitins is a knower, must be sentient, while the pure Brahman, not a knower according to the Advaitins, must be non-sentient. Hence the inference:

The pure Brahman is false,
because He is not a knower,
like the universe.

The Advaitin cannot get out of the difficulty by saying that although pure Brahman is not really a knower, yet He is imagined to be so and hence Brahman is sentient,–for an imagined something cannot be the reason for anything, i.e., imagined knowership of Brahman cannot be a reason for His not being non-sentient; also, according to the Advaitins themselves the internal organ is imagined to be a knower, and hence it must too be sentient like Brahman. It cannot be said that the non-sentient is what is not knowledge, for the knowledge of particular objects through one or another of the sources of knowledge, being knowledge, must be sentient, while the self, not being knowledge, must be non-sentient.

"Thus, has the knowledge of the real nature of the self a content or not? On the first alternative, the question arises: Is the self itself the content here, or not? It cannot be itself its own content, for according to the Advaitins the self is never a content of the ordinary sources of knowledge. But, on the other hand, nothing else can be the content here, since in liberation there is no other object, yet there is knowledge about the real nature of the self, and what is present alone can be its content. Thus, the knowledge about the real nature of the self can have no content. But the second alternative also, viz., the knowledge about the real nature of the self has no content–is not tenable, for knowledge cannot be without a content, i.e., it must manifest an object, otherwise the pot, etc., might very well be

called knowledge.

Further, is the knowledge about the real nature of the self knowledge or error? It cannot be the first, because according to the Advaitins it is not generated through any source of knowledge; nor can it be the second, because it is not due to any defects. If it be said that it is neither, then we point out that in that case it cannot be knowledge at all. Thus we find that there can be (S167) no knowledge of the real nature of the self, and hence the self, not being knowledge, must be non-sentient.

It cannot be said finally that that *jaḍatva* is being the not-self, because that is not a universal, there being only one Self and what is not a universal cannot be the predicate of a definition, e.g. when we define a man "a man is mortal", 'mortality " is a universal. Thus, we conclude that the second reason, *jaḍatva,* is not itself established.

"The third and the final reason, viz. *paricchinnatva* too does not prove the case. There are three kinds of limit–limit of space, limit of time, and limit by an object. Now, limitedness of space and time cannot be cause of falsity, because space, though unlimited, is false according to the Advaitins, while the illusory silver has not limitation of time (i.e. it never was, never is, never will be–no distinction of time), yet it is false. Ignorance, too, being the material cause of all space and time and connected with the all-pervading Brahman, is without any limitation of space and time, yet it is false. Hence, it cannot be said that limitation of space and time is a criterion f falsity. Nor can it be said that limitation by an object is a criterion of falsity, because according to the Advaitins there is no object besides Brahman.

"Thus the three reasons adduced do not prove that the world is false.

"Finally, the example too is not possible, for according to the Advaitins there is no shell at all, there being nothing besides Brahman. If it be said that Brahman may very well be cited as

an example here (if we put the argument in the negative form: what is non-perceivable, non-sentient and non-limited is not false, like Brahman)–then we ask: Is the pure Brahman to be cited as an example here or the qualified Brahman? Not the first, for the pure Brahman is outside all sources of knowledge and can never be cited as an example; nor the second, for that does not prove the case and is opposed to the Advaita theory itself.

"Thus we conclude that the above inference does not prove that the world is false.

(B) Criticism of *sattātraividhyavāda*

"According to the Advaitins, there are three kinds of existence, *pāramārthika* or real, *vyāvahārika* or empirical such as the world, and *prātibhāṣika* or illusory, such as the illusory (S168) silver. But this distinction is absolutely untenable. First, on the Advaita maxim itself there must be more than these three grades. Thus, according to the Advaitins, a dream is *prātibhāsika* and the illusory silver is so, and hence the dreamt silver-shell illusion must be one degree lower than the *prātibhāsika* and put to an end by the *prātibhāsika*; while the dream of a dreamt silver-shell illusion must be still another degree lower. On the other hand, there are objects higher than the *vyāvahārika*. Hence, once the Advaitins begin to divide objects into grades of reality, they cannot stop at three only.

"Further, this division into three grades can neither be real, since Brahman is the sole reality, nor the unreal, since then the Advaitins contradict themselves. In the very same way the falsity of the world, the distinction-less-ness of Brahman, etc. inevitably lead to the horns of a dilemma (E82-83).

"Further, how to distinguish between the *pāramārthika* and the *apāramārthika*? It cannot be said that the *pāramārthika sat* is being or the existent, and the *apāramārthika* is what is other than *sat*, for what is not existent can never be perceived, while the world, etc., are perceived. It cannot be said also that

the *pāramārthika* is what is never negated while the *apāramārthika* is what is negated–because the real nature of a superimposed object may not be negated, while Brahman may sometimes be the content of a negation, as, e.g., we say 'this is the world and not Brahman'. That is, if Brahman be possessed of attributes, etc. then those very attributes, etc. will be negated, but if He be attributeless, then He cannot be the remover of illusion, as shown above. Thus, no valid distinction is possible between the *pāramārthika* and the *apāramārthika* (E83).

"Further, how can we distinguish between the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhāsika*? It cannot be said that the *vyāvahārika* is due to *māyā* or cosmic ignorance, while the *prātibhāsika* is due to ignorance–for no hard and fast distinction can be made between *māyā* and ignorance, e.g. the magic of a juggler, who is *māyika*, is *prātibhāsika,* while the pains, etc. of the individual selves are (S159) *āvidyaka* yet *vyāvahārika.* It cannot be said also that the *vyāvahārika* is what leads to successful practical reaction while the *prātibhāsika* is what does not–for in dreams, a dream-pitcher may serve the purpose of fetching dream-water, but none would say the dream-pitcher is *vyāvahārika.* It cannot be said also that the *vyāvahārika* is what is negated by the knowledge of Brahman, while the *prātibhāsika* is what is negated by the knowledge of something else–for according to the Advaitins themselves the *prātibhāsika* silver too is negated by the knowledge of Brahman, and also the knowledge of Brahman alone is knowledge according to them. It cannot be said also that the *vyāvahārika* is what is negated by knowledge, while the *prātibhāsika* is what is negated by illusory awareness, for as shown above the knowledge of Brahman negates that also which is negated by illusory awareness, (i.e. the *prātibhāsika* negated by the *vyāvahārika*). It cannot be said also that the *vyāvahārika* is what is negated by the knowledge of pure Brahman while the *prātibhāsika* is what is negated by the knowledge of something else, for what is

meant by the term 'pure' here? It cannot stand for the locus of erroneous awareness, for if there be knowledge of pure Brahman there can be no error. As shown above again and again, the pure Brahman being essentially self-luminous, there can be no ignorance veiling Him, i.e. knowledge and ignorance being mutually contradictory and exclusive cannot possibly co-exist. Again, the term 'pure' cannot stand for Brahman without a second yet not *known* as such, i.e. the *upalakṣita* Brahman, for if the knowledge of the pure Brahman is to stand for that of the *upalakṣita* Brahman, then the Vedānta texts, concerned with the one without any distinction, must be taken to be concerned with distinctions. The same argument goes to refute the view that the *vyāvahārika* is what is negated by the knowledge of the great texts like 'thou art that', while the *prātibhāsika* is what is negated by the knowledge of something else,–for the great texts, being due to the Vedānta, concerned with a distinction-less object, must be free from distinctions, and as such cannot be negatory of the *vyāvahārika,* and if they refer to distinctions then those distinctions must be real. Hence it cannot br said also that the *vyāvahārika* is what is negated by knowledge which does not designate distinction, while the *prātibhāsika* is what is negated by knowledge which does so. Finally, it cannot be said that (p. 170) the *vyāvahārika* is what is negated by the *pāramārthika,* while the *prātibhāṣika* is what is negated by the *vyāvahārika,* for that is to assume the very thing to be explained (E83-84).

"We conclude, therefore, that there is no way of distinguishing between the *pāramārthika* and the *apāramārthika,* and between the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhñasika*,and hence the *sattātraividhyavāda* falls to the ground.

(C)Criticism of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda*

According to the docttrine of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* the entire universe is generated by perception only, i.e., a thing *is* so long

as it is *perceived*, e.g., the body of Devadatta who is sleeping does not exist in him, though it exists for Yajñadatta who is awake and is perceiving it. According to this view recognition is simply an error, like the perception 'this is that lamp', the fact being that the real lamp never persists for two consecutive moments.

"This view is evidently absurd. According to the Advaitins themselves, there are six things which are beginningless, viz., *jīva, īśvara,* pure *cit,* the distinction between the *jīva* and *īśvara,* ignorance and the connection between consciousness and ignorance. Hence, the universe being beginningless, must be permanent (E105).

"Further, if the entire universe be due to perception, then the effect, being of the form of perception only, cannot be said to be due to its own particular cause, e.g., we have to say that a pot is due to the perception of one who is perceiving it at that moment, and not to clay. But if an effect be not due to its cause, then the scriptural injunctions regarding the performance of sacrifices, etc., leading to heaven, or of hearing etc. leading to liberation, are simply meaningless. And the Advaitins themselves ought not to take food for allaying hunger, or utter words for making others understand their thoughts.

On this view, objects like pots, etc., have no existence beyond the particular perceptions of particular individuals, and this makes ordinary activity impossible. Thus, if the shell does not exist prior to being perceived, then when a man perceives 'this is a piece of silver' there is generated only silver and no shell, and hence the perception cannot be said to be a false perception due to the superimposition of the silver on the shell. Also, the awareness 'this is a piece of (S171) silver' and the awareness 'this is not a piece of silver' are concerned with different objects (i.e., the object of the first awareness is 'silver' because thing=perception, while the subject of the second awareness is not-silver), and hence the latter cannot negate the former. Also, this very negation of the illusory silver being itself

dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi , the illusory silver must be true.

"Further, if a mere perception gives rise to a pot, etc., that very perception, being *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi* like everything else, must be itself due to another perception, that to another perception and so on to infinity. The very doctrine of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* being itself *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭa*, must be false and hence things cannot be *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭa.*

"This doctrine also fails to explain the fact of recognition, such as 'this is that pot'. The example of a candle is not to the point, for a candle is being consumed, i.e. changed every moment, but not pots etc. Pots, etc., are permanent, and so too the perceiving self and this makes recognition and memory possible If everything be *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭa,* then the knowledge of non-dualism must also be so, and hence it cannot be negatory of the knowledge of plurality.

"If it be said that the following inference proves that the entire universe is *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭa*, viz.

The universe is *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭa,*
Because it is false,
Like dream objects,

then we reply that the example quoted is not correct, because dream objects are not false, being created by the Supreme Lord Himself (E107-109).

"In the very same manner, the universe too is real, being created by the Supreme Lord. The universe also leads to successful practical reaction and hence it must be real. It cannot be objected that mere leading to successful practical reactions is not a sure criterion of reality, seeing that often what is merely superimposed, viz. the (S172) illusory snake, etc., lead to successful practical reactions–for the very superimposition of a non-existent thing is not possible.

"The universe is real because it is protected by the Lord. Thus has the Lord a direct knowledge of the falsity of the world or not? If He has such a knowledge, then why should He have any inclination to protect it, and if He has not, then He cannot

be held to be omniscient. If it be said that a magician protects false objects, why not the Lord?, then we point out that the magician never does so-he simply shows actual entities which are past or in some other places through the power of gems, *mantras* etc., but never knows them directly nor protects them. But the Lord being omniscient cannot wish to protect what is false. Hence we conclude that the world is real, because it is created and protected by the Lord and leads to successful practical reactions, but is never *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭa* or generated by perception (E109-110).

20 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ (1890)

"Paṇḍita Amolakarāma. Śāstrī is the well known scholar and commentator of the Nimbārka school of Vedānta. He was the direct disciple of Svāminiśaraṇa, the immediate disciple of Svāmi Haridāsa of Vṛndāvana. Sudarśanācārya Śāstrī was his Vidyāguru. He was a Sanskrit teacher in the Śrī Raṅga-Lakṣmī Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya, Vṛndāvana (Mathura). He was a Gauḍa Brāhmaṇa, born in the district of Kurukṣetra (Hariyāṇā), in the village named Puṇḍarīka. His father's name was Śāligrāma Upādhyāya and his mother's Haripyārī Devī. His father was highly learned and pious. He always lived in Vṛndāvana, never left this place...He is supposed to have flourished in the end of 19th century A.D." All the works of Amolakarāma Śāstrī were published from Vṛndāvana." (Agrawal 2000l, pp. xxiv-xxv)

20.1 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ, *Bhāvadīpikā* on Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahmasūtra*

Edited by Madan Mohan Agrawal in Agrawal 2000, Volumes I-II.

20.2 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ, Commentary on Mādhava Mukunda's *Parapakṣagirivajra*

According to Agrawal 2000, Volume One, p. xxv, it is "a wonderful work written in *Navya-nyāyas'ailī*".

20.3 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ, *Candrikā* on Anantarāma's *Vedāntaratnamālā*

Noted in Agrawal 200, Volume One, p. xxv.

20.4 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ, *Tattvaprakaśikās* on eight Upaniṣads beginning with the *Iśopaniṣad*

Three (those on the *Iśa, Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Śvetāśvatara,* are mentioned in Agrawal 2000, Volume One, p. xxv.

20.5 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ, *Tattvaprakāśikā* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-* and *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣads*

20.6 AMOLAKARĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ, *Tattvaprakāśikā* on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*

21.1 AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1914?) , *Adhyātmasudhātaraṅgiṇī* on Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava's *Vedāntakārikā*

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22.1 SANTADĀSA VRAJAVIDEHĪ (1935), *Vedāntasubodhinī* on Nimbārka's *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha*

Published by Sudhir Gopal Mukhopadhyay, Daulatpur and printed at Allahabad, 1929; Daulatpur 1930, 1932

22.2 SANTADĀSA VRAJAVIDEHI, *Bhedābhedadvaitādvaita-siddhānta*
Published from Banaras in 1935.

23.1 LADITIŚARAṆĪ (1937), *Subodhinī* on Nimbārka's *Daśaślokī*
Published Vṛndāvan 1937

24.1 BHAGĪRATHA MAITHILI JHĀ (1935)
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SBS = Śrīkaṇṭha, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*

SS = S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *The Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha.* Madras: University of Madras, 1972

TV = *Theistic Vedānta* (ed. R. Balasubramaniam). History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in IndianCivilization (Gen Ed. D.P. Chattopadhyaya) II, part 3 (Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2003)

VK = *Vedāntakaustubha* of Śrīnivāsa

VKP = *Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā*

VPS = *Vedāntapārijātasaurabha* of Nimbārka

VPSVK = *The Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha of Nimbārka and Vedānta-kaustubha of Śrīnivāsa (Commentaries on the Brahma-Sūtras)* translated by Roma Bose. Bibliotheca Indica Work No. 259 (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1940) Volumes I-II have the translation; Volume III is a book by Ms. Bose concerning the system of Nimbārka and his followers.

WZKSOA = Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens (Wien)

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This is only a partial index; English translations of Sanskrit terms provided here are limited to a portion of those which actually appear in the text.

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